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

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THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION : ISSUES OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS

By C. RAJA MOHAN* AND C. VISHNU MOHAN**

The international debate on information and communication became intense and acrimonious by the end of the 1970s. The publication of the Macbride Commission Report in 1980 was the high water-mark in this debate.[1] Throughout the 1970s, the developing countries had been pressing for a new world order on information and communication as part of their struggle for a new international economic order. In the Third World, the public debate in general has been limited to issues of imbalances in the flow of international news dominated by the big four international news agencies (AP, Reuter, AFP and UPI), the efforts of the non-aligned countries to create a newspool, etc. However, the rapid strides in the field of microelectronics and its marriage to the developments in space technology has posed a number of intractable problems before the Third World, besides the issue of newsflow. The most important international fallout of the new developments in technology is the issue of transborder data flows (TDF).[2] The international legal, political and economic implications of data flows across national frontiers are increasingly acquiring greater significance.

At the outset, it is essential to comprehend what the enthusiasts have been terming as the "information revolution," the coming of the "age of information" and the "information society."[3] The computer has introduced limitless possibilities for the storage, integration, analysis and accessibility of vast quantities of information. Thanks to the developments in the technology of the silicon chip—which have made possible very large scale integration of electronic circuiting onto a small chip of silicon—the computer has become more powerful, much smaller and cheaper. The advances of satellite communication technology have enabled the instantaneous movement of vast quantities of information between any two points on the earth. The convergence of these two areas—computing and communications—has led to what is now called "communications" or "telematics." (The words "informatics" or "information" are more popular.) This convergence has removed the earlier constraints of distance and costs of transmission in setting up international information networks. Tremendous concurrent advances in semiconductors, lasers, optical fibres, and electronic digitalisation offer seemingly endless and revolutionary possibilities in computer power and transmission of information. The automated "office of the future," personal and home computers, interactive

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home communication systems, a wide range of voice and video casette equipment, and many other exotic devices are increasingly coming into daily use in the major industrialized countries.[4] Many of the *Fortune 500* companies in the United States, which have been involved in manufacturing industrial products or data processing equipment are expanding into this high-growth information sector. The IBM, Exxon, Xerox, Chase Manhattan, General Electric, RCA, Aetna Insurance, Columbia Broadcasting Service have moved into information industries in a big way and are shaping its future.[5] Besides the large corporate actors, a number of small entrepreneurial endeavours by professionals are also on the scene.

Traditionally, the vendors of data processing and telecommunication equipment and services have restricted themselves to their respective specialities. The blurring boundaries among communications technologies are creating new definitions of traditional markets and distribution channels, and new conflicts among the established producers of information.[6] Telephone companies, such as the privately owned ATT in the United States and the many government-run post and telecommunication monopolies in Europe, are worried about rapid growth in private-company-leased line data traffic, impending satellite services using roof-top antennas (Direct Broadcast Satellite), the home video market (Viewdata and Teletext), electronic message switching and other new services wrought by modern electronics. IBM has launched Satellite Business Systems (SBS), Control Data has CYBERNET, and various other companies are branching out into providing equipment to facilitate link-ups and better utilize telecommunication possibilities. Publishers and broadcasting companies increasingly perceive themselves as part of the information industry and are moving in to capture new areas of data and information markets. Micrographics and electronic newspapers are showing the great potential of electronic publishing. The possibilities of "electronic mail" within and between large corporations would see the bypassing of established postal systems in the world. The increasing use of "electronic fund transfer" (EFT) and computerised personal and corporate banking in the global financial networks has reduced money to a form of data stored in a computer and moved via satellites.[7]

Technological developments in micro-electronics and telecommunications have at once generated new forces of production and encapsulated a number of older ones. As it subsumes a number of older, hitherto diverse activities such as printing, publishing, broadcasting, cultural artefact production, communications, data processing, banking, education, and the entire service sector in general, the information industry is now estimated to be one of the largest industries in the advanced countries. According to some estimates of the information industry in the United States, it accounted for more than half the United States GNP in 1979. While such estimates are based on questionable definitions, they crudely indicate a real contemporary trend.[8] As the production, distribution, storage, and processing of information

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assume a new place of importance in today's world, it is increasingly being realized that information, however intangible it is, is a commodity like any other. The value and importance of information is threefold:

1. Information collection, management, and distribution today consume a sizeable proportion of the financial and human capital of government and business organizations; this portion could significantly increase in the future.
2. Information has become a product and a commodity to be packaged and marketed and, as such information can be valued, bought and sold.
3. Information constitutes a national resource to which regulatory policies relating to taxation, security, sovereignty and socio-cultural values may be attached.[9]

The emergence of information as a commodity has brought about the awareness regarding the power of information. "Information is power and economic information is economic power. Information has an economic value and the ability to store and process certain types of data may well give one country political and technological advantage over other countries. This in turn may lead to a loss of national sovereignty through supranational data flows."[10]

TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS

The flow of data and information, and their storage, across the boundaries of nation-states have posed a number of serious policy challenges before governments giving rise to a host of political, economic and legal questions at the international level. Hitherto, in the international debate about the new world information and communication order, the chief concern has been with the imbalances in the flow of news and print, broadcast, film and other tools of mass communication. In the area of transborder data flows (TDF), the concern is with the problems of "data flight" from sovereign states. The marriage of computers and telecommunications has led to increasing mobility of data and information which could be transferred, retrieved, copied and utilised in those countries leading to the information technology boom.

For example, the airlines' booking systems for internal domestic flights of many European countries (including Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia), depend upon a computer situated in Texas-USA. All the information required by the fire departments of Sweden is kept in a special data base in Florida. The personnel records of most transnational companies are held in the country where the company has its headquarters.[11] There are several other reasons why data is passed from one country to another. The most important of these is the nature of the dispersed international operations of the multinational corporation,

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Electronic communications now play a crucial role in facilitating the daily operations, decisions, planning and record-keeping of a few thousand companies that are engaged in production, distribution and marketing in nations around the globe. The merging of computer and communication technologies is transforming the way in which MNCs operate. Today a MNC can collect data on its operations and personnel from all parts of the world, and almost instantaneously transmit such data to a single location for storage, processing and use. This provides the central management of these companies current information for decision-making on a scale which was never possible before. Plant siting and production, prices, raw material supply, currency holding and investment decisions can now be made centrally and transmitted at once to company branches all over the world. For system-wide use, the international banking industry provides similar services and facilities. Global computer and communication networks are relied upon heavily for these tasks. Private international communication networks, run by individual banks and by groups of banks, are transmitting billions of financial transactions and data annually.[12]

A supreme example of the threat to national sovereignty from trans-border data flows is seen in the case of the computerized banking system called SWIFT (Society for World Information Financial Transactions). This system allows finance houses to buy and sell in a single world market and to make loans anywhere and at any time. It means that money can be moved around the world with great rapidity and without any physical or legal hindrance. SWIFT holds 300,000 transactions at a time, some of considerable size beyond all national control. The system is run by a computer which generates a kind of "stateless money," hurling it around the globe potentially creating international currency instability as it moves. If SWIFT acquired large sums it could bring catastrophe to struggling currencies in the course of an evening. In the hands of a hostile power (a government or a MNC intent on taking retribution on a small country attempting, say, to substitute local manufactures for cheaper imports), SWIFT could be a devastating tool. Besides increasing the velocity of international money and causing currency and stock fluctuations, such devices could create a kind of electronic "free port" where funds can be placed in unregulated markets.[13] Most countries are yet to come to grips with these problems.

The furtherance of the hegemony of the MNCs and "free enterprise" in general requires the greater use of computer communications. The United States Defence establishment is today one of the largest users of computer communications. In the Pentagon's command and control structures, and in formulation of war (including nuclear war) strategies, computer and satellite communication has become crucial. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration as part of its unprecedented militarization is strengthening and modernizing its military bases and communication facilities all around the globe. The security, political and legal implications for those countries which

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have allowed communication bases to the United States and consequent integration through TDF into the US military strategy are only now being recognized.[14] The new satellite and computer technologies also facilitate detailed surveillance of the nations of the world by collecting, transmitting, processing the intelligence secured from numerous spy satellites orbiting the earth. Alongwith the surveillance and military communications functions —the "law and order" machinery of global domination—some satellites supply detailed, continental natural resource information, the most useful of which finds its way directly or circuitously, to the research and planning units of the big mining, mineral and agribusiness corporations.

Evidently transborder data flows are of inestimable value to the MNCs and their support structures: the banks, market research firms, advertising agencies, travel companies and the international armed forces of domination. The new communication technology creates unprecedented opportunities for the MNCs to strengthen their international operations. It also permits the advanced industrial states to maintain their ascendancy in the world system, and allows them to keep the underdeveloped countries performing less sophisticated work assignments. For this reason, there is determination among the Western decision-makers that the information industries—computer and telecommunications equipment manufacture, data processing and information services—be developed rapidly. (At the same time there is a great tussle going on between America and other Western nations which are fighting against American domination of the information industry.) The expectation is that this will permit the continuation of the familiar heirarchical international division of labour, with the already advanced industrial nations shifting another notch upward in the scale, while the newly industrializing states put their efforts into older industries.

The transborder data flow from one country to another, driven by computer/telecommunication networks, have hitherto been considered in a technical context rather than in terms of their application and socio-political impact. Increasingly however, the concerns expressed by various nations and international organizations deal with the content of messages rather than just the medium of communication involved. In this way an entirely new set of information issues has emerged. Two alarming facts of life are how facing national governments. The first is that whereas laws stop at national boundaries, data based on modern technology knows no borders. A second is the tremendous difficulty that exists in even finding out the contents of messages which cross borders electronically. In the following sections some of the legal and politico-economic issues of TDF would be discussed.

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LEGAL ISSUES OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW

The international legal problems arising out of TDF fall intot hree categories. The first relates to concerns for national sovereignty and cultural identity resulting from the aggregation of transborder electronic traffic and information flow. The second refers to the problems of administration of the affairs of the state. The territorial foundation of national jurisdiction and hence of regulatory law is the immediate source of frustration for a country hoping to exercise control over the storage and data beyond its own borders. Third is the set of problems related to the rights of the individual and the legal difficulties that might arise in his/her attempt to redress wrongs in respect of personal data about him stored abroad.[15]

National Sovereignty

The issue of national sovereignty is the most recurring theme in the debate about international communications in general. The rapid developments in communication technology and their control by a few, are working towards the erosion of national sovereignty of the weaker states in the international system.[16] The issues of transborder data flow has heightened concerns about the very concept of nationhood; technology facilitating TDF it is feared would negate the possibility of secure nationhood for any who permit the unquestioned flow of data across the borders. Accumulation, storage and processing of data are part of decision-making, the effectiveness of which depends to a growing degree on access to massive amounts of data, which are manageable only when computerized. The physical location of computerized data would then appear to be an important factor in regulating access to them and therefore in affecting decision-making ability. The fact that 90 per cent of all the information in the world held in data bases is located in the United States, is the underlying basis for concerns of national sovereignty.[17] For example, the transfer of Canadian data to American data banks would mean, potentially at least, that Americans would have the means to make decisions about Canadians that depend on that data. Conversely to the extent that Canadians lack data about themselves, they would be unable to make decisions about their future. "This can result in a national self-perception of impotence, an inability to effect one's vital choices and the effective erosion of one's political sovereignty."[18]

Issues of cultural identity are also seen as related to the computerized, extra-territorial decision-making process. It has been argued that to the extent that a loss of political power results from the loss of data control, national identity succumbs to imposed cultural values, tastes and attitudes, resulting from the totality of extra-national decisions to which it submits; that is, the extraterritorial exercise of power forces acceptance of cultural norms which the use of that power would reflect. The extraterritorial storage of

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data has also given rise to concern about the "vulnerability" of computerised societies. If a country allows much of the basic data concerning its business, economy and administration to be stored in another country, thus requiring remote accessing through communications systems, what would happen if the data base or communication system of the foreign state suffered a catastrophic failure or sabotage?[19]

The skewed-up flows of data across national borders has given rise to thorny international legal problems. The multiplicity of international actors —nation states, international organizations, multinational enterprises—has further complicated the legal tangle. These actors engaged in international computer communications perceive advantages in pursuing either "exclusive" or "inclusive" policies over the access, content and use of transborder data flows. "Competition between the exclusive interests of information control and the inclusive interests of unrestricted transfer of information across national boundaries is the taproot of the controversy."[20] Inclusive interests consist of principles, practices and policies grouped under the general term "free flow of information." These policies promote increased sharing, use and exchange of transborder data flows. Principles, practices and policies that represent exclusive interests are grouped under the term "sovereignty over information," and promote controlled use, restricted access, conservation, denial and decreased transfer of data across borders.

States and Domestic Regulation

The curious problems of computerized data traffic and storage are clearly recognisable when its impact on domestic regulatory processes are assessed. The most apparent source of difficulty arises from the territorial limitations of public law. Storage and processing of data beyond the territorial limits of a nation-state necessarily hampers the exercise of state control over the data, unless it is permitted by means of some form of bilateral or multilateral agreement. The foreign location of data, irrespective of the motives for storing data in a foreign country, renders domestic regulation of such data virtually impossible. There is also the possibility that "data havens" would emerge, similar to "tax havens", with sensitive data being shipped to countries without data protection laws.[21] There is also the possibility of electronic tax evasion. Computer service networks can bill a client in whichever country suits his fiscal circumstances.[22] Domestic regulation would also be difficult in areas of monetary policy where aggregated data is necessary for determining credit levels. Thus domestic public control would be frustrated in a number of policy areas.

Regulatory problems may also arise in relation to domestic legal procedures. Data storage abroad poses problems regarding the production of data as evidence in court, either by subpoena or warrant. Since data is subject to the law of the place where it is stored, a foreign jurisdiction can

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apply its own laws of evidence or confidentiality to prohibit its production, even if no such prohibition applies in the laws of the state seeking access. Concerns about data havens become more understandable in this context; one has only to look at the total inaccessibility of information about bank deposits in some European states. Here the possibilities of "data extradition", and "*habeas data*" are being talked about.

Rights of Individuals

Another aspect of TDF often discussed is, of course, its impact on the civil rights of individuals as "data subjects." This has usually been examined in the context of privacy, computers and other information systems. The increase in computer-aided data processing has produced a fundamental change in records management and use, and a corresponding need to enlarge the scope of privacy rights. The familiar notions of statutory protection against unreasonable search and seizure, which were sufficient in the 19th century when whatever records one maintained were likely to be located at home or some other physical setting controlled by the individual, are clearly inadequate in the advanced societies today when many personal records are created, held and used by large institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and most importantly, governments. Vital decisions affecting citizens' lives are usually made by such distant and impersonal institutions on the basis of personal records whose existence and contents are often unknown to the citizens and whose use or misuse is just beyond their economic and legal control.[23]

Issues of civil liberties and privacy of individuals take on an added dimension in the light of extra-territorial storage of data and TDF. When an individual's rights in respect of personal data stored in an automated data bank arise from obligations imposed upon data bank operators, the law of the place of data, and not the law of the domicile of the data subject tends to apply. Such rights might consist of a right of personal access, verification, and challenge, and possibly some measure of control in determining the extent of the dissemination of that data. But divergence between domestic and foreign law could nullify the civil rights of data subjects. More complications could emerge when a data bank is located in a foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding the rigours of domestic law. Besides the issues stemming from the gulf between domestic and foreign law, the problem of distance raises a number of questions relating to redress of privacy violations in a foreign jurisdiction. Would a plaintiff have to travel to a foreign jurisdiction in order to bring action against the operator of a data bank? Would he/she have any standing before the foreign court? Alternatively, in cases where foreign law may endow the court of a plaintiff's domicile with competence, what is the applicable law? And what rules of evidence apply?[24]

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Resistance to Information Hegemony of the United States

Underlying the legal issues of TDF posed in abstract, is the simmering struggle against the preponderant American information hegemony, being challenged by other developed countries of the West, and to a lesser extent by the Third World. The challenge to the American hegemony in the information industry has virtually become a fight against the IBM. Standing like a colossus over the United States information industry, the IBM has become a global force. Its debut in space age communications system through the SBS would make it even more powerful. It has been noted that the vast bulk of automated data bases are located in the Uinted States and most data flows consist of storage of data in the latter country and its manipulation by its firms for others.

The growing controversy over TDF issues which began primarily with concern over personal privacy and individual rights is beginning to reveal several other areas of economic and commercial concern. The United States domination in the information industry has caused considerable apprehensions in Canada, Japan and Western Europe.[25] These countries have considerable investments in information and communication technologies and view the American dominance with alarm. The future trade advantages in capturing the burgeoning information market around the world, are pushing Canada, Japan and Western Europe to protect domestic markets and encourage domestic industry. The fears of these countries have been well documented in France, Canada and Sweden.

In France, there was the celebrated report—*L'Informatisation de la Societe* (also called the Nora-Minc Report)—in June 1978.[26] The report catalogued in detail French fears about the role of the Uinted States in computing, data processing and telecommunications. It made a strong case for France regaining its own destiny in the area of informatics; it was pointed that the *"informatisation"* of society would have serious consequences for France, socially, economically and culturally. Foreign firms, primarily IBM, must not be allowed to be instruments of foreign, primarily US, dominance. It also recommended restructuring of post, telephone and telegraph (PTT) administrations so that the telecommunications portion could be redirected to interact closely with other high technology areas. Another important assertion was that mastery of electronic component technologies was essential for national independence. The Nora-Minc Report represents the initiation of a serious French commitment to information independence.

The Canadians too have highlighted the need for building a domestic industry in information technology. In 1980, the Canadian Deputy Minister of Communications, Bernard Ostry reaffirmed Canada's determination to avoid becoming a passive consumer of knowledge and information: "If a country allows all its vital data on business, economy and culture to be stored outside its borders, it becomes alarmingly dependent on the integrity and reliability of foreign enterprises that provide its computer services."[27]

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A large number of Canadian firms in the fields of banking, insurance, mining, consumer industries store and process their data in the United States. The Canadian Government has highlighted the effects of such data flow on its employment and the economy; dependence on the United States resulted in loss of revenue to the tune of $150 to $300 m in 1976, according to an estimate by the Department of Communications, Canada. Further, this practice cost Canadians 30,000 to 40,000 jobs through either loss or lack of creation.[28] It has also been suggested that if this trend continued unchecked, it could result by 1985 in some $1.5 billion worth of Canadian computing services being displaced by work performed in the United States. It was estimated that over the same time about 25,000 directly related data processing jobs could be established in the United States to meet Canadian requirements. Another estimate puts the total number of jobs involved at 100,000 by 1985.[29]

REGULATION OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS

The potential deleterious impact of transborder data flows on employment, the economy and the development and utilization of advanced information technologies has led a number of developed countries to consider the imposition of restrictions, including taxation, on data flows across national frontiers. However, the curious and intangible nature of trade in information would make it very difficult to devise and enforce restrictions. A large number of developed countries—Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland—have adopted national laws for data protection. So far most of the national legislation is concerned with personal privacy issues.

These legislations have a number of common features. Nearly all of them place restrictions on the export of personal data and usually demand the existence of comparable laws in the recipient country. There are limitations on the length of time data can be stored and regulations on secondary use, sharing and dissemination of data. The European approach has been to create a new government agency, empowering it to draw rules and regulations and giving it broad powers over data processing agencies. They also emphasise the need for a binding international treaty to deal with data exchanges between nation states.[30]

A number of international organizations are also seized of the issues relating to TDF. The OECD set up an intergovernmental working party on information, computer and communications policies (ICCP), for studying the social and economic implications of TDF. The working party prepared draft guidelines to harmonize various national efforts in the personal privacy area.[31] The Council of Europe has also been active in this area. It has proposed a convention on international data protection. The convention commits the ratifying states to enact a legislation requiring that personal

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data be lawfully obtained, accurate and relevant and that its use be restricted to approved purposes. Any information recorded on race, politics, religion, health, sexual behaviour and criminality is subject to extra safeguards, although the convention may be overridden in extreme cases involving state security, public fraud and crime.[32] The United States was invited to participate in drafting the treaty with the further option of acceding to its terms if agreeable. However, it refused to participate citing "free flow" considerations.

The official policy of the United States has been elaborated in a policy statement on international communication submitted to the Congress in 1979. The document clearly describes national security, political, economic and technological interests that the United States has as the leading exporter of communication and information equipment worth $5 billion a year. "Our economic interest is obvious. Our industrial base relies on adequate communications; large corporations have become increasingly dependent on world-wide computer circuits. Moreover, USA is the world's largest producer and consumer of telecommunications equipment and services."[33] An inter-agency task force on TDF research and policy co-ordination chaired by the Department of State and National Telecommunications and Information Administration has been set up to formulate US positions in the OECD. This task force has been charged with the objective of assuring access to US MNCs, to efficient information systems and opportunities to market internationally data processing and data bank services.[34]

The official United States policy reflects the general sense of uneasiness about the motives of the European data protection laws. The data protection laws passed in the name of personal privacy are seen in the United States as a mere facade to protect domestic economic interests and caused by frustration resulting from the long American lead in the field of computer communications. The Americans argue that the European data protection medicine might prove more deadly than the malady it was intended to cure.[35] American trade associations in the field of information are exerting considerable pressure on the government to oppose any restrictive regimes on transborder data flows.[36] In spite of the intensifying "data wars" among the developed countries,[37] a trend of tie-ups between American and European firms in the information industry is also in the offing. American SBS has been looking around to internationalise its operations. It has started negotiations with the French Telecommunication Authority whose satellite Telecom I is compatible with SBS space systems. SBS is also negotiating with the British Telecommunication Authority and British Aerospace.[38]

THE THIRD WORLD AND TDF

The vast majority of the information resources—both natural and industrial—are controlled by a tiny section of mankind. Modern information technologies, generated by a handful of developed countries, enable their

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users to acquire, hold and to retrieve information more efficiently than ever before. Knowledge regarding mineral resources, atmosphere, market conditions or technology itself provide the nations and companies which have it with enormous advantages in the global system. Indeed the information-backwardness of the developing countries cripples them in their struggle for a new international economic order.

The case of the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979 (WARC-79) at which complex technical arguments over the allocation of the frequencies of the radio spectrum were carried out, is an apt example where the Third World's information impotence led to its inability to technically argue out a just case. The basic argument of the Third World was that the radio frequency spectrum was a capacity of nature and hence the property of entire mankind. Its allocation therefore should be equitable and not monopolised by a few developed nations. The United States, strongly opposed to this, successfully managed to retain its hegemony over the use of the spectrum by taking recourse to complex technical arguments. The American delegation to WARC-79 had a staff of more than 100 compared with one or two from some of the smaller countries. Nearly a 1,000 people had been involved in preparing the US proposals for this conference. It mapped out with its formidable computer expertise a negotiating position covering the entire spectrum from I hertz to 387 gigahertz, with a complex set of fall-back positions. The delegation had also collected all-known facts concerning the stand of the other delegations. The entire information could be held on line and retrieved in a few monents. This tremendous information base provided the United States the power to shape the conference.[39] This is also true of other international negotiations in various issue-areas. According to a study, "Discussions on the reform of the international monetary system, or on the allocation of resources of the sea and space have thus often been pre-empted by the more powerful nations, leaving the developing countries with only a 'yes, but...' role or encouraging them to politicize issues as a substitute for the technical arguments which they did not possess."[40]

The fundamental issue, however, arising from the new information technology and transborder flow of data is the certain possibility of centralization and control of information in the traditional centers of global power, reinforcing the dependence of the Third World on the West and its multinationals. The new information technologies and the global context of their use could seriously erode the already fragile sovereignty of the nascent nation-state in the Third World in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Unhindered data flows across the borders while strengthening MNCs would weaken the developing nations. Availability and quality of information is one of the key elements of the power of MNCs, and the structure of modern MNCs is information-dependent.[41] The ability of MNCs to appropriate information is perhaps as important as its R & D capacity and the control it exercises over markets and technology.[42] The power of MNCs rests as

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much upon their capacity to marshall and control information and knowledge in a proprietary way as much as their dominance in directly productive activities. Information handling capacity which provides the MNCs considerable economic and political leverage in their interaction with LDCs is concentrated in the West. Much of the information which is gathered, processed and stored for retrieval is not available, easily and cheaply, to the developing countries.

Remote Sensing and National Sovereignty

Modern remote sensing technology illustrates in a dramatic fashion the loss of sovereignty in the Third World resulting from modern information and communications technologies. Carried on for a number of years, originally with high altitude aircraft and now by satellites, remote sensing techniques are utilized to survey the earth and its diverse features, including agriculture, forestry, hydrology, oceanography and mineral resources. Computer and data systems store and process the large amount of data secured. It is only those nations capable of making and launching remote sensing satellites and equally capable of processing electronically the data derived from the satellites that occupy a totally privileged position, for raw data is not of much use. The differential capacity to sense the earth and interpret the data has placed the developing countries at a serious disadvantage. At present only the United States NASA's *Landset* series of satellites have the ability to comprehensively map the planetary resources. On the basis of its supremacy over remote sensing technology the Uinted States has already developed large data bases on the natural resources of developing nations; the knowledge derived from this unilateral capability permits it to secure a comprehensive inventory of the physical characteristics of any nation regardless of that state's willingness to have such a geographical profile developed. Moreover, it allows the United States to process that data for whichever purpose it may desire, without the consent of the nation sensed.

The United States has made available (at a nominal price) the raw data obtained from remote sensing to any nation which requested it. However, very few developing countries are in a position to process and utilize it. On the other hand the major US transnationals dealing in minerals and agricultural commodities have formed themselves into user committees of satellite information.[43] Thus when a developing country deals with these US transnationals on the global market, the knowledge of the MNCs about the resources of the developing country is far superior to the information of the country about its own resources.

Remote sensing poses two issues both affecting national sovereignty. First, there is the basic inviolability of national space. Remote sensing is indifferent to this national prerogative. Second, there is the unequal capability to use the data derived from remote sensing; undoubtedly, the advanced

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countries can use remote-sensing technology to increase their political and economic power relative to the weaker countries. Knowledge of likely oil deposits, projections of crop yields and better estimates of mineral concentrations can help the governments and multinationals of the developed countries make better judgements and bids in the international markets. The growing usefulness of remote sensing technology has made the US corporations to push for shifting the LANDSAT system from under NASA to private ownership. The French too are seeking to enter the market for remotely sensed data. They have recently formed a company SPOT-IMAGE to acquire and sell remotely sensed data.

The developing countries correctly apprehend that in future they might virtually lose control over their own natural resources, for at the global level there are very few rules governing the gathering and dissemination of data on natural resources. The orbiting cameras in space are "visa-less" and bypass national authority.[44] At the present time remote-sensing technology is an American monopoly. The primary data is available to all takers. However, the processed data is treated as proprietary information. The developing countries have been demanding at the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) a set of norms and rules which would ensure the sovereignty of the developing nations. However, the United States, has been obstructing this process in the name of "free flow of information."[45]

Towards Information Autonomy in the Third World

The issues of informatics in general and transborder data flows in particular, are yet to attain an important place in the agenda before the Third World. A few countries have indeed taken halting measures in restricting transborder data flows. Brazil now requires the registration of foreign data links, not so much in order to control the data content, but help facilitate local data processing services and to strengthen its informatics industry. Venezuela embargoes the external movement of data related to oil production and Mexico has made foreign flows of information of Mexican origin subject to rules and regulations on grounds of national interest.[46] However, most of the developing countries are yet to formulate coherent policies with regard to transborder data flows. Moreover, it is necessary to formulate policies regarding TDF in the overall context of the assessment of the relevance of information technology to the developing countries. The inclusion of informatics in research and action related to domestic development and its external dimensions is essential. Whatever progress is made in redressing inequalities in international news exchange (the only area in which the developing countries have taken some comprehensive action), without self-reliance and sovereign control in the expanding informatics field, equality and independence will remain diplomatic phrases.

The Inter-governmental Bureau of Informatics (IBI) has been the major

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international organisation working towards the creation of the informatics industry in the Third World. Originally formed as the International Computation Centre (ICC), under the auspices of UNESCO, it served the computing needs of the Third World, when very few computers existed in the world. The proliferation of data processing equipment led to modification of the objectives of ICC. The IBI was born in 1974 and it currently handles a variety of informatics projects for its member countries, which include a large number of developing countries.

The IBI's 1978 Conference at Torremolinos, Spain, on Strategies and Policies for Informatics (SPIN), argued for clear universal access to and implementation of informatics, while recognising the current limitations on money, manpower and infrastructure necessary to close the development gap. The major recommendation of the conference was that developing countries

> should recognise the necessity for a national informatics policy with a view to introducing a comprehensive strategy which should be planned with regard to: the definition of application priorities; the elaboration of a policy governing action to be taken in the matter of acquiring informatics equipment, the drawing up of programmes for training technical and administrative specialists; the formulation of a coherent studies and research policy; and the setting up of a national informatics industry for both software and hardware.[47]

The IBI is launching its second SPIN Conference to be held at Havana in June 1983. The IBI has set SPIN II a target of raising $1,000 million over five years. The fund is broadly intended to assist the development of informatics in the Third World.

The urgency for the creation of a general policy for the development of informatics is felt only in a few nations of the Third World, notably Brazil and India. In India, space technology grew rapidly in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s with some spectacular achievements—launching of SLV-3, Bhaskhara series of remote sensing satellites, APPLE and INSAT-I. However, the computer and electronics technology, the other major component of modern information technology, has been unable to keep pace with world developments. There was indeed an Indian policy of strict centralised control over the import of electronics technology. This protectionist barrier was not however, matched by an effective policy to develop R & D and industrial capabilities in modern micro-electronics. Pressures are now building up to liberalise the import of electronics technology and thus stymie even the existing domestic capabilities in computers and electronics.

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APPRAISAL

Our rather cursory look at the information revolution has shown the enormous importance of the technology of informatics. The problem of TDF could be the thin end of the wedge of a whole range of problems surrounding the emergence of information technology. Our analysis of TDF reveals the great threat to national sovereignty in the Third World in the political, economic, strategic and cultural spheres. In India, there is an urgent need to formulate coherent and comprehensive policies for the development of the informatics technology, and grappling with the problems of TDF has to be part of that. Moreover, the national policy regarding informatics would have to be extremely judicious. In the West, the spectre of unemployment haunts the rapid growth of microelectronics and information technologies. In a developing country like India, if the introduction of informatics is not judicious, it could aggravate unemployment problems.

The Third World in general, and India in particular, would therefore have to grapple with the problems of transborder data flows at both international and domestic levels. At the global level to resist the threat to national sovereignty, the need for a comprehensive national legislation regulating the flow of information and data across our borders is immediate. Viable technical mechanisms would have to be devised to keep a track of and have control over the transborder data traffic generated by multinational corporations. India and other advanced Third World nations should strive at the global level to devise an appropriate regime on transborder data flows. Efforts to build such a regime would have to mesh in with the drive to construct an equitable regime on outer space and the establishment of a new world information and communication order.

Such a global strategy on TDF would have to be complemented with a domestic effort for the development of informatics, the key function of which would be to ensure that the developing countries are not critically dependent on the West for their computing and data processing needs. Such a strategy would make it imperative to have a clear assessment of the relevance of rapidly advancing informatics technology to the needs of the Third World. A national informatics policy thus needs to clearly identify the specific sectors and the extent to which informatics could be applied without engendering social tensions, through labour displacement. Given the character of informatics technology, the policy framework must therefore be integrated with the strategies to develop space, microelectronics and computer technologies in a self-reliant manner. This is not an easy task because the above technologies are highly sophisticated and the industrial infrastructure in the developing countries is backward, weak and fragile. It is also essential to create new institutional mechanisms to pursue the development of informatics. Where such mechanisms exist (the National Informatics Centre at New Delhi, India), they need to be expanded and strengthened. These new institutions would also be burdened with the task

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of coordinating the wide range of governmental and non-governmental entities involved in the production, dissemination and use of informatics. These include the modern sectors in the government such as electronics, space and the older governmental institutions like Post and Telegraph, Communication, Information and Broadcasting, Census bureaus, statistical bureaus, etc. The private sector is also involved in a major way. The problem of devising a national informatics policy is indeed a tall order and it cannot be solved unless initiative comes from the highest political levels of decision-making in the Third World.

March 1982.

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THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM

By C. EDWIN GILMOUR*

"You can never plan the future by the past."—Edmund Burke

A central theme of contemporary literature on American political parties—a theme with a broad consensus that is uncommon in the discipline—is that the party system of the United States is in transition due to significant changes within the past two decades that distinguish the operation of today's party system from what it was before 1960. *However, consensus is lacking as to the implications of these changes for the future status of the American party system.*

This paper has four broad objectives: 1. *to review briefly the phenomenon of party re-alignment in American history as a useful perspective on the present party era;* 2. *to identify and discuss significant alterations in the party system since* 1960; 3. *to note various scenarios in the literature concerning the future of the party system in 'the United States and* 4. *to hazard a personal assessment of the scenarios as to their plausibility and probability.*

I
EARLY AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS[1]

American electoral history is often divided by political historians into five "party systems," each distinguishable from the other either by different existing political parties or by different competitive relationships of the existing parties. The transition from one party system to another has been marked commonly by a re-aligmment, sudden or secular.

The First Party System, 1788-1824

The first party era[2] began with the election of George Washington as the first Federalist President in 1788, when the new Constitution became operative. During the second administration of Washington, 1793-1797, an opposing faction developed within the Congress under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson, and in 1800, Jefferson was elected as the first President of the Republican-Democrats. When the latter party was also successful in the three succeeding presidential contests, the Federalist Party disappeared. In the ensuing period—1816 to 1824—also known as "the era of good feeling," the Republican-Democrats were unchallenged.

The central issue that divided the Federalist and Republican-Democrat parties was the attitude of their supporters towards the central government.

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The Federalists, dominated by the commercial and financial interests of the more populous northeast, favoured a strong national government with enhanced powers. The Jeffersonians, representing the farmers and rural dwellers of the South and the artisans and other workers of the northern cities, resented the aristocratic tendencies of the Federalists and called for more power for the states.

These first national political parties represented and channelled the emerging pluralism of the new nation and offered choices and vehicles for political participation to the electorate. By developing effective organization at the state and local levels, the Republican-Democrats became the first "modern" political party, based on broad grass-roots support among the voting population, rather than being a mere faction in the national Congress, as was the case with the Federalists.[3]

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The Second Party System, 1824-1860

Party competition reappeared with the factionalizing of the dominant Republican-Democrat Party in the 1824 elections; in the elections of 1828, there emerged from this renewed competition the Whigs, representing substantially the same constituencies as the former Federalists and the Democrats, so renamed from the earlier Republican-Democrats and led by the war hero of the battle of New Orleans in 1814, Andrew Jackson. These two parties competed for national power fairly until the 1850's; this period was characterized by increased mass participation and strengthened party organization spurred by party competition.

The salient issue of slavery made it difficult for the existing two parties to cope with the severe sectional differences within their ranks; when the Whigs and the Democrats temporized and compromised about this issue third parties appeared to recognize the insistent demand in the North for the abolition of slavery. One of these, the Republican Party, with the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, replaced the exhausted Whigs as the second dominant party.

The Third Party System, 1860-1896

The intense conflicts preceding and following the Civil War resulted in a basic regional re-alignment of party identifiers and supporters, with the older Democratic Party dominant in the South and the new Republican Party dominant in the North. But this regional pattern of partisanship was substantially softened by a measurable amount of support from each party in both regions. The period following the Reconstruction era was characterized by alternative control of the national executive and legislative branches by the Republicans and Democrats, with the sharpest party competition in American history.[4]

Two realities are noteworthy concerning this third party system. First,

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it was only during this period that a stable two-party system developed, for the first party system was one-party-dominant and the second party system was an unstable, multi-party one. Secondly, the two parties of this period have remained dominant in American political history ever since, for well over a hundred years, and the subsequent re-alignments of the fourth and fifth party systems merely changed the relative competitive position of the Democratic and Republican parties.

The appearance of third parties (most notable the Populists in the Midwest and the South), together with the recession of 1893, weakened the Democratic Party. In the critical elections of 1896, the militant presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, representing a coalition of Democrats and Populists, resulted in a clear victory for William McKinley, the Republican candidate, and the emergence of the fourth party system.

The Fourth Party System, 1896-1932

The elections of 1896 represented a re-alignment in two ways. First, it moved the Republican Party into the position of the majority party; this electoral dominance was to continue until 1932.[5] Secondly, the discriminating issue—basis for the fourth party system was economic, differing from the slavery issue of the Civil War period. The Republican Party advocated rapid industrialization coupled with a *laissez faire* opposition to governmental regulation of the economy while the Democrats represented the intense concern of the agrarian populists and the working classes *re* the abuses of unrestrained capitalism. These issues led to the more economically advanced and advantaged areas of the North solidly supporting the Republican Party and the backward and depressed areas of the South in strong support of the Democratic Party. In the early decades of the twentieth century, party competition was largely confined to the border states and some mountain states.

The Fifth Party System, 1932 to Date

Following the Great Depression of 1929 and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, the Democrats emerged as the majority party nationally and the fifth party system began. In the forty-eight years from 1932 to 1980, the Republicans controlled the Congress for only four years, i.e., 1947-49 and 1953-55, while the party competition for the presidency was markedly closer. The Republicans controlled the office of president for one-third of this period, i.e., 1953-61 and 1969-77, including the landslide victory of President Nixon in 1972.

Roosevelt's New Deal Coalition reflected the policy biases of his tenure of over twelve years: the urban workers, the less prosperous farmers, ethnics, Catholics, Jews, racial minorities, northern white liberals and "the solid South." The minority coalition of the Republican Party consisted of the

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manufacturing, financial, and commercial interests (including small town businessmen), the more prosperous farmers, Protestants, and the better educated and more affluent middle class.[6] This social class basis of party support, in some ways, resembled the class basis of partisan support in the Jacksonian phase of the second party system. Changes in this party system and their significance for the future are the primary foci of this essay.

II
CHANGES IN THE FIFTH PARTY SYSTEM

Reviewing the above history of party re-alignments in the United States, one notes that, contemporary analysts of each of the previous four party systems appeared either oblivious to or careless of the forces and events that were moving the system from one era to another. Judging the future significance of occuring phenomena is never easy; 'tis more manageable, retrospectively to identify and assess past phenomenon, e.g., in the present context, to relate specific past political developments to stages of the party system.

To their credit, contemporary party analysts are making a serious attempt at a prospective, rather than a retrospective, analysis of changes in the present party system. Since, in the past a significant party re-alignment took place on the average of every 36 to 38 years[7] and since the present party system dates from 1932, a possible sixth party re-alignment could, based on past experience, have been reasonably expected by 1968 or shortly thereafter.

Almost a plethora of books, monographs, and articles have been written within the past decade or so concerning important changes in the present major political parties.[8] The inventory and analysis of these changes are wide-ranging. To lend some coherence to the discussion of recent changes in the fifth party system, the threefold typology of meanings of "party" by Professor Key in the mid-sixties[9] will be employed here, *viz.*, party-in the-electorate (i.e., changes in party identification, support, and loyalty), party-in-the-party (i.e., changes in the organization and activities of the parties), and party-in-the-government (i.e., changes in the operation of the party in the Presidency and the Congress).

Changes in the Party-in-the-Electorate

There have been significant changes in the New Deal coalitions of both the Democrats and the Republicans[10] that were formed in the Roosevelt period. Chronologically the first change was in the traditional regional support base of the two parties. The rural and agrarian South was quite at home in the New Deal coalition of the 1930s, with the Democratic Party's programme for agricultural recovery, but as the South industrialized and as the agenda of the Democratic Party emphasized civil rights and other

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egalitarian policies, the loyalty of the southern whites began to erode. Thus, the South gave Roosevelt 69 per cent of its vote in 1944, but in the next presidential election in 1948, Truman obtained but 52 per cent of their vote. In 1952 and 1960, the Democratic candidate polled barely a majority in the South. This secular decline has continued to date, interrupted only by the Johnson landslide of 1964 and the elections of 1976, when Georgian Carter carried all but one southern state. But the increasing Republican character of the South was accentuated in 1980, when Carter carried only one southern state, his own.[11]

Similarly, there has been an erosion in the traditional republicanism of the Middle Atlantic and Northeastern regions. The elites of the regions firmly supported the Republican Party from the post-Civil War period until the 1960's. However, since then, there has been a secular shift towards the Democratic Party; until today these regions are the most liberal and democratic in the country. Two primary causes for this shift are the continued increase in the number of blacks in the regions and the transformation of the economy of these northern regions from an industrial to a post-industrial stage, with a strongly Democratic elite.

There has been a marked change in Democratic support among groups prominently associated with Roosevelt's New Deal majority. Roosevelt and Truman carried the farmers, manual workers, city dwellers, Jews and Catholics with much higher majorities than with the public at large. With the exception of Kennedy in 1960 in the case of Catholics, and of Johnson's strong support among workers in 1964, there has been a decided drop in the support level of these New Deal Democratic groups, until in 1980, Carter led by only 8 per cent points among union members and by but 7 per cent points among Jewish voters while the farm vote and almost 40 per cent of the Catholic vote was strongly in support for Reagan.[12]

Professor Ladd describes these changes as "an inversion of the New Deal class order."[13] Professors Nie, Verba and Petrocik summarize the results of these changes as follows : a Democratic electorate that has become "more black, less Southern, and have developed a larger silk-stocking component" and a Republican electorate that has become "more Southern, less black, more Catholic, and relatively less of a silk stocking and Protestant party."[14]

There have been four salient changes in party identification since 1960. The period indicates a secular decline in the proportion of citizens who identify themselves as Republicans though with a decided increase following the Republican victory in 1980. Thus, in 1960 Republican Party identifiers represented 32 per cent of the electorate, 24 per cent in 1964, 28 per cent in 1968, 24 per cent in 1972 and a low of 21 per cent in 1976. On the other hand, Democratic identifiers in the same presidential years were 46 per cent in 1960, 54 per cent in 1964, 40 per cent in 1968, 42 per cent in 1972, and 46 per cent in 1976—much more of a stable pattern of party identification.[15] In February 1981, various polls showed an appreciable gain in Republican identifiers and a comparable drop in the Democratic identifiers. Thus, a

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Washington Post-ABC poll on 19-20 February reported that 32 per cent identified as Democrats and 25 per cent as Republican—a margin of only 7 per cent for the Democrats in contrast with the 25 per cent Democratic margin in 1976. During the same post-1980 election period, Richard Wirthin, Reagan's campaign pollster, found an identification distribution of 34 per cent Democrats and 25 per cent Republicans, or a 9 per cent Democratic margin, and two Gallup polls showed a Democratic margin of a high of 6 points and a low of two points (contrasted with a Gallup 12 per cent spread between the party identifiers at the time of the November election).[16] How permanent this pattern would be remains to be seen, since it is not uncommon for the winning presidential party to pick up new identifiers in the period following an election.

The second important change within the past two decades in party identification is a decided drop in the strength and intensity of attachment to both parties. Analyses of the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan reveal that the number of strong Democratic identifiers declined from 21 per cent in 1960 to 15 per cent in 1976, and the proportion of strong Republican identifiers dropped from 14 per cent in 1960 to 9 per cent in 1976. The third change, a function of the drop in party identifiers, is the striking increase in those voters who describe themselves as "independents." Here the increase has been secular: 21 per cent in 1960, 23 per cent in 1964, 28 per cent in 1968, 31 per cent in 1972, 32 per cent in 1976, and 44 per cent in 1980.[17] The post-election polls referred to above reflected a slight drop in the number of independents, *viz.*, the *Post-ABC* poll 43 per cent and the Wirthin poll 41 per cent.

The fourth significant change since the 1960 elections is that, voters are increasingly less likely to see party as the basis for evaluating candidates. As educational levels have been raised and as most voters now obtain more of their information concerning candidates and issues from the media, the importance of party identification in influencing vote decisions has steadily declined.[18] Nie, Verba, and Petrocik sum up these changes in party identification and support thus : "Citizens are less likely to identify with a party, to feel positively about a party or to be guided in their voting behaviour by partisan cues."[19]

Other evidence of the weakening of the parties-in-the-electorate is the steady decrease in straight-ticket voting, from a high of 65 per cent in 1960, plummeting to 43 per cent in 1964, 34 per cent in 1968 and 33 per cent in 1972 and 1976. This phenomenon of ticket-splitting is common to both parties at the national, state and local levels, though it has been more common at the presidential level than at the congressional and state levels, somewhat more common among Republicans than Democrats, and less common among Democrats in 1976 than in 1968, 1972 and 1980.[20]

Still further indications of lessening party loyalty are the apparent increases in third-party movements since the mid-sixties (particularly in 1968 and 1980), the prevalence of divided governments in the post-War II period

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(in the years between 1946 and 1980, for almost half of the time, i.e., 16 years, the Presidency was controlled by one party and the Congress by the other), and the increasing volatility of voting behaviour, particularly at the presidential level. In the six presidential elections since 1960, three Democratic candidates have been elected and three Republican candidates. In three of these elections, the results were very close while the other three were landslide victories.[21]

Another important change in the-party-in-the electorate since 1920 is of the voter turnout; it was at a high of 62 per cent in the presidential elections of 1960, but in each succeeding presidential contest, the turnout has dropped. Thus, in 1964 it was 60 per cent, in 1968 58 per cent, in 1972 55 per cent, and in 1976, a shade lower at 54.6 per cent.[22] And only about 53 per cent of the nation's voting age population of 160.5 million went to the polls in 1980, the lowest turnout since 1948.[23]

Further, several party analysts have noted the effects of cross-cutting issues in undermining the New Deal governing coalition. Some of these de-aligning issues—race, urban riots, Vietnam, and Watergate—help explain the decline in party identification, ticket-splitting, the Wallace movement in 1968, and the landslides of 1964 and 1972.[24] Other so-called "social issues"—law and order, crime, and life-styles—in the middle and late seventies further destabilized earlier voting patterns of the 1930's and 1940's. In the 1980 election these were the "single" issues of abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, school busing and prayers in the public schools that cut across party lines, still further eroding the partisan voting patterns of the New Deal period.

Changes in Party-in-the-Party

Party organizations played a central and crucial role in presidential politics upto, and including, the presidential election of 1968.[25] Most of the delegates to the quadrennial presidential nominating conventions were party activists selected by a process which was dominated by party leaders. The loyalty of the delegates was thus to the party chiefs, not to the presidential aspirants, and presidential nominations were determined by bargaining and negotiations between coalitions of party leaders, with each leader delivering the votes of his delegate supporters.

Party leaders also had an important role in the presidential campaign; the presidential nominee relied heavily on the party chiefs, both those of his winning nominating coalition and those who supported other candidates at the convention. They aided him in developing campaign strategies and in mobilizing the support of the state and local party organizations in the determinative functions of raising money, staging rallies, canvassing the voters, distributing campaign literature and getting the vote on election day. The national chairman of the party was chosen by the presidential nominee and later he was made his campaign manager.

The parties' role in presidential politics entered a new phase after 1968.[26]

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At the 1968 Democratic Convention, a process was begun that drastically altered the traditional dominance of party leaders and their party regulars in presidential nominations by 1980. Eugene McCarthy, Senator from Minnesota, representing the anti-Vietnam War Democrats, entered most of the 1968 presidential primaries winning a substantial majority support of 40 per cent of the convention delegates elected by primaries. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey entered no primaries, but relied on the support of President Johnson and most of the state party leaders. When Humphrey was nominated by the Chicago Convention, McCarthy supporters, claiming "grass-roots" support of party members, created boisterous scenes within the hall while their supporters' demostrations outside in the city's streets developed into a riot and were projected nation-wide on the television screens.

To placate the rage of the dissidents and unify the Party for the upcoming campaign, the Convention created a commission to reform the rules for delegate selection, The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (called the McGovern-Fraser Commission, after its co-chairmen), operated from 1969-1971 making a series of recommendations that were accepted by the Democratic National Committee for the 1972 Convention. Two subsequent commissions, the Mikulski Commission (1972-74) and the Winograd Commission (1975-1978), modified the McGovern-Fraser rules somewhat for the 1976 and 1980 Democratic conventions.

These rule changes aimed at a broader participation in delegate selection by party members and at more representation for women, youth, and minorities among the state delegations and required that, at all stages of delegate selection, the delegations be proportional to the presidential preferences expressed by the primary voters or in non-primary conventions. The Republican Party, in a slower and somewhat less extreme manner, paralleled these changes in their own delegate selection procedures. Moreover, these rule changes in both parties were accompanied by (or perhaps contributed to) a marked increase in the selection of convention delegates by presidential primaries. While there were but 17 Democratic and 16 Republican primaries in 1968, by 1980 there were 34 Democratic conventions and 33 Republican conventions at which over 75 per cent delegates were selected.

The overall result of the rule changes and the proliferation of primaries has been the almost complete loss of control by party regulars and party leaders in the presidential nomination process. The "old presidential elite" of faithful party supporters and financial contributors, together with the party's main elected public officials (Governors, Senators and Representatives), were replaced by a "new presidential elite" of lawyers, teachers, and other professional persons and leaders of women, youth and minority groups, with a marked drop in the proportion of businessmen, workers, farmers, and public office holders. Jeanne Kirkpatrick asserts that the new presidential elite in both parties is less representative of the party rank-and-

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file members, with the Democratic delegates decidedly more liberal than the membership of the Democratic Party and the Republican delegates more conservative than the Republican Party membership.[27]

The role of the party organization and its activists in the presidential campaign has also been greatly diminished by the increased tendency of the presidential nominees to rely on their own staffs of pollsters, issue specialists, speech writers and public relations experts instead of on the national and state party committees and their party workers. Also, the increased use of television in campaigning enables the presidential candidate to enter the living rooms of the voter without the intervention of party workers. And the public financing of presidential nomination and election campaigns since 1976 relieves the party organization of its traditional money-raising function.

The crimes associated with the Watergate break-in of 1972 and the subsequent illegal cover-up for two years were perpetuated by the Nixon Administration and not by the Republican Party. But, ironically, one of the chief outcomes of the Watergate period was a campaign finance law that further weakened the national political parties. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended in 1974 and 1976, places severe limits on political contributions by both individuals and interest groups and on the campaign expenditure of presidential aspirants (in 1980, $10 million nomination expenditures and $29.4 million for general election expenditures), if public financing is accepted (upto $50 per cent of nomination expenses and the full limit of $29.4 for general election expenses).

The limitations on total campaign expenses in the nomination and general election contests, together with the increasing size of the American electorate (over 160 million in 1980) forces the presidential candidates to allot a major share of their available funds to television appeals. The result is largely personal, non-party campaigns, with the focus on the candidates' personalities and on the dominant issues, with party affiliation downplayed and with less need for the traditional party activities of organizing rallies and parades, distributing campaign buttons and bumber stickers and with less emphasis on party platforms. Also, the fact that the public funds go to the presidential candidates and not to the national party organizations[28] makes the role in money-raising for the presidential campaign a minimal one.[29]

The increased use of TV campaigning has had similar, though less severe, effects on the state parties in gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns and on mayoralty campaigns in metropolitan cities, but public financing to-date is largely restricted to the presidential level.[30]

Changes in Party-in-the-Government

In the first edition of Lubell's *The Future of American Politics*, published in 1951, he noted the beginnings of the erosion of the Democratic coalition of the Roosevelt-Truman period. He also predicted that this erosion would

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continue until it would no longer be effective, but that a Republican majority coalition would not develop in its place.[31] Thus, Lubell projected that, in the decades ahead there would be an absence of "an effective coalition to govern" ushering in the politics of twilight, with the Democratic sun on the wane, but with no new majority sun able to rise into clear ascendancy."[32]

Lubell's prediction that neither party would be able to mobilize and sustain an effective governing coalition has been borne out in the years since 1951. In the 1952 presidential election, Eisenhower won with a decided majority, but his Republican Party gained but a slim margin of control of both houses of the Congress. Also, this control of the two branches of the national government was weakened by the conflict between the more progressive "presidential wing" of the Republic Party and its more traditional "congressional wing."[33] And, for the remaining six years of Eisenhower's two terms—1955-61—the Democrats controlled the Congress, but they, in turn, were riven by conflict between the northern liberal Democratic members and the conservative southern Democratic members. This Democratic schism continued through the three years of the Kennedy presidency, when the Democrats controlled both the national executive and legislative branches.

However, a temporary governing coalition developed with the landslide victory of Johnson in 1964, sweeping into the Congress enough northeastern, midwestern, and western Democratic liberals so that the presidential wing of the Democratic Party was clearly dominant. The result was the passage of more progressive social legislation in the brief period of 1965-1967 than at any time since the early New Deal years. But the Democratic coalition was undermined by the divisive issue of the Vietnam War, and in 1968, the electorate voted for Nixon by a narrow margin as a Republican president but returned a still-divided Democratic Party to control the Congress. This divided party government remained through the entire Nixon-Ford presidency.

The 1976 elections returned the Democrats to control both the Presidency and the Congress, with Carter elected by a slim margin of 2 per cent over Ford but with almost two-thirds of the House and Senate membership Democratic. However for two reasons, there was not an effective Democratic coalition to govern during the period 1977-1981. First, recognizing the strong distrust of the "imperial presidency" as a result of Watergate and an increasing lack of faith of the American people in all governmental institutions, Carter in 1976 ran against "the Washington eatablishment," inevitably reflecting unfavourably on the Democratic Congress. This hardly enhanced the prospects for effective executive-legislative relations. Further, in the early months of the Carter presidency, his parochial staff ("the Georgia Mafia") blithely developed sweeping proposals for SALT II negotiations, civil service reform, energy policy, a new department of education etc., without consulting the Congressional Democratic leadership and appropriate committee chairmen. The predictable result was that Congress rejected or substantially altered both the priorities and the content of most of Carter's

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legislative programme. Second, during this period, the insistent "single issue" constituencies, both pro and anti, on the emotional questions of abortion, school busing, and school prayers had the cross-cutting effects on both parties noted earlier. And there was a spill-over effect on to other issues, complicating the process of legislative coalition-building.

The 1980 elections continued the tendency towards divided party government evident in American national politics since World War II. Reagan was elected in a landslide victory, contributing to his Republican Party's control of the Senate for the first time since 1955. However, the House of Representatives remains under Democratic control, though a group of some 35-45 conservative southern and southwestern Democratic representatives have been supporting the main elements of Reagan's sweeping bugdet and tax cutting programme. But the extent and stability of this tenuous cross-party coalition remains to be demonstrated.

Earlier political party analysts had asserted that a very important, if not indeed a necessary, function of American parties was to "bridge the constitutional gap," i.e., to harness "the constitutionally antagonistic" institutions of the Presidency and the Congress together to achieve productive governance. The founding fathers hoped to minimize the abuses of the substantial powers of the national government under the 1787 Constitution by creating multiple centers of powers, each with constitutional restraints on the other. Thus, by constitutional design, the Presidency and the Congress were geared more towards control of each other than for co-operative action.

The adaptation of American political parties to this constitutional reality has resulted in what Professor Burns calls "four-party politics," with each major party having "a presidential wing" organized around or oriented towards, the Presidency and "a congressional wing" organized around the Congress. The presidential wings of both parties (based more on urban and metropolitan constituencies) have tended to be more liberal and internationalist, while the congressional parties (with more restricted electoral bases) have been more conservative and domestically-oriented.[34] These real constituency and doctrinal differences between the two wings of each party have compounded the task of the majority party in bridging the constitutional gap, even when the party controls the Presidency and both houses of the Congress. And when the electorate gives control of the Presidency to one party and the control of the Congress to another party, as has been the case for a majority of the years since 1946, the problem of effective party governance becomes all but unmanageable.

Prior to about a decade and a half, the president was the undisputed leader of his party. He influenced the selection of its organizational and congressional leadership, he determined its public and legislative agenda, he set party priorities, and he was the dominant spokesman for the party. But the loss of control by the party leaders and their party regulars of the presidential nomination process in the years following 1968 and the development of "a new presidential elite" that is more issue-oriented and less party-

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oriented mean that a presidential aspirant's winning nomination coalition is substantially outside the party framework. Also, since his election is more and more due to his personal and media-centered campaigns than to the activities and support of his party, a president is less loyal to, or under obligation to, the party organization and its leaders. Consequently, the party cadre is less inclined to follow the president's leadership or to support him when he could use their help.[35]

Moreover, due to the decentralization and fragmentation of party control in the Congress in recent years, the day is past when a president could negotiate an agreement with the floor leaders of his party and a few important committee chairman and have the necessary votes delivered in both houses of the Congress for his legislative proposals. Finally, given the absence of deference and loyalty of the organizational and congressional leaders to the president, there are many public spokespersons for the party, often challenging or even controverting the public positions and pronouncements of the president.

Further, the Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946, which greatly reduced the number of standing committees in the Congress and rationalized their subject-matter jurisdiction substantially, has had the unexpected result of decentralization and fragmentation of party control in the Congress.[36] For with the reduction in the number of standing committees, the proliferation of sub-committees has proceeded apace and still continues. In the 95th Congress (1979-1981), almost one half of the Democrats in the House of Representatives chaired either a committee or a sub-committee, and three-quarters of the House Republicans were ranking members of a committee or sub-committee. Also, the committee leadership of the Senate was as widely dispersed with even freshmen senators given leadership assignments.[37]

Added to this diffusion of party congressional leadership, the weakening of the seniority rule for the selection of committee and sub-committee chairman, through the expanded powers of the caucuses of the two houses, has diluted the formerly formidable powers of the committee chairman and increased the autonomy of the numerous sub-committees. Further, the pressures of the single-issue constituencies in recent years has encouraged voting defections by members from their party position on an increasing number of issues.

Congressmen Charles Vanik, veteran House member from Ohio, reflected these new realities concerning congressional party leadership and control when at the time of his retirement he said: "There are now 531 political parties in the Congress," indicating that the individual Representatives and Senators place their own constituents' demands and their own re-election above their loyalty to either their party or their president.

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III
FUTURE SCENARIOS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM

It has already been noted that there is a broad consensus among American political scientists that the fifth party system of the United States is in transition, as a result of the significant changes within the past two decades in the general electorate and in the electorates of the two major parties, in the organization and activities of these parties, and in how the parties operate within the government. However, an examination of the recent literature on American parties reveals a wide divergence as to the implications of these changes for the future of the party system. Apparently, as Ranney has remarked, the crystal ball for divining the future character of the parties is "so opaque."[38] This section will identify and review four general future scenarios of the American party system.

The End of American Party Politics?

Writing in 1969, before the development of a number of alterations in the party system that have been discussed here, Walter Dean Burnham in a boldly titled article—"The End of American Party Politics"[39]— noted "the withering away of the parties." His introductory sentence stated : "American politics has clearly been falling apart in the past decade."[40] He further reviewed the evidence to support this statement by identifying a "long-term trend towards a politics without parties," and concluded accordingly:

> The evidence lends some credence to the view that American electoral politics is undergoing a long-term transition into routines designed only to fill offices and symbolically affirm 'the American way.' There also seem to be tendencies for our political parties gradually to evaporate as broad and active intermediaries between the people and their rulers.... It is certain that the significance of party as a link between government and the governed has now come once again into serious question.... What need have Americans of political parties? More precisely, Why do they need parties whose structures, processes, and leadership cadres seem to grow more remote and irrelevant to each new crisis?[41]

Burnham also observed that "the American socio-economic system has developed and transferred itself with an energy and thrust that has no parallel in modern history." But he decried the fact that the political system had remained static, "based on the same Lockeian formulation that... has dominated its entire history ... with a high wall of separation between politics and government on one side and the socio-economic system on the other."[42] He identified "the ultimate socio-political consequences of the persistence of Lockeian individualism into an era of Big Organization:

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oligarchy at the top, inertia and spasms of self-defense in the middle, and fragmentation at the base. One may well wonder whether political parties or critical realignments need have much place in such a political universe."[43]

In a second article, six years later in 1975, Burnham both sharpened and softened his thesis of "no-party politics" in the future. He asserted that the American electorate is going through "a critical realignment to end all critical realignments ... the most sweeping transformation it has experienced since the Civil War ... radically different from any in American electoral history" channeled not through political parties as in the past but "cutting across older partisan linkages between rulers and ruled. The consequence is an astonishingly rapid dissolution of the political party as an effective intervenor between the voter and the objects of his vote at the polls."[44]

After developing his arguments in support of this sweeping proposition, Burnham examined the implications of "this functional decomposition of voting behaviour." As a policy analyst, he saw the results as, "first, a concomitant destabilization of domestic policy initiatives and follow-through, and second, a future of policy-making which rests uneasily between the alternatives of reinforced institutional deadlock and of executive imposition of policy on the rest of the system."[45] As a democratic theorist, he concluded that if the process of partisan decomposition "continues under conditions of pervasive public discontent, democracy will be progressively emptied of any operational meaning, as executive-bureaucratic imperatives come to dominate the political system."[46]

However Burnham, assuming a more alert (because of recent painful experiences) and more sophisticated (as educational levels have risen) electorate, continued cultural and institutional barriers to authoritarianism and outstanding political leadership, admittedly "heroic assumptions", concluded that, "quite possibly, the current dissolution of party-in-the-electorate will turn out after all not to be 'a critical realignment to end all critical relignments,' but the prologue to a revitalization of democracy through party."[47]

Another analyst, who saw the possibility of "no-party politics" in the future, Austin Ranney, has criticized recent "reform" efforts as those which would unwittingly seriously weaken the parties. He argued that if another proposed reform, a national presidential primary, were to be adopted, it "would certainly weaken the presidential party organizations still further and perhaps wipe them out." And he added:

> What if it did? The Republic would not collapse, at least not right away. The party labels would persist for a while and serve as cues for the dwindling number of voters for whom they were still meaningful. The candidate organizations, the women's caucuses, the black caucuses, the right-to-life leagues, and the like would become the only real players in the game. The mass communications media would become the sole

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agencies for sorting out the finalists from the original entrants and for defining the voters' choices. And the societal functions of interest-aggregation, consensus-building, and civil war prevention would presumably be left to the schools, the churches, and perhaps to Common Cause and Nader's Radiers.[48]

A Rebirth of the New Deal Party System?

James Sundquist, in a 1973 book[49] and in a journal article later that same year,[50] has presented a scenario of the future of the party system that is almost the polar opposite of the "no-party" scenario. After analyzing the party re-alignments that ushered in the third party system in 1860, the fourth system in 1896, and the present party system in 1932, he explained the central changes in the party system in recent decades and the shifts in support of the two major parties. Looking ahead, he has projected not an inevitable disintegration of the party system, but instead a reversal of the current trend towards political independence and a rebirth and reinforcement of party loyalties along lines of cleavage resembling those of the New Deal era.

Sundquist's explanation of the transformation of the fifth system was in terms of cross-cutting issues. He observed:

> The party system is always thrown into turmoil when powerful, cross-cutting issues are at work. Fluidity, independence, and party switching are characteristic of the pre-alignment and re-alignment periods that such issues generate. The present time—when millions of voters have been jarred loose from past allegiances and are floating unattached in political space—has all the characteristics of a pre-alignment period.[51]

He examined four cross-cutting issues that have had disturbing and divisive effects on the New Deal Party System since its inception in the early 1930's: Communism, the Vietnam War, the "social issues" (i.e., really a cluster of issues associated with "permissiveness"—crime, law and order, welfarism, pornography, and homosexualism), and race. He concluded that the first three issues had only limited and temporary effects and were not contributory to a party re-alignment. Thus, the communism issue helped to elect Eisenhower in 1952 and led a number of conservative Catholic Democrats to become Republicans. The Vietnam issue was highly disruptive of the Democratic Party in the late 1960's and probably tilted the close election of 1968 to Nixon. And the "social issue" had a measurable impact on the conservative Democratic Union of members in the North and conservative white Democrats in the South. However, since both parties ultimately ended up on the same side of these three cross-cutting issues, the basis for a major re-alignment of the party system did not exist.

Sundquist saw the fourth issue of race as continuing to have vitality in

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1973. As early as 1948, it led to the rise of the Dixiecrat third-party movement that shattered the Democratic solid South; particularly during and after the black ghetto riots of 1965-68, the issue was highly salient in both parties. At that time, it was possible for the major parties to move to opposite poles on this issue—the Republicans opposing black demands and the Democrats pro-black, or conceivably, the Wallace Movement of 1968 could have continued to grow until it supplanted one of the major parties, reminiscent of the Republic Party on the slavery issue over a century before. Neither of these eventualities developed then, nor did Sundquist feel they would in the future though race most probably would continue to have an unsettling influence on the political system.[52]

Looking ahead from the perspective of 1973, Sundquist foresaw the possibility that a reinforcement of the New Deal Party System was likely to occur, counteracting the cross-cutting issues and reversing the process of party decomposition of the past decades.[53] Thus, he believed that the second term of President Nixon, with the settlement of the Vietnam issue, would be "dominated by the same fundamental dispute over the role of government [i.e., government spending and management of the economy] that defined a new party alignment in the 1930's." And he concluded his analysis with this prediction:

> In the long run, the prospect may well be a further gradual decomposition of the party system. But there is at least as much reason to believe that in the short run the headlong march towards decomposition that marked the late 1960's will be checked and reversed, that the New Deal party system will be reinvigorated and that most of those who ceased identifying with one or the other major party in the recent turmoil will re-identify. The parties may not regain the degree of voter loyalty that was accorded to them in the crisis days of the Great Depression. But the bonds between voters and the party would be restored to something like the strength of the late 1950's and the early 1960's—before Goldwater, Vietnam, Watts and Hough, campus riots and draft card burning, and the Chicago Democratic Convention of 1968.[54]

An Emerging Republican Majority?

Following Richard Nixon's election as President, Kevin Phillips in the opening sentence of his book—*The Emerging Republican Majority*, published in 1969, stated : "Far from being the tenuous and unmeaningful victory suggested by critical observers, the election of Richard M. Nixon as President of the United States in November 1968 bespoke the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginnings of a new era in American politics."[55]

Phillips asserted that a new cycle of Republican domination began in 1968, based on developing Republican majorities in the suburbia, the South,

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the "Heartland" region of the Great Lakes, Midwest, the Mountain States, and the West. He buttressed his argument with detailed historical and statistical analyses of national election results since 1896 in each of the four regions of the Northeast, the South, the Heartland, and the Pacific. Further, he noted that the Northeastern states, particularly New England, had shifted decisively from comfortable Republican majorities, going back to the post-Civil War era, to being the most strongly Democratic region in the country. However, in the Chesapeake Bay states of New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware, a trend towards the Republican Party was apparent. Moreover, since the population of the big northeastern states was dropping, the normal Democratic pluralities there were also decreasing. Finally, with the fastest growing areas of the United States in the South and the West, both increasingly Republican strongholds, the relative political significance of the Northeast was waning, Phillips observed.[56]

Phillips saw the traditional Democratic strength in the South declining, parallelling the decline of the traditional Republican strength in the Northeast. The Dixiecrats began the trend when they deprived the Democrats of four Deep South states in 1948, and Eisenhower captured four Outer South states in 1952 and five of these states in 1956. The strong anti-Catholic vote against Kennedy expected in the South in 1960 was weakened by the presence of Lyndon Johnson, a southerner on the Kennedy ticket; however, Nixon still carried the three states of Texas, Florida and Virginia. And in 1968, Nixon carried five southern states and Wallace won in five other states of the South, with Humphrey winning by a thin plurality in the remaining southern state, Texas, and then only because Nixon and Wallace split the White conservative vote there. One striking statistic sums up this secular Democratic decline: between 1932 and 1968, the Democratic share of the presidential vote skidded from 90 per cent to 26 per cent in the Deep South and from 77 per cent to 32 per cent in the Outer South—the most sweeping political change in this period save for the matching and related black trend to the Democrats, both within and outside the South. Phillips viewed the southern states as an important part of the emerging Republican majority, with the South's contribution to Republican national hegemony increasing, since its share of the United States population was rising.[57]

The 25 Heartland states together represent a total of 223 electoral college votes, only 47 short of the number required to elect a president. And in each of the sub-regions of the Great Lake states, the Farm states, and the Mountain states, a discernible move into the Republican column was noted by Phillips. In 1968, of the twenty-six states carried by Nixon, seventeen were in this region, continuing earlier Republican victories in the Heartland by Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, and Eisenhower. Phillips said of this developing bastion of Republican strength, that it was the result of the erosion of southern Democratic traditions in the southern Heartland and an important trend base in the northern Heartland of strongly Republican German and Rocky Mountain populists, with the earlier Democratic majorities in

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these areas shrunken to often a mere one-third of former levels. Though Democratic strength remains alive in some of the region's core cities, the Republican Party increasingly has come to be the socio-economic representative of voters outside of these cities.[58]

Phillips further described the three Pacific states of Washington, Oregon, and California as "a mirror of American political trends," with California "virtually a national socio-political microcosm."[59] Also California, the most populous state in the Union, according to Phillips, was the bellwether of the Pacific region. The two major forces locked in conflict in California were the liberalism of northern California and the conservatism of southern and interior California. Both ideologically and demographically then, the trend was clearly towards Southern Californian conservatism, which was increasing steadily its population and ballot-box lead over the San Francisco Bay liberalism. Washintgon and Oregon were of less political significance, though with more of a Democratic tendency. Phillips concluded his analysis of this region saying: "By all indications, the Pacific should be a major and ever more powerful battleground of the upcoming political cycle. The party able to win a majority of Pacific electoral votes in the quadrennial presidential sweepstakes is also likely to triumph nationally."[60]

Phillips was confident that these pro-Republican trends would continue in the future, for "much of the emerging Republican majority lies in the top growth states (California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida) or new suburbia, while Democratic trends correlate with stability and decay (New England, New York City, Michigan, West Virginia, and San Francisco—Berkeley)."[61]

Phillips' "new Republican majority" thesis was later, just two months before the 1980 elections, updated by two seasoned political observers, Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg.[62] Like Phillips, but with a more current prespective, the authors also saw "the end of an era"—the era of American liberalism and Democratic Party dominance.

Scammon and Wattenberg gave three reasons for their prediction. First, they cited survey research data that indicated a decided change in voter opinions during the 1970's on important public issues. Thus, increasingly, inflation and economic stagnation have been seen as the real problems today, with big government viewed as the major cause of inflation. And, as Vietnam has receded from the public consciousness and concern has increased about Soviet "expansionism", neo-isolationism appears to have lessened and strong demands for increased defense spending are apparent. It is noteworthy that all of these new public opinion positions are in general concerning recently perceived Republican, and not Democrat, doctrine.

Secondly, election results in 1978 suggested a growing rejection of Democratic liberalism; the incumbent Democratic Senators who lost their seats were liberals, only one liberal Democratic Senator won. Also, late in the 1980 campaign, public opinion polls indicated that the most liberal Senators and Congressmen were in serious trouble and the more moderate Democrats running appeared slated for easy wins. Hence, Scammon and Wattenberg

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predicted that the Republicans would pick up at least four or five Senate seats and a good number of House seats. Moreover, they saw the odds in favour of the Republicans winning control of the Senate in 1982, since nineteen Democrats and only fourteen Republicans would be up for re-election. Further it appeared that Reagan would beat the Democratic incumbent, Carter, in the 1980 presidential race.

Third, in terms of partisan perceptions, the polls indicated that on the leading issues of the 1980 campaign, the Republican Party proposals for severe cuts in government spending and in taxes had significantly more voter support than the Democratic plan to curb inflation and rejuvenate the economy. All told, Scammon and Wattenberg concluded that a political re-alignment was indicated by these three realities and that the Republican Party stood in a better position to capitalize on the changes in public opinion, the shift away from liberalism, and *re* perceptions of which party could better handle the important problems facing the country. They thus saw the Democratic Party, for the first time in four decades, as seriously on the defensive and lacking in new ideas and policy positions to replace their outmoded New Deal ideology.

A New Party System for Post-Industrial America?

It is interesting that Kevin Phillips is the leading articulator of two of the four scenarios of the future of the party system reviewed here. Six years after publishing his *The Emerging Republican Majority,* Phillips took an entirely different tack in analyzing the enormous changes in the American political system in recent decades and in exploring the implications of these changes for the party system. In the preface to his 1975 volume,[63] Phillips clarified its purpose and theme, as follows:

> Too little attention and analysis have been devoted to the political impact of a post-industrial, or communications revolution. In an age of mass media, the old Republican and Democratic parties have lost their logic. Effective communications are replacing party organisations as the key to political success; and, beyond that, they are becoming an increasingly dominant force in national life. As the first communications society, the United States is on its way to becoming the first 'mediacracy'.[64]

Also in the book's preface, Phillips offered a brief explanation of why he abandoned his 1969 scenario of a developing Republican hegemony in the United States. He noted that Nixon's 1972 campaign was directed solely at his own re-election, with no attempt whatsoever to lead a bottom-to-top Party effort to exploit the electorate's movement to the right and away from Democratic liberalism. Secondly, the Watergate scandal arising from Nixon's obsessive and unprincipled actions to ensure his re-election made impossible

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the fashioning of a positive and lasting Republican political coalition out of the huge 1972 victory.[65]

The organizing principle of Phillips' 1975 study is that there is a political re-alignment, resulting in a new party system, whenever there is a radical transformation in the American society and economy. Thus, the first party system, with its limited franchise and hence limited participation, and its elitist, aristocratic political leadership, was replaced by the second party system with the broadening of the electorate in "the era of the common man" and with a new, non-elite leadership. Both these party systems operated within the matrix of a pre-industrial economy. The third party system reflected the catastrophic polarization of American society over the slavery issue and evolved into a largely regional party pattern. Moreover, the Civil War prompted the development of an industrial economy, but the 1896 presidential election marked the end of the Civil War party system and ushered in a new party alignment in keeping with the unchallenged dominance of *laissez faire* capitalism over the American political economy. The Great Depression of the late 1920's and early 1930's created a new ideological divide and a new party alignment, with the Democratic Party responding to the need for governmental action in ensuring a stable economy and a social security "safety net", while the Republicans still clung to the *laissez faire* philosophy.[66]

Phillips also traced the genesis of the Post-Industrial Revolution in the United States from World War II and the 1940's, its "breakthrough" in the 1950's, and the phenomenal increase in extent, momentum, and importance during the 1960's. Further he examined the central characteristics of the Post-Industrial era: the metamorphosis of the economy from manufacturing industries to knowledge industries (education, research and development, technological innovations, insurance, information and other services, etc.); the increasingly almost dominant role in American life of the media; the new and powerful knowledge elite (media specialists, educators, computer technologists, and highly specialized professionals of all kinds); a widespread affluence, including a substantial proportion of the working class; a terminological obsolescence of the old liberal-conservative cleavage of American political liberalism and new post-industrial social conflicts (where conflicts over life style, morality, bureaucratic regulation, internationalism and media power replace the older conflicts of poverty *vs.* affluence, labour *vs.* management, youth *vs.* elders, etc.)[67]

Phillips' study then indicated how the fifth party system, a product and a prisoner of an earlier, quite different America, lacked relevance and effective response to the fundamental changes in American society and economy of the past three decades and to the new aspirations, needs, and expectations of American voters. This functional obsolescence of the existing party system, Phillips argued, was the real cause of the decomposition of American parties and for the taking-over of many of its traditional functions by other new institutions of post-industrial America. And it was this fundamental

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incompatibility of the industrial era with its revolutionary communications technology, that presaged a necessary, perhaps overdue, political re-alignment.[68]

This re-alignment, Phillips asserted was imminent and inevitable; a new political system must evolve that could effectively aggregate and convert popular preferences for political leadership, but which would be compatible with the realities of post-industrial America. In the final chapter on "The Future of American Politics," he attempted to answer two pointed questions: 1. Can a post-industrial party, or sixth party system be expected to use the existing Republican and Democratic party framework? and 2. Once new party alignments are clear, can we expect post-industrial party organizations to function in the traditional nineteenth-twentieth-century style?

In answering these questions, it is apparent that his crystal ball is quite opaque, for his responses are more general than specific and more guarded than confident. However, with positive confidence he asserted that the existing party system was doomed, organizationally, ideologically, and operationally. But, he restricted himself to four broad generalizations while describing the sixth party system: 1. The sixth party system would be more ideological than its predecessor, with more of a focus on social (life-style) issues than on economic (labour-capital) issues; 2. The new presidential parties would be—more concerned with both ideology and communication technology than the fifth party system; 3. The sub-national parties would not have the organizational depth of its predecessors (i.e., with increased reliance on communication technology, the older, grass-roots organizations will no longer be needed), and 4. The Democratic name is more likely to survive (because it is linked to a majority past and is perceived to be associated with change) than the Republican name since it is linked to a minority past, has been less friendly to change, and may be a cultural block in wooing many southerners, ethnics, and labour-union members.[69]

Agreeing with Phillips on the failure and the increasing non-relevance of the existing party system, Everett C. Ladd, a respected name on the American party system, was less confident of an imminent political re-alignment.[70] He asserted that the present party system was "de-aligned," with neither party capable of what Lubell would call "a coalition to govern," and with neither having "a presidential majority of an enduring sort now on the horizon." However, unlike Phillips and Scammon and Wattenberg, he did not visualize political re-alignment in the near future resulting in one party having a "majority status of the kind the Democrats enjoyed in the New Deal era and the Republicans held from McKinley to Hoover."

IV
FUTURE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

In this final section of the paper, an attempt will be made to assess the four scenarios of the future of the American party system that have been

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described. In this endeavour, I shall have the benefit of hindsight—ranging from nine months to as much as twelve years. In this regard, the reader should remember the date or dates of the predictions made by the various authors: 1. The "no-party politics" scenarios of Burnham (1969 and 1975) and of Ranney (1978); 2. "The revival of the New Deal party system" scenario of Sundquist (1973); 3. "The emerging Republican majority" scenario of Phillips (1969) and of Scammon and Wattenberg (1980); and 4. "The post-industrial party system" scenario of Phillips (1975) and of Ladd (1978 and 1980).

A General Caveat

In the past three decades, a number of American political scientists have devoted a substantial portion of their research efforts to an increasingly sophisticated analysis of voter behaviour in the United States and to the development of a nascent body of causal theory about parties and elections. Understandably, these researchers have gone "hunting where the ducks are," i.e., they have, in most instances, researched questions where hard data was readily available or where survey techniques could generate such data most productively.

Election satistics are maintained by public agencies for almost all of the half a million elected public officials, from county courthouse to the presidency. With elections commonly held every two or four years, the productive use of this mountain of raw data demands limitations and priorities. Thus, the development of in-depth, longitudinal, and comparative analyses of election results have been restricted largely to the presidential level, with somewhat less attention to congressional and gubernatorial politics. Three realities dictate this emphasis. First, the data banks developed by the Center for Political Studies and the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and by other similar academic agencies throughout the United States (with the data centered at Michigan's Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research), together with the published studies of these institutional research processes, emphasized presidential (and to a lesser extent congressional) voter trends and voting attitudes. Secondly, the data generated by the periodic public opinion surveys of the major polling agencies (Gallup, Harris, NBC-*NY Times*, etc.) focus on national issues and on presidential contests, with their polls on the Senate and Congressional races only at the macro-level. The third reality is that, for both the public and the researchers, analyses of presidential elections and the political processes related to such elections are deemed of more interest and importance.

This does not mean that micro-level election and voting studies are not being done (i.e., at the state legislative, city, and county levels), but only that these studies lack the comparative, over-time character of the presidential studies and hence, have less of a useful theoretical basis for purposes

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of interpretation and guidance of future research.

It should therefore not be surprising that the literature reviewed here is, almost exclusively, concerned with the presidential parties, with little insight into the operation and reality of the sub-presidential parties. It should be noted that the main focus of each of the future-of-the-party-system scenarios described here is only one part, admittedly an all-important part, of the American party system. A quick check in the index of the volumes reviewed here revealed virtually no references at all to state and local political parties. Hence, care should be exercized in extrapolating the empirical findings and projections of these scenarios of generalizations about the entire political party system.

The End of American Party Politics?

This general caveat applies with particular relevance and force to the "no-party politics" scenario sketched by Burnham and Ranney. Granting the manifest weakening of the presidential parties and the serious erosion of their functions, the situation at the state level and local levels is measurably different.

"Party decomposition"—as evidenced by a decrease in party loyalty, an increase in the number of independent voters, and split ticket voting—is evident at the sub-national party levels, but is appreciably lower in extent and impact.[71] An exception to this generalization would be statewide contests for the offices of Governor and Senator in populous, urban states and in the mayoralty elections in the largest metropolitan areas. For these elections have some decided similarities with presidential politics. But, as Ladd observes, "the weakening of party loyalties and hence of party regularity is clearly evident at all levels of the electoral process ... but the most dramatic effects have centered around presidential ballotting."[72]

To put it differently, the total party system is by no means losing its identity, its relevance, or its functions of aggregating voter preferences and converting them into an elective leadership. For state legislative offices and at the congressional and country levels, party identification is much more important and party organizations much more active and effective than the picture painted by Burnham and Ranney. Thus, their obituary of American party politics, like Mark Twain's, appears somewhat premature.

A Return of the New Deal Party System?

The rationale of Sundquist's 1973 scenario for a revival of the New Deal party system in the years ahead was that, as the cross-cutting issues of Communism, Vietnam, the "social issue" and race lost their salience, the perennial conflict associated with economic stress would lead to the traditional party cleavages, resulting in a Democratic majority coalition much like that over which FDR presided in the 1930's. And certainly, since the

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energy crisis of 1973, the problems of inflation, unemployment, increased taxes and economic stagnation represent as much economic stress as America has known since the Great Depression.

Futhermore, Sundquist could cite the results of the 1974 congressional election in support of his thesis. For in that year, Democratic representation in the Congress increased much more than those gains normal for the non-presidential-party in off-years. But most informed observers credited these Democratic gains to public outrage due to the Watergate scandal culminating in President Nixon's resignation some three months before the November 1974 elections.

Again, the election of 1976 lent some real credence to Sundquist's prediction; Carter's winning coalition consisted of the South (every Southern state except Virginia), mostly all the industrial states of the Northeast and North-central regions, union members, ethnics, Catholics, Jews, and Blacks, with a larger proportion of the latter two groups voting Democratic than in the 1930's. Moreover, the Democratic Party controlled both Houses of the Congress by an almost two-thirds majority. This national Democratic Party hegemony was reminiscent of the New Deal days.

However, this Democratic "coalition to govern" was shattered in the 1980 presidential elections in winning by a landslide, Reagan carried every southern state except Carter's home state of Georgia and captured most of the traditionally Democratic states of the northeast and north-central regions, with a higher proportion of nationwide support from union members, ethnics, Catholics, and Jews enjoyed by any Republican presidential candidate since 1928. It is interesting to note though, that in the 1980 campaign and in the recent debates in the Congress, the central and crucial issue has been the very one that Sundquist asserted—*viz.*, a dispute over the fundamental role of the federal government. If this issue continues to dominate national politics, as seems quite probable, Sundquist's thesis remains to be more fully tested in the years ahead.

An Emerging Republican Majority?

In presenting his 1975 scenario for a "new post-industrial party system," Phillips apparently abandoned his 1969 scenario for an "emerging Republican majority," for the expressed reasons reported earlier here. But judging from the 1978 and 1980 elections, Phillips' earlier scenario appears as potentially valid as when he wrote it twelve years ago. Furthermore, Scammon and Wattenberg's predictions of a Republican resurgence in 1980 was accurate, even proving a bit too modest concerning Republican control of the Senate.

In the 1978 Congressional Elections, the Republicans made an encouraging comeback from their serious losses in 1974 and their more modest losses in 1976. They also made some modest gains in the state Houses and state legislatures of the country. But it was the 1980 presidential election that

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revived the relevance of the Phillips' 1969 prediction. Consistent with Phillips' model of a winning Republican coalition, Reagan carried every state west of the Mississippi except Hawaii and Minnesota—Vice-President Mondale's home state, and every southern state except Georgia—President Carter's home state. While his winning vote margin of 10 per cent was substantially less than Johnson's margin in 1964 and Nixon's in 1972, his electoral college vote of 489 was slightly higher than Johnson's 486 in 1964 but lower than Nixon's 520 in 1972.[73] The Republicans picked up twelve additional seats in the Senate, the largest net gain for either party since 1958, and gained control of the Senate, for the first time since 1955, by a margin of 53 to 47.[74] In the House of Representatives, Republican gains reduced the margin of Democratic control from a two-thirds majority before the election to a majority of just fifty-one.[75] In the states, four new Republican Governors were elected and over two hundred new Republican state legislators (all in states west of the Mississippi, again consonant with Phillips' model).[76]

This certainly was an impressive electoral sweep by the Republican Party in 1980. However, today in 1981, neither Phillips nor Scammon and Wattenberg would be able to claim that the Republican Party was the majority party in the United States. For, more American voters still identify themselves as Democrats than as Republicans (though the Democratic margin has dropped decisively from its peak in 1976). The House of Representatives is still controlled by the Democrats. Democratic Governors outnumber Republican Governors by 27 to 23, and the Democrats control 31 state senates to the Republicans' 17. Further, Democratic state lower chambers number 32 while Republican state lower chambers are only 17,[77] giving the Democrats a great advantage in the congressional and state legislative redistricting process to follow the 1980 census.

The question remains, though, as to whether President Reagan can and will build his party's 1980 electoral success into Republican control of both houses of the Congress in 1982 and of a majority of the state legislatures and state-houses and into a Republican majority among party identifiers. Unlike Nixon in 1972, Reagan apparently has the inclination to attempt such a new Republican hegemony.

Several political commentators have recently remarked on the huge gamble the Republican Party has taken in supporting whole-hog Reagan's proposals for the most sweeping changes in the role of the Federal Government since President Roosevelt in the 1930's.[78] In a nationally-televised address to the Congress in early May (after his recovery from the assassin's attack), Reagan renewed his demand for and defended his plan for severe cuts in federal taxes and expenditure, a sizeable increase in defense outlays and a substantial dismantling of government controls of the private sector. He also promised that this plan would produce a four to five per cent growth rate after 1982 (compared to 1.1 per cent in 1980) and that it would reduce inflation from double digits in 1980 to 8.3 per cent in 1982 and to 5.5 per

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cent in 1984. Further, he argued that his plan not only would balance the budget but meet the aims of "controlling government spending, reducing the tax burden, building a national defense second to none, and stimulating economic growth and creating millions of new jobs."[79]

If Reagan's plan were to be approved by the Congress and would result in all or even most of these objectives by 1984, then he would become the most popular American leader since FDR a half a century ago and the chances are good that the Republican Party in the 1980's would gain the majority status the Democratic Party enjoyed in the 1930's. However, if (as most economists, including conservative Wall Street economists, expect) the Reagan programme has little effect on inflation, unemployment and economic stagnation, then he would become a political "bum" and the Democratic Party would most probably be returned to power in 1984.

A New Party System for Post-Industrial America?

If one accepts, as do Phillips and Ladd, Daniel Bell's seminal 1973 thesis that the United States has moved from an industrial era into a post-industrial era, with profound implications for, and changes in, the American economy and society,[80] then Phillips' 1975 scenario for a new party system for the new era is logically appealing and perhaps persuasive. Also one can understand and substantially accept Phillips explanation for the serious "decomposition" of the existing party system: the fifth party system, a product of the earlier industrial era, is no longer relevant and effective in the new post-industrial era and the dysfunctional character of the parties, increasingly apparent, has resulted in a marked lessening of partisan loyalty and support by the American voters. Furthermore, logically, one can expect a new party system to develop that is more relevant and responsive to the realities of post-industrial America, i.e., the knowledge industries, the communications revolution, the new knowledge elite, the higher levels of education and affluence, the new patterns of social conflict, etc.

However, one can accept these general premises and predictions of Phillips without embracing *in toto* his scenario for the future of the American party system. Because, as with the other scenarios discussed here, the Phillips and Ladd scenarios are preoccupied with the presidential parties and, to a marked lesser degree, the congressional parties, with virtually no meaningful analysis of the sub-national parties.

Phillips asserts that "the presidential-level Republican and Democratic parties have tentatively re-aligned themselves along ideological, regional, and demographic lines fundamentally compatible with post-industrial cleavages,"[81] but, as noted earlier, he has only several broad generalizations to make concerning the expected new party system as it would operate at the state and local levels. And it is this part of Phillips' scenario that measures up poorly as to its plausibility and probability.

It is the judgment of this writer that the effects of the "Post-Industrial

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Revolution" have been, and will continue to be in the immediate future, more powerful on the presidential parties and to a somewhat lesser degree on the elections of Senators and Governors of populous, urban states and perhaps, on mayoralty races in the largest metropolitan areas. For it is at these levels and for these urban offices that the communication revolution results in media-utilization and media-assessed candidates and that the new computer technology permits direct mailing for fund-raising and campaign appeals, all without the identification with or involvement of the parties. Also, it is in these macro-campaigns that television has more extensively taken over the information furnishing and voter-mobilisation functions of parties. Hence, the title for Phillips' scenario should, more properly and accurately, have been "A New Presidential Party System for Post-Industrial America."

One final comment on Phillips' 1975 scenario—his prediction that, in the new party re-alignment that he projects, the Republican Party is less likely to survive, at least in name, rings false today after the sweeping Republican victory in 1980. Rather, it remains to be seen whether, in the four years ahead, the Republicans will proceed to become the new majority party or whether they would sink again to a decided minority status, as has been true for most of the period since 1932.

V
APPRAISAL : A FIFTH ECLECTIC SCENARIO

With the benefit of hindsight and the ideas and insights of the four other scenarists, I offer here tentatively (my crystal ball is also "so opaque"), the broad outlines of a fifth scenario of the future of the American party system, to wit:

1. A post-industrial presidential party system with more ideology and more emphasis on issues, with media-utilizing and media-assessed candidates, with widespread use of communications and computer technology in its operation, and with the same names employed as now for the two major parties.
2. A somewhat similar party system for the election of Senators and Governors of populous, urban states and for metropolitan mayoralty elections.
3. A state and local party system not markedly dissimilar to that existing today, since its focus would continue to be on the more traditional, non-post-industrial issues (e.g., administration of justice, institutional care, health and welfare programmes, paving of highways and streets, law and order, garbage collection, water supply and sewerage systems, etc.). Judged by party loyalty and support and by party identification, this party system will be much weaker than that existing in the

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New Deal period but appreciably stronger than the present presidential system.

4. In the 1980's, the two probabilities of either a new Republican majority, along the lines of Phillips' 1969 scenario, or a revived New Deal Democratic majority, akin to Sundquist's 1973 scenario.
5. A Republican Party coalition of the business, financial, manufacturing and mining interests, mostly all the Western states and particularly the Rocky Mountain states, the white voters of the South, the owners of the media, the Protestant moralists, the more prosperous farmer and town-dwellers of the midwest, the more affluent union members, the more conservative Catholics, and the bulk of retired persons. A Democratic Party coalition of the northeastern states, and Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii in the West, the blacks of both the north and south, the ethnics, the professionals of the knowledge industries, the journalists of the print and electronic media, liberal Protestants, and college graduate students. The Jewish vote will switch from party to party as the group perceives one party or the other favouring Israel at a given time.

In sketching this scenario of the future of the American party system, I am sobered by the demonstrable truth of Burke's observation that the past is a poor guide to the future.

December 1981.

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3 William N. Chambers, n. 2, pp. 95-112.

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5 It should be noted however, that in this period there was more Democratic support at the presidential level, with the Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912 and re-elected in 1916.

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6 See Everett C. Ladd, Jr., *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York, 1978), Second Edition, pp. 31-177, and Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1965), Third Edition, pp. 43-105, *re* the party coalitions of this period.

7 Thus, the time span of each of the four party systems was as follows: first, 36 years; second 36 years; third 36 years and fourth, 42 years—or an average of 36-38 years.

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11 A distinction should be made between southern whites and blacks *re* Democratic support. No Democratic candidate for president since Johnson in 1964 has carried the White vote of the South, while the Democratic loyalty of the southern blacks has increased since 1964, due substantially to the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and 1970 and the increased level of electoral participation by southern blacks. Thus, in 1976, Carter carried most of the southern states only by his large plurality among blacks: in 1980, though, Carter's strong black support was overwhelmed by Reagan's decisive dominance of the White vote. See, *Congressional Quarterly* (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 38, November 1980, p. 3297 for the state-by-state results of the 1980 election.

12 Jbid.

13 Everett C. Ladd with Charles D. Hadley, n.8, p. 238.

14 Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, n.8, p. 241.

15 Gallup surveys, *Public Opinion* (New York), Vol. 1, March/April 1978, p. 23.

16 *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 2 March 1981, p.3.

17 Gallup surveys for the appropriate years.

18 See Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, n.8, Chapter 4 and Kevin P. Phillips, *Mediacracy: American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age* (New York, 1975), Chapter 2.

19 Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, n.8, p. 57.

20 Ibid., p. 53. See also De Vries and Terrance, n.8, throughout.

21 Specifically, Kennedy (D) won by only two-tenths of one per cent in 1960, Johnson (D) won by a landslide margin of 22.6 per cent in 1964, Nixon (R) squeaked through by only four tenths of one per cent in 1968 but was re-elected by a margin of 24.0 per cent in 1972, Carter (D) had a winning margin of but two per cent in 1976, and Reagan's (R) winning margin in 1980 was 10.1 per cent. A margin of 10 per cent or more is considered a landslide in American presidential politics. Cf. Gallup surveys for appropriate years.

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31 Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1951), Chapter 10.
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RIOTS IN BRITAIN : AN ANALYSIS

By B. VIVEKANANDAN*

Peace and tranquility in Britain was seriously disrupted by a spate of riots in different parts of the country from April to July 1981. It is estimated that the riots, which affected Birmingham, Brixton, Liverpool, Manchester, Southall, etc., caused damage to properties worth about £45 million.[1] *Although some commentators have collectively characterized these riots as "racial," a closer look into their nature and participation would reveal that the riots were caused by a combination of factors, including race, unemployment, hooliganism, alienation of the youth, unsatisfactory housing conditions, suspicion over the impartiality of the police, etc.*

I
RIOT CAUSES ANALYZED

RACIAL FACTORS

The racial factor evolves mainly around the presence of coloured immigrants in Britain. Britain's immigrant population is about 1.8 million composed of peoples of Chinese, Italian, Jewish, West Indian, African and Asian origins out of a total of 57 million. Their presence in notable numbers has made the British society multi-racial. If one looks back to the post-Second World War history of race relations, it may be found that at least until the race riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958, seldom had the racial element been a contentious factor in Britain's social relationships. Indeed, one of the spillover effects of the race riots in 1958 was a louder demand for curbs on Commonwealth immigation into Britain, as a result of which the racial factor became a part of Britain's immigration policy.

Measures Restricting Immigration

It may be recalled that the coloured population in Britain in 1958 was only 1,90,000 out of which about 50,000 were from the Indian sub-continent.[2] However, following the racial disturbances of 1958, restrictions on Commonwealth immigration were sought on the ground of problems arising out of the concentration of immigrants in certain localities of Britain. Though these disturbances seem to have resulted in the development of a new attitude in official circles towards Commonwealth immigration to Britain, the British Government introduced a Bill to restrict Commonwealth immigration only in 1961, that too, according to R. A. Butler, then Home Secretary,

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"only after long and anxious considerations and a considerable reluctance."[3] It was stated that the government had initiated this measure due to pressures of certain social problems like inadequate housing, overcrowding and unemployment.[4] The Bill became an Act in July 1962. Since then immigration control has been progressively tightened. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, in the wake of the influx of Asians from Kenya to Britain following the "Kenyanisation" programme in Kenya, the Immigrants Act of 1971, which contained a "patrial" clause also and the British Nationality Bill passed by British Parliament this year, have applied severe restrictions on immigration—especially from the new Commonwealth countries—to Britain.

It is understandable that in order to deal with, or forestall, a particular social or economic situation, in this case to stem the tide of a large and sudden influx of people from outside, which also had the potentiality of added strain on the country's economy and social services, the British Government came forward with new legislations to end the open door policy hitherto pursued as regards Commonwealth immigration. But, at the same time it was also imperative to see that social relationships in Britain, especially between the majority and the ethnic minority already present, remained harmonious. Unfortunately, what has happened in Britain during the last two decades was that simultaneous to the introduction of restrictions on Commonwealth immigrants, the complexion of immigrants—black and brown—was highlighted and an alarming picture painted of its effects on the future composition of the British population. Imaginary figures of a highly exaggerated nature have been presented by persons like Enoch Powell; for example, about the would-be coloured population in Britain in the year 2000 in order to stir up hatred against immigrants already settled in Britain. Enoch Powell, as an individual, and the British Movement and the National Front as organizations have become the disseminating centres of this racist-loaded propaganda against the coloured immigrants in Britain.

Today, Britain has a coloured population of about 2.3 million out of which about 7 lakhs are from the Indian sub-continent with an Indian component of about 4 lakhs mainly drawn from a few districts of Punjab. Others hail mainly from the West Indies and Africa. If one goes by the statistics, it is obvious that in the midst of 55 million whites the presence of 1.5 million coloured population is too insignificant a number to make any impact on the overall complexion of Britain. But it can create problems if there is concentration of immigrants in certain localities after effecting substantial displacement of the local whites in Britain. Indeed, this has occurred in certain areas like Birmingham, Brixton, Manchester, Southall, Toxteth, Wolverhampton, etc. To a great extent this clustering has hampered the assimilation process of the immigrant population with the British way of life.

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Role of Fascist Political Organizations

In recent years considerable pressures have been built up in Britain against the coloured immigrants. Besides the various social and legal measures, some of them were also subjected to harassment by the overzealous immigration officials at various entry points in Britain, including the Heathrow airport. Fascist organisations like the British Movement and the National Front have emerged in the country with an avowed objective of harassing coloured immigrants and making their lives miserable. They lead physical and verbal assaults on the non-white population through their arm band—the Skinheads.[5] This developing hostile environment has forced the coloured peoples to seek safety by clustering together.

The National Front in its manifesto published in 1979, reiterated its pledge to repatriate "all coloured immigrants and their offspring." Such repatriation, they believed, would alleviate the suffering of "non-white people condemned to live in an increasingly hostile Britain."[6] The Front believes in the superiority of the White race and thinks that there is a "cultural clash" in Britain between the Whites and non-Whites. It believes also in cultural nationalism, the expression of which is its advocacy for repatriation of the coloured immigrants as the only possible policy which would meet Britain's needs—i.e. White.[7] *The Bulldog*, the newspaper of the Young National Front, is full of stories aimed at incitement of racial hatred against the coloured immigrants in Britain. The July 1981 issue of the newspaper wrote: "The blacks have our jobs, our homes and, if we don't fight back they will soon have our country."[8] In another article, captioned "Coloured Immigration Can Seriously Damage Your Health," the paper wrote that the immigrant doctors were killing, injuring and raping their patients.[9]

In recent years, the National Front, which has a 20 per cent component of Skinheads, has been concentrating its efforts on school children in order to convert them to the cause of racialism. This is being done by the adoption of Nazi methods—effective and enduring indoctrination of immature minds. In the process, the Front radiates a message of hatred against the coloured immigrants and depicts the latter as the sole cause of Britain's ills. Indeed, of all the activites of the National Front, this one, unless effectively curbed, has highly dangerous potentials since it instils in the upcoming generation racism, violence and other fascist methods which can cut at the very roots of the value system upon which the British political and social edifices are built.

British Society Rejects Fascist Race Propaganda

Without much doubt it may be said that British society as a whole is basically receptive to the concept of a multiracial Britain and is tolerant to the coloured immigrants. A cross-section of the British people openly acknowledge the contributions that immigrants have made to the health and wealth

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of Britain, conceding them the right to enjoy a respectable position, free from discrimination, in British society. At the official level also, several measures have been taken to promote harmonious race relations. In 1965 the first Race Relations Act, which outlawed racial discrimination in public places and made incitement to racial hatred unlawful, was passed; it set up a Race Relations Board to enforce anti-discrimination laws. In 1968, the Government passed the second Race Relations Act which outlawed racial discrimination in housing, employment, facilities and services and set up the Community Relations Commission in order to promote racial harmony. Again in 1976, the third Race Relations Act was passed which gave power to make formal investigations against companies or any other organisations suspected of discrimination and gave individual complainants direct access to courts. In 1977, the Commission for Racial Equality emerged out of the old Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission, arming it with wide powers to eliminate racial discrimination and promote racial harmony. The record shows that during the four years of its existence, the Commission had completed inquiry into 10 cases and found that widespread discrimination was prevalent at different areas and levels of employment.[10] But, the Commission's effectiveness has not yet been felt in Britain.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the British population undoubtedly detest racism and treat the racists with revulsion; they have also never approved the extremist line followed by racist groups like the National Front or the British Movement. It is important to note in this context that the National Front and its pernicious programme of the repatriation of "all coloured immigrants and their offspring" got a severe rebuff from British society when it totally rejected all its 303 candidates who contested the 1979 General Elections in Britain. The rejection was so total and resounding that all the Front candidates lost their deposits miserably; except John Tyndall, the Chairman of the Front, none of the others polled more than 2,000 votes. In all the National Front could collect only a dismal 0.6 per cent of the total votes polled.

At the political level also, no major political party in Britain has shown any inclination to support racial discrimination against the coloured immigrants. It may be recalled that when Enoch Powell, whose views in the matter approximate to those of the National Front, made an inflammatory speech at Birmingham on new Commonwealth immigrants on 20 April 1968, saying that "like the Romans, I seem to see the river Tiber foaming with much blood," it took hardly 24 hours for the Conservative Party leader, Edward Heath, to condemn the speech and dismiss Powell from the Shadow Cabinet as a punitive measure. Although Mrs. Margaret Thatcher is credited with her pre-election reference to the fear of Britain being "swamped" by immigrants, and although Edward Heath criticized her policies as breeding racial hatred, she has not lent any support, as Prime Minister, to discrimination or harassment of the coloured immigrants in Britain.[11] On the other hand, the Government has expressed determination to fight racism in the

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country. William Whitelaw, Home Secretary, while emphasizing "our duty to fight racial hatred," reaffirmed the Government's "complete" commitment

> ...to a society in which every one has equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities. We want a society in which people are treated acording to their merits as human beings and fellow-citizens, and not on the basis of irrational preconceptions; a society in which individual customs and traditions are respected; a society in which equal opportunities are open to all. I do not believe there are separate roads to equal society for black or brown or white.... All our citizens are entitled to equal treatment and equal opportunity."[12]

Racist Explosion in Southall

Coloured immigrants are seen all over Britain—from the Scottish Western Isles in the north, through many of the industrial cities of the north and midlands, down to the districts of London in the south. They occupy important positions as doctors, magistrates, civil servants and elected members of local authorities. But, since the vast majority of them are attached to industry, their larger concentration is in the industrial towns. Nevertheless, interestingly enough, although the recent riots were largely in the cities where there is a concentration of coloured immigrants, it would be a travesty of truth to say that racism was the principal element of violent outbreaks in these areas. In fact among the riot-affected areas in recent months Southall was the only instance of a racist explosion, and that too was caused by the intervention of racist elements from outside.

Southall has the largest concentration of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent. These Asian immigrants, mostly Indians from Punjab, began to settle in Southall in the 1950s and early 1960s displacing the local Whites. In fact, the 1961 census shows that there were 2,000 Commonwealth immigrants in Southall—1600 from India.[13] Since then however, Southall has witnessed a steady flow of Asians. As a result, today out of a total population of 70,000 in Southall, about 35,000 are Asians, mainly Indians from Punjab. It is true that this concentration of an ethnic immigrant group in one locality and its spillover effects have given rise to certain genuine complaints from the local population. These complaints from the local population, that the immigrants in Southall showed little sensitivity to the feelings of the local white population appeared to be genuine. For instance, the local people had complained that there was no facility to see an English movie in Southall. The author during a visit to Southall, three years ago, found that there was substance in this complaint. Some enterprising Indian entrepreneurs have bought all the three cinema theatres in Southall and not one was showing an English movie. Instead the movies shown in them were either Hindi, Punjabi or Urdu. However, despite complaints of this nature,

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they never reached a point of acrimony such which would spark off violence between the local population and Asian immigrants. Further, it has also been widely recognized that community relations between Whites and non-Whites in Southall were by and large harmonious.

Southall has been the scene of violence only twice—in 1979 and in 1981; on both occasions they were triggered off by the White extremists from outside. In April 1979, Blair Peach, a New Zealand teacher, was killed and scores injured, during a demonstration against a National Front meeting at the townhall in Southall.[14] In July 1981, the area was invaded by 200 Skinheads from London's East End on the pretext of playing "Oi" music at the Hamborough Tavern in Southall. They attacked the Asian shops in Broadway, and the Asian youth countered them.[15] Therefore, the riots in Southall in July this year could well be called race riots deliberately started by the Skinheads through provocative actions against the Asians.

BRIXTON: INEPT HANDLING BY POLICE

Barring Southall, the riots in other parts of Britain fall under a different category. In Brixton, for example, the riots—in April and July 1981—were caused by the inept handling of certain situations by the local police. The April riots were sparked off by the delay on the part of the police in taking a stabbed black youth to hospital on 10 April 1981, though there were certain other underlying local causes like unemployment, poor housing and economic and social deprivation.[16] Similarly, the 10 July riots were caused by the beating up and arrest of a young Black businessman who went to the police to plead in favour of a friend who was being roughed up by them.[17] Although the riots that followed could also be described as an expression of anger against the police, in actuality the disgruntled youth took it as an opportunity to loot the shops in the area. But, the riots which broke out five days later, on 15 July 1981, were undoubtedly caused by the heavy-handed and provocative police raids at midnight on a number of houses in a vain search for petrol bomb factories.[18] It was reported that during the search, the police used sledge-hammers, pick-axe handles, and crowbars to break open the doors and windows of the houses and smashed floors and furniture.[19] Reportedly, the looting in Brixton was the work of a group of White and Black youths—Whites 40 per cent and Blacks 60 per cent. Thus, all available evidences show that the principal cause of the riots in Brixton was the insensitive or high-handed police behaviour rather than racism. The high rate of unemployment among the youth was also a contributory factor.

TOXTETH: A COMBINATION OF HOOLIGANISM AND FRUSTRATIONS

Riots in the Toxteth District of Liverpool however, present a different scenario, although, as in Brixton, they broke out as a result of a small incident involving the local police. It may be pointed out that the problems

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of Liverpool are more complex than elsewhere in Britain. It has a sizeable section of the Irish community and a notable contingent of Black West Africans and West Indians settled since the late nineteenth century. The size of the Black population in Liverpool today is about 30,000, out of which about 40 per cent are British born. In addition to this the city has a sizeable Chinese community also. The presence of the Irish people has been responsible for a tradition of Protestant-Catholic fissure. Besides, Liverpool has a history of confrontation between the Blacks and the Whites; these occurred in May-June 1919 and in July-August 1948, when large sections of Black labour was displaced in order to rehabilitate the ex-servicemen returned from the Second World War. However, these confrontations did not lead to any street clashes.

A recent survey conducted by the Liverpool University reveals that the overall unemployment level in Liverpool-8 District (Toxteth included) is 43 per cent among the Whites and 47 per cent among the Blacks.[20] This thus is the dismal economic situation in which Liverpool, once a highly prosperous sea port, is placed today. Recession is also taking place in a progressive manner so that many large firms in the area have either closed down or are resorting to labour retrenchment. Among the notable firms which have closed in recent months in Liverpool are the Courtaulds factory, Tate and Lyle sugar firm, English Electric, Plessey, Thorn Colour Tubes, Cammel Laird, Western Ship Repairs, Tillotsons, Bird's Eye, Standard Triumph, Dunlop, Mecanno, and Massey Ferguson.[21] In addition to this, housing conditions also remain extremely unsatisfactory.

As in Brixton, riots in Toxteth were ignited by a small incident; on 3 July 1981, a Black youth chased by the police fell off from the motorcycle and was caught by them. Soon, about forty Black youths gathered there, grabbed the youth and disappeared. Riots followed when a crowd of about 150 Black and White youth appeared on the scene and clashed in the Upper Parliament Street—the main artery of the area. Notably, the rioters were both Blacks and Whites—of all ages and of both sexes—and the police were the direct and common target of their attacks. Cars were burnt and shops looted. Out of 63 persons arrested in connection with the riots—12 were Blacks and 51 Whites. Thus, taking into account the totality of the situation, it appears that the underlying causes of riots in Toxteth were a combination of hooliganism, unemployment and frustration among the Blacks and Whites who were awaiting a pretext. However, they cannot be described as race riots.

Similarly, in cities like Manchester, Leicester, Huddersfield, etc., the rioters indiscriminately damaged the establishments owned by the Asiams, West Indians and Whites and the police was again the common target of these multiracial rioters.

It is not necessary to survey, in detail, the recent riots which have taken place in other places like Bristol, and parts of London like Woolwich, Delham, Dalston, Fulham, etc., since all of them fall within the patterns

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detailed above. However, to a great extent these riots have served as a pointer to the test of the quality of the British society today. It is true that Britain is undergoing a difficult economic situation and recession; the unemployment figure has reached a record level close to 3 million. This mass unemployment, coupled with the bleak prospects of new job opportunities, has resulted in brewing unrest in Britain. As Peter Walker has rightly observed: "The history of cities has shown that irrespective of being black or white, high unemployment among teenagers has always meant a massive increase in crime."[22]

II
POSSIBLE PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Observers have given some thought to possible preventive measures which would help forestall recurrence of similar troubles. According to Roy Hattersley, Shadow Home Secretary, the problem could be combated by a policy of positive discrimination to help the young Blacks get jobs; special incentives to private companies in inner cities; major investments in housing, schools and amenities, and by the relocation of public enterprises to city centres.[23] William Whitelaw, Home Secretary, is of the view that the government should develop policies designed to promote mutual tolerance and understanding on which the whole future of a free democratic society depends. He expressed his determination to see that the evils of extremist, racialist activities are isolated and eliminated.[24] He also assured the minority communities of the Government's complete commitment to a society in which none is a second class citizen and in which people are treated according to their merits and as fellow citizens.[25]

Conceding that Britain has a multi-racial society and that the vast majority of the British population is a tolerant community detesting racism, one cannot overlook the racist fringe among the peoples and the cases of discrimination against coloured immigrants. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Coggan, publicly affirmed that the coloured people suffer discrimination in obtaining accommodation and employment.[26] Indeed, a recent survey in Liverpool reveals that out of a total of 22,000 City Council jobs in Liverpool, where a sizeable section of the population is Black, only 169 went to the latter.

As regards the role of the police force there is suspicion; in fact its handling of the riots has come under severe criticism. In a few cases at least the police behaviour has been put as the immediate cause of the eruption of riots, e.g., riots in Brixton, and Toxteth. Instances like deliberate driving in of police vehicles into crowds—once resulting in the death of a person in Toxteth on 29 July 1981—are cited as examples of the rash behaviour of the police which aggravated tense situations. Similarly, there is a widespreed feeling that police actions are at times prejudiced against the coloured population. Therefore, it is imperative to restore the confidence of the ethnic

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minorities as regards the impartiality of the police force.

Another remedial step would perhaps be concerted economic measures to find solutions to the economic and social causes of the riots in Britain. The British Government in the aftermath of these riots, seems to be addressing itself to steps which would lead to the creation of more employment opportunities in the deprived inner city areas—the scenes of riots—by reopening some of the factories already closed down and reversing the trends of recession through the provision of incentives to industries.

But the most difficult problem to tackle would be the scourge of racism which is being slowly injected in the minds of the upcoming generation in Britain by fascist organizations like the British Movement and the National Front, which preserve racial hatred as their principle asset. However, in the present situation, neither the "you have seen nothing yet" attitude of Enoch Powell, nor his imaginary talk of a future "civil war,"[27] nor the talk of "keep Britain white," can contribute to the promotion of racial harmony in Britain. If fear and animosity becomes the order of the day, it would destroy the very fabric of a good and tolerant society which Britain has boasted of until now. Indeed, the stream of disaffection and hatred spread by fascist organizations like the National Front poses an enduring threat to the very foundations of the social relationship in Britain based on equality, liberty and tolerance. However, to deal with the racial problem, a more tolerant mental outlook towards the ethnic minorities—especially the coloured—is necessary; so that the complex of "unwanted" does not get rooted in the minds of the coloured immigrants. Besides, in a positive sense, the coloured people should be made to feel at home in Britain, and efforts should be made to provide them with sufficiently higher level opportunities in the civil service, military and police—as is done in the United Sates—so that they ould have a sense of belonging and recognition that they are partners in the building up of a new Britain. As Edward Heath said, those who deal with racial questions should bear in mind that they are dealing not only with statistics "but with people, with human beings, who have families and who have lives to live and who have problems just like everybody else."[28] However, dependence on CS gas, water cannon or rubber bullets or additional powers to the police, or even imposition of penalty on the parents of the youth involved in riots could hardly be a viable or durable solution.

As the recent riots in Britain seem to have been caused by a combination of racial-cum-economic-cum-social problems of the British society, it becomes imperative to adopt a multi-pronged approach to combat these problems. Racial hatred is undoubtedly an expression of dehumanisation. And to launch planned attacks on innocent people in the name of their colour, to make their lives miserable and unsafe, is further degradation. There is no doubt that fear is corrosive and destructive—whether it is the fear of police for a law-abiding citizen or the perennial fear of an instant fascist attack. What an onslaught it would be on Britain's esteem if its streets were to become unsafe and the pedestrians constantly intimidated by the lurking

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fear of murderous assaults anywhere at anytime at the hands of fascist, racist groups?

In this context, the findings of the Scarman Committee, which enquired into the riots, published in November 1981, makes interesting reading. The 154-page Report could well constitute a landmark in Britain's race relations and police-community relationship. Although the latter relationship in Britain remains the main focus of the Report, the Commission has extensively analyzed the riots and devoted a substantial portion of its report to focus the social causes—especially unemployment, housing, discrimination, education, insecurity, etc.[29] The Report underlines the point that racial disadvantage suffered by Britain's 2.3 million non-white population is a current fact of British life and that "urgent action is needed if it is not to become an endemic, ineradicable disease, threatening the very survival of our society."[30] It also blamed the police and the community at large for the outbreak of the riots and urged the Government and the local authorities to take steps to eliminate racial inequality.

> The attack on racial disadvantage must be more direct than it has been ....A policy of direct and co-ordinated attack on racial disadvantage inevitably means that the ethnic minorities will enjoy for a time a positive discrimination in their favour. But, it is a price worth paying if it accelerates the elimination of the unsettling factor of racial disadvantage from the social fabric of the United Kingdom.[31]

Further, Lord Scarman took note of the provocative nature of marches by extreme right-wing groups through areas of high ethnic minority settlement and observed that the sight of those marchers, heavily escorted by columns of police, had led significant numbers in the minority communities to conclude that the police were present purely to protect those marching and were therefore in agreement with their political beliefs. " 'Institutional racism' does not exist in Britain, but racial disadvantage and its nasty associate, racial discrimination, have not yet been eliminated. They poison minds and attitudes; they are, and so long as they remain, will continue to be a potent factor of unrest," it concluded.[32]

Most of the blame for the breakdown of community relations was laid at the doors of the police force. Their racial prejudices and consequent tough policing tactics against young blacks, the Report stated, was largely responsible for their social harassment. The Brixton riots, the Report added, were "essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police." There was a strong racial element in the disorders but they were not a race riot.[33] In Southall, the Committee observed, the Skinheads were to blame. "The disorders which ensued appear to have been a response to what the local Asian community saw as an intrusion into its area by a racially hostile group of white youths. To that extent, the circumstances of the disturbances differ from those in other areas."[34] The riots

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in Liverpool, the Report observed further, were a case of deprivation in the inner city areas.

In order to forestall the recurrence of similar situations, Lord Scarman called for a new approach both from the police and the Government. His recommendations, in this context, included: 1. The introduction of an independent element into the police complaints procedure; 2. The increase of the initial police training period from 10 weeks to six months as a step to eliminate racial prejudice from the police force; 3. A statutory framework for police-community consultation; 4. Recruitment of more police officers from the ethnic minorities; 5. Use of existing law to ban racist marches; 6. Inclusion of racially prejudiced behaviour as an offence in the Police Discipline Code, normally punished by dismissal; 7. Review by local authorities of their housing policies to check discrimination; 8. Better education for ethnic minorities; etc.[35]

The initial reactions, both official and unofficial, in Britain to the Scarman Report were quite favourable and encouraging. Roy Hattersley, the Shadow Home Secretary, expressed the view that "to reject any of its proposals would set back the cause of community relations in an unacceptable way."[36] Later, in a debate in the House of Commons on 10 December 1981, he said that if the Scarman Report was implemented it could make a dramatic improvement in two areas of concern: in the confidence that the police enjoyed among the ethnic minorities and policy of policing in the inner city areas.[37] David Lane, Chairman of the Commission of Racial Equality, called the Report a historic document which offered "a brilliant analysis of Britain's urban and racial problems and an urgent prescription for action."[33] *The Guardian* observed that the Report had created a watershed in Britain's policing policy.[39] The Association of Chief Police Officers welcomed the recommendation to increase the period of initial police training from 10 weeks to 6 months.[40] Leaders of the minority groups in Britain also welcomed the Report.

At the official level, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw instantly accepted two of the recommendations made by the Scarman Committee and promised careful examination of the others. In the House of Commons he stated on 25 November 1981, that he was preparing to introduce an independent element into the police complaints procedure and was also increasing the training period for the police. Discussions would also be held on arrangements for statutory consultation between the police and the community, he added, and efforts would be made to progress on the issue of banning marches considered racist.[41] Later, during a debate on the Scarman Report in the House of Commons on 10 December 1981, Whitelaw accepted Scarman's recommendation that vigourous action was required if the composition of the police force was to become more representative of the community it served.[42] In this connection, he pointed out that throughout the 1970s the number of police officers from the ethnic minorities from England and Wales had registered a steady increase. In 1970, he observed,

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there were only 33 non-white police officers in England and Wales, including 8 in the Metropolitan Police; but in 1981 it was 334, including 134 in the Metropoliton Police; Hereafter, he added, more candidates from the ethnic minorities would be encouraged to come forward to join the police force.[43] Needless to say that one would have to wait before making a proper assessment of the impact of these recommendations on Britain's social life until their actual implementation.

Nevertheless, one may ask the question: What can an outside world do in this context to help tackle this problem? The situation calls for moderation and understanding of the basic issues. Certainly, outright condemnation of the entire British society for the mindless racist behaviour of a few fascist elements is unfair and can prove to be counter-productive. In fact, unjustifiably condemnatory outbursts can hardly contribute towards the promotion of better relationship between Britain and, say, a country like India, from where about 4 lakh people have migrated to Britain. The efforts should be to strengthen the hands of those who genuinely try a multi-racial society in Britain.

November 1981.

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3 UK, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Session 1961-62, Vol. 649, col. 687.
4 Ibid., col. 694.
5 The Skinheads are divided between the British Movement and the National Front. They are distinguished by the laces of their boots; while the National Front Skins use red laces the British Movement Skins use white laces. They not only harass but also are violent to the coloured peoples of Britain.
6 *Financial Times* (London), 19 April 1979. The "Monday Club" suggested an annual repatriation of 50,000 immigrants, *The Times*, 4 May 1981.
7 See the interview with Martin Webster, National Front organiser in the *Financial Times*, 25 April 1979.
8 See *The Times*, 25 August 1981.
9 *The Times*, 28 August 1981.
10 *The Times*, 26 May 1981.
11 For Heath's criticism see, *The Times*, 2 July 1981.
12 British High Commission in India, *British Information Service* (New Delhi), BIS.B.269, dated 9 July 1981.
13 *The Times*, 9 June 1976.
14 *Financial Times*, 25 April 1979.
15 *The Times*, 4 July 1981.
16 *The Times*, 17 June 1981. About 300 people, mostly Black youths, were arrested in this connection.
17 *The Times*, 11 July 1981.
18 *The Times*, 16 July 1981.
19 Ibid.
20 *The Times*, 7 July 1981.

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21 Ibid.
22 Peter Walker, presently Minister of Agriculture, in an open letter to Prime Minister James Callaghan in June 1976. See, the letter reproduced in *The Times*. 8 July 1981.
23 *The Times*, 10 July 1981
24 *The Times*, 17 July 1981.
25 Ibid.
26 *The Times*, 15 June 1976.
27 Enoch Powell's interview on the BBC on 9 July 1981. See, *The Times*, 10 July 1981.
28 *The Times*. 10 April 1978.
29 See, UK, HMSO, *The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981: Report of An Inquiry by the Rt. Hon, The Lord Scarman, OBE*, Cmnd. 8427 (1981).
30 Ibid., p. 135.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 45. Also, see UK, HMSO, *Survey of Current Affairs* (London), Vol. 11, no. 12, December 1981, p. 374.
34 n. 29, p. 12.
35 The suggestions to include racially prejudiced behaviour as an offence in the police cadre was made by the Commission for Racial Equality. See, *The Times*, 3 September 1981.
36 *The Guardian* (London), 26 November 1981.
37 UK, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 14, no. 27 (Daily Report), 10 December 1981, col. 1008.
38 *The Guardian*, n. 36.
39 "Scarman: At the Watershed," *The Guardian*, 26 November 1981.
40 *The Times*, 8 January 1982.
41 See UK, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*. Vol. 13, no. 16 (Daily Report), 25 November 1981, cols. 891-900.
42 See UK, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 14, no. 27 (Daily Report), 10 December 1981, col. 1001. John Newing, Head of the Scotland Yard's Community Relations branch, said that recruitment of more black policemen by the Metropolitan Police was a priority of the Scotland Yard, He said that, "It is in line with British police traditions going back 150 years that we should be fully representative of the society we serve." See, British High Commission in India, *British Information Services*. (New Delhi), BIS, B 11, 14 January 1982, p. 1.
43 Ibid., col. 1002. It may be mentioned that Lord Scarman while suggesting an increase in black recruitment to the police, pointed out that "Britain with a population of 57 million, of which 4 per cent are non-white, has 11,8102 police officers and only 297 are non-whites."

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INTRA-NON-ALIGNED DISCORDS AND INDIA

"THERE exists today a paradoxical situation with respect to the movement of non-alignment."[1] Although its membership has increased from 25 plus at the First Non–Aligned Conference at Belgrade in 1961 to 93 plus at the Sixth Conference at Havana in 1979, the non-aligned movement has not emerged stronger as a factor in international relations. On the contrary, it has been weakened, and its "credibility" has been eroded.[2] One of the factors responsible for this weakening is increasing conflict between and among the non-aligned countries. Intra-non-aligned discords may be divided into two categories, ideological discords and bilateral disputes. Ideological discords have undermined the unity of the movement by virtually splitting the non-aligned countries into two groups: pro-Western and pro-Communist countries. In recent years there has been a move by Cuba and some other pro-Communist countries to nudge the movement closer to the Soviet bloc on the grounds that the Socialist countries are "the natural allies" of the non-aligned states. At the Havana Summit in September 1979 much time was taken up by some Arab countries trying to condemn Egypt for signing a peace treaty with Israel and by others, such as Somalia and Vietnam, to condemn their particular "enemies" within the movement.[3] Burma, disillusioned with the trend of deliberations at the summit meetings, withdrew from the movement soon after the Havana summit. Similarly, bilateral conflicts such as conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Iran and Iraq have affected the unity and solidarity of the non-aligned group adverrely, and several non-aligned countries are disturbed over the future of the movement.

India has a special association with non-alignment; it is not only its founder-member, but has also been a prominent one. It has been taking an active part in shaping its character, course and direction. That is why a study of its responses to the problem of intra-non-aligned conflicts deserves our attention.

Since the origins of non-alignment India has been solicitous about the unity among the non-aligned countries. Jawaharlal Nehru, who formulated the policy of non-alignment in September 1946, was cautious lest there be differences among Asian countries on this policy. This was discernible in his speech at the Asian Relations Conference that he convened in March 1947. He said, the countries of Asia should work for the larger ideal of "one world" and not for any group which came in the way of the larger world group. However, he made no reference to the policy of non-alignment. Possibly he thought that "this idea would be too novel and controversial to recommend to this Conference."[4] It is likely that he was circumspect because of the advent of the Cold War.

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INDIA'S ROLE IN INTRA-IDEOLOGICAL DISCORDS

Nehru's Role in the Fifties

"Ideological issues became the burning realities of international life," in the post-Second World War period.[5] The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States in the wake of World War II had grown intense towards the mid-fifties; it was "almost impossible to consider any matter logically, reasonably or by itself." Everything was considered from the Communist or anti-Communist point of view because the major part of the world was divided into the Western and the Communist blocs.[6] Such an international milieu tended to divide the non-aligned countries along the sides of the rival cold war antagonists. This could be discerned at the Asian-African Conference which was held in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955. The Conference, attended by independent countries of Asia and Africa, reflected the cold war attitudes of the time. All participating countries were opposed to colonialism, but several of them, including a few non-aligned countries such as Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), wanted to oppose what they described as Soviet imperialism.[7] Sir John Kotelawala, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, called on the Conference to condemn "all forms of colonialism" including "Soviet colonialism" as evidenced by Soviet domination of Central and Eastern European States. "Are not these colonies," he asked, "as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa and Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty to openly declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism."[8] Nehru apprehending that such a view would split the conference, made a prolonged intervention in the debate opposing Kotelawala. He reminded the delegates that some of the states alleged to be subjects of "Soviet colonialism" like Poland and Czechoslovakia—were represented in the United Nations. Many of the participating countries recognized those states and had diplomatic relations with them. Some Western countries also recognized them. The United Nations recognized them as sovereign, independent states. Nehru made it clear that it was not proper for the Conference then to challenge the basis of that recognition. He said: "It seems to me rather extraordinary that we should discuss nations as such whose people we have recognized in the capacity of sovereign nations and then say that they are colonial territories." He appealed to the delegates to take a broader view of the issue and desist from taking a stand such as would split the Afro-Asian countries between rival ideological groups.[9] Nehru opposed the "war of ideologies which he said, "smacked of all the bigotry, fanaticism and intolerance which characterized the religious crusade of Europe." He endeavoured to keep this part of the world free from big power politics and desired to turn this region into an "area of peace."[10]

These ideological differences crystallized by the 1960's leading to the emergence of two distinct groups: radicals and moderates. While the radicals

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stressed the need for a struggle against the established order, the moderates sought its continuance so as to solve their domestic problems. Both groups wanted to secure full independence—political and economic—from the Great Powers; while the radicals believed that the only means to achieve this objective was to continue their struggle against the imperialists, the moderates felt that their salvation lay in international co-operation. For them, the idea of orderly change and industrial and technological progress with capitalist co-operation was the ideal.[11] But for the radicals, confrontation was a basic precondition to economic progress.

The rival non-aligned groups, i.e., the radicals and moderates, projected their differences at subsequent non-aligned conferences. At the Non-Aligned Preparatory Meeting in Cairo in June 1961, the radicals—Indonesia, Guinea, Mali and Cuba—advocated a "narrow" concept of non-alignment and attempted to make the non-aligned group a closed society by granting admission only to a few countries.[12] India feared that the radicals might attempt the formation of a third bloc, something repugnant to its conception of non-alignment. Later, supported by Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Egypt and Yugoslavia, it recommended a "flexible" definition o fnon-alignment. The leader of the Indian delegation, R.K. Nehru, the then Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry pleaded for the extension of the perimeters of non-alignment. India finally won the day when its conception of non-alignment prevailed.[13] It along with the sponsoring countries, adopted a broad criteria, representative of diverse elements, for defining non-alignment.[14]

If the radicals had had their way, they would have confined themselves to condemning Western "colonialists" at the Belgrade Conference. It was Nehru who stressed that the Belgrade Conference should desist from indulging in negative fulmination against "Western imperialists" and strive for "constructive" results. At the Conference, the radicals led by President Sukarno of Indonesia laid the blame on Western colonialism and imperialism for all the problems confronting the world. He reiterated the view that "there can be no co-existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other."[15] Nehru, on the other hand, without getting bogged down by ideological conflicts stressed the importance of maintaining peace in the world and highlighted the "dangers of modern nuclear warfare" which overshadowed all other issues. Nehru said:

> Imperialism, Colonialism, Racialism and the rest—things which are vitally important—are somewhat over-shadowed by this crisis, for if war comes all else for the moment goes. Therefore it becomes inevitable for us . . . to make sure that the dominant note of our thinking and action and what we say and put down is that it is that crisis that confronts humanity.[16]

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India Breaks China's Drive for Influence in Afro-Asia

Ideological differences increased among the non-aligned countries in the years following the Belgrade Conference. Although the Cold War had been eroded towards 1962-64, China intensified its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union during this period and made a vigorous bid to win allies in the Third World; it used Indonesia and Pakistan as its cat's paw. The campaign for a second Asian-African Conference during this period was part of the China drive for influence in the Afro-Asian countries.[17] Thus Afro-Asia and non-alignment which ran parallel in the 1950s became "openly competitive" towards the mid 1960s.[18] India contributed to the growth of the non-aligned movement by discountenancing the move for a second Asian-African Conference and by taking active part in organizing a second non-aligned conference. However, Nehru's death in May 1964 left the moderate non-aligned states in disarray. At the Second Non-Aligned Conference which took place in Cairo in September 1964, the radicals such as President Sukarno of Indonesia and African leaders like Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Modeiba Keita and Ben Bella stressed "almost exclusively the struggle against colonialism."[19] Besides, Sukarno advocated a policy of confrontation with the developed countries. He stated: "There will be peaceful co-existence between us the developing countries and the imperialist states only when we can face them with equal strength."[20] Lal Bahadur Shastri, on the contrary, stressed the importance of peaceful co-existence, nuclear disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes; he said: "We must continue to strive for peace, to resolve all differences through peaceful methods by conciliation, as distinct from confrontation and by trust instead of suspicion."[21]

Mrs. Gandhi's Contribution to a United Non-Aligned Group

Nevertheless, towards the mid-1960s India's position in the international sphere was low; its debacle in the war with China in 1962 had already shattered its global image. Worsening political and economic conditions that followed in the wake of the death of Nehru further weakened its international standing. It thus maintained a low posture in world affairs, and its low profile synchronized with the eclipse of the non-aligned movement.[22] There were two main reasons for it. First, "cohesion between the more radical and moderate member countries proved to be precarious."[23] Secondly, with the relaxation of tensions between the two Super Pewers in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, non-alignment seemed to have fallen into desuetude inasmuch as it was considered less relevant. However, it became active in the following decade when India's domestic situation improved.

India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, overcame the trauma of the earlier reverses in the 1962 war with China by strengthening militarily and politically. It also began to improve its global image. The non-aligned group recovered and came to life again in the seventies.[24] Mrs. Gandhi

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played a major role in reactivating the movement; she not only highlighted the relevance of non-alignment but also sought to strengthen the movement by emphasising economic co-operation among the non-aligned countries. In an interview with the Yugoslav news agency, *Tanjug* in August 1970 Mrs. Gandhi said: "Non-alignment at present has more value than ever before because there exist two hostile blocs. The theory of domination of Super Powers and spheres of influence is still very much present. Therefore, it is important that nations declare themselves to have their own independent policies." She discerned that "the biggest danger" to non-alignment "is the conomic pressure of large countries," and laid stress on developing economic co-operation. She said, "Non-aligned countries in essence have the same problems. They are all poor countries.... and therefore, I think, they must try to find ways to support each other and to help every country to consolidate its independence. If we do not become economically stronger, our independence will to a certain degree be in danger."[25] Mrs. Gandhi regarded "neo-colonialism" as a threat to the non-aligned countries; at the third Non-aligned Summit in Lusaka, she stated: "The old comes back in a new guise. There are subtle intrigues to undermine our self-confidence and to sow dissensions and mutual distrust among us. Powerful vested interests, domestic and foreign, are combining to erect new structures of neo-colonialism."[26] In fact, non-alignment changed its character and content in an important aspect in the 1970s. "From a primarily political strategy individually and collectively followed by the new states it has transformed itself fundamentally into a collective economic movement of the Third World Countries."[27] India under the premiership of Mrs. Gandhi took a leading role in bringing about this transformation of non-alignment. She recommended that economic issues be discussed at non-aligned conferences. In an interview to *Tanjug* in August 1973 Mrs. Gandhi said, that the most significant subject that the non-aligned summit at Algiers should address itself was to secure a better deal economically to the developing nations. She added that the conference should try to "influence the world economic forces in such a way that developing nations, especially those in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Caribbeans can overcome their poverty and secure a fairer return for their experts."[28]

India Checks Tilt Towards Soviet Union

Ideological differences surfaced again at the Algiers Summit. Fidel Castro of Cuba made a special plea for treating the Soviet Union favourably and refused to paint the two Super Powers with the same brush. He was opposed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Col. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. While Prince Sihanouk strongly dissented with Fidel Castro, Col. Gaddafi branded both the United States and the Soviet Union as colonialists and imperialists.[29] India did not get involved in the ideological dispute but criticised the old power politics' game practised by Big Powers.

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At the Algiers Summit, Mrs. Gandhi welcomed *detente* between the Super Powers but pointed out that domination, external interference, coercion and occupation of other lands were continuing. She also warned against threats to world peace by the deliberate induction of arms in the name of promoting regional balance.[30]

As Super Power rivalries increased by the mid–seventies, particularly in the Indian Ocean region, and the two intensified their struggle for influence among the non-aligned countries, the major challenge before the latter was how to resist pressures, political or economic, from the Big Powers. In fact, some of the non-aligned countries were being used by the Super Powers as surrogates for fighting their battles by proxy, as it were, in non-aligned conferences. This could be discerned not only at the Algiers Summit Conference but also at the Colombo Summit meeting where Singapore's Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam presented the case for co-operation with the West, whereas the Cuban Deputy Prime Minister, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, reiterated that the non-aligned movement must recognise the Soviet Union as its chief ally.[31] Nevertheless, India stressed the unity of the non-aligned countries and cautioned against pressures from the Big Powers to divide and weaken them. In a speech at the Colombo Summit Conference, Mrs. Gandhi emphasised unity and said that a united non-aligned group would make an impact on world peace and on the evolution of a new economic order. She called for vigilance against attempts to split the movement, violate its integrity or introduce discords from outside. Colonial rule had almost, she observed, ended, but the legacy of the Cold War continued and many nations remained politically vulnerable to Big Power pressures.[32]

Cuba and other pro-Soviet countries, however, made vigorous efforts to commit the non-aligned movement to an alliance with the Soviet bloc[33] and were disinclined to put up with innuendoes critical of the Soviet Union. At the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in Belgrade in July 1978, they took exception to the inclusion of the word "hegemonism" in the draft political declaration since this term is normally associated with or seen as a reference to Soviet domination. At one stage, the uncompromising stands of the pro-Soviet group and their opponents on this particular word threatened to wreck the Conference and it was India which finally brought about a compromise. The word "hegemonism" was not deleted from the declaration but it was incorporated in such a way that it could be interpreted as referring to Western or Soviet hegemonism.[34] Similarly India played a role of a moderator at the meeting of the 25-nation Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries at Maputo (in Mozambique), in February 1979. The original draft communique prepared by the host country referred to socialist countries as "natural allies" of the non-aligned movement. India rightly pointed that while the help rendered by socialist countries to the liberation movement could not be minimized, a reference to that bloc as "natural allies" could well offend non-socialist countries critical of the minority regimes in southern Africa. It clarified that it was not in the interests of the liberation movements

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themselves to be deprived of support from all sources, socialist or non-socialist. The Indian view finally prevailed.[35]

The move to have the Soviet Union recognized as the "natural ally" of the non-aligned group,[36] mooted at the Algiers Summit and then reiterated at the Colombo meet, was openly campaigned for by the host country at the 1979 Havana Non-Aligned Summit Conference. India expressed the view that the concept of non-alignment ran counter to the philosophy of "natural alliance."[37] S.N. Mishra, the then Indian Foreign Minister, opposed the Cuban move to line up non-aligned nations behind the Soviet bloc in its ideological war with the Western bloc. He made it clear that—"We cannot have one foot in non-alignment and another in alignment."[38] Although Cuba and other pro-Soviet countries were not able to have their way at the Havana Summit, they succeeded in shifting the emphasis of non-alignment towards a more "anti-imperialist" stance. The Havana Declaration not only condemned imperialist states, in particular the United States, for seeking to "increase and consolidate their military presence in the (West Asian) region" but also criticised Egypt for signing a peace treaty with Israel.[39]

INDIA'S STAND ON BILATERAL DISPUTES

The Issue of Egypt's Suspension from Membership

Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in Washington on 26 March 1979. President Carter, who had earlier initiated the Camp Devid Agreement, justified his sponsorship of the treaty by stating that it would open the way for peace in the West Asian region.[40] But the treaty which bore the "Made in USA" stamp assumed ideological overtones; whereas it was warmly welcomed by the governments of Western countries, it was vehemently condemned by official Soviet sources and other Communist bloc countries. Speaking at a banquet in Damascus on 27 March, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, said that the treaty struck a blow at the interests of all Arabs without exception and could not lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East because "its real purpose is to try to consolidate the results of the imperialist aggression of many years against the Arabs."[41] Most of the Arab states registered strong opposition to the treaty and demanded the suspension or expulsion of Egypt from membership of the non-aligned movement on the ground that it had acted contrary to the decisions of the non-aligned conferences over the Arab-Israeli conflict. This demand "divided not only the Arab states but the entire membership of the movement."[42]

India took a critical view of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty because it ignored the basic issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict; it did not provide for Israel's full withdrawal from Arab territories it occupied by force in the 1967 War and the Palestinian people's legitimate rights in statehood and self-determination.[43] Nevertheless, it maintained friendly relations with

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Egypt and was averse to the Arab move to suspend or expel it from the membership of the non-aligned movement. Intra-regional disputes, it believed, should not bring into question the membership of any member of the movement. Morarji Desai, the then Indian Prime Minister, took a principled stand; he stated: "Whatever may be the trouble with the Arab countries, there is no provision for removal of any country as long as the country fulfils the commitments of the non-aligned movement and Egypt fulfils them."[44] The dispute between Egypt and other Arab states on the former signing a separate peace treaty with Israel was in fact an intra-Arab issue and was "extraneous" to the non-aligned movement.[45] The Havana Summit criticised Egypt for signing the treaty with Israel but shelved the question of suspension until February 1981 when the conference of non-aligned foreign ministers took place in New Delhi. At the New Delhi conference India dissuaded the Arab states from pressing their demand for suspension of Egypt. In fact, the suspension demand receded into the background and the issue of the Iran-Iraq war posed a greater problem at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in New Delhi in February 1981 where Tehran and Baghdad demanded the suspension of each other from the non-aligned movement.[46]

Disputes Between and Among the Non-Aligned States

In the early years of non-alignment, conflicts between and among the non-aligned states were few and were "lightly dismissed,"[47] but as tensions relaxed and their numbers swelled a number of disputes arose—particularly in the 1970s. This was largely because many non-aligned countries began to practise the traditional power model in international relations contrary to the theory of non-alignment and took recourse to arms in order to settle their disputes. Besides, some countries began to use the forum of non-aligned conferences for airing their bilateral differences.

India has been opposed to using the forum of non-aligned conferences for ventilating bilateral differences. It stressed unity of the non-aligned nations for achieving common objectives such as the goal of a better world economic order. At the Colombo Summit in August 1976 Mrs. Gandhi said:

> We should not allow such differences as may exist between some members on certain issues to affect our unity. With so many leaders the conference is too important to spend time on bilateral matters. There are risks when national goals completely supersede the collective purpose.[48]

India also mobilized support for the view that bilateral differences among the non-aligned need not be projected at summit conferences but should be resolved by direct negotiations.[49]

In the second half of the 1970s many armed conflicts, such as the conflict

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between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Cambodia and Vietnam, took place among the non-aligned states. The threat to the unity of the group became so grave in 1978 that this issue dominated the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers. A.B. Vajpayee, the then Indian External Affairs Minister, called for a code of conduct for non-aligned nations with a view to ensuring strength and unity of the movement. He explained that the main element of that code should be an agreement among the nations that they should respect established frontiers and not resort to force for settling disputes.[50] The Belgrade Conference decided to offer the good offices of an informal ad-hoc group of fellow non-aligned nations for peaceful settlement of disputes between members without outside interference.[51] In consonance with this decision some non-aligned states offered their good offices and endeavoured to bring about peace between Iran and Iraq when the armed conflict between them began on 22 September 1980.

The Iran-Iraq War

India was concerned over the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. The bulk of the crude that it imported came from these two countries and it rightly felt that a prolonged conflict would cause serious problems.[52] Nevertheless, India adopted a "wait-and-see attitude."[53] It had cultivated friendly relations with both the countries and was keen to maintain them; it was therefore cautious with its peace initiatives for fear of being misunderstood. It also probably wanted to await the outcome of the Islamic Conference peace endeavours. The Islamic Goodwill Peace Mission, comprising the President of the Conference, Gen. Zia-ul Haq and the Secretary General, Habib Chatty, visited Tehran and Baghdad towards the end of September 1980. However, Zia-ul-Haq's initiative did not succeed. Shams Ardakani, Iran's special envoy who visited New Delhi on 29 September to deliver a message to the Indian Prime Minister from his country's top leadership, announced that Iran did not accept the Pakistani President's mediatory role. He said that his country expected the non-aligned countries, such as India, to play a "great role" to bring the Iran-Iraq hostilities to an end.[54] Similarly Iraq also sought India's initiative in bringing its conflict with Iran to an end.[55]

India's peace initiatives were started in October when it found that the earlier endeavours of the Islamic Conference did not get off the ground and that there were no indications of the conflict abating. Mrs. Gandhi wrote letters to Presidents Saddam Hussain and Bani Sadr making an impassioned plea for a peaceful solution of the problems between the two countries. Mrs. Gandhi expressed apprehension that the conflict between two non-aligned countries would weaken the unity and solidarity of the movement. She also pointed out that a prolonged conflict between these two countries would lead to increased interference by super powers in the region to the detriment not only of Iran and Iraq but also other nations of the region.

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She further stressed the need for both belligerents to observe restraint and take immediate steps to halt the fighting.[56] India also decided to send Romesh Bhandari, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, on an urgent mission to Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to impress upon these countries the urgency to make efforts to see that the conflict did not spill over to the rest of the region. It was also aimed at securing oil supplies for India from these countries.[57] Romesh Bhandari also met the Iraqi President on 27 October and expressed India's concern over the conflict. India intensified its efforts to bring about a ceasefire towards the end of October. On 30 October Mrs. Gandhi convened a high level meeting to discuss the war situation. The meeting attended by the External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Foreign Secretary, R.D. Sathe and the Secretary for External Affairs, Romesh Bhandari, who had just returned after talks with the leaders in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait, discussed the outcome of Bhandari's talks with President Saddam Hussain of Iraq, King Hussain of Jordan and the Amir of Kuwait. It also discussed the results of Narasimha Rao's visit to New York where he had had talks with the foreign ministers of several countries including those of the Non-Aligned Co-ordination Bureau on the Iran-Iraq War. The Indian Government decided to send Sathe to Iran on 31 October as a special envoy of Mrs. Gandhi to confer with the Iranian leaders on the war.[58] He met Bani Sadr, the then Iranian President and delivered a letter from Mrs. Gandhi expressing grave concern at the conflict and a wish for an early end to the hostilities.[59]

Thus India not only made individual peace efforts, it also assisted the collective non-aligned initiatives to end the war. The Co-ordination Bureau of non-aligned countries which met in New York on 27 October decided that a goodwill committee would be set up offering its services. However, the foreign ministers of seven non-aligned states, who met in Belgrade in the beginning of November failed to institute a goodwill committee. There was a stalemate over its composition. While Iraq objected to the inclusion of Algeria on the committee, Iran insisted on the Algerian candidature. External Affairs Minister, Narasimha Rao, conceded that the non-aligned efforts to end the conflict had not made any notable headway. However, India would not relent in its efforts to restore peace between Iran and Iraq. In his statement in Parliament on 18 November, Rao said:

> We will continue to offer our good offices in whatever way both the countries or the international community may require of us. We are prepared to play this role because we believe this conflict to be one of the most unfortunate that has taken place in recent times.[60]

Again, at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference which met in New Delhi on 9 February 1981, Mrs. Gandhi made a pointed reference to the "unhappy conflict in West Asia between two of our own brothers" and

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pleaded with the two belligerents to end the war.[61] The Delhi Conference appointed a four-member Goodwill Committee to bring about peace between Iran and Iraq. The Committee consisting of India, Cuba, Zambia and the Palestine Liberation Organization met in Geneva, New Delhi, Nicosia and Lusaka and visited Tehran and Baghdad three times in search of ways to end the war. However, they failed to effect even a cease-fire. When the Goodwill Mission arrived in Tehran on 7 August 1981, for the third time, to offer its good offices, the Iranian President, Mohammad Ali Rajai told the mission that its "comings and goings" were "fruitless" and that the fate of the war would be decided on the battlefield.[62] Thus one of the factors that obstructed the efforts of the non-aligned Goodwill Mission was the rigid and irreconcilable position adopted by both Iran and Iraq; while Iran wanted a condemnation of the Iraqi action, coupled with the total Iraqi withdrawal, Iraqi leaders insisted on a recognition of the Shatt-al-Arab boundary before the Iraqi troops would withdraw. Apart from their differences over the boundary there also are historical animosities between them. The conflict between Iran and Iraq "is an elemental fight on both sides, a fight for honour and dignity—the deepest nationalist sentiments have been aroused and it has become a question of life and death."[63] Thus the conflict has turned itself into a war of attrition.

CONCLUSION

India's response to intra-non-aligned discords has primarily been motivated by its desire to maintain unity and solidarity of the non-aligned group. India has shown tolerance of differing ideologies and endeavoured to avoid an extreme ideological position at non-aligned conferences. By and large it attempted to play the role of a moderator between the two ideologically extremist non-aligned groups, that is, between pro-Western and pro-Communist groups at these conferences. It also endeavoured to strengthen the non-aligned movement by emphasizing its economic aspect especially when the policy of non-alignment seemed less relevant with the advent of *detente* and polycentrism. Moreover, it has made earnest efforts to prevent the weakening of the non-aligned movement by dissuading the member countries from broaching bilateral issues at the non-aligned conferences.

India's response to bilateral disputes between and among the non-aligned countries has been marked by circumspection. Possibly its circumspect response resulted from its policy to maintain friendly relations with all countries. This was particularly so with, regard to the conflict between Iran and Iraq. India endeavoured to continue friendly relations with both the countries. It did not support a stand which smacked of partisanship or self-righteousness. Thus when in November 1980 Iran urged it to condemn Iraq as an aggressor, it refused to oblige. However, it has been deeply concerned over the conflict and has made sincere efforts to bring it to an end. The failure of Indian efforts and those of the non-aligned goodwill peace missions

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shows intransigence on the part of the belligerents as well as the limitations of the non-aligned countries as a peace-making group.

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THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION: THE ROLE OF THE US IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

WITH the election of Ronald Reagan as the President of the United States, the latter's enthusiasm for promoting an Arab-Israel settlement has considerably waned. The assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt has further impaired the prospects of the negotiations. That leaves only Israel, which was lured to the negotiating table by the United States in the first place. In the present circumstances, therefore, a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict seems to be beyond the horizon. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to assess the United States' mediatory role in the dispute.

CONFLICT AND MEDIATION DEFINED

A widely used definition of a dispute under negotiation is given by Fred Ikle: "There must be both common interests and interests of conflict; without common interest, there is nothing to negotiate for, without conflict, nothing about."[1] The Arab-Israeli dispute—basically a contest between two distinct nations staking their claims on the same territory—has become a very complex problem in the course of almost half a century of its existence, involving issues like the border settlements, recovery of lost territories, disengagement of armies, liberation of Jerusalem, compensation and repatriation of refugees and a plethora of subsidiary issues flowing therefrom. Over the long decades, the Arab-Israeli dispute has attracted new disputants with the result that it has now become a crowded battle-arena: there is the Palestinian Zionist dispute at the centre, the Israeli border disputes with the frontline Arab states, the conflict between Arab nationalism and the state of Israel, and the Super Power contest at the outer-most perimeter. The battle arena, therefore, does not represent a neatly drawn picture as there are crooked lines, broken angles and overlapping borders.

The disputants' perceptions of the dispute are also different. The Israelis perceive the problem as one of survival and security. The Arab perception is not uniform. For the Palestinians, it is essentially the reassertion of their right to a nation-state. For Saudi Arabia, the principal issue is the liberation of Palestine. For the Baath ideology, it is the task of erasing Israel which is considered a blot over the vast, continuous stretch of Arab land, and so on. Even on the political plane, there are variations in the Arab perceptions of the problem at any given time, which are reflected in the rival groupings, mutual denunciation and an ever-shifting alliance pattern among the Arab countries.

Thus, from a mediator's point of view, the Arab-Israeli dispute is a very complex and a difficult task. At the same time, because of its complexities it is open to clever manipulation and exploitation—if the mediator is so inclined.

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ROLE OF A MEDIATOR

A mediator is a person acceptable to both the parties in a dispute; by implication therefore, a mediator should be a disinterested person as far as the substance of the dispute is concerned. The role of a mediator is to create conditions in which the parties join in identifying, defining and solving the problem. The mediator may fulfil this function either as a polite middle-man whose task is to encourage the convergence of interests between the two warring camps without making his presence felt or he could adopt a fiercely interventionist style of mediation and might even be willing and able to carry out the results of his mediatory efforts. An example would be, if the two parties agree on a general principle on the demarcation of the boundaries between their countries, the mediator may willingly take over the responsibility of sending his own team of trekkers to mark out the points along the border, or he may himself lead such a team. The point is that the mediator should accept whatever solution is agreed upon by the parties.

A relevant background to the United States' role in the Arab-Israel conflict is the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947. The resolution partitioned the Palestine territory into an independent Israel, an independent Arab state and an international city of Jerusalem. The United States was one of the important signatories of this resolution and as such, is committed to the recognition of Palestinians as a distinct nation and to their right to a sovereign, independent state. Since then therefore, it has been associated with the developments on this issue and has, at times, proposed elaborate plans for its resolution.

The United States' mediation, which was essentially an exercise in personal diplomacy in an on-going dialogue over a period of time, can be traced back only to Kissinger and his shuttles. Kissinger's mediatory role can be assessed at three separate levels.

Kissinger's Personal Diplomacy

In Kissinger's own words:

> ... by the summer of 1970, it was clear to him [William P. Rogers, Secretary of State], that he was being excluded from key decisions on almost all issues except the Middle East .... Neither Rogers nor I mustered the grace to transcend an impasse that we should have recognized was not in the national interest ... Rogers was reluctant to face the prospects that it [the Rogers' Plan] might fail; he was acutely sensitive to any hint of White House interference. He tended to consider my concerns as an attempt to deprive him of his own field of glory.[2]

From then onwards, Kissinger set himself the task of elbowing Rogers out of his only field of glory. Within a few months, the civil war in Jordan

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came as a God-send. In his autobiography, there are repeated references to his role during that episode; "... on 9 September 1970, I activated the WSAG, [Washington Special Action Group] the NSC [the National Security Council] machinery." "... I convened WSAG twice that day." "... my calender shows repeated meetings with the President that day." "... my records show that the President and I met five times alone between 9.30 a.m. NSC meeting and 2.50 p.m." Kissinger was performing in the prestigious Washington power-centres, not relating himself to the developments in Jordan.

By December 1971, he had pursuaded Nixon to adopt a dual-track approach under which Sisco would pursue the Roger's Plan by conducting "proximity talks" whereas Kissinger would work in a parallel back-channel. The understanding was that the two channels would continuously feed each other. But predictably, Kissinger got rid of the front-channel altogether and himself emerged out of the back-channel to be seen and heard across half the globe and with hundreds of tele-cameras and mikes trailing him for three years and more.

US Initiative on the Arab Israel Problem

What are the credentials of the United States on the Arab-Israel dispute? Does it have a record of objectivity and impartiality? Since Israel's birth the United States Government is committed to its national existence and territorial integrity and has put up with, and at times encouraged, the Israeli expansionist and adventurist policies *vis-a-vis* the Arabs.

Even on the popular level, the Arab-Israel issue is the most sensitive foreign policy issue. No other country attracts so much national attention and debate at the popular level. The emotional responses which Israel evokes are unique. It may also be noted that the pro-Israeli sentiments are deliberately and systematically articulated by the Zionist lobby.

Also, the domestic political circumstances were peculiar at the time of the United States' initiative on the Arab-Israel problem. The Arab-Israel war had jerked American public opinion into a realization of the need for a response to a drastically changed situation; the oil embargo and the price-hike had exerted an added pressure on the United States Government and the public alike. And significantly, Nixon was a Republican, whose constituency did not include the Jews. In fact, the 1972 Presidential Elections had witnessed a swing in the Jewish vote in support of Nixon—a positive outcome of McGovern's blundering on the Israeli issue. According to Kissinger, "The President was convinced that most leaders of the Jewish community had opposed him throughout his political career. The small percentage of Jews who voted for him, he would joke, had to be so crazy that they would probably stick with him even if he turned on Israel."[3]

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US Interests in West Asia

(a) Energy Interests: Was the US mediation prompted by the Arab-Israel War of 1973 or by the Arab oil politics of the same period? It is a question to which there are no authentic answers although all circumstantial evidence points to the second contingency. At least once during the negotiations, even Nixon acknowledged this when he said, "It is in the interest of these countries that imposed it as well as the United States that it be lifted. The two should be parallel. Inevitably, what happens in one area affects the other, and I am confident that the progress I am going to continue to make on the peace-front in the Mideast will be very helpful in seeing to it that an oil embargo is not reimposed."[4] There definitely was a linkage between the Arab oil politics and the United States mediatory role. In fact, it was the Arab oil which fueled and lubricated the Kissingerian shuttles.

(b) Strategic Interest: Kissinger's own rationale for the mediation was:

> A comprehensive approach involving all the parties would inherently favour the radicals by giving the most intransigent governments a veto over the entire process. If a settlement then appeared to result from the Soviet pressure or blackmail, the radical regimes with their anti-Western and pro-Soviet orientation would be strengthened. Territories would be seen as returning to Soviet clients. We needed to work not just for any solution but also to demonstrate that progress could be achieved best by our friends, that in other words, the moderates held the key to peace in the Middle East.[5]

In the light of the above analysis, the United States' mediation can be seen as arising out of four broad considerations:

1. Kissinger's personal political ambitions to come out of the wings to the centre of the stage;
2. Domestic political circumstances favouring an active US role on the issue;
3. Opportunity to enhance the prestige of the United States' allies in regional politics and thereby secure US predominance in the area, and
4. Freedom to conduct an exclusively American exercise. The Soviets would be kept out of the mediation process by dangling the carrots of SALT and the grain deals, if need be.

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THE MEDIATION PROCESS

On taking over as mediator Kissinger commented, "Now there are four Arab parties, and one Jewish party, and I think that's a script worthy of Dante's inferno!"[6] It gives an impression as if Kissinger's was an impulsive plunge into the inferno. Far from it. It was a meticulously calculated programme.

The rationale behind the shuttle was the step-by-step approach. This was justified on the ground that the West Asian situation was too entangled a problem to yield a general comprehensive solution. The tangles needed to be resolved by a tedious, gradual craftsmanship. The various knots in the situation, however, were never identified nor was the route to tackling them made clear, which should rightly have led to the final knot, the Palestinians. On 17 October 1973, when the Arab Foreign Ministers met Nixon and Kissinger in the middle of the war in West Asia and the cease-fire deliberations in the United Nations, Kissinger made it clear that he would not get involved in the Palestine problem. He argued that any talk of the Palestinian rights could mean "either the destruction of Israel or the destruction of Jordan."[7]

The shuttle mediation held out a case-by-case treatment to various issues. The issues were kept isolated and the parties were offered separate proposals. Thus, in his shuttle in October 1974, Kissinger's proposal to Sadat was a complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in return for an Egyptian declaration ending the state of belligerency.[8] The proposal to Jordan offered an Arab administration in the West Bank with Israeli military presence in the strategic areas there in return for a similar declaration.[9]

An interesting side-light of United States' mediation during the Kissinger years was the informal contact between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the Lebanese Civil War. It sought the assistance of the PLO, then controlling important land-roads and Muslim-dominated areas, to evacuate local Americans to safer areas. Later, Kissinger publicly confirmed these dealings with the PLO through the Egyptian, Tunisian and Saudi Arabian intermediaries.[10] This was a reversal in the play-acting. The mediator was in need for mediation, seeking help from a party it had deliberately kept out from the negotiation table.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF US MEDIATION

In January 1974, the Egyptian and the Israeli armies agreed to the first disengagement accord.

In May 1974, the Syrian and the Israeli armies agreed to the Golan Heights disengagement.

On 2 June 1975, Israel announced a reduction in troops, artillery and tanks along the Suez and on 5 June Egypt reopened the Suez Canal.

On 1 September 1975, Egypt and Israel concluded the Second Sinai Accord.

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The United States agreed to supervise one Egyptian and one Israeli strategic warning system and man six tactical warning stations in the Suez area. It also sanctioned substantial economic and military assistance to Egypt, automatically increasing assistance to Israel.

By the end of his shuttle-diplomacy, Kissinger had built up a regional power-structure of his own choice which consisted of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Soviet Union was effectively contained—at least for some time. Oil politics was in a shambles. In fact, the oil rich Arabs were more than ever dependent on the industrial west.

Carter's Role: Mediation to the Rapid Deployment Force

Jimmy Carter's foreign policy was committed to the preservation of human rights in the world. On West Asia, he drew heavily on the Brookings Institution study *Towards Peace in the Middle East*, which envisaged an ultimate solution of the Palestine problem either as a federation with Jordan or as an independent state. It also recommended the representation of the Palestinians in peace negotiations either as a single Arab delegation, or a delegation of the PLO after it had recognized Israel, or a delegation of the PLO and the non-PLO Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.

Carter's initial statements marked a definite advance over the previous Administration on at least three points. On 23 January 1977, he announced that the Geneva Conference was likely to be held in 1977.[11] Secondly, on 31 January, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, relented on the PLO condition of Israeli recognition while insisting on their acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 to qualify the representation at Geneva.[12] Third, Carter made a historic declaration on 17 March that the Palestinians were entitled to a "national home."[13] The term "national home" aroused memories of the Balfour Declaration, as the expression used was identical; it gave rise to hopes that exactly half a century after the Balfour grant of nationhood to Jews, which had resulted in the liquidation of the Palestinian nation, the mistake was being rectified.

The Carter Administration however, started wriggling out of each of the three commitments almost as soon as they were made. In October, Carter made his penance when he declared that he would "rather commit suicide" than harm Israel.[14] In the same month, during Moshe Dayan's visit to Washington, a "working paper" was prepared, in which Carter dropped his insistence on the Palestinian participation in the Geneva Conference.[15] Brzezinski finally put the whole matter to rest when he declared, "we have done everything possible to urge moderation on the PLO. We made every possible overture to them. They did not respond. Now, bye-bye, PLO."[16]

After that, Carter conveniently fell back upon the Kissinger strategy of a step-by-step approach. In November 1977, Sadat accomplished the *mubaadarat* (initiative) when he paid a state visit to Israel. The peace-process between Israel and Egypt, although a direct bilateral negotiation, provided

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for a limited US role. The United States association, this time, was no more the spectacular one-man show of the earlier years. It now was a bewildering array of movements involving a large number of actors: Carter, Cyrus Vance, Edmund Muskie, Sol Linowitz, Robert Strauss, Alfred Atherton, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and so on.

On 17 September 1978, it bore results, when two agreements were signed between Sadat and Begin: A framework for peace in the Middle East, which stipulated an agreement on a self-governing authority on the West Bank and Gaza within five years; and a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which envisaged bilateral negotiations. The linkage between the two agreements remained a point of disagreement between the two. As autonomy talks limped along, the parallel Egyptian-Israeli negotiations fructified in the Israel-Egyptian Treaty in March 1979, Israel's phased withdrawal from the Sinai, lifting of Egyptian embargo against Israel and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two.

There was one more interesting episode in Carter's West Asia policy. On 1 March 1980, the United States voted a Security Council resolution which called Israel "to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967 including Jerusalem." Two days later, the White House issued a statement repudiating the vote on the ground that there was a failure in communications. The episode provides an interesting insight into the personal, political considerations which tend to submerge all national and rational calculations, especially in the presidential election year.

Towards the second half of his term, Carter was caught up in the revolutionary upheaval in Iran, the takeover of the Iranian Embassy in Tehran, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and so on. By the end of his term, his attention was already diverted from the Arab-Israel problem to immediate strategic considerations. The United States quietly left the mediator's office to put on a marine's uniform in the service of the Rapid Deployment Force.

Reagan: Mediation to Consensus

In December 1980, President-elect Ronald Reagan sent Kissinger on a private visit to West Asia. It set the world wondering if the shuttle was being put back on the rails again. However, even if the gesture was meant to convey an indication of a future revival of the earlier mediatory role, it is highly debateable whether it would succeed this time.

A more pertinent question is whether it would be revived in the first place. There are three distinct circumstances which would prevent its repetition: Secretary of State Alexander Haig's visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel in April this year in a quest for a "strategic consensus." The US West Asia

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policy is now likely to be fully subservient to this one supreme goal. Secondly, in recent months Israel has emerged to be almost the only strategic asset that the United States has in West Asia. US policy-makers are aware of this fact and would be under a tremendous constraint against putting the slightest pressure on Israel asking it for even the most minor concessions. Finally, even if the Kissingerian wheel were given a momentum, it would only be for appearances' sake as he is no longer a member of the inner sanctum of power. In such circumstances, Kissinger may not even agree to get involved in a useless exercise.

CONCLUSIONS

A recent study on the United States' role in the Arab-Israel dispute titled *Broker or Advocate? The U.S. Role in the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973-1978*[17] brilliantly conveys the author's assessment of America's role.

There never was a US mediation in the Arab-Israel conflict. It was a short-term US response to Arab oil politics. However, Kissinger took up seriously what was originally meant to be only an optical illusion.

Carter started off with a search for a comprehensive solution, soon got reconciled to bilateral negotiations and ultimately lost interest in the whole exercise—resigning the mediator's role for a more effective role of a policeman.

Reagan is neither committed to a solution of the problem, nor does he see any incentives for doing it. His despatch of Kissinger and Phillip Habib are merely diplomatic gestures showing concern where none really exists.

If the United States did not mediate, what did it do? One credible answer can be derived from an interesting comment by George Ball on Kissinger's shuttles. "He is first and last a unilateralist, firmly committed to a policy of manoeuvre in which the United States reserves full freedom of action to make decisions and play a lone hand, while it utilizes friends and allies only as instruments for its own tactical purposes."[18]

If the expression "unilateral" could be stretched to cover not just the Kissingerian shuttles but also the US mediation in general; and if the process itself could be described in a more accurate term, the "management"—it would provide a better and a more appropriate title to the present paper: The US Unilateral Management of the Arab-Israel Conflict.

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1. The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian Arabs. After the opening session, the conference will split into working groups.

2. The working groups for the negotiation and conclusion of peace treaties will be formed as follows :

Egypt-Israel; Jordan-Israel; Syria-Israel and Lebanon-Israel.

3. The West Bank and the Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Arabs.

4. The solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and of the Jewish refugees (who fled the Arab countries) will be discussed in accordance with the terms to be discussed and agreed upon.

5. The agreed basis for the negotiations at the conference are the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt Israel Peace Negotiations* (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 70-71.

16 Brzezinski's interview with the French magazine *Paris-Match* quoted in *Newsweek* (New York), 16 January 1978, p. 16.
17 Harvey Sicherman, *Broker or Advocate? The US Role in the Arab Israeli Dispute,* 1973-1978 (Foreign Policy Research Institute Monograph, Philadelphia, 1978).
18 George Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World* (Boston, 1976), p. 121.

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EUROPEAN ENERGY CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIONS

A Review Article

I
INTRODUCTION

THE energy crisis and Arab unity (1973-74) were proximately founded on the basis of an obverse western disunity in face of the Arab-Israeli War. The particularized embargo, by the Arab petroleum exporting states, of the Netherlands, seemed to reinforce this perception. A gradually unfolding sequence of events tended further to lend substance to this perception of western disunity, especially in the laboured genesis of the United States sponsored International Energy Agency (IEA 1974), together with the carefully disruptive, later isolationist, role played by the French within this context.

By 1974 therefore, two lines of tension within the broader framework of the Atlantic Alliance had been exposed. There was, first, the continuing strain within the monetary sphere, dually reflected in a gradual US retreat from the free-trade precepts of GATT since 1971. After 1973 there was additionally also the question of OECD energy in face of the energy crisis. (It is notable that both these tensions owed to a degree to the French, in terms of initiative).

In the more specific context of the European Economic Community (EEC), the first oil-shock (1973-74) was equally ineffective in inducing much policy convergence in practical terms. Saving a few conditioned-reflexes and some conjunctural declarations of unity, the EC member states tended on balance to devise their own separate responses depending mainly on individual needs and abilities. The only manner of common distinction that, with any degree of resolution, can be drawn is relating to Community energy consumption policies which, while not homogenous, were yet far more restrained than the ones followed by the United States.

Finally we note that this portfolio of individual responses had served quite fairly for a while to regenerate OECD activity-levels, tied albeit to OPEC apronstrings. Even this was, however, not to last out. The earlier, post-1974, scenario with the established rules-of-play has thus, since 1979 been drastically revised.

II
STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE CRISES

It would, at this stage, be appropriate to introduce the book under review as being devoted to an analysis of the European Community's policies and

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reactions following the first oil-shock.* These had included of course, apart from in the area of energy, attempts at collective action, or policy convergence also in areas of monetary harmonization and the North-South Dialogue. Of these, harmonization in monetary and energy areas further carried aspects of a joint Community conflict-resolution *vis-a-vis* the United States. The book devotes itself, however, to only some particular modalities of the EEC's energy-interface with the outside world. The particular emphases culled by the author from his theme are given below.

Part I of the *opus* deals with energy *demand* (including import-dependence factors) and with indigenous *production* competence of the EC Member States. Included are the choice of technique aspects attending upon the latter, and oil is assessed as the balancing factor. (pp. 76-86) Part II of the book deals primarily with the aspect of *supply*, in the sense, especially, of delineating the mechanics of the trade in oil and in related energy products. Included in this part also are analyses of trade-power, its shifting balance and also, in brief, the modalities of the OPEC Members' development strategies. In Part III the author supplies a discussion of EC objectives relating to energy policy. He here treats the matter of price-determination as a bargaining outcome between host and consuming governments. The oil-majors are here described and their function delineated at relative depth. The respective viewpoints of host and major are discussed although not from any "national" point of view relating to incentives for pricing, reallocation or diversification in production. Finally, the energy crisis having provided the proximate motivation for the North-South Dialogue, Part IV of the study deals at depth with the EC's place and motivations within this extended framework. The discussion here responds ably to the Community's spread and heterogeneity in global North-South matters; it distinguishes carefully between regional, global, bilateral and multilateral modes of attack.

III
THE EVOLVING CRISIS : THE DISARRAY OF RESPONSE

It is evident, therefore, that the author has attempted to provide a large compass to his study. It is arguably the case that any analysis of the EC's post-1974 energy-dynamic should cover all that the author indeed has. But it is perhaps also true that, despite the above, the spirit behind the Community's own many-faceted and multilateral dynamic still eludes this *opus*. The spirit to which we here allude includes such seemingly unrelated details as the striving since 1974 for a common monetary identity as well as the essential place of fiscal convergence within the Community in an attempt to unify externally along the energy axis. Indeed, relating the central

*Hanns Maul : *Europe and World Energy* (Sussex European Research Centre, Butterworths, London, 1980), viii, 342 p., £ 16.50.

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issue of price-formation and its evolution, the author has unequivocally this to state:

> Politics, thus, determine the level of international oil prices for the time being: *the price of oil is a consequence of the relationship of prices in the international oil market*. This is the central assumption of our model. (p. 203)

Having said which, of course, the intra-Community dimension loses resolution and appears to stop playing any determining role. Member States as actors in the energy markets are relegated to the role of price-takers. The subtler, and often conclusive, leverage which domestic or Community-level fiscal-policy might have been able to exert is thus largely lost to analysis or assessment.

It is also in this way that the book's vintage (writing was complete by 1979-80), most clearly dictates its *metier*. For, after 1974, the EEC, within the larger OECD context, had rapidly come to (profitable) terms with the new price-supply configurations. We allude, here, not to indicators of industrial production (down 8 per cent between 1974-75), to unemployment levels (increased from 3.5 million to 5.5 million, 1974-76) or to the GDP calculus.[1] We allude instead to the commercial conquests, which enabled the EEC, as also other OECD states in terms of increased flow of goods and finance with the OPEC. The flow of finances, in particular through the "recycling" of OPEC surpluses through the western banking system, exhibited also the former's characteristic of sharing in the financial burden of the OECD in their efforts to channel aid-quanta to the non-oil-producing LDCs. This, apart from sustaining NOLDC demand for petroleum products, served also to support their internal development programmes—an important factor in keeping their demand for OECD machinery (and allied infrastructural) imports alive. The related manner in which the developed market economies succeeded in transferring the incidence of the oil-price increases was through the speedy reversal in the terms-of-trade between exportable manufactures and LDC exportables which were mainly non-oil primaries. With their exportables rising slower in terms of price, there was a 12 per cent fall in the NOLDC terms-of-trade in 1974 alone, followed by a smaller one in 1975. Meanwhile developed market economy manufactures had increased 40 per cent in terms of price over 1973-75.[2] The OPEC surpluses were recycled by the Western banking and financial system with the Euromarket playing the major role in this framework. Net Euromarket lending to NOLDCs, by the end of 1979, stood at US $68.5 billion; Latin American countries got $65.1 billion, with Asia and Africa getting $6.5 and $4.7 billion respectively, while the Middle East was a net lender of $7.8 billion into the system.[3]

Altogether, then, despite the notable lack of any long-term view (this even despite the EC Commission's promptings)[4] and also given the attending absence of policy convergence, the Community record till 1979, managed

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yet to demonstrate some restraint relating to external energy sources. It is true that this was at the cost largely of lower and more sluggish activity levels leading, as earlier instanced, to unemployment and under utilization on the rise. So, whereas the Community GDP, over 1973-78, increased by 10.7 per cent, yet energy consumption was estimated lower by 7-8 per cent than might otherwise have been the case in the 1975-77 period. It was lower by as much as 10 per cent in the 1978-79 period. Dependence on external energy sources was also curbed; from 63 per cent (1973), to 55 per cent (1978), while (over the same period) the proportion of oil in total energy consumption declined from 61 per cent to 55 per cent.[5]

By 1977-78 therefore, it had been evident that, attending upon the setbacks in terms of unemployment and lower rates of growth, various Member State policies were, nevertheless, adding up to a degree of restraint relating to energy imports. This was buttressed by the Community's policy of internally expanding the production of oil and natural gas (the North Sea) as well as by its policies of helping LDCs in attaining, wherever feasible a semblance of energy self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, the contrasting United States profligacy relating internally to cost-insulated (subsidized) energy consumption by leading to an 11.2 per cent depreciation of the Dollar against the Deutschmark (1978), had further provided a source of help in aiding EC energy imports (denominated in dollars).[6] Already US oil imports had increased from an average of around 20 per cent of its total oil consumption in the 1960s, to 48 per cent in 1977. (The Carter Administration was the only one which had moved a few tentative, and hard-to-implement, paces towards conservation measures; these did not bite.) Indeed, by 1977 the United States current account balance was in deficit to the tune of $15 billion, as compared to the surpluses of Japan and West Germany of $11 and $4 billion respectively.[7]

1979 saw, therefore, the relative positions of the United States and some member states within the Community (and the OECD in general), somewhat metamorphosed. Thus, a situation which had cumulatively built up,[8] would have held true had there not occurred the 1979 Iranian Revolution or the subsequent spate of uncertainties and supply disruptions on the part of a a cartel (OPEC) with its unity then on the wane. The advent, at this juncture, of the second oil-shock (on the plea of eroded terms-of-trade), served the *coup de grace* to an already uncertain economic situation for the OECD. And when, by 1980, the EEC was on the verge of a resuscitated Euro-Arab Dialogue[9] plus economic recovery, the United States Administration decided to progressively raise the rates of interest, unconsulted, to their highest levels since the Second World War. Perhaps a reaction in chagrin at the setting up by the EEC of the European Monetary System (EMS 1979), and the relative strengths of the Deutschmark and the Guilder, this ploy has served, nevertheless, to scotch the EEC's upturn after 1979. Of allied interest, in the current, has been the Reagan Administration's strenuous attempts at finally nullifying limping remnants of the EEC-USSR gas pipeline deal on the basis

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of Soviet policies in Afghanistan and Poland, *inter alia*. It is forgotten that the conception of this pipeline can be attributed to the Nixon Administration's early years, a period which had just followed hard on the heels of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968).[10] But US economic interpenetration of the EEC was, at that period, proceeding apace and yielding handsome dividends; the relative strength in the position of the EEC and Japan in the allied fields of money and trade had yet to materialize.

The situation, as it has now evolved bears, of course, scant resemblance to the earlier unity visible amongst either the OPEC or the OECD. Interestingly, however, the renewed context of dollar ascendancy, a US rate of interest with debilitating consequences for its allies[11] and the stubbornness of the current recession has forced the Community to go back to the drawing board. Fiscal convergence and transparency in the pricing of EEC energy supplies have been newly adopted for implementation; and, in this development, one also notes, finally, a convergence between the Council and Commission points of view. The Commission had long been advocating the formation of homogeneous pricing of energy within the Community; supply situations and economic strengths were, however, held different sufficient to warrant divergence.

Meanwhile, even the OPEC, in the current situation of an OECD recession, internal disunity, and the excess supplies portended by the Mexican (and other) finds, have as well been selectively driven off their vantage position of nurturing seemingly illimitable surpluses.[12]

After the second-shock has reopened, therefore, the era of normatives and of designs to again reduce the functional linkages between GDP and oil-consumption rates of growth.[13] The entire gamut of policy instruments are being brought to bear and include the provision of adequate finances to evolve the technology of diversification and factor redeployment; the intention is to re-emphasize coal and to accelerate the transition to nuclear energy as well.

To the extent, therefore, that the book reviewed compels our attention to the pragmatic set of tactics employed by the EEC after the first oil-shock, it would be hard to fault it. Given, however, that there had, throughout, underlain a strategic dissension between the Commission and Council, and given further that it has finally been the Commission which has induced the Council, on the basis of circumstances, to accede, one feels the book a trifle poorer for having missed these matters out. There is, however, no dearth of information if one could fill in these details.

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11 C. Fred Bergsten, n. 8, p. 33.
12 *The Economist* (London), 10 July 1982, p. 66.
13 *Bulletin of the European Communities,* (Luxembourg), 5/1980, p. 24.

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RSS: MYTH AND REALITY

A Review Article

THE spectre of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has for long been haunting the leftists and all political parties except the former Jana Sangha and its new incarnation, the Bharatiya Janata Party. Practically the entire National Press and the intellectual community have been anti-RSS almost since its inception in 1925. Most leaders of the Muslim and Christian communities have seen in the RSS their greatest enemy and together with the leftists have spared no effort in attacking it as the worst obstacle to democracy, socialism, secularism, and national integration. The RSS has also been accused of fomenting communal violence and having planted its agents in the state machinery, including the police and the army.

And yet during the past 55 years the RSS has steadily grown in strength, so that it now has more than two million *Swayamsevaks* (Volunteers) in the country.

How is this phenomenon to be explained? What is the true nature of the RSS and what danger does it pose to the ideals enshrined by the Founding Fathers in the Constitution of India? Is it anti-Muslim and anti-Christian, and does it want to convert India into a Hindu state, as alleged by its critics? Or is it, as asserted by its spokesmen, a basically cultural organization which has no political ambitions but which merely seeks to restore the self-confidence of the Hindus and promote unity among them on the basis of their own culture and tradition? Is it a fascist organization as the leftists charge, a liberal one as the Sangh itself proclaims, or an expression of the authoritarian Hindu tradition?

These are some of the questions to which the reader would seek answers in the two books under review.* Unfortunately, both are partisan in the extreme. Goyal writes from the well-known leftist point of view; to him the RSS is a revivalist, communal, anti-Muslim and anti-Christian Hindu organization, based on the fascist principle of leadership and controlled almost exclusively by Maharashtrian Brahmins who resented the rise of Mahatma Gandhi as a national leader after Lokmanya Tilak. Further, according to Goyal, the RSS prepared the ground for Gandhi's assassination and has been the main culprit in most, if not all Hindu-Muslim riots after its birth. Worse still, "rather than joining hands with Gandhi and the nationalist forces to defeat the partition designs, the RSS came into action to finally prove, through provocative as well as retaliatory actions, that Hindus and Muslims could not live together." (p. 95) The evidence that

*Dina Nath Mishra : *RSS : Myth and Reality* (Vikas Publishing House, Sahibabad, 1980), xiv, 219 p., Rs. 60.
D.R. Goyal : *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (Radhakrishna Prakashan, New Delhi, 1979), 232p., Rs. 30.

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Goyal presents in support of these charges is one-sided and therefore highly misleading. Take, for instance, the charge regarding Hindu-Muslim riots; he does not care to explain the occurrence of these riots for more than 30 years before the birth of the RSS or even of its founder. He concedes that "the aggressiveness of the Muslim National Guards and the Khaksars of Allama Mashriqi contributed in no small measure to impress on the Hindus the need for organized counteraction." (p. 94) But he does not refer to the aggressiveness of the Muslims who followed other leaders and political parties. Nor does he explain why there should have been few, if any, Hindu-Christian riots in spite of the questionable methods adopted by the missionaries.

The answers that Goyal provides to other questions are equally unsatisfactory. His thinly veiled attempt to fasten the responsibility for Mahatma Gandhi's assassination on the RSS is not only unconvincing, it is nauseating.

This is not to suggest that the RSS is a combination of the Boy Scouts and the Ramakrishna Mission as Mishra's book naively seeks to make out. But Mishra is not as clever as Goyal, and therefore reading his book is not as trying an experience. However, he too does not provide satisfactory answers to the questions formulated above and, like Goyal, is misleading as regards the true nature of the RSS, though in the opposite direction. For him, the RSS is a cultural organization dedicated to the building of Hindu solidarity on the basis of the universalistic principles of Hindu culture—tolerance and respect for all religions, a sense of social obligation, discipline, a feeling of kinship among all Hindus, and a legitimate pride in the greatness of their past on which foundation alone a nation can be reared and live with self-respect. As is to be expected, Mishra takes some pains to rebutt the charges of the RSS being anti-Muslim or anti-Christian and of its involvement in Gandhi's murder or in Hindu-Muslim riots. Indeed, he asserts that the RSS does not believe in violence and it is ridiculous for the leftists, in particular the communists, to accuse it of resorting to violence. As in most such cases, the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes. It is true that the RSS as an organization has never been convincingly convicted of having fomented Hindu-Muslim riots. Individual members might have been guilty of it, but a similar statement can be made about almost every other group except the Sarvodayists and the Socialists. For any other group to assume the mantle of self-righteousness and condemn the RSS would be like the pot calling the kettle black. As a matter of fact, while talking of violence Goyal himself gives up the game when he distinguishes "between revolutionary or communist violence and counter-revolutionary or fascist violence of the RSS kind." (p. 141) In other words, leaving aside the RSS case as undecided, Goyal would suggest that the concentration camps of Hitler deserve condemnation but those set up by Lenin and Stalin, and the actions of the Communists in Indo-China, call for sympathetic understanding if not unreserved support. I suspect that even Marx would

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turn in his grave if he were to be told of Goyal's theory of revolutionary *versus* counter-revolutionary violence.

As to the RSS involvement in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the record is clear: it had nothing to do with the event. Mishra establishes this fact by a mass of documentary evidence. Nor is it true that any leader of the RSS—I do not know about the ordinary *swayamsevaks*—advocated violence except in self-defence, much less against any political leader, let alone Gandhi. If the RSS believed in violence, and political assasination in particular, it could have easily bumped off Jinnah who pushed the partition demand till the bitter and bloody end, and Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, but for whose acquiescence as "tired old men" in Lord Mountbatten's proposal, Gandhi would not have been so forsaken and isolated in the last two years of his life. It is also not true that the RSS distributed sweets on learning of Gandhi's death; this was done by some members of the Hindu Mahasabha. Goyal obviously does not distinguish between the two organizations, though soon after he became *sarsanghchalak*, Golwalkar described the Hindu Mahasabha as a *tamasha* in a speech at Sangli and for ever alienated it from the RSS. Godse and Apte were products of the Hindu Mahasabha rather than of the RSS. It was the Hindu Mahasabha leaders who had created the atmosphere of hatred against Gandhi, not those of the RSS as Goyal asserts. The latter were, and though it may sound anachronistic today, are still inspired by the vision of a resurgent Hindu India that can be traced to Vivekananda and Dayananda Saraswati who were primarily moved by the degradation of Hindu society rather than by hatred of the non-Hindus in India.

I am aware that it is dangerous in contemporary India to make such statements: one is bound to be stigmatized as Hindu chauvinist, a Muslim and Christian-baiter, a *gobrahmanpratipalaka* and a defender of the faith. However, as a result of persistent leftist propaganda over the past fifty years, the thinking of Indian intellectuals on certain controversial issues has been so perverse that they do not care to verify even elementary facts. Someone has to do the scavenger's job in the interest of the nation's intellectual health.

Goyal also misses the point that the creation of Pakistan was, among other things, the result of Congress appeasement of Muslim separatism—of which even Tilak was guilty—and the failure of the nationalist and leftist political leaders to understand the sources of this separatism as well as the Hindu's sense of having been let down when Nehru and Patel agreed to partition. More important, the appeasement of the Muslims of Pakistan no less than of India continued even after partition—from the noblest of motives, no doubt, but it pushed the "nationalist" Hindu psychologically to the wall. One of the outcomes of this approach was the Godse phenomenon. Where Goyal goes wrong is in singling out one factor out of the many that led to the tragedy. This may suit the propagandist's purpose, but it does not help in understanding the real nature of the problem and thereby evolving a

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solution in keeping with the principles which secularists, real and psuedo, profess.

It is important to understand the complexity and historical background of the Hindu-Muslim problem in the Indian sub-continent if the two communities are to come out of the stage of tribal sniping.This is not the place to go into a detailed analysis; for the purpose of this review, suffice it to say that militant Hindu nationalism can, with more than enough of historical evidence be shown to be mainly a reaction to Muslim and, to a lesser extent, Christian aggressiveness. It would therefore be not only futile but counter-productive to single out the RSS and go on condeming it without judging Muslim and Christian organizations by the same norms. This is all the more necessary in the interest of the non-Hindu minorities because the Hindus feel that for the first time since 15 August 1947 they have been masters in their own home after being ruled by others for more than 800 years.* Fortunately, most Hindus harbour no ill-will towards the Muslims or Christians. However, unless the minorities realize the change in the situation and shed their superiority complex which makes no sense in a democracy with unversal suffrage, they would weaken the hands of liberal Hindus and drive most of them into the sphere of influence of the RSS in so far as the minorities problem is concerned.

This is not to hold a brief for the RSS. On the contrary it is important to note that the RSS poses a greater threat to liberal Hindus than to the religious Muslims or the Christians. The latter two groups can, as in other situations, they have often done in the past, accept the status of second-class citizens and wallow in orthodoxy without any harassment from the RSS. The Christians, for example, do not feel particularly unhappy on the ground that they are not allowed to carry on proselytizing activities in Muslim or Communist countries; they are at peace with themselves and with their God if only they are allowed to live according to the teachings of Jesus Christ. The Muslims too would be happy as the RSS has given them a guarantee that their personal law will not be touched. It is the liberal Hindu, who takes seriously the values embodied in the preamble of the Constitution and who wishes to see his country develop into a vigorous, modern and open society, who will be the worst sufferer in a state which is governed by the traditional ideology of the RSS.

This ideology is not fascist as is usually thought. It is authoritarian in the special Hindu sense in which benevolence is combined with heartless exploitation and a denial of individuality. It is also backward-looking in its conceptions of knowledge, ethics and the good society, and leaves little scope for creativity and the operation of the critical spirit. Its adherents look down

*V.D. Savarkar, in spite of all his distress over the partition of India, hoisted the tricolour on his house on 15 August 1947. When asked by Nathuram Godse why he was celebrating the creation of Pakistan, Savarkar is reported to have retorted : "My life's dream has come true; an Indian now sits on the throne of Delhi. If may not be the united India I had longed to see free, but even if truncated it is a free India now."

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upon "mere ideas"—perhaps because, as Vivekananda often asserted, the ancient Hindus had anticipated all the major findings of modern science and what now remains to be done is to take this knowledge to the ordinary mass of people. The RSS wants social change, but without pains, which explains why it has undertaken work among the tribals but completely neglected the Scheduled Castes. Its leaders are innocent of modern social science thought and would regard a total ban on cow-slaughter as more important than meeting the protein requirements of an undernourished population. In this respect by the way, they are nearer to Vinoba than to Vivekananda.

They say that the RSS is changing. Perhaps this is true, but the change in that case must be proceeding at snail's pace. Meanwhile, those who, like the present reviewer, feel concerned over its growing strength have to think of a suitable strategy for combating its influence. I am convinced that whatever the details of this strategy, it will have to be based on a firm commitment to democratic secularism and an even-handed attitude to all the religious groups which make up the people of this land. The kind of shrill propaganda carried on against the RSS by honest as well as dishonest leftists is not going to help.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

MICHAEL BRECHER (with BENJAMIN GEIST) : Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980, xvii, 479p., $24.95.

BUILDING a theory of international crisis behaviour can hardly be dismissed as an idle academic exercise in a world plagued with recurrent crises. Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration have conducted some researches on effective use of quantitative methods to decipher decision-makers' perceptions. Michael Brecher, co-author of the book under review, heads an International Crisis Behaviour Project in Canada.

Brecher defines crisis as a situation with three necessary components: threat to basic values, high probability of involvement in military hostilities, and finite time for response to threat. The study concentrates on the perceptions and behaviour of a single state—Israel—in relation to the 1967 and 1973 crisis. It employs three comprehensive typologies: dimensions of crisis (its source, gravity, complexity, intensity, duration and communication pattern); attributes of a crisis actor (systemic context, geographic context, belief system, economic development and military capability); and crisis decisional unit (its structure experience, psychological environment, and options).

After trudging a tricky forest of obfuscating jargon the reader desperately gropes for light. In the last but one chapter the authors sum up the findings in a relatively less obscure diction. One notable finding concerns the impact of "changing crisis-induced stress on cognitive performance." The evidence from Israel's 1967 and 1973 crises shows that (i) as stress increased, decision-makers relied on past experience as well as new information, and (ii) there were notable examples of impaired performance due to extreme fatigue and strain (witness Prime Minister Eshkol's stammering broadcast on 28 May 1967 or Dayan's loss of customary self-assurance during the Yom Kippur War). Net addition to knowledge: the current hypothesis that the greater the crisis the greater the tendency on the part of individual (s) dealing with it to rely on past experience stands partly modified.

Another finding is about the effects of changing stress on the type and size of consultative units and on group participation in the consultative process. We are told that the "only relevant finding" from experimental work on groups is that, "as stress increases both the frequency and intensity of interaction tend to rise." The present research supports this finding. Hence its net addition to knowledge is admittedly nil.

It is perhaps unnecessary to belabour the point. Suffice it to say that this elaborate inquiry gives no new insights into international crisis behaviour

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that a rugged common sense and careful perusal of contemporary newspapers would not readily yield.

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Foreign Policy

USSR

DARSHAN SINGH, (*Ed.*): Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, 1978. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xiv, 312 p., Rs. 100.

THE volume under review is in a way about Soviet policies and activities in the world and about preparations for their further activities. The documents contained in the volume show the new pattern of Soviet aggressiveness towards the United States of America and the West. This pattern emerged in the 1970s.

A major landmark of the last decade has been the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union. The Moscow Declaration of 1972 is a recognition of this fact. The attainment of military parity, naturally, has exercised a tremendous influence on the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. It has enabled the country to pursue more aggressive policies not only towards the United States and the West, but also in other parts of the world.

Thus one finds a new pattern of aggressiveness in Soviet foreign policy of the seventies. This new pattern has been made possible by changes in the overall correlation of forces in the world. As Leonid Brezhnev put it: "Having assessed the overall correlation of forces in the World, we came to the conclusion several years ago that there existed a real possibility of securing a radical turnabout in the international situation."[1] The military attainments have permitted the Soviet Union to assert its global role: "Today no question of any importance in the world can be decided without our participation and without consideration of our economic and military might,"[2] declared a Soviet General.

The new pattern of Soviet policies is a manifestation of the Soviet leaders' conviction that the United States is undergoing a steady decline in power and in its ability to influence world developments. This facilitates ever greater commitments of the Soviet leadership to use various means including the use of military force to achieve its objective successfully. The forty-seven documents included in the volume under review reflect a wide spectrum of Soviet activity in the world in 1978.

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), 15 June 1975.
[2] Quoted in Major General V.S. Ryabov, *Dvina : Voiskovye Manevry Provedennye na Territorii Belorussii v Marte 1970.* Goda (Moscow, 1970), p. 8.

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The documents included are official language texts made available by Soviet embassies from time to time. Many of them are TASS statements. The volume is useful only to the extent that it brings together various documents which are otherwise not easily available. Its value could have been enhanced by a substantive and analytical introduction by the author. While the author includes in the volume all kinds of statements whose usefulness is questionable, it is not clear why he has omitted the text of the communique issued at the end of the former Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's visit to Moscow in September 1978.

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JAPAN

RAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN: The USSR and Japan 1945-1980. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, xx, 397 p., Rs. 130.

THE Japanese perception of Russia as a threat from the north has not changed over the years. As Hiroomi Kurisu, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council stated, the threat (*kyoi* in Japanese), is a perception which is independent of the intentions of the country to view it as a threat. The term, *odoshi no chikara* (power to intimidate), is probably more appropriate than the term *kyoi* or threat. Russia looming large in the north of Japan with abundant potential capability, straddling both over the West and the East and the only nation with whom Japan had to delinate its frontiers has always been a significant factor in the international relations of the latter. It was the Russian approach from the north and Khvostov-Davydov raids of the Kuriles and the Sakhalin, organized by Nikolai Rezanov in 1804, angered by the refusal of the Shogunate to open Japan for trade, that made Japan think in terms of national defence. Even after the amicable settlement of the national boundaries by 1875, Japan's realisation of the potential capability of Russia to restrain its expansion obliged it to be on the offensive. The West encouraged the Japanese perception of Russia as a threat on two counts. Japan would be the bulwark against Russian expansion and thus protect their possessions in the East. Secondly, Japan would be too preoccupied with Russia and fritter away its strength in its confrontation. In this way its attention would not be diverted to the United States possessions in the Pacific. In the 1980s, we find that not only the West but China is also interested in maintaining the pressure on Japan, so that the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat, is continuously heightened. As in the past, the government finds this "threat" situation very advantageous, as it affords enough justification for increases in defence

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expenditure, sophistication of the self-defence forces, etc. In the pre-World War II situation, this was considered advisable in order to maintain its significance in the region for the West or even to make the West take a tolerant attitude towards its policy of expansion in China. In the present situation, Japan's policy is conditioned by its commitments to the United States and and the greater advantages perceived in security and economic spheres by not taking a stand different from the USA. From the Soviet point of view, the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States granting the latter military bases in Japan, as well as the continuous efforts made by the Self Defence Forces to co-ordinate their strategic plans with USA keeping the Soviet Union as "the hypothetical enemy" constitute a "threat" from which it should protect itself.

The threat perception, however, does not prevent the two nations from taking pragmatic positions in economic relations, e.g., trade, fisheries, joint development of Siberia, etc. The USSR would continue to be looked upon as supplier of strategic raw materials for Japan. The book under review gives details of all these aspects.

As in the case of his other books, Jain has made a compendium of details of relations between the two countries, supported by documents. He has drawn extensively from the various published sources on this subject and compiled it in this volume, so that it would become a ready reference.

The author himself avoids the word "analysis" in the Preface, and therefore it would not be correct to expect any new view-point or penetrating analysis in this book. The book is titled, *USSR and Japan,* so that probably it finds an extensive market particularly in India where the title *Japan and the USSR* might not have attracted much attention. However, the treatment is weighted more from the Japanese side and the title is, therefore, deceptive. Again, although sporadic references to Japanese titles, Russian titles, etc. are made, the contents do not reveal that the author is conversant either with Japanese or Russian language sources. Such gimmicks could have been avoided. But probably, such strict standards can be expected only in a research publication, while, as stated earlier, this is more of a compendium. It is also noticed that the author, even while quoting verbatim from other writings, sometimes with quotation marks and sometimes probably this has been overlooked, may make a mention of it in the footnote, but has carefully avoided including the publication in the bibliography. Since it is apparent that the author has got extensive help from many research assistants (though not acknowledged), he might like to prepare a more comprehensive bibliography in his future works, which he is planning, to make the book more useful to students and researchers.

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CHINA

ANDREW WATSON, (*Ed.*): Mao Zedong and the Political Economy of the Border Region (A Translation of Mao's Economic and Financial Problems). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, xii, 271 p., £5.50.

THE debate on China's development strategy has continued to generate world-wide interest; the significant policy changes enforced in post-Mao China and the reassessment of Mao Zodong's ideas has given added importance to this discussion. Tracing back Mao's ideas to the days of the people's democratic revolution, especially of the Yanan (Yenan) period has been a familiar exercise. But many such references were based on journalistic reports of those years or general impressions of visitors. Gradually studies by Chalmers Johnson, Mark Selden and Govind Kelkar appeared on the scene giving more substantive data on the Shen-Gan-Ning Border Region. The present book which is a translation of an important document of that period, accompanied by an analytical introduction, is a valuable addition to this literature.

This document is the speech given by Mao at the Senior Cadres Conference at Yanan in December 1942, in which he analyzed the situation arising out of the virtual collapse of the United Front with the Guomindang (KMT) and the serious economic crisis in the Border Region and spelled out new policies. Parts of this speech appeared in Volume III of the Selected Works of Mao in 1953, and now Watson's translation makes an English version of the full text available for the first time. In this speech Mao enunciated the economic perspective of the new democratic revolution by criticising the "left" as well as the "right" deviations and advocated a policy of mixed economy, mass mobilisation and maximum utilization of resources.

By 1941, the Border Region under the effective control of the Communist forces had stabilized at 29 counties (Xian) and 266 districts (Qu) with a population of around 1,500,000. The Party membership had risen to nearly 800,000 and the Red Army strength to 500,000 by the year 1940. The KMT's blockade and attacks on the Red Army and the ongoing Sino-Japanese War on the one hand and the sudden expansion of Party and army strength on the other, created a series of problems. The Rectification Campaign of 1942 and the economic drives of the period were some of the responses to these developments. The Rectification Campaign was an education in Marxist ideology for the members which called for a non-dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and adoption of a "mass line" as the method of organization. In the sphere of economics, the policies were put forth in the form of the following slogans: "Develop the economy and ensure the supplies," "Give consideration to both public and private," and "Give consideration to both troops and civilians."

Laying enormous stress on the need to increase production, Mao advocated that private agriculture and small industry by private individuals

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must be protected and enouraged for it provided the supplies to maintain the livelihood of the bulk of the population. At the same time, agriculture, industry and commerce by the government, troops, official organisations and schools should be developed in a harmonious way. Analyzing the experiences of the Yanan county, he recommended that its lessons should be the basis for the policies of the entire region, even though the specific conditions obtaining in each area had to be respected. A list of eight policies that Mao propounded gives us an idea about the approach to agricultural development in the Border Region which inspired the policies in later decades. They were: (1) the reduction of rents and the interest rates, (2) an increase in the opening up of uncultivated land, (3) an increase in the planting of cotton, (4) not violating agricultural seasons, (5) better adjustment in the use of labour power, (6) an increase in agricultural credit, (7) improvement in technical skill, and (8) implementing progressive taxation. In addition to these, emphasis was to be laid on the development of animal husbandry, handicrafts, cooperatives, salt industry, self-supporting industry, productive undertakings by the Armed Forces, official organizations and schools, each of which was discussed in detail by Mao Zedong.

In the above package not only lay the new democratic economic outlook which brought together various anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes to co-operate in the anti-Japanese war efforts but also the origins of the Chinese communist approach to agricultural development. It considered generation of resources from within the rural sector as significant for a self-reliant economy and at the same time emphasized on the interrelatedness of industry and agriculture and the potentiality of developing a diversified rural economy that included commercial crops, animal husbandry, handicrafts etc. Production was to be accompanied by structural changes to an appropriate level, hence the need for reduction of rent and interest. But nothing like the radical structural measures of the Jiangsi period were proposed. Emphasis on combining available traditional technology with innovative methods was yet another feature of this approach. This line paid dividends during the Yanan years, miseries of the population were considerably reduced and economic support for the war efforts was moderately ensured with popular support. On the other hand, the economy in the KMT areas was in a shambles with inflation rising high, scarcities worsening and corruption mounting day by day.

Yet, this approach has been the centre of controversy in the People's Republic. In the early fifties when China was experimenting with the Soviet model of development this approach was relegated to the background. Perhaps that is why the portion of Mao's speech published in 1953 in the third volume of the Selected Works contained these additional lines: "This self-supporting economy, which has been developed by the troops and the various organizations and schools is a special product of the special conditions of today. It would be unreasonable and incomprehensible in other historical conditions, but it is perfectly reasonable and necessary at present."

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The post-Mao leadership which has dropped commending references to the Dazhai Model which had a similar orientation may also stress these additional lines since it has denounced the Great Leap Forward. But the political as well as economic experiences of the Yanan period has already become part of the world legacy of the struggling people even though they have to avoid reductionist formulations at all cost.

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H.D. MALAVIYA : Peking Leadership : Treachery and Betrayal. New Literature Co., Delhi, 1979, viii, 178 p., Rs. 25.

THIS book, the forty-seventh by the author, is a sad commentary on our politician-intellectuals. The book is pure and simple propaganda reminding one of the pen-pushers in the West who wrote plain cold war nonsense on Socialist states in the late forties and early fifties. This book is even worse because the "bourgeois pen-pushers" are consistent within their own system which Shree Malaviya is not. In short, this book does not deserve a review in an academic journal.

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PERSIAN GULF

JAMES H. NOYES: The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and US Policy. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Calfornia, 1979, xvii, 144 p., $6.95.

WEST Asia has always been, more so in the last three or four decades, one of the most turbulent regions of the world. The relatively quick transition from a semi-feudal stage to contemporary times is powerful enough to break the societies at their seams. Coping with the challenges posed by such massive and revolutionary change by itself would have been an uphill task for the fragile governing institutions in operation. Added are many other sources of disarray, discord and disharmony—creation of Israel, discovery of oil and its development into a vast industrial and technological enterprise, super power rivalry in the political, ideological and economic realms, and the more recent fundamentalist Islamic revivalism have transformed the region into a virtual volcano. The recurrent and frequent eruptions should not surprise us as much as the fact that so many things are still in place and not razed to the ground.

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By the 1970's the industrialised West, Japan and even the United States became dependent on foreign oil, mostly from the West Asian region; their economies and wealth became critically vulnerable to the flow of oil from West Asia as was dramatically demonstrated by the events of 1973. The OPEC countries were able to use oil as a political weapon and jack up the price of oil at will. It is now clearly established that the world's known key reserves and potential for increased production of oil lie in the Persian Gulf region. James H. Noyes' book seeks to analyse the contours of American policy in the Gulf and its implication for the "security" of the countries in the region.

The Clouded Lens clearly reveals that Noyes is intimately familiar with the region as well as the intricacies and dilemmas of his country's policy towards the Gulf. As a result of the traumatic legacy of the Vietnam War, the Press and mass media have concentrated attention only on the risks of American involvement. Consequently, the American public, to Noyes, has not been made aware of the risks of non-involvement for their country's security. Furthermore, there is no concern for "the natural defence interests of the Gulf states" either, he points out.

In his well-reasoned analysis, Noyes draws attention to a number of "misreadings" of the situation. He asserts that the conventional assumption of looking at the middle classes as a source of instability has been proved wrong by recent events and developments in the Gulf countries. Countering the usual adverse comment about the supply of arms to the Shah of Iran on a large scale, Noyes argues that the weapons enabled Iran to successfully meet the threats from Soviet Union's proxies in the region. With those arms Iran could not be expected to cope with the Soviet Union itself, a task which can be done only by another super power like America.

Noyes' analysis of what he calls "debates" of America's Gulf policy is particularly interesting. His approach and perspective are refreshing, whether one agrees with them or not. For example, he disagrees with the popular view that America's arms sales policy tended to destabilize the delicate military balance in the Gulf; according to him, that overwhelming Israeli military superiority over the Arabs was always the key American objective. "Delicate military balance" was only an euphemism for a clear and massive Israeli military superiority. Noyes asserts that Jordan was and should be given arms and weapon supplies to make it strong enough to cope with Syria and/or Iraq, but not so much as to threaten Israel.

The Clouded Lens, however, suffers from one crucial blind spot. In his brief chapter on the British military rule in the past, Noyes asserts that the British departure was a net gain for Gulf stability. He reasons that this was so because the Gulf states were able to sort out mutual problems without hang-ups and ideas about the compulsions of British interests. Noyes seems to be unaware that a similarly benign context will be created for the Gulf states to sort out their mutual problems if they are not to respond to the real and imagined national interests and security concerns of the United

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States and the Soviet Union. But then, it is not very reasonable to expect such objectivity even from an othersise thoughtful analysis.

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B. RAMESH BABU

PETER SINAI: New Lamps for Old: The Arabs and Iran Meet India's Energy Needs. Arab Cultural Centre, New Delhi, 1980, 79 p., Rs. 20.

SINCE the beginning of the 1970s the world oil scene is undergoing a rapid change, and to comment upon this one needs to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach. For instance, the sudden spurt in oil prices both in 1973 and 1979 was the result of a series of political developments that took place in West Asia and Iran. Similarly, some of the new oil-rich Arab countries interests in economic co-operation with the developing countries was not guided by economic interests alone; it had other motives too. For example, Iranian economic co-operation with India during the 1970s was believed to be to neutralize a potential threat to that country from within the region. In addition, if the Arabs and Iran depended on the developed North for items like man-power, that would have not only increased the economic leverage of the North but would also have been economically suicidal for the oil-producing countries. The recent US economic sanctions against Iran is the best example.

In these circumstances, the non-oil producing developing countries did manage to survive with high oil prices by cleverly exploiting the international market. Unlike other developing countries, India not only managed to absorb the immediate impact of high oil prices due to its diversified national resources, but also brought home the idea of mutuality of interests to the West Asian oil producing countries and Iran. This new trend in energy politics needs closer scrutiny.

On India's energy problems, besides a number of Official Reports, two indepth studies have come out in the 1970s—B. Dasgupta's *The Oil Industry in India* and P.D. Henderson's *India: The Energy Sector*. While Dasgupta's book is more a historical study, Henderson examined the whole question of primary energy source materials and the policy options available to India. Peter Sinai's study even though it has chosen to analyze a new dimension compared with the earlier two, fails to bring out India's multifaceted strategy to respond to the increased oil prices. His quick survey of India's energy requirements, costs involved and Indo-Arab economic co-operation in the 1970s, touches only the periphery of the issues involved. The two crucial questions: Do the Arabs and Iranians have an alternative other than depending on the developing countries like India in implementing their

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development programmes? and What measures India should take to have a better deal in the 1980s? have remained unanswered.

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AFRICA

MICHAEL A. SAMUELS, *Ed.*: Africa and the West. Frederick A. Praeger, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, xiii, 114 p., $14.00.

IN this tiny book, Michael A. Samuels has edited a collection of speeches delivered by Foreign Ministers of some African countries (Morocco, Sierra Leone and Tanzania), one important official from the Foreign Ministry of Zaire and Senghor, "ex" President of Senegal before distinguished Washington audiences drawn from the academic, business and the government circles. Although its title is *Africa and the West,* the West is merely represented by the speakers from Belgium and Sweden respectively. A number of important countries from the West such as Britain, France and Portugal which had, and continue to have, intimate relations with Africa have not found a place in this collection. This has naturally severely restricted the area of the range of issues that could be raised from the Western side. Similarly, from the African side a few more countries such as Guinea, Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia, which drastically differ with Senegal, Zaire and Morocco in their world view, could have been picked up to portray a reasonably comprehensive picture of the theme. The distinguished audiences of Washington were denied the pleasure of hearing many more speeches. A review of the present work can be done only by keeping these basic inadequacies in mind.

The substance of all these speeches have two broad dimensions. All the speakers, to start with, have highlighted the specific issues of foreign policy which are of immediate concern to their respective countries. Secondly, they have raised some general problems and spelt out their attitudes towards them. Among the latter set of problems the destabilizing activities of the Soviet-backed Cubans and the future of anti-racist struggles in Southern Africa have surfaced more frequently. In the light of these two dimensions an analysis of individual speeches can unravel a few more complexities of the theme.

Leopeld Sedar Senghor's speech entitled "Africa and America: Culture, Development and Co-operation," summarizes his intellectual interests and mental attitudes as a scholar and political leader. Being one of the founding fathers of the concept of Negritude he has been consistently stimulating the interest of ignorant Westerners in the history of African civilization and culture. He has attempted to fascinate the American audiences by reflecting on Africa's past with his usual finesse.

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While discussing the politics of the black continent, Senghor has classified African states into three main groups. The first group consists of about a dozen countries which talk in terms of "Marxism-Leninism" or scientific socialism. In the second group there are countries which claim their allegiance to "democratic socialism." "Parties from these fifteen countries," says Senghor, "have decided to create an Inter-African Socialist Union which explicitly refers to democratic socialism." (p. 17) Senegal falls in this category. Finally, there are about twenty-four to twenty-seven countries which follow "liberal capitalism." In spite of their differences these groups have co-existed harmoniously within the Organization for African Unity. However, their co-existence was becoming increasingly difficult; Senghor holds the destabilising activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa largely responsible for such a state of affairs. He also observes that the United States could send its dollars or get its soldiers killed for West Europeans and Latin Americans but certainly not for Africans. He therefore appeals to the Americans to define their Africa policy and apply it. (p. 19) In contrast to the United States, France he adds, has been arming a number of African countries which are apprehensive of communist penetration in Africa. Senghor's speech reads like an essay on the justification of the Franco-African ensemble. He has also expressed a strong desire to bolster Euro-African co-operation.

The spectre of destabilization has been haunting the Moroccans too. Mohamed Bucetta, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, has aired his grievances against the Americans by complaining about the State Department's apparent indifference towards the role of foreign military troops and their increasing involvement in contemporary African politics. (pp. 33-4) He suggests that even a country like Morocco went to Zaire's rescue during the two Shaba crises by sending military aid and tried to ward off the collapse of the Mobutu regime.

Mohamed Boucetta has also raised the question of Western Sahara and ventured to justify the official Moroccan policy regarding Sahara with an absurd logic. According to him, Western Sahara is an integral part of Morocco and making an independent state out of it is "utter nonsense." (p. 58) He has accused the Algerians of using the principle of self-determination for Western Sahara as a cover to achieve their hegemonic aims in the region. He also suggests that the people of Central Sahara which was handed down by France to Algeria must enjoy the right of self determination. However, it must be noted at this stage that the distinct traits of Central Saharans has not led to the formation of an effective national liberation struggle in that region. In contrast, to achieve sovereign statehood the Western Saharans have launched a sustained war against all the oppressers such as the Spanish, French, Mauritanians and Moroccans during the last decade. It is surprising to note that Mohamed Boucetta has even forgotten to take the cognizance of such a long liberation struggle.

Umba di Lutete who held top official positions in Zaire's Foreign Ministry

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appears to be preoccupied with three main issues. First, he is involved in an endeavour to project a proper image of President Mobutu's regime. According to him, Mobutu has been following the path of genuine Zairian nationalism. Some of its essential prerequisites are struggle against national disunity, social inequality, imperialism and colonialism. But these high-sounding objectives have hardly brought about a qualitative change in the performance of the Mobutu regime! The speaker has conveniently avoided to spell out the ambiguities in the concept of Zaire's genuine nationalism as propounded by Mobutu. Zaire's present regime has been characterized by the growing dictatorial tendencies of President Mobutu, corruption, rising foreign debts accompanied by increasing dependence upon the erstwhile colonial powers like France and Belgium. In the light of these facts one wonders how far the speaker could succeed in selling the idea of genuine Zairean nationalism to the audience. Second, even if Zaire is aware of the Soviet-Cuban activities in Angola it has taken steps to normalize relations with it. During the civil war in Angola, Zaire was backing the National Front of Liberation of Angola (FNLA) to sabotage the MPLA's victory. The speaker offers a pale explanation of this policy by stating that Zaire supported FNLA only because it was based in Zaire. (p. 76) Third, by categorically condemning the racist policies of South Africa the speaker has reassured the world that Zaire does not believe in adopting a soft posture towards the white minority regime.

Sierra Leone's Abdulai O. Conteh leaves the reader with a feeling that he is a hard-headed realist. The following passage is an evidence of his realism: "The expression 'Africa' or 'African point of view' is itself an improvisation for want of a better term. There is in reality no such thing as 'African point of view.' Africa, it is often forgotten, is a collection of disparate entities which by force of circumstances play the role of sovereign states." (p. 45)

The Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Ndugu Benjamin Mkapa, has given a balanced speech. He has explained the unique experiment of nation-building in Tanzania through *Ujamma*. Despite certain Marxist-Leninist elements which the concept of *Ujamma* has incorporated in its fold the Africanness of *Ujamma* can hardly be underestimated. The speaker has refrained from glorifying the achievements of Tanzania after the Arusha Declaration of 1967; the only valid point that is driven home is that Tanzania is more socialist, more self-reliant and less poor than what it was in 1967. He has also voiced a strong concern about the basic developmental problems of the Third World. According to him: "What we see as the world economic crisis is, as far as we are concerned, our escalating underdevelopment. The value of our raw materials is declining, which means that value of our work is declining." (p. 60).

Henri Simonet and Karin Soder, Foreign Ministers of Belgium and Sweden respectively, represent the West. There is very little to comment on these two speeches. One is rather struck by a confession given by Henri

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Simonet about the Western role in Africa in these words; "We must admit that the Soviet and, even more so, the Cuban interventions give the impression, to the African countries, that the communists are fighting for freedom and sovereignty of Africa, while we are attempting to fence it off in order to preserve our economic interests and our dubious connections with some white regimes in Africa." (p. 94) Swedish involvement in Africa has not been significant. Nevertheless, Karin Soder informs the audience about the Swedish involvement in Africa in such areas like trade, assistance to liberation movements and nursing the victims of apartheid.

The present work, on the whole, is a good beginning and one hopes that a more comprehensive book on this theme would come out soon.

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RAJEN HARSHE

H.P.W. HUTSON: Rhodesia: Ending an Era. Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1979, 198p., Rs. 70.

IT will be worthwhile to know a little about the background of the author before this book is reviewed. Major General Hutson was a soldier who had fought in the Sudan; he also had some administrative experience in Nigeria. He later travelled in East Africa, South Africa and Rhodesia. The author has a number of friends and relations settled in southern Africa, who naturally carry the "White Man's Burden." His sympathies are with his kith and kin in Africa and as one reads in the book on several pages, he would be happy with a continued White man's rule in southern Africa. He has nothing but dislike for the African freedom fighters, whom he continuously refers to as insurgents and terrorists as late as during the 1976 developments, when Henry Kissinger arrived on the scene and started his shuttle diplomacy.

One does not know if Gen. Hutson is today watching the developments in independent Zimbabwe ruled by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. If he is and if he has any sense of fair play, he must be feeling peeved. As a prophet of doom his predictions of chaos and civil war after African victory have not materialised. Obviously, the author has a jaundiced view of Africa and the Africans.

The book under review is a historical work on Rhodesia beginning with colonial rule of the late nineteenth century, on to the self-governing period after 1923 and then to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 and on through the years when several efforts were made to settle the question of Rhodesia. But one can at once say that the author's sense of history lacks objectivity. It is a history written by a White man with a strong bias against the non-Whites.

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Rhodesia has graduated to an independent Zimbabwe. The book is being reviewed late, but it is a useful exercise because the author deals with a colourful part of Africa with a chequered history. More than half the pages of the book deal with the developments of the last five years, which have an international flavour. That is also the period when the African nationalist forces of ZANU led by Mugabe and of ZAPU led by Nkomo were giving a tough time to the White illegal regime of Ian Smith in the bush war. The author is perhaps right in saying that by 1976 "White Rhodesians must have realised that they were fighting a war which they could not win but also could not afford to lose." (p. 130)

He admits, though reluctantly, that in 1976 the fighting was confined largely to the north-eastern part of the country, but later it spread more widely. Obviously, referring to ZANU he says that the nationalist fighters were getting training and arms deliveries from Tanzania and Mozambique. But he is wrong in saying that Russia was stepping up its arms deliveries to Tanzania and Mozambique. As was well known then and as it is now, it was China and not Russia which was helping ZANU.

One cannot agree with the author that in 1976 the morale of the Rhodesian forces was extremely high. If it was so, Smith would still have been talking of White minority rule for a thousand years. He was, in fact, conceding the principle of Black majority rule and had agreed to elections within two years to put it into effect.

At this stage the Americans moved in to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. They did not want Rhodesia to become another Angola. Came Kissinger in September 1976 to apply his Middle East-type of shuttle diplomacy to Africa for the first time. The African leaders of the five front-line states were naturally apprehensive of the American moves, but later they gave Kissinger whole-hearted support.

While Smith agreed to majority rule and elections as early as 1976, he kept dragging his feet. In the last three chapters the author gives an account of the developments till the book went to press in December 1977. The Anglo-American proposals were not accepted by Smith, but the author does not seem to be impressed even at this stage with the successes of the freedom fighters. He even ridicules British Foreign Secretary Owen, who "seemed over fearful of the guerilla armies."

There appears to be a lot of wishful thinking on the part of the author. One wonders, therefore, what useful purpose the book would serve to the readers from the freedom loving world. Whatever his intentions, we are all satisfied with the last stages of the independence of Rhodesia. British role in forcing Smith to step down and Britain assuming its role as a colonial power were excellent developments. The Lancaster House Conference, which drew up the constitution for independent Zimbabwe, was a long drawn-out affair and at one time it appeared that the conference may not succeed. Here one hopes that the author would allow this reviewer to pay tribute to

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the sagacity of Mugabe and Nkomo, who gave more concessions to the Whites than were expected.

The internationally supervised elections and the ensuing freedom in April 1980 are events of recent history. Many Western writers called Mugabe's victory a tribal one and they forecast a civil war after independence. The guerilla forces of Mugabe and Nkomo did give the people many a problem, yet the two leaders are today running the affairs of the country rather smoothly and there has been no civil war. The fear expressed by the author in the preface that an independent Zimbabwe may come under Soviet domination has also proved baseless.

New Delhi HARI SHARAN CHHABRA

International Economics

ARUN BOSE: Marx on Exploitation and Inequality: An Essay in Marxian Analytical Economics. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980, xxiv, 237p., Rs. 70.

WHILE describing the admittedly elusive concept of capital, John Hicks likened it to the aspect of a building, that if one were to take pictures of a building from different angles, the same building, seen through the pictures, would look different. One may add that even a circular building could be made to look flat if the camera were adjusted suitably. This seems to apply to the system that Karl Marx built. Marx's system is a massive structure, open to inspection from different angles. It may thus look different to different viewers, even though the structure happens to be the same. The book under review illustrates this in a conspicuous manner. Its author, Arun Bose, holds up before our view the proposition which occurs in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme,* namely that "labour is not the source of all wealth," and he argues that this contradicts the labour theory and leads up to what he calls the "capital theory" approach—a theory which represents capital as a "coercive social relation."

The author is thus led to believe that there are "two Marxes"—one upholding the labour value approach, and the other the capital theory approach. And he regards the latter as the true Marx. He takes pains to *prove* that labour is not the only source of "price, surplus or profit," and having proved it he discards the Marx of the labour value approach. It is further argued that there is no link between Marx's labour value approach and his theory of profit, so that the "transformation" exercise, which figures so conspicuously in Marxian literature, is altogether irrelevant to the "core" of Marx's system, the theory of exploitation.

It is very true that Marx, like everyone else, recognizes that capital in the technical sense is productive in the same way in which labour (or land) is

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productive—labour cannot do without capital, even as capital cannot do without labour. Yet this by itself does not contradict Marx's labour-value approach, or the theory of exploitation which is based on it. A zero-profit situation—which is what the labour theory implies in the limit—does not surely mean that capital (or land) is not productive in the technical sense. Marx *defines* value as labour embodied in commodities, and he proceeds from the "magnitude" of value, as thus defined, to "exchange relations"; relative values are thus equated to the relative quantities of labour that the production of commodities involves. It follows as a corollary that the value of labour power, in so far as it is for sale, should be equated to the amount of labour embodied in commodities that workers need for their supply to be sustained—"necessary labour," as Marx would call it. Now, in so far as the value of output exceeds the replacement cost of machines and raw materials used up in the process of production (Marx's "constant capital") and that of the labour employed (Marx's "variable capital"), there emerges a surplus. This surplus can certainly be attributed to the fact that land and capital goods cooperate with labour. Marx would acknowledge this co-operation, and yet he would claim that, in so far as the surplus is appropriated by capitalists, the workers are "exploited", the "rate of exploitation" being given by the ratio of surplus value to "necessary labour". Productivity, he would argue, inheres in capital goods, not in capitalists.

So far it is all definition—a "norm", so to say. Trouble arises when Marx goes on to translate this value system into what may be called the price system. In Marx's exposition of the value system, the rate of profit—surplus in relation to *total* capital—is necessarily lower than the rate of exploitation, which is surplus in relation to *a part* of capital. Is the rate of profit, as it is defined in the value system, related to the rate of profit, as it is determined in the market? If so, in what way? This is where Marx's transformation exercise comes in. Marx is aware that there is an error in his transformation procedure—he leaves the measure of capital as it happens to stand in the value system. Yet he believes that his assumption that "price" in the aggregate conforms to "value" in the aggregate is substantially correct, so that the rate of profit in the market does indicate the extent to which workers are exploited by the capitalists. What Morishima and his associates, to whom our author refers, have done is to confirm this belief. They have proved that while the rate of profit in price terms lies below the rate of exploitation, both tend to decline as the rate of wages rises, until at the point where profit is zero they coincide. A positive rate of profit in the market is thus a sufficient condition of exploitation. Marx uses the labour theory of value as a ladder to arrive at this position. Having arrived, one could surely discard the ladder. Marx chooses not to; he thinks he needs it in order to be able to exhibit what he regards as the essence of exploitation. After all, "exploitation," as a pejorative concept, is what you define it to be.

How does all this stand in relation to the so-called capital theory approach, which our author puts up as representing another Marx? It seems clear that

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the concept of capital as coercive power, rather than being incompatible with the labour theory of value, is a supplement to it. Marx, let us remember, deduces the value of labour power as a corollary of his labour theory, to say that it is equated to a certain minimum which is necessary for the sustenance of workers. The question thus remains as to what forces operate to bring the rate of wages, as it is determined in the market, to this minimum. Marx discards Smith's theory which runs in terms of the combination of "masters;" he is anxious to show that even under competitive conditions his theory of wages holds good. Nor would he countenance the Malthusian theory of population as a possible explanation. Where does he turn? This is where the concept of capital as coercive power becomes relevant. Marx shows the correspondence of his theory of wages with the labour theory of value by revealing the essential character to capitalism as a mode of production wherein the capitalist is the agent who takes all economic decisions and wherein labour remains a passive element. The capitalist derives this coercive power simply from the ownership of the means of production. And if even under competitive conditions each capitalist adjusts his investment rate so as to keep wages down to a minimum, it is because by so doing he derives maximum profit.

Marx's price theory is admittedly inadequate. He does not show enough care in his enunciation of the theory of profit; his "price of production" is indeed essentially a value concept. The theory does need emendation. It is indeed in this context that the Sraffa system, of which our author makes so much, becomes relevant. Yet the proposition that there are "two Marxes" and that one repudiates the other is one which few would agree to swallow. No wonder that our author should find himself, as he fears, somewhat isolated.

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PIERRE JALEE: How Capitalism Works (Trans. by Mary Klopper). Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980, 128p., Rs. 22.50.

THIS slim paper-back is probably the shortest available introduction to the Marxian theory of capitalism, up-dated to take into account late 20th century realities, as well as the controversies among Marxists about these realities at that time. The author promises at the outset, in the succint Introduction, that he would present a concise, analytical view of capitalism "which omits nothing essential," which is "accessible to everyone, with no preparation in this field!" The "simple analysis offered," it is also claimed, is unburdened by academic verbiage, more complete than the "dishonest condensation and simplification" sometimes undertaken "on the pretext of writing for beginners." Finally, the author ends his pamphlet with the laconic

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remark: "Marxism is by its very nature *antidogmatic;*" and expresses the hope that by reading his text, the reader would be "better equipped for the struggle against a system that must now be overthrown."

These aims are wholly laudable, and not only Marxists, but non-Marxists, and even anti-Marxists will benefit to some extent, and in different ways, if some of them are fulfilled. There is no doubt that some of them *are* fulfilled. For instance, it is certainly simple, concise, "accessible" to anyone without prior knowledge of the field, provided only that he is interested enough to learn a little, and is *not* distrustful of "analytical" studies which say very little directly about the "facts." It is also commendable in extending the coverage of the "ABC of Marxian political economy" to include such topics as the role of money, interest rates, land rent, and commercial profits which are often unknown to many Marxists, but have been discussed a great deal in recent French writings. It also introduces the reader to some of the basic issues posed by the ideologues of "Eurocommunism," especially in its French and Spanish variants, where the questions have been asked whether under conditions of advanced capitalism in the west, the "proletariat" of the late 19th and early 20th centuries have been reduced to a minority, so that the possibility of achieving "proletarian hegemony" in a revolutionary struggle to overthrow capitalism no longer exists. It also incorporates the work of American Marxists who have re-defined the late 20th century specific features of "monopoly capitalism", and of Marxists throughout the west who have stressed the problem of "alienation" as the major problem of advanced capitalism, and of the "mode of production" under capitalism as a "mode of living."

What is striking about this pamphlet is that in touching on all these problems, the author does *not* cut loose from his moorings in the fundamentals of Marxian theory as a "guide to revolutionary action." In this sense, what we have here is "antidogmatic Marxism" which is up-to-date, but not spurious, or, in Marxian jargon which became widely known in the 1970's, "revisionist" Marxism.

It is a pity, however, that the author did not depart from Marxian orthodoxy more than he has done, to clear up some logical problems of Marxian political economy, which should now be done, and *can* be done, even at the level of a first introduction to Marxian analysis of capitalism. For instance, he adheres to the proposition that "labour is the only source of value," (p. 19), which Marx recognised as a proposition which it is impossible to prove, and ultimately denounced as a "bourgeois idea" to justify capitalist exploitation. He also ignores Marx's insistence that it is impossible to "get rid of constant capital" when calculating "necessary labour" embodied in commodities. (This makes him commit an error in a numerical example presented on pages 26 and 27). He also clings too much to Marx's analysis of "the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall" as the fundamental "self-contradiction" of capitalist development, to which every other contradiction is related. This too, is logically untenable, on Marx's own

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assumptions, and is an article of faith only in a particular, spurious version of Marxian theory which reduces it to a theory of "economic determinism." These examples—and there are others, especially his discussion of the problem of the relationship between the "infrastructure and the superstructure" of any society—show that the author has not been able to keep his promise either to be "antidogmatic," or to avoid "dishonest simplification" entirely. The reason may be his lack of specialised training in economics and his lack of interest in such less widely read Marxist texts as the *Theories of Surplus Value and Capital,* Volume III, *Wage, Labour and Capital* and *Critique of the Gotha Programme.* If he had paid attention to these, he may have produced an even better concise introduction to Marxian theory which is also up-to-date, and is "antidogmatic" without being "revisionist."

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ARUN BOSE

K.L. SETH: Foreign Capital and Debt Servicing. Varma Brothers, New Delhi, 1979, iv, 108p., Rs. 30.

FOREIGN Capital and Debt Servicing discusses the problems of servicing of debts in developing economies which invariably use foreign capital either in the form of government-to-government loans or in the straightforward form of foreign private capital for achieving accelerated growth rates. The discussion begins with what constitutes the absorptive capacity of a developing economy. Absorptive capacity is a rather loose concept in economics which eludes precise definition. And yet an estimate of the absorptive capacity in every developing economy is essential in order to find out the quantum of foreign capital investment required for a pre-determined rate of economic growth. It is necessary to determine the level of foreign investment available. Should the foreign investment available be greater than required, it would lead to creation of spare capacity which may remain unutilised. In case the foreign capital available is less than required, it will obstruct the implementation of planned economic development. Thus both the excess and shortage of foreign capital can create problems for a developing economy.

The issue which figures prominently in the study is the impact on the economy of a developing country created by debt servicing. Debt servicing is understood both in the sense of payment of interest on foreign loans and the repayment of principal through amortisation. The author correctly observes that debt servicing implies a continuous "drain" on the economy. It is essential therefore, that marginal returns on foreign capital should at least be equal to the cost of foreign capital in terms of debt servicing. Again, one could not agree more with the author when he says that a constant increase in savings largely determines the capacity to service foreign debts,

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and that in turn determines the total of foreign capital that a country can absorb. Debt servicing, however, not only requires an increase in savings internally but also an export surplus in the balance of payments. Without an export surplus in the balance of payments, debts cannot be serviced properly.

The important question is: How does one determine the debt servicing capacity (which is the same thing as credit-worthiness) of a country? The most important test of the debt servicing capacity of a country is whether capital inflow has enabled a country to maintain a steady rate of growth.

Connected with the capacity of a country to service foreign debts is the question of terms of foreign loans. Judging by the number of instances which one comes across in respect of rescheduling of loans by developing countries, the terms of loans are beyond the capacity of most of these countries. All international institutions including UNCTAD, therefore, have recommended some softening of the terms of loans to developing countries. The least that can be done is to fix the terms of loans in keeping with the debt servicing capacity of a country.

Rising debt servicing obligations do result in an unfavourable balance of payments normally. The only viable remedy for correction of balance of payments, according to the author, lies in import substitution and export promotion. One could not agree more. However, both import substitution and export promotion are not as easy as they might appear at first sight. Both import substitution and export promotion policies are subjected to pressures and cross pressures in the process of implementation.

The final chapter of the book discusses the termination date for receipt of foreign capital. The author takes a look at the ways and means by which dependence on foreign aid can be ended within the foreseeable future.

It is a good study. The best comment on the study, however, has been made by the author himself. "At best, the present monograph can claim to be an orderly compilation of the various views regarding debt servicing."

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S.S. MEHTA

INDIA

General

S.L.N. SIMHA and JANAKI G. KRISHNAN: The Saga of Silver. Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1980, xiv, 208p., Rs. 40.

INDIA has not been fortunate in the management of its precious metals. Although its own production of silver is negligible, it has vast quantities of this metal and is able to influence and even lead the international

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market. In the absence of a clearly formulated policy, however, we have not been able to derive as much advantage as might have been expected, of our virtually unique position as a supplier, controlling the release or outflow of vast hoards. Even the awareness of the facts of history, or of the importance of silver considered merely as a commodity at present, is lacking. This book aims at filling this gap. It is a well-documented history. The claim in the Preface that no other publication provides as much data on silver for as long a period seems to be justified.

The historical survey takes up the greater part of the book and reproduces several tables regarding trends in gold and silver prices, production, imports and exports and government's purchases and sales in the United States and India. The effort in assembling these facts is laudable, but the dry official and statistical records could have been enlivened and made more interesting, perhaps, if tit-bits of other information had also been provided.

Silver has had several ups and downs, has aroused intense passions and has been the object of speculative trading, not as bizarre in real life as in Paul Erdman's recent work of popular fiction, but volatile enough to create many problems for individuals and governments. Before it was eased out as a monetary metal, with Germany taking the lead in 1871 to opt out of bimetallism, silver prices were extraordinarily stable for about 150 years in relation to the price of gold (one need not go back further, as neither world trade nor mining for the previous metals had been developed in the earlier years). Because of this stability in prices, silver coins were widely used. The Roman silver *denarius* and many other coins which could be exchanged for their bullion value used to be in universal demand. Later, the silver *thaler*, originally minted by Count Stephen Schlik, owner of the silver rush mines in Bohemia became the prototype for the dollar, leading to the minting of a number of other coins, including the Maria Theresa dollar which was prized as a collector's item all over the world and the United States' dollar itself. The silver rupee and the Spanish and Mexican dollars were in circulation in the greater part of Asia and the Far East.

As an article in daily use silver was also dirt cheap in India. This is illustrated by two instances. In his classic history of the rise, progress and condition of banking in India, written in 1863, C.N. Cooke has referred to the silver trappings of an elephant, with chains sufficiently thick and large to serve as the ground tackle for a vessel of twenty five tons. In his lectures on the Indian currency system, Jehangir Coyajee has referred to a tradition which was current in Western India to the effect that during the American Civil War boom, our import surplus was used for getting the wheel tyres of carriages made in silver and the aminals drawing them also shod in silver.

As for the passions, William Jennings Bryan made free silver, by which was meant the unrestricted minting of silver coins, a national issue; and in a phrase, which he made memorable by his oratory, he opposed the crucifixion of mankind on a cross of gold, long before Keynes.

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Speculation in recent times—the Hunt family in the United States becoming so deeply involved that the banks have had to bale them out in the public interest, has almost matched the fantastic description in Paul Erdman's best-selling novel—*Silver Bears*. But even in the past speculation was never altogether absent. The consequences affected governments relatively more than families and individuals, as governments were handling silver every day, while those in the private sector, who were holding on to their stocks in the forms of articles for daily use, were less worried about temporary changes which did not affect them immediately.

Among the governments, which were exposed to the consequences of speculation by private traders, the pre-independence and pre-war Government of India fared very badly. In retrospect, it is amazing that while European countries were abandoning silver for gold, and West Germany in particular, was dumping silver stocks released from coinage, the then Government of India expected the fall in silver prices to be arrested. It waited in vain for the major western countries to take effective decisions at international conferences, in preference to adopting other alternatives. Before the Indian mints were ultimately closed to the coinage of silver, speculative inflows of silver into India, for being tendered to the Indian mints for coinage, had been taking place for some time. The helplessness of the Government of India in a situation which they could not control was in sharp contrast to the alertness of the private traders. A few days before the closure of the Indian mints in 1893, the British Government declined to publish the findings of the Herschell Committee's Report in the House of Commons, before the Viceroy had received it, but a summary of it had been obtained and had appeared in the *Frankfurter Zietung* earlier. Following the closure of the mints in India, a question arose about the coinage of silver in transit, which had already been shipped to India. One of the leading British firms then seems to have had some influence in determining the seigniorage to be levied by the Government of India for this purpose.

It is surprising but true that India suffered, both when silver prices were falling in the seventies and eighties of the last century and the rupee cost of the home charges rose steadily as a result leading to a severe dose of retrenchment and when silver prices rose steeply during the First World War and the Government of India was unable to procure silver in adequate quantities for coinage in India. The Government of India was driven to the necessity of requesting the British Royal Mint to mint gold sovereigns at Bombay, and also to produce gold mohurs at the Bombay mint in 1918, as an alternative to the coinage of silver, as silver was just not available.

During World War II, India had a different experience. It obtained 226 million ounces of silver on a lend/lease basis from the United States. After partition, India's share of this liability was fixed at 172.5 million ounces. Not all of this was used. When it was necessary to return India's share of 172.5 million ounces, the silver refinery, which had been established at Calcutta to recover silver from the quaternary coinage for this purpose,

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was not ready. The bulk of the liability to the United States was therefore discharged by tendering quaternary coins containing silver.

These are sobering facts, which indicate the difficulties of dealing with precious metals and particularly with silver. In recent years, in the context of a steady increase in silver prices, the Government of India's policy in regard to the export of silver has not been quite clear. As our stocks are non-replenishable, as silver prices are soaring and as the world outlook is that there may be a permanent and widening excess of demand over supply, it is in our interest to conserve our silver stocks, and to export them later at increased prices rather than now at necessarily lower prices. This will, of course, mean that there will be a greater increase immediately in world silver prices, as we will be feeding the market with greatly reduced supplies. Because of this greater increase in world prices, smuggling would become even more profitable.

The problem is complicated, but the basic issue which arises is how far, when, and in what stages our silver hoards, which are a national asset, should be allowed to be depleted by exports. A long-term view will have to be taken; and a policy or policies based on a correct assessment of trends in the international market from time to time will have to be formulated.

This book contains some suggestions in the context of these recent developments. It is proposed that a Gold and Silver Board should be established. The Government of India should try to stabilise the price of silver through this Board, making purchases of about 15 million ounces per annum for additions to its silver stocks. The Board is expected to set up more refineries and to provide in a more orderly manner for the requirements of the electronic industry and other industries using photographic films. It may also arrange for the recovery of silver which is now lost in industrial processes, check outward smuggling and conserve our stocks in other ways, if possible. Exports of silver from India, whether of bullion or of articles made from silver, should, it is proposed be permitted in future, within the framework of a policy to be formulated by the government on the recommendations of the Board. Futures trading in silver in the international markets, it is suggested, should also be undertaken by the Board as a part of its trading activities. The entire profits as a result of the Board's operations will accrue to the government. It is envisaged that ultimately some ceilings may be imposed on private holdings of silver, if prices continue to rise and the conservation and more orderly use of silver becomes in consequence even more important than it is at present.

Not all the policy recommendations which have been made in this book are likely to be accepted. The Gold Board, which was constituted immediately after the introduction of gold control in India, was not able to achieve anything useful; and there is no reason to think that another body, if it is established at present, will be successful. As regards purchases for building up the official stocks, it is extremely unlikely that the quantities which are envisaged will be available or that Government will be prepared to spend

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the money, which will be necessary for this purpose.

Although one may disagree with some of the recommendations in this book, the value of this survey cannot be denied. The Institute of Financial Management and Research deserves to be congratulated for drawing the attention of the public to the problems of silver and for providing a handy book in which a great deal of relevant information has been collected.

Madras. R.K. SESHADRI

History of Modern India

B.R. NANDA, *Ed.*: Essays in Modern Indian History. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980, ix, 252p., Rs. 70/-

ESSAYS in Modern Indian History covers various facets of the Indian national movement, such as the rise and growth of the early Congress, the concept and ideology of the Salt Satyagraha, and the Princes' response to the Congress movement and the economic background to the growth of communal antagonism. The papers, based on lectures delivered at the Nehru Memorial Library, provide a "valuable discussion on different approaches to the understanding of historical processes in India."

The volume includes two historiographical essays. A.K. Majumdar's bibliographical survey of the literature on the transfer of power is descriptive rather than analytical. There is no attempt to identify the dominant interpretations, the context in which these emerged, and the assumptions on which they proceed to explain the events leading to the transfer of power.

Rajat Ray, however, contributes a fairly comprehensive paper on the three interpretations of Indian nationalism. Though tentative in his criticism of certain lines of approach and somewhat ambivalent on some of the issues he has discussed, he provides interesting clues to the "more sharply-defined sets of analyses" amongst the writings on Indian nationalism.

Rajat Ray examines the three interpretations—Marxian, neo-traditionalist and predominantly political—and argues that their differences relate mainly to an identification of the "innermost springs of the major political changes," the territorial units in which the changes need to be investigated, and the groups whose participation shaped the political processes of changes. His conclusion that, "at one level the Marxian method might seem appropriate, at another, the neo-traditional and political approaches might throw light," is a rather "safe" conclusion and is unlikely to go down well with serious students of Indian nationalism. A cut-and-dried explanation may not always be desirable, but a preference for a certain approach is crucial for the understanding and appreciation of a historical process.

S.R. Mehrotra, whose detailed study of the emergence of the Congress (published in 1971) does not figure in Rajat Ray's analysis, provides no

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fresh insights into the ideals, objectives and organisation of the Congress. His view of the unilinear progress of nationalism and of the monolithic character of the Congress is hardly tenable. So is the use of "moderate" and "extremist" as explanatory categories. Judith S. Walsh's study of Surendranath Benerjea reveals the inadequacy of such categories.

The three essays on the Dandi March, the Princes' response to the deliberations of the Round Table Conference, and on the tribal "sub-movements" illuminate the various facets of the national movement. Based on a wide range of original sources, they considerably advance our knowledge of the role of certain groups who, according to most traditional accounts, were of peripheral importance to the study of India's freedom struggle. K.S. Singh, in particular, does well to reveal that the tribal involvement in regional politics from 1920 to 1947 was deeper than is generally known, and was also more diverse because it centred round specific issues concerning land and forests.

P.C. Joshi and Aparna Basu make serious contributions to the debate on the communal problem. The main thrust of Joshi's argument is that Hindu-Muslim antagonism can be explained in terms of the fact "that for the major part of British rule and in the key areas of the Indian sub-continent the Muslim upper class steadily *lost ground* to the Hindus." Using Gunnar Myrdal's phraseology, Joshi argues that while the Hindus experienced the "backlash" as well as the "spread effects" of the modernization process under British rule, the Muslims were exposed largely to the "backlash" effects of the British impact alone.

Such conclusions are tentatively, hastily formulated and unsupported by existing historical evidence. A complex phenomena like communalism cannot be reduced to the declining fortunes of the Muslim community. Besides, where is the evidence in support of such a formulation? Joshi virtually cites none. Nor does he identify the areas where the Muslim "upper class" was supposedly losing ground to the Hindus. Surely, the Uttar Pradesh Muslims maintained their dominance on land, government service and the professions. This was equally true of the trading communities of western India and the prosperous Muslim landowners of the Punjab, such as the Tiwanas and the Daultanas. So, what requires explanation is the involvement of certain influential and dominant Muslim groups in the communal and sectarian movements and their motivations for doing so.

Joshi points out that "the demand for a separate homeland seemed to give an outlet to the anxieties, fears, uncertainties and aspirations of large sections of Muslims who identified 'Hindu' domination as the greatest impediment to progress." Again, the implicit assumption that the anxieties and fears concerned primarily the material interests of the community is not quite tenable. The ideology of Muslim separatism cannot be simply reduced to a struggle for power, influence and status. Likewise, Joshi's presupposition that the communal ideology was created and fostered by the "upper class" (a somewhat vague category), to protect and promote

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its interests takes no cognizance of the interplay of various historical forces which heightened communal consiousness among a wide spectrum of the Muslim community and paved the way for the emergence of a powerful separatist movement.

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New Delhi. MUSHIRUL HASAN

ALGERNON RUMBOLD: Watershed in India: 1914-22. Athlone Press, London, 1979, xii, 344p., £ 14.

THE author of the book under review, Sir Algernon Rumbold served in the India Office from 1929 to 1947. He has however, not ceased to look at India from the narrow window of his old office. As he himself says (p. vi): "My knowledge of the period is derived from documents publicly available, but my interpretation of them has been helped by the impressions formed during nearly 19 years in the India Office from 1929 to 1947...." His book deals with the years between 1914 and 1922, which, according to him marked "the watershed of British rule in India, and indeed of the British Empire." (p. v) It examines the effect on British policy of the First World War, the Montagu Declaration of August 1917, the introduction of dyarchy and Gandhi's first non co-operation movement. This book is not really about Indian politics; it is essentially "a study of the management of British policy in India during the First World War and the four following years." (p. v)

Rumbold has thoroughly examined the archival sources in Britain. He writes with great lucidity and objectivity. Unfortunately, he writes more like an administrator than like an historian. He does not seem to realize that even official policy cannot be fully understood merely with the help of official sources.

It is easy to be wise after the event. Rumbold's book abounds in "if onlys" and "might-have-beens." His credo is summed up in the following remark: "Perhaps bolder policies might have reduced the dangers. Reasonable concessions can win middle of the road men; but those made from weakness gain only a pause. When a government reveals that it can be pushed, groups are encouraged to press their ambitions harder. Reluctance to deal with unconstitutional agitation provokes more agitation." (p. 318)

Rumbold also believes that the end of the Raj was not inevitable. He says: "Autocracies are not necessarily doomed to die; although the baton of power may pass, and authority may cloak itself with a curtain. There are still subject peoples, although perhaps under new governors; the satellite states continue to exist; there is no principle of inevitability operating against men ready to rule over others who are willing to be bidden." (p. 321) Here, he argues against the belief of many more knowledgeable and liberal-minded

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men—both British and non-British, past and present—that the Raj was in a sense an artificial phenomenon which could not last for ever, and that India could not be governed indefinitely by relays of Englishmen from six thousand miles away. Rumbold is not entirely oblivious of the contradictions involved in the governance of an empire by a democracy. But he totally fails to appreciate the strength of nationalism in the modern world. Prominent among the causes which he lists as being responsible for the demise of the Raj are "the acceptance in 1917 of the idea that the Raj might have heirs; the pressures encouraged by the parliamentary system; and the consequent increasing difficulty of the government holding the scales between competing Indian interests." (pp. 321-2) He also does not seem to fully appreciate two other basic facts about the Raj, namely that the British could rule India only as long as India imposed no burden on the British taxpayer, and that the British Government in India was based upon the support and acquiescence of the Indians themselves.

The author is obviously unhappy over the British withdrawal from India and calls it an "abdication." But he is correct in his assessment of its wider historical significance when he remarks: "The British abdication in India, and in particular the statement made in 1917, which came to be interpreted as a decision eventually to abdicate, set the pattern for the dismantlement of the whole British Empire and of the Empires of all western democracies. Without this example, the middle of the twentieth century might not have seen the massive move of dependent peoples to sovereignty." (p. 322)

Himachal Pradesh University,
Simla.

S.R. MEHROTRA

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences. (Managing Editor)

CHIANG, C.Y. Jesse. *The Good Life* (Bhavan's Book University, 242). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, 127p., Rs. 12, Paper.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part is a collection of essays on the principles of a good life. The second part, "the vital distinctions" is composed of four essays of double themes—loneliness and solitude; existence and living; intelligence and wisdom; and fun versus joy. The third and last part deals with mystery of life.

D'ABREO, Desmond. *People and Forests: The Forest Bill and a New Forest Policy* (Indian Social Institute Monograph Series, 5). Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1982, 49p., Rs 7.50, Paper.

This monograph is based on the discussions that took place at the Workshop on A New Forest Policy at the Indian Social Institute, April 12-14, 1982. It critically examines the development of the Indian forest policy and legislation, and the proposed Indian Forest Bill, 1980, and suggests a new policy. The appendix section contains a statement of the Workshop and an appeal to the MPs on the Indian Forest Bill, 1980.

DATTA, Aswini Kumar. *Bhaktiyoga* (Bhavan's Book University, 59) tr. from Bengali by Gunada Charan Sen. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bomaby, 1981 xix, 217p., Rs. 20, Paper.

DE SOUZA, Alfred. *The Social Organisation of Aging Among the Urban Poor* (Indian Social Institute Monograph Series). Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1982, 78p., Rs. 20, Paper.

Based on a survey of eight resettlement colonies of Delhi, it provides information on the social and economic situation of the aged among the urban poor, their nutrition and health status and the coping mechanisms they have developed—family kinship, group and neighbourhood ties—to manage psychological stress related to physical and economic dependency status, social isolation and loneliness. It also discusses different implications of old age in Western societies and in India, and for men as compared to women.

DUGGAL, K.S. *Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir* (National Biography Series). National Book Trust, New Delhi, 1982, 95p., Rs. 8, Paper.

Biographical monograph of a former Chief Minister of Punjab, a creative writer in Punjabi. It includes his writings rendered into English, by the author, a former Director of the National Book Trust, India and personal friend of Gianiji.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (*Ed.,*) *The Ten Classical Upanisads* Vol. 1: *Isa and Kena.* Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, 312p., Rs. 80.

Under the Bhavan's project to present the critically edited Samskrit texts of the Upanisads with their English translations and appropriate comments, highlighting their relevance to modern times, the editor presents in this volume *Isa* and *Kena* Upanisads. The comments of the editor are followed by the *Bhasyas* of the four Acaryas Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva and Vallabha rendered into English. It also gives a glossary of Upanisadic terms.

GHOSH, S.K. *Protection of Minorities and Scheduled Castes* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 181p., Rs. 50.

Highlights the problems of the minority groups and weaker sections and emphasises

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the need to explore the various factors which led to the widespread communal, caste and linguistic dissension that erupted into riots in several parts of the country and frequent breakdown of law and order. The author, a retired Inspector General of Police, contends that the maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice have a high degree of correlation. He therefore says that every law enforcement officer must convince himself, that, under the law, the government requires non-discrimination in terms of religion, caste, or social standing.

HANUMAPPA, H.G. *Urbanisation Trends in India : Case Study of a Medium Town.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, xiv, 130p., Rs. 40.

Study of socio-economic structure of Hospet, undertaken in response to a request made to the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, by the Municipal Administration of Hospet, for the purpose of planning future development of the town.

HASRAT, Bikrama Jit. *History of Bhutan : Land of the Peaceful Dragon.* Education Department, Thimphu, 1980, xxii, 241p., Illus., Maps.

Presents history of the state from pre-historic times. The author, an eminent historian and an authority on the Himalayan region also discusses developments in government, society, institutions, literature, art and architecture. Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1774; Treaty of Sinchula, 1865; Treaty of Punakha, 1910; Indo-Bhutan Treaty, 1949; Constitution of the Tshogdo of Bhutan—1953 and Third Five Year Plan are given in the Appendix. It also includes a chronology starting from 500 BC-500 AD to 1972.

KAMBLE, N.D. *Atrocities on Scheduled Castes in Post-Independent India (15th August 1947 to 15th August 1979).* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, xvi, 528p., Rs. 150.

Chronology of the nature and extent of the atrocities on scheduled castes and the steps taken by the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary in this behalf. These are presented in five broad categories *viz.*: (a) Source of information and date; (b) Place of atrocity and date; (c) Atrocity; (d) Cause of atrocity and (e) Action taken by the victim, executive and judiciary to remedy it. Information is collected from newspapers, journals and the Report of the Commissioner for SCs and STs.

KAMBLE, N.D. *The Scheduled Castes.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, 264p., Rs. 85.

Traces the historical background of the development and growth of untouchables and untouchability and discusses the socio-economic and political profiles of the scheduled castes in India with reference to their social, economic and political status in the Indian society. Scheduled castes and their area of enumeration is given in the Appendix.

MISHRA, G.P. *Dynamics of Rural Development in Village India.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, xii, 89 p., Rs. 45.

The purpose of this study is to examine the social dynamics of rural development in the areas which are experiencing dairy development programmes. It shows how castes and classes figure in the process of rural development in the villages covered under the scheme of dairy development and how the benefits from it flow in favour of the dominant caste in general and the emerging capitalist class in particular who, by and large, come from the large holding group of the dominant caste. The study also highlights the prospects of asset-based income and employment generation for the poor through dairy development in rural areas based on a case study of rural areas in Karnataka. This study is a by-product of the study on "The Impact of Dairy Development in Rural Areas of Karnataka" which was conducted by the author at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore.

RAMACHANDRAN, Arcot. *Energy Research and Development in India—Challenges and Perspectives.* Andhra Pradesh Akademi of Sciences, Hyderabad, 1974, 32p., Paper.

Prof. S. Bhagavantam's Sixtieth Birthday Commemoration Lecture—V, delivered by the Secretary, Department of Science and Technology. Presents the issue of energy problems of India in future years.

SUBRAMANIAM, V. *Aspects of Buddhist Culture Including Veera Kanya Vahini.* Ashish Publishing House New Delhi, 1981, viii, 78p.

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Book of dance-dramas in Sanskrit on Buddhist themes. Seeks to glorify Buddha through song and dance.

SUBRAMANIAM, V. (*Ed.*). *The sacred and the Secular in India's Performing Arts: Ananda K. Coomaraswamy Centenary Essays.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 185p., Rs. 100.

This book is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to analysis and criticism of Coomaraswamy's thesis that *art is religion and religion is art.* The editor himself, in three chapters discusses the importance of the secular elements in Indian dance and music from a socio-historical point of view. One chapter is devoted to the history of the devadasis and their contribution. The second part includes essays published in the *Journal of the National Centre for Performing Arts.* These essays illustrate two points: (a) that the practitioners and theoreticians of Hindustani classical music are normally less obsessed or even totally unconcerned with the religious or Bhakti elements, and (b) that how people deeply involved in Bharatanatyam, Kootiyattam and Yakshagana arts bring in the religious element but not with the same obsession as Coomaraswamy does.

SURENDRA KUMAR, (*Ed.*). *India-USSR : Friends in Peace and Progress.* Kalamkar, New Delhi, 1982, viii, 107p., Rs. 25, Paper.

Collection of essays and two speeches made by Shankar Dayal Sharma and T.N. Kaul, at the Round Table organized by the *Soviet Land* magazine. It discusses the international significance of Indo-Soviet relations and friendship.

TALEYARKHAN, Homi J.H. *Splendour of Sikkim*, 2nd ed. Gangtok, 1982, 78p., Illus., Map, Rs. 8, Paper.

The Governor of Sikkim introduces to readers the developments taking place in all areas in the state.

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

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NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING AND CACOPHONY OF VOICES IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

By P.M. KAMATH

In the post-World War II period "national security" has become the most important concept commanding respect among policy-makers and demanding crippling-silence on the part of the national community. It is not necessary here to examine the reasons[1] *for this commandeering position given to the concept of national security, but in an objective sense, foreign affairs of any nation in the ultimate analysis is conducted to secure national security. In this sense national security essentially denotes a nation's determination to preserve at any cost some of its interests. Foremost are : territorial integrity, political independence and fundamental governmental institutions.*[2]

In the contemporary world it is also a well established fact that the military, diplomatic and economic aspects of a nation's foreign affairs are inseperably interlinked with one another. While foreign policy aims at serving national interest through peaceful diplomatic means, military policy aims at preparedness to protect national interest in case foreign policy fails. The foreign policy of a nation has also to take into consideration economic states involved in a particular policy consideration. This is particularly true for a super power like the United States. Hence, in a sense, it is appropriate to term the combination of foreign and military policies of a nation as national security policy.

Who makes national security policy in the United States? What are the special features of national security policy-making process? It is proposed to answer these questions in this paper with special reference to the Reagan Administration.

INTRODUCTION

The most striking feature of the American national security policy-making process is their almost proverbial inability to speak in one voice. In the post-World War II period, since the United States emerged as a super power, this characteristic feature has become embarrasingly obvious. Every presidential aspirant has promised, during his election campaign to present US foreign policy in one voice. In the 1980 presidential campaign this was a major charge of the Reaganites that the Carter Administration spoke in too many voices in foreign affairs. Reagan's supporters boasted that they were going to "hit the ground running" and "speak with one voice."[3] The same need was stressed by the *Report of President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties* when they said: "The degree of cohesion and sense of common purpose projected by American society as a whole" is a prerequisite for a sound national security policy.[4]

It is true that the Carter Administration spoke in too many voices at the same time. President Carter himself practised zigging now and zagging later,

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He was initially in favour of production of B1 bombers, but later—backed out. Initially, he was enthusiastic of the Neutron Bomb, but later shelved it. He was for supply of air borne warning and control system (AWACS) air crafts to Iran under the Shah but the United States Congress was against it. The House Committee on International Relations voted by 19 to 17 to disapprove the sale. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was also against it. So finally he was forced to withdraw his proposal.[5] Several such speak-ins and speak-outs by President Carter personally, eroded his credibility in foreign affairs.

The Reagan Administration has not proved itself different from the preceding administration. In retrospect, while President Carter himself exhibited an indecisiveness his advisers did not so often speak in many, confusing and contradictory voices. There have been too many instances of contradictory and cross-purpose policy pronouncements in the Reagan Administration so far. There have been too many examples of "two step process: declaration and disavowal."[6] This was highlighted by Alexander Haig when he resigned in June 1982 on the grounds that US foreign policy lacked "consistency, clarity and steadiness of purpose."[7] The experience the Reagan team has had in speaking in a divided voice ought to make them swallow their own criticism of the Carter Administration along with the realisation of the bitter truth—that in the American national security policy-making process multiplicity of voices has become almost inevitable.

What makes national security policy-making in the United States to be so plagued with so many voices? While several reasons[8] can be adduced for this state of affairs, the two most important are : 1. The constitutional division of powers in the area of national security between the Executive and the Congress and 2. the nature of the organization of the Executive to manage national security affairs.

Division of Powers Between the Executive and the Congress Generate Discord

Separation of powers is the hallmark that distinguishes the American political system from other democratic societies. In the United States, power in the area of national security affairs has been divided between the President and Congress.[9] The powers of the Congress have been further bifurcated between the House and the Senate; within each House, powers have been devolved around several committees and their sub-committees. Separation of powers between the Executive and the Congress and the consequent decentralization of powers within Congress itself is, the first source of multiplicity of voices in foreign affairs.

Thus, the President can establish diplomatic relations with foreign powers, but all the presidential nominees for diplomatic jobs have to be approved by the Senate. The President has the power to initiate and negotiate treaties with foreign powers, but before they come into force "advice and consent" of the Senate is required. Similarly, the President can build and train the

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Armed Forces, but money for their maintenance has to be appropriated by the House. The President can wage a war but only after a declaration of war by the Congress. As a matter of fact, a mere reading of the Constitution would create an impression that the Congress has a greater control over national security affairs than the President. The Constitution does not specify that the President has the direction and control over foreign affairs. The term "foreign" does not appear at all in the Constitution in relation to the Presidency, while it appears three times in Article I dealing with the Congress; similar is with the word defence. Such a constitutional system of governmental institutions sharing power in the same area of activity, intensifies the institutional power struggle.[10]

In actual practise however, especially in the twentieth century, many of the powers of Congress have come to be diluted, some to the extent of becoming redundant. Thus, to avoid the need of congressional confirmation, the President might resort to the practice of appointing special envoys to conduct delicate negotiations. The Senate's control over the President's treaty-making power might be circumvented by signing executive agreements. Presidents have fought so far 125 undeclared wars (all wars since World War II have been undeclared wars). Now the War Powers Act of 1973, legally permits the President to fight a war or a conflict for the first 60 days; after that he would need congressional authorization. Congressional control of the purse has not enabled it to play a positive role in foreign affairs.[11] The President has come to acquire a pre-eminence and predominance in national security policy-making, unknown in the past two centuries. This is largely due to the nature of modern weaponary and warfare and the dominant position enjoyed by the United States in international affairs. The President has become "the maker" of national security policy at least in crisis situations. In such a situation he first acts and then rationalizes the power to act. Even in a non-crisis situation, the President has the initiative, though Congress may discuss, debate, defer, differ or delay; but rarely can it destroy.

Yet, the American Congress remains today the most powerful legislature in comparison to other national legislatures as regards control over national security policy-making. It is this constitutional division of powers over national security affairs between Congress and the President that has generated the conflicts as to their respective jurisdictions. Whenever, the Congress feels threatened by the presidential power arrogance it attempts to limit the powers of the President through legislative devices. In 1951 Senator John B. Bricker (R. Ohio) made an unsuccessful attempt to limit the President's treaty-making power so as to preserve the Senate's power in that area.[12] In 1973, overriding President Nixon's veto, Congress enacted the War Powers Act which purported to preserve the congressional role in the declaration of war.[13] In the process, the two branches often voiced independent and contradictory opinions. The Congress and the President felt so independent of each other with their respective perceptions of their jurisdiction over

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national security affairs that the link between the President and Congress came to be "the weakest in foreign affairs."[14] For instance, the SALT II talks were initiated by the Nixon Administration and carried forward by the Ford Administration. Yet, when President Carter intended to complete the negotiations, the Senate, at the very outset of Carter's presidential tenure, gave clear signals that it could no longer be taken for granted on the treaty-making process.[15] Inspite of that President Carter was able to conclude the SALT II Treaty and sign it in June 1979. However, the Panama Canal Treaty which had been ratified earlier by the Senate in 1978 proved to be a pyrrhic victory for the Carter Administration, because he exhausted all his goodwill with Congress in getting it ratified.[16] Hence, the SALT II Treaty was not ratified by the Senate dominated by the Democrat-President's own party. The Senate demanded certain major changes in the treaty, if necessary even renegotiation!

There are numerous examples of the Congress and the President speaking in different voices; and this extended also to the Congress. The problem is further complicated by the nature of the congressional organization; the Congress is a leaderless body functioning amidst chaos. Power is dispersed among different committees.[17] In the Senate there are the Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services Committee and a number of their sub-committees. Similarly, the House of Representatives has the Foreign Affairs Committee and Armed Services Committee with their own sub-committees. It is not that national security policy issues go before only these committees and their sub-committees. If the issue under consideration were to have overlapping jurisdiction with other committees, the latter world also consider the issue. In the Senate for instance, 11 of the 22 standing committees have jurisdiction over one or the other national security related issues. Differences of opinion between the committees within the Senate or the House, or between the committees of the House and the Senate are too often and too numerous to be illustrated. Suffice it to note one example. The Panama Canal Treaties were finally adopted by the Senate and signed by the President in 1978. Four committees of the House were considering further legislative action needed to implement the treaties. But the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, which had the main jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Treaties, was still considering the steps to prevent the implementation of the treaties. In the ultimate analysis each member of the committee expressed his opinion as though it was the considered opinion of the United States Government. Over the Vietnam War, for instance, during the Johnson Administration a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said: "There are 19 men on it and they represent 21-1/2 view points."[19] However, all committee recommendations have to go before the Congress, and Congress may over-rule their committees.

In recent years, in complex security matters Congress has begun to leave the initiative with the Executive. But it has inserted clauses on what can be called a legislative veto. Thus under a 1976 law, major arms sales by the

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United States are subject to the congressional veto. Similarly under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, for instance, if the President wanted to supply enriched uranium to any country that had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, orders to release such supplies were subject to legislative veto. In such a case, if *both* the houses rejected the proposal within a month, the President's decision would stand negatived. Thus when President Carter recommended granting of fuel for Tarapur in 1980 the Congress used its legislative veto; it rejected the President's decision by an overwhelming vote.

In the Senate the President's voice on this crucial foreign policy issue was dinned by the opponents from the President's own party. The loudest critic of the President's decision to supply 38 tons of enriched uranium to India was John Glenn, Jr., Democratic Senator from Ohio. The Democratic-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the President's proposal. Though, finally the Senate approved the proposal, it was done only after the President personally persuaded every wavering senator to vote for the proposal.[20]

What has been the Reagan Administration's record as regards the Executive's relations with Congress in national security affairs? President Reagan has support of half of the Congress—Senate, while the other half—House, is controlled by the Democrats. The first major test of his foreign policy in Congress came with his proposal to sell $ 8.5 million worth AWACS to Saudi Arabia. The Democrat-controlled House voted decisively against the sale by 301 to 111.[21] However, the Executive was keen to provide the AWACS to the Saudi's on the plea of helping moderate Arabs in West Asia. On the other hand, the opponents of the deal, mainly the pro-Israeli-legislators, feared that eventually those AWACS might fall in the hands of pro-Russian regimes; that it would deny Israel the air supremacy it had enjoyed for so many years.

The Republican majority dominating the Senate was however equally opposed to the President's national security policy initiative; 55 Senators solidly opposed the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. Senator Alan Cranston pronounced the AWACS deal dead and urged Reagan to withdraw it. Why did this happen? First, before the proposal was sent to the Senate there was no effective consultation with the Republican Senators. Second, having made the proposal, the Reagan Administration did not put any official incharge to pursue the sale proposal, allowing the opponents of sale to develop a sizeable majority. Then President Reagan put the National Security Adviser, Richard Allen to persuade the Senators. Third, when Allen was attempting to get the objections of the Senators softened and reach a compromise over one of the crucial issues of joint US-Saudi control over the AWACS, the Secretary of State, protested. He was reported to have said that he did not want "any ... senators running foreign policy." But senators are conscious of their constitutional role in the making of foreign policy. Senator Howard

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Baker, the majority leader reprotedly retorted that neither did he want "any ... Secretary of State running the Senate."[22]

In such situations one is quite at a loss to understand the democratic processes of the United States wherein the President is opposed and contradicted by his own Congressmen. The Saudi's could not entirely trust the American ability to keep their promise, hence they began negotiating for less effective but easily available surveillance aircraft from the United Kingdom or France.

By the time the Senate was due to vote the proposals on 28 October 1981, so many diverse voices were heard on the desirability or otherwise of the sale that though finally the Senate voted with 52-48[23] majority in favour of it, the government had already exposed inconsistency and uncertainty in its security policy-making process.

However, the conflict between the Legislature and the Executive in national security policy-making or their speaking in divided voices is not unique to the American system. Even in parliamentary democracies like India or Canada, foreign policy-makers and parliamentarians do not always speak in the same voice on the nation's security policy.

ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE CONDUCIVE TO CONFLICT

But what is unique in the American system is the frequent expression of divergent opinions and conflicting indication of directions which national security policies ought to take by the members of the executive branch itself. This unique phenomenon can be traced directly to two inter-related factors: the constitutional centering of powers in a single executive *viz.*, the President and (ii) divided responsibility amongst several departments and agencies of the government for national security advice and administration.

President and Advisers

As stated earlier, the constitutional power over national security policy initiation and administration is vested in the President. In the executive branch the President alone has the constitutional power of decision-making. But he alone cannot act or decide; he needs advice.[24] In the area of national security policy-making, the President has at the highest level the following most important advisers and institutional support from the respective institutions they head: the Secretary of State (SOS) and the State Department; the Secretary of Defence (SOD) and the Defence Department; and the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the National Security Council Staff.[25] These individual advisers have power and influence in national security policy-making to the extent that it is permitted by the President, though by virtue of their position as heads of certain established departments of the government they come to exercise a degree of influence that cannot be denied by the President.

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During World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt adopted a national security policy-making process which can best be described as chaotic. He generally relied on none or at best only on some of the established departments of the government, he gave assignments to more than one individual in the same area of security policy, he received overlapping advice from different agencies and individuals and than made his own decisions.

National Security Council

To provide a systematic form of decision-making a Republican Party-controlled Congress, troubled by the fears of the Rooseveltian style of national security decision-making, provided for a National Security Council (NSC) under the National Security Act of 1947. The NSC today consists of the President, Vice-President and the SOS and SOD as statutory members. Additionally, the Secretary of the Treasury, Director CIA, Chairmen, JCS and the NSA invariably attend. However, all efforts by Congress to expand the statutory membership of the NSC and especially, to include the Secretary of the Treasury as the statutory member have been rejected by Presidents.[26] But the National Security Council, except under the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, was not used as a collective decision-making body. After a lapse of sixteen years under Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford, once again Carter and Reagan have made earnest efforts to use the National Security Council as at least a serious forum to deliberate national security issues.

Nevertheless, the real problem with the NSC, as a forum for making national security policy-decisions, was well stated by Clark Clifford who had a role in drafting the National Security Act of 1947 and also observing its working, first under Truman as an Assistant to the President and then under Johnson as the Secretary of Defence. He says:

> It was'nt important at all during the year that I was there ... those meetings were held because certain people expected them to be held.... Subjects would be assigned to the National Security Council, they would be taken up ... would be briefed, there would be some desultory discussion of the points. Then everybody would pick up and leave.... My own theory is that you cannot institutionalize the decision-making process at the highest levels of government.... I did not consider it an important cog in the decision-making process ....[27]

The result has been that Presidents have often called NSC meetings to ratify the decisions they reached through their consultation with individual advisers. As the constitutional power vests with the President in the decision-making process, no adviser can claim any power or right to be consulted. They can only compete with one another to have access to the President's ears and influence national security policy. Since, individual advisers hold varied opinions on different issues, they coalesce with one another, bargain

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with one another to support or oppose a particular policy.[28] Presidential advisers also try to enlist the support of the congressional committees, leaders and general public for particular policies preferred by them, so that they can eventually become acceptable to the President. In this game of coalition-building, bargaining for support and creating public pressure, the advisers of the President tend to speak in divergent voices.

The Secretary of Defence and the Secretary of State

Thus in the Reagan Administration, the Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger in March 1981, only two months after coming to office, made a surprise announcement that the neutron bomb might be revived as a part of overall review of national security. Earlier, the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, had publicly argued that there was no legal reason for the United States to adhere to the expiring SALT I and the unratified SALT II treaties. This was certain to arouse the West Europeans who had greater stakes in arms control and *detente* than the United States. Alexander Haig, considered from the beginning as a friend of Europe, had to publicly repudiate Lehman.[29] Thus, in the case of Weinberger, Haig publicly challenged him by saying that no such decision had been made. Later Weinberger tried to pass off the whole controversey by saying that it was his personal opinion.[30] Thus Weinberger, as the Secretary of Defence could hold the view that US national security interests demanded the production of the neutron bomb but this was not shared by the Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

Later examples of the conflicting and contradictory statements made by the two, provide an idea of the United States Administration's inability to speak in one voice. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Alexander Haig, stated that a NATO plan to fire a nuclear warning shot in the event of the Soviet-led Warsaw alliance launching a conventional attack on Western Europe existed. But Weinberger said next day to the Senate Armed Services Committee: "There is nothing, absolutely nothing in any plan I know of that contains anything remotely resembling that." The confusion was worse confounded by the While House clarification that both were right. Haig was correct, since such a shot had been "envisioned," by NATO. But Weinberger was also right as that "option has never been translated into a military plan." Haig having been formerly the Commander of the NATO Forces ought to know better the difference between "envisioned" and existence of "contingency plans in the military doctrine."[31]

The Presidential advisers thus, not only air their conflicting views in public but along with congressional and public support, attempt to develop coalitions within the government. In the process, there may not be bartering of support in clearly spelt-out terms, but in effect the process develops on that pattern. Hence the Secretary of Defence might secure the support of the National Security Adviser and or the Director CIA and others, or

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viceversa. In the case of the neutron bomb, Weinberger finally had his way undercutting Haig's position as the Secretary of State; Ronald Reagan announced his decision to go in for the manufacture of neutron bombs.

There have been far too numerous competitive conflicts between the Secretaries of State and Defence to be possible to enumerate them. Suffice it to say that the two have clashed on US policy towards Central America, the Polish developments and the Western allies. The latest in the series being on the West Asian conflict; while Haig has been a staunch supporter of Israel, Weinberger has advocated closer ties with the moderate Arabs. Hence the need to restrain Israel in the Lebanon Crisis.[32] Their public policy clashes led the noted journalist and national security commentator, Philip Geyelin, to suggest that the job of Secretary of State better be left vacant. That "could save a lot of money ... and lose nothing. At least half of the time ... Weinberger acts and talks as if he thinks he holds both jobs now."[33]

The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser

Though the National Security Council itself has not been that influential, its staff has been used by presidents to develop their policy options. The National Security Council staff is headed by the National Security Adviser, who has become a new competitor for influence in the policy-making process. While in the early 1960s, there were doubts whether the National Security Adviser ought to be treated as a staff assistant or a policy adviser, by late 1960s all these doubts were settled in favour of the latter position.[34]

In the recent past, the diplomatic or foreign policy aspects of national security have brought about a division of responsibility between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser for the policy-making advice. Increasingly, conflicts have developed between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser because of this division of responsibility. The two have either intensely competed with one another or the Secretary of State has accepted a secondary role since the Kennedy Administration. In the Kennedy Administration the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk was overshadowed by the National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy. He even expressed the futility of his being Secretary of State when Bundy was dominating the foreign policy-making process in the White House.[35] In the Nixon Administration, Secretary of State William Rogers was nowhere close to the seat of decision-making; the adviser who dominated policy-making was the National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. President Nixon and his National Security Adviser provided conceptual thinking and direction to national security formulation and administration. His own dominance in national security policy-making was so complete that it began to haunt Kissinger when he was appointed by President Nixon as the Secretary of State in September 1973. Kissinger insisted and succeeded in wearing two hats that of the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser simultaneously.[36] In Kissinger's own words: "Though I did not

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think so at the time, I have become convinced that a President should make the Secretary of State his principal adviser and use the National Security Adviser primarily as a senior administrator and coordinator. If the Security Adviser were to become active in the development and articulation of policy he inevitably would diminish the Secretary of State."[37]

In the Carter Administration, conscious efforts were made to see that the National Security Adviser played a secondary role. However, it was difficult for Brezezinski to accept a secondary role in the policy-making process. Within a year he began to make his presence felt by other advisers in the area of national security policy.[38] Finally, policy differences developed between Cyrus Vance and Brezezinski over the risky plans to rescue the American hostages from Tehran. After resigning as the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance told news reporters: that the National Security Adviser "should not be the one who makes foreign policy or who expresses foreign policy to the public. That is the task of the President and the Secretary of State."[39] Since the 1960s crisis management has become a White House responsibility and the crisis management teams have been headed by the National Security Adviser. From that position they have drawn much publicity for their role in foreign policy-making.[40]

Why conflicts develop, is easy to answer; both compete to influence the policies of the Administration they serve. The National Security Adviser, normally with the help of his staff, is expected to analyze the policy proposals made by the relevent departments from the presidential perspective. Since he is close to the President both in the physical and personal sense of the term, he comes to develop his own independent line of policy advice to the President. Normally he does not do so in the area of defence as the latter is backed by the military machine which is difficult to ignore, or set aside.

When conflicts develop it is natural that policy advisers speak in divergent voices, so as to influence public opinion in favour of their point of view, which could in turn make if difficult for the President to ignore the advice. In the Reagan Administration, this conflict between the former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig and the former National Security Adviser, Richard Allen ended in the resignations of both: Allen in January 1982 and Haig in June of the same year. Undoubtedly Allen had in the beginning played a secondary role in national security policy-making. This was in keeping with Reagan's promises, prior to his election, to restore coherence to foreign policy-making and towards that end institute "structural changes," make the Secretary of State the "principal spokesman and adviser" and the National Security Adviser merely a staff assistant.[41] Yet, Haig had been uneasy and nervous right from the beginning about the existence of a second adviser in the area of foreign policy in the White House. Even before President Reagan had changed his inaugural dress, Haig rushed to him to inform his plans regarding the foreign-policy making process, wherein of course, he provided for himself a dominant role.[42] President Reagan subsequently issued a

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statement to say that in his administration the Secretary of State would be the chief formulator and executor of foreign policy.

With the obvious purpose to de-emphasize the importance of the National Security Adviser, President Reagan put the crisis management team in his administration under Vice-President George Bush.[43] This arrangement constitutionally and administratively is less controversial than when the system was managed by the National Security Adviser—a staff assistant. Yet, the measure was publicly objected to by Haig, as he felt he should head the White House crisis management team. He even threatened to resign. To pacify the wounded ego of the latter, President Reagan issued a second statement within three months after assuming office, reiterating that Haig was his "principal adviser on foreign affairs, and ... is the chief formulator and spokesman for foreign policy" in the Administration.[44]

But despite this, conflict between the two did not abate. Richard Allen, for instance, speaking to the National Conservative Political Action Committee in March 1981, criticised the Western European democracies for their defeatist attitude towards the Soviet Union, for their inability to control pacifist movements and the re-emergence of the slogan "better red than dead" at a time when the Secretary of State was pursuing the policy of strengthening US relations with its Western allies. A legitimate question was then raised by the critics of the Administration: Who formulates and expresses American foreign policy?

The inner conflicts between Haig and Allen can best be illustrated by how they got rid of each other's nominees working in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, in July 1981 the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Robert G. Neumann was compelled to resign for his apparent indiscretion in privately (which newspapers made public) accusing Haig of not being very strong in condemning Israel's attack on Iraqi nuclear installations in June 1981.[45] But Haig's real reason for the Ambassador's removal was that Neumann was a nominee of Allen and Haig accused Neumann of establishing a secret link with the White House through Allen. Allen settled scores with Haig when in September 1981 he asked Gen. Robert L. Schweitzer, a nominee of Haig on the National Security Council staff, to quit for his off the cuff remarks that "the Soviets are on the move. They are going to strike."[46] The conclusion that Allen was only acting to settle a score with Haig is irresistable because one of Allen's own nominee on the National Security Council staff, Richard L. Pipes had said more or less the same thing, that "detente is dead", and unless the Soviet Union changed from the communist model war would be inevitable.[47] But he was not touched. Such conflicts between Haig and Allen naturally gave rise to conflicting public pronouncements. Richard Pipes' observation had to be publicly disavowed by the White House.

The growing feud between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser reached its zenith in November 1981. On 3 November Haig conveyed to Jack Anderson, Washington's syndicated columnist,

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that a top official in the White House had been conducting a "mind-boggling guerilla campaign" to discredit him. He went on : "This damages my ability to carry out the President's foreign policy." The top official he was referring to was obviously Richard Allen.[48] Not able to contain infights within the Administration, Reagan appealed to the "patriotism" of American reporters since such reports on discord within the Administration were bound to be "very destructive to our dealings world-wide."[49]

Alexander Haig's conflicts with Allen were at least partially due to his own misplaced fears. The fear of the National Security Council dominating security policy-making was always haunting him. He had seen from inside, as Kissinger's deputy, how competely the former overshadowed William Rogers, Nixon's Secretary of State, until he resigned in September 1973. He knew, that in any bureaucratic infight for supremacy in national security policy-making, between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, the former was a loser. However, in his anxiety he failed to understand how to preserve his supremacy in foreign policy formulation, also that President Reagan had a genuine desire to de-emphasize the role of the National Security Council and in this regard he had been largely successful during the first year of his administration.

President Reagan however, seized the opportunity provided by Allen's apparent imprudence in accepting a gift of a watch from his Japanese friends and relieved him on 4 January 1982 from the position of the National Security Adviser. However, Reagan and his top White House advisers were motivated mainly by their desire to put an end to the infighting and discord between Haig and Allen.[50] President Reagan appointed his close associate and then Deputy Secretary of State, William Clark as the new Security Adviser with added powers to brief the President on national security, deal directly with the Secretaries of State and Defence and the Director CIA. President Reagan said, Clark "will be responsible for the development, co-ordination and implementation of the national security policy."[51]

Commenting on these developments, I wrote elsewhere in March 1982:

> How long the cordial relations, developed between Haig and Clark while they were in the State Department, would serve them well to avoid rivalry and conflicts which troubled the Haig-Allen relations? Given the President's confidence, with enhanced powers, Clark might soon turn out to be a formidable challenger to Haig's constant efforts to preserve and protect his supremacy in foreign policy-making. In that event, his victory over Allen in the bureaucratic power struggle might prove to be only a pyrrhic victory.[52]

It is now clear that if Haig felt compelled to resign on the grounds that foreign policy was drifting away from the carefully accepted course, an important contributory factor to his decision was his growing differences

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with William Clark, the new National Security Adviser. In the initial months, Clark sided Haig in his conflicts with the hawkish (*vis-a-vis*) Soviet Union Weinberger. But Clark, a Californian, being close to other Californians in the White House and the President, began to support the Secretary of Defence Weinberger (another Californian), in his advocacy of steps against West European participation in the Soviet pipeline project to carry Siberian gas to the West European nations.[53] Weinberger, Haig's principal adversary over the issue, had been the first to argue that the Soviet Union should be made to feel its economic shortcomings. The National Security Council on 18 June 1982, at the initiative of Clark, in the absence of Haig, decided not to ease the restrictions on the European subsidiaries of American companies from selling American equipment for the Soviet pipeline. Clark's winning argument at the meeting in the fight with Haig was the same as that of Weinberger.[54] Haig was for easing United States restrictions on the Soviet pipeline, though he was not less opposed to the Soviet policies. But he felt that US restrictions on the West Europeans would be counter-productive.[55]

Coming in quick succession to the pipeline issue was the recent Israeli military action against the PLO in Lebanon over which Haig and Weinberger again publicly clashed. While Weinberger believed that the United States should come down hard on Israel to show Arab friends that it did not condone the former's "unilateral resort to force," Haig supported the Israeli goal of ending PLO attacks from Lebanon and the re-establishment of an independent sovereign Lebanese State. President Reagan having initially accepted Haig's line of support to Israel's military action, began to shift under the influence of Clark to accept Weinberger's position on the conflict. It is this presidential shift, that made Haig resign.[56]

It is not that conflicts develop only between the Secretary of Defence and the Secretary of State or the latter and the National Security Adviser. Either may develop, and had developed, in the past conflicts with the United States representative in the United Nations. In the Carter Administration, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, proved to be a foreign policy liability for the President and the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. Andrew Young made policy pronouncements which became terribly embarrassing to the other foreign policy advisers in Washington.[57] In the Reagan Administration similar conflicts have occurred between Haig and Mrs. Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the United Nations, especially over the Falkland crisis. Mrs. Kirkpatrick was sympathetic to Argentina and continued to undercut Haig's unreserved support to the United Kingdom.[58] Similarly, conflicting views were also publicly aired by the Secretary of Agriculture John Blok and Haig, over the advisability or otherwise, of lifting the grain embargo on the Soviet Union. But it is not necessary to elaborate these additional differences between other officials in the Reagan Administration to establish the main thrust of this paper.

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CONCLUSION

The problem of inner conflicts and many voices, contradictions and confusion, in the making of national security policy seems to be a product of the institutional framework itself, wherein power belongs to one individual but is exericised by several advisers and agencies in actual practice. The President as the fountainhead of all powers, simply cannot exercise all or even a major part of them; he has to depend upon his advisers to exercise delegated powers. At the same time, all post-World War II Presidents have been conscious of the fact that powers are vested in them. This is true whether they were interested in foreign effairs or not, or whether they were rated as strong or weak Presidents. Thus Nixon, for instance, had said that the United States needed a President to manage its external affairs; domestic affairs could be run by the departmental secretaries. Reagan, not much interested in the intricacies of national security affairs said at a news conference, soon after Haig's resignation, that he made foreign policy. "Foreign policy comes from the Oval Office and with the help of a fine Secretary of State."[59]

The institutional diversity and advice from diverse sources also seems to be essential in the American system of government. If the policy-maker relies only on one agency or adviser, the President may be taken for a ride. This fear has been expressed by strong Presidents like Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. Thus the diversity of advice emanating from diverse institutions need to be unified into a coherent policy. Such policy co-ordination can be provided only by the President. Thus, the need is for a dominant-personality in the White House—like Nixon or Johnson. But if the President himself is an easy-going one like Reagan, or indecisive like Carter, the foreign policy begets too many voices. Stanley Hoffmann, a sympathetic analyzer of Carter's foreign policy says that Carter "except at Camp David" failed to provide such command over foreign policy issues.[60]

In the Reagan Administration, Haig-Weinberger, Haig-Allen and later Haig-Clark competitive conflicts would possibly remain as the classical examples of such conflicts in national security policy-making. Or it may not be so. As Haig pleaded, "It has always been so. That's inevitable."[61] In any democratic executive branch, differences among the policy makers are inevitable; it is even necessary in the interest of democratic working. But as Philip Geyelin rightly points out, "What is not inevitable is that these conflicts be given public expression in a way that baffles...allies and/or adversaries and confounds the forceful conduct of national security affairs...by rendering American...purposes unintelligible."[62]

However, during the last 17 months in office Reagan has not shown any ability to impose coherence on his advisers, holding diverse viewpoints. It may be too early to pass a judgement on the Reagan Administration, but Reagan seems to be either disinterested in managing conflcts or unable to manage them. His Administration has so far specialized in a zig-zag

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formulation of foreign policy—outwitting the Carter Administration.[63]

Thus in the absence of an imposing presidential personality, "diversity enshrined in different administrative sanctuaries become cacophony."[64] But whenever a dominant personality attempts to guide without receiving much collective aid and advice, as Johnson and Nixon did for instance, the Presidency is not only open to charges of imperial behaviour but becomes susceptible to corruption of power and ends with infamy.[65]

July 1982.

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SUPER POWERS AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE*

By P.S. JAYARAMU**

In any analysis of the role that the Super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—would play in the international system in the 1980s and beyond, one has to be careful of the fact that the projections that can be made cannot bear the stamp of definitiveness and are therefore debateable. Consciousness of this limitation notwithstanding, this paper attempts such an analysis. It is the belief of this writer that any projection of the Super Powers' role in the future has its roots in an understanding of the role they played in the past and are playing at present.

INTRODUCTION

Origins of the Super Power Concept

It is common knowledge that after the Second World War the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two strongest nations. The increased strength and status of the two countries was in contrast to the decline of the European Powers—Britain, France and Germany. The Soviet nuclear explosion (1949) not only added to its stature in the international system, but also broke the virtual monopoly the United States enjoyed over nuclear weapons. The two Super Powers[1] which emerged as the principal actors in world politics were soon to be involved in what is familiarly known as the Cold War. The Cold War was in essence a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for the spread of their ideologies and value systems—Liberal Democracy and Communism—in the international system. This quest for support to their contending ideologies led to the creation of alliances with the United States as the leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union heading the Warsaw Pact, the former formed of West European nations and the latter comprising Eastern Europe. Super Power rivalry thus contributed to the emergence of an East-West conflict as the cardinal feature of international politics in the fifties. The United States, in pursuance of its policy of containment of communism, also set up the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO, also known as the Baghdad Pact). In this contest between the United States and the

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Soviet Union for power and influence in the international system (of course through the spread of their ideologies and value systems), the fifties was marked by an unquestioned superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union, thanks largely to the strength of its economy and the awesome military might it had built up.[2] American involvement in the Korean crisis in the fifties and the Vietnam War in the sixties, which continued in the early seventies, are representative examples of American power during this time. The Soviet side of the picture is of course to be seen in its involvement in the Hungarian and the Czechoslovakian crises.

The gradual strengthening of the Soviet position and its expanding influence, particularly in Asia, with the acceptance of the principles of peaceful co-existence by Khruschev, constituted the main source of worry to the United States as regards America's position in the international system. Further, the Soviet recognition of Indian non-alignment (after the Korean War) and the consequent strengthening of its relations with India and Egypt (under Nasser), added to American fears about the role which the Soviet Union was going to play in the international system in the years to come.

Nuclear Powers' Quest for Hegemony

Signs of Western European economic recovery followed by the acquisition of nuclear capability by Britain (1952) and France (1960), the unfolding of colonial empires resulting in the emergence of newly independent states in Asia and Africa[3] and the possibilities of Communist China getting out of its isolationalism led to the feeling that order and stability in the international system would be at stake and that Super Powers should enter into a joint hegemony over the international system. Echoing this view, John Strachey wrote: "What can be envisaged for the nineteen seventies is a 'concert of Europe' in which the nuclear Super Powers arrange humanity's affairs amongst themselves (and no doubt to suit themselves) and for that purpose keep the rest of the world in order using the United Nations as an instrument."[4] Strachey's was, unmistakably, an advocacy of Super Power nuclear hegemonism and the same is indicated in the following statement:

> The basic agreement among the Super Powers should contain at least two provisions, the first would commit the contracting parties to preventing any additional state from gaining nuclear capability. In the second, the parties would agree to set up, with all their nuclear forces, and to extinguish any one of themselves who for any cause whatsoever and however just that cause might be held to be, resorted to the use of nuclear weapons.[5]

Strachey was thus not only reflecting his own views but was in a way representing the thinking of the Super Powers, both of which were gripped by the fear of Communist China going nuclear. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963),

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which was signed by the two Super Powers and Britain, though on the face of it a disarmament measure, had the objective of putting a blanket ban on China's nuclear activities by making it sign the Treaty. China not only did not sign the Treaty, but preferred to call it a "scrap of paper." In October 1964, Communist China confirmed the suspicions of the Super Powers when it exploded its first nuclear bomb.

These attempts by the nuclear-weapons-states to perpetuate their nuclear hegemony over the non-nuclear states were continued by the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which came to be projected through the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). The arguments advanced were—and they are repeated even now—that the spread of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace and security. The hidden intentions however were two-fold: firstly, to prevent the expansion of the nuclear club and, secondly, to legitimize the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapons-states.[6] It is precisely this question—whether nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of the nuclear few and whether their acquisition by the non-nuclear states would endanger peace and security—that has come to occupy, since the early seventies, the attention of scholars and statesmen in the Third World. Ali Mazrui, an eminent African political scientist, in his BBC Reith Lectures in November 1979 called for nuclearisation of the non-aligned world in general and Africa in particular.[7] India's peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974, the emergence of South Africa[8] and Israel[9] as clandestine nuclear-weapons-states, and the vigorously pursued nuclear programme by Pakistan[10] since the second half of the seventies, with the possibilities of the explosion being carried out in the near future, point to the growing trend towards nuclear proliferation in the Third World. Countries like Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Iraq, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philipines have nuclear energy programmes while Egypt, Libya and Turkey are planning them.[12] The international nuclear system has become multipolar although most of the Third World nuclear programmes are for energy and peaceful purposes, which makes the nuclear-weapons-states feel that their hegemony in the international system is being challenged.[13] Suffice it to remember that nuclear multipolarity is in addition to the already existing features of political and economic multipolarity of the international system.[14] The impact of this multipolarity has come to be perceived by the Super Powers as the beginnings of their loss of control over the international system. It is at this juncture that the Super Powers signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I) and heralded the formal announcement of Super Power *detente*. Super Power *detente* which can undoubtedly be looked upon as a landmark in taking the world nearer to peace and disarmament, soon came to be used by the Super Powers to seek some sort of a condominium in the international system, an idea advocated by John Strachey long ago. *Detente* in essence meant legitimizing the Super Powers' spheres of influence in the various regions of the world like Eastern Europe and Latin America.[15] *Detente* thus came to mean an

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agreement to pursue each others dominance in the various regions of the world through the strategy of proxy-wars. It is well-known that such proxy-wars, in the era of *detente,* are fought in regions like the Middle-East and the Horn of Africa.[16] Analyzing the Super Power strategies, Sisir Gupta wrote: "To fight their own battles in the Third World is one way of ensuring that their own worlds are not touched by their conflict; and that they retain a great measure of option to escalate and de-escalate their conflicts, according to their relationships."[17]

Third World—particularly non-aligned—reactions to Super Power *detente* were given expression to by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when she said: "We welcome any effort towards peace and understanding....But we are aware of the dangers which still hover over us. *Detente should not become an occasion to build new balances of power and redraw spheres of influence or to reinforce the opinion of certain big Powers that they alone can be responsible for the shaping of the destinies of small nations.*"[18] She was even more forthright when she said in an interview with a Yugoslav television correspondant: "We have welcomed *detente* in Europe as well as the moves that have been taken in South-East Asia...*but we must not ignore the fact that simultaneously with these peaceful moves and detente, there is also the arming of small countries. There are still the old attitudes of balance of power, of spheres of influence. I think that these pose certain dangers....*"[19] India and the other non-aligned nations in the international system thus, welcomed Super Power *detente* but have always emphasized that *detente* should extend to Asia, Africa and Latin America, thereby becoming truly global in character.[20] Super Power *detente* thus had two important objectives: firstly, to maintain the stability of the central balance unaffected by conflicts in other regions of the world, and secondly, in order to maintain the stability of the central balance, shift their own conflicts from the East-West theatre to the remote areas of the Third World where they could collude, even if necessary, without any risk to themselves and their allies. One of the effects of such Super Power strategies was the development of an awareness on the part of the Third World for a more united and homogenous role in the world system. The result was the institutionalization of the non-aligned movement in the seventies.

The concern of the non-aligned on the prospects of peace, security and disarmament in the international system becomes evident when we take a look at the continued arms rivalry between the Super Powers. SALT I did not have any impact on the possession of sophisticated weapons like the Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) and deployment with the result that the ICBM and SLBM deliverable nuclear war-heads have steadily increased. The number of deliverable strategic nuclear war-heads of the Super Powers increased from US 5,700, USSR 2,500 (8,200 in 1972) to US 10,000 and USSR 5,000 (16,000 in 1979).[21] This represents a combined explosive power of over a million and a half Hiroshima size bombs. There are additional tactical weapons believed to be about four

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times larger in number than strategic nuclear war-heads and equivalent to about 700 million tons of TNT or to over 50,000 Hiroshima-type bombs. Thus at the end of the year of SALT I, each side would be capable of destroying the other, not fifty but one hundred times over.[22]

The Oil Crisis and Its Aftermath

Another important development in the seventies which brought about significant changes in the international system in so far as the role of the American and other West European nations was concerned was the oil crisis of 1973. After the Arab-Israeli War (1973), oil exporting countries (OPEC) introduced a three-fold increase in the price of oil sending shock waves through western capitals. The event at once elevated the OPEC nations to the centre-stage of the international system. The oil crisis not only crippled the Western economies but also meant a decline of the West European role in world politics.[23] Continued dependence on Gulf oil was later to result in the development of strategic divergence between the West Europeans (America's NATO allies) and the United States on the question of finding a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Such a strategic divergence came to be reflected in the West European stand that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) should be involved in any peace process—an idea not acceptable to Israel and the United States—and their consequent lukewarm support to the Camp David Accord. Western Europe's lukewarm support to the United States' strategic policies in recent years can be found on issues like the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the United States' plan of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for the Gulf.[24] If this strategic divergence continues in the 1980s, Western Europe might perhaps emerge as an independent actor, strategically speaking, in the international system. We will return to this theme later.

THIRD WORLD STRUGGLE FOR NIEO

The oil crisis provided a strong impetus to the Third World struggle for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). It is well-known that the Non-Aligned at their third conference at Lusaka (1970) had accepted the question of Third World economic regeneration as a priority issue to be taken up at the various international forums in their deliberations with the developed industrialized countries.[25] It must be remembered that assigning priority to economic issues was a natural corrolary to the fact that by the seventies, decolonialization as a political objective was nearing complete achievement. The oil crisis now came handy to the OPEC nations and the other Third World countries to integrate their strategies *vis-a-vis* the industrialized world and thereby negotiate not only on energy but other economic issues affecting the Third World. The non-aligned Group of 77 and the OPEC nations thus came together under the leadership of Algeria.

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The result was the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. The General Assembly passed the now well-known Declaration on the New International Economic Order.

The United Nations Declaration on NIEO not only reflects the Third World's economic demands and aspirations, but its claim to be accommodated in the decision-making structures at the global level. In other words, NIEO is a struggle for a restructuring of the international political and economic system by effecting a change in the heirarchy of power, where the developing South can participate in the international system with honour and dignity along with the industrialized North. The North-South conflict thus came to occupy a significant place in world politics in the seventies, an issue which would continue to engage global attention in the eighties and nineties.

Commenting on the Third World struggle for NIEO, Guy Pauker, in his *Military Implications of a Possible World Order: Crisis in the 1980s* (prepared for the Rand Corporation) observed: "An increasingly determined campaign is being waged by the Third World, through a variety of overlapping groupings for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Although its articulated demands are economic, the general thrust of the movement is political, aiming at a major modification of the power relations between the former colonial powers, which are at present the most advanced industrial societies and the former colonies which are still in the early stages of modernization and industrialization."[26] Discussing its possible consequences on the role of the Super Powers, specially the United States, Pauker added:

> If the North-South conflict becomes a major source of turbulence and intersects the East-West conflict, the United States may find its way of life much more directly threatened than by the challenges of the Cold War years .... Crisis Management is likely to be much more complicated in a world in which the role of the Super Powers has decreased and a large number of countries ruled by volatile elites, play an active role in international affairs.[27]

This aspect of the North-South conflict over the question of NIEO, as agenda number one in the eighties and the intermeshing of North-South conflict with the East-West conflict has been the subject matter of many writings on world politics in recent years.[28]

Although the North accepted the United Nations Declaration on NIEO—it is argued by some that the acceptance had been forced upon them at a time when they were reeling under the oil shock[29]—it has made no specific commitments so far. The main thrust of the northern strategy has been to engage the Third World in arduous and protracted negotiations on minute matters of detail. The North has also been working to weaken the solidarity of the South by dividing the Third World countries; it has capitalized on the political disputes, economic disparities, and foreign policy differences in

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the Third World. If the South has to succeed in winning concessions from the North and eventually establish a new order, they would have to co-operate among themselves. South-South co-operation should therefore be encouraged. Nations of the South should forge greater solidarity, improve their negotiating strategies, and last but not the least, win the support of those northern countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, which have adopted a moderate stand on the NIEO, as also Japan and France, which are willing to take a practical stand in dealing with the South. In other words, the South has to exploit the divergences that are surfacing among the northern countries on the question of NIEO. The North's unyielding commitment to the defence of *status quo* in the international system—a situation which is absolutely favourable to them and serves their interests admirably well—should serve as a reminder to the South that the task of achieving NIEO is an arduous and a difficult one. But the goal has to be achieved; only then would the Third World be able to enjoy autonomy in this heirarchical international system. International peace and order in the true sense of the term would be possible only in an egalitarian system.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND SUPER POWERS

Another important issue which merits our attention while analyzing the role of the Super Powers in the international system concerns the question of regional conflicts in the post-war years and their impact on international peace and security. It is argued by many Western scholars that Third World nations have gained in strength and that they are using that strength—and the initiative they have gained in international politics—to fight wars among themselves and that these regional conflicts drag the Super Powers into the vortex much against their wishes. The argument goes that such regional conflicts are not only going to destabilize the international system but also jeopardize international peace and security. This is an issue which requires careful and rational analysis. Then only would it be clear that though regional conflicts do have local roots, these conflicts, especially disputes involving boundary demarcations, are legacies left behind, often deliberately created by the colonial Powers and that they have been fuelled and exacerbated by the Super Powers/Great Powers. It may be mentioned here, that while discussing regional conflicts and outside intervention, the phrases "Super Powers" and "Great Powers" are often used interchangably. In pursuance of their policies of seeking spheres of influence and winning allies in the Third World Great Powers have very often interwoven their regional interests with the interests and objectives of the local combatants.[30] The role of the Great Powers in creating the conflict between India and Pakistan as regards the Kashmir issue,[31] their role in the creation of Israel in a land which legitimately is the home of the Palestinians, to further their own interests,[32] the role played by Britain, France and Italy in appropriating Somali

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territory on the Horn of Africa in the nineteenth century and the intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Horn's conflict politics in the post-World War II period and their role in the Ogadan War,[33] are issues which have been well researched and documented. Also, by transferring large quantities of ams to the conflict regions of the Third World,[34] Great Powers have not only contributed their share to the severity of the damage suffered by the combatants—these weapons have been used by the combatants in their war—but have continued their presence in these regions by way of giving aid to those countries for re-construction of their war-torn economies.

Another important issue which merits attention is the view that the Third World now causes the greatest amount of tension in Soviet-American relations and has thus come in the way of the Super Powers reaching agreement on bilateral issues. This conclusion however can be contested. As elaborated in the preceeding pages, in pursuance of their global ambitions, the Super Powers have intervened in the various regions of the Third World. The post-war history of international relations bears ample testimony to this—their intervention in regional politics apart, both the Super Powers are gripped by a paranoid fear of each other. The burden of American policy statements and academic writings, after the setting in of Ame ica's decline in world politics fol owing the reversal of their policies in Vietnam, the oil crisis and fall of Iran from American control after the downfall of the Shah, is that the Soviet Union, has sought and achieved military superiority over the United States. This American feeling has been accentuated by the Soviet Union's role in the Horn of Africa and its intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.[35] In fact some scholars in the United States have written about the emergence of *Pax-Sovietica* and emphasized the need for a refurbished policy of containment by the United States Administration.[36] The Soviet Union, on the other hand, feels, and justifiably so, encircled by the Sino-American-Japanese axis, reflected largely in the growing strategic convergence between China and the United States. Such mutual threat perceptions coupled with the feeling that an increase in their adversary's influence in a particular region of the world means a decline in their own control over the region is the root cause for the spiralling arms race between the Super Powers. Super Power behaviour since the late seventies makes us doubt whether they can be described at all as "responsible managers" of international peace and security.[37]

NEW "COLD WAR"—FEATURE OF THE EIGHTIES

The United States Administration has refused to ratify SALT II and linked it to Soviet "good behaviour" in the Third World. Brezhnev's recent proposal—made at the 26th Congress of the CPSU— for a summit meeting between the two Super Powers has drawn an enthusiastic response from America's NATO allies and the Third World countries, but has been rejected

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ed by the United States Administration. Such a refusal symbolizes the shape of things to come so far as America's Soviet policy is concerned. It should also be remembered at this juncture that the second NPT review conference which was held in September 1980 came to an abrupt end due to the intransigent attitude of the nuclear weapon's Powers, especially the United States. The international system in the eighties thus faces a new Cold war,[38] with the difference that it is being fought not on European soil, but in the Third World. Under such circumstances, one wonders whether there is any truth at all in the Western, mainly American, propaganda that the Third World is coming in the way of the Super Powers entering into bilateral agreements to take the world nearer to peace and security. The stumbling block for the non-signature of a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not the Third World but the mutual fears and imperialist goals of the Super Powers. Was it not a display of imperialist thinking when Robert Tucker wrote—after the oil crisis—that the United States should take over the Gulf oil fields?[39] Was it not a display of imperialist design when President Carter, in the State of the Union Message in January 1980 said, that the United States would not hesitate to use any means, including military, to defend its interests in the Gulf? Was it not again a display of the arrogance of power when Richard Darman, as Vice-Chairman of the United States' delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference wrote in summer 1980 (in the *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*): "The United States no longer needs any Law of the the Sea Treaty or convention. Let the conference fail. The United States can impose its will...."[40] The Reagan Administration's decision to seek a review of the Sea Law Treaty clearly reflects America's commitment to the defence of *status quo* and its unwillingness to accommdate any change which would benefit the vast majority of Third World countries.[41]

The new Cold War is likely to be a strong feature of Super Power relations in the eighties, but with a difference. It is being fought at a time when both the Super Powers are losing control over their allies.[42] Eastern and Western countries have benefited immensely from *detente* in terms of trade and cultural relations. They have developed vital stakes in the continuance and further consolidation of East-West *detente*. As such, they do not want to be sucked into the global power game of their alliance leaders. West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, in an interview with the *Economist* (London), said in October 1980: "... *We do not want to get back to the Cold War. There is nothing to be gained for the Germans in a Cold War, divided as our nation is, divided as our capital of Berlin is, nothing to be gained from a new cold war period.*"[43] Western Europe's desire to maintain peace and security in Europe by delinking it from the global happenings, which in strategic language is referred to as decoupling, were articulated much more strongly by Theo Sommer when he wrote: "Most Europeans with the possible exception of the British have long insisted that *detente* along the central front must be insulated against the effects of peripheral turbulence, that linkage was not only impractical but unwise, that the idea of making *detente* indivisible

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spelled great peril in as much as it implied logically, the indivisibility of tension too. *Should the peace of Europe be really jeopardized each time a fuse blows in some arc of crisis? No one thought so over Angola, Ethiopia, or South Yemen, and there will be precious little inclination to think so now. Europe must not become an arena of tension simply because there is tension elsewhere. Battles lost in Luanda, Addis Ababa or Kabul cannot be won in Berlin.*"[44] Sommer continued: "It is a safe bet that contrary to the expectation of most Americans, the rape of Afghanistan will not put to rest the old argument between the United States policy-makers and the Europeans about the use of *detente*, about linkage.... *A Franco-German axis of interest is emerging whose leaders are not intent* on cancelling *detente* in Europe...."[45] No wonder William Hyland wrote: "...*at a critical point of time, America found itself confronting not only Moscow but its European allies as well.*"[46] The fact of the matter is that Western European nations have come to realize that they are regional powers with regional ambitions and therefore it is not necessary for them to get involved in the global designs of their alliance leader, the United States. They also seem to have realized that there is an essential difference between appeasing the United States and deterring the Soviet Union. Caught in this dilemma, the West Europeans, particularly the West Germans, have reconciled to the idea of living with the reality of Soviet power. This is perhaps what Christoph Bertram had in mind when, in the wake of the crises in Afghanistan and Iran, he said: "If we decide not to go to the Olympics, if we decide to break off diplomatic relations with Iran, if we decide to impose economic sanctions for the sole purpose of appeasing the Americans rather than deterring the Soviets, then, something is wrong with the alliance."[47]

As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, West European differences with the United States on the question of Afghanistan and the Middle-East were reflected in British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington's proposals for neutralization of Afghanistan and the European initiative for associating the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in any attempts at finding a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. NATO countries also do not see eye to eye with the United States on the American plan of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for the Gulf.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper on the changing role of the Super Powers in the international system in the eighties concludes with a brief reference to an important controversy raised in recent years. The controversy relates to the objections to the usage of the term "Super Power". Such objections are the result of some of the cardinal changes that have taken place in the international system in the post World War II period. The international system has moved away clearly from the bi-polarity of the early post-war years—when the United States and the Soviet Union with the help of their economic and military

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power and with their unquestioned leadership in their respective alliance systems had established control over the course of events in world politics—to a multipolar world where not only new actors like the non-aligned movement (OPEC included) and China[48] have appeared on the horizon, but the United States and the Soviet Union are slowly losing control over their allies. It is argued that the Super Powers are ceasing to be Super Powers and therefore we return to the earlier descriptions like "major powers" or "Great Powers."[49] While we have the choice to enter into this terminological debate or not, we have no choice as regards the role of the Super Powers; there are going to be definite limits to the Super Powers' role in the international system in the 1980s. One wonders whether "Fortress America" and "Fortress Soviet Union" are really going to remain all that impregnable.

January 1982.

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23 The figures for West European, Japanese and American dependence on Gulf oil stand at about 65 per cent, 80 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Western economies were caught in a vicious circle of recession and inflation. Production went down, unemployment increased, the cost of living registered a sudden spurt and the future prospects looked bleak. The cumulative effect of all this was what Walter J. Levy refers to as the decline of the West in world politics. See, his "Oil and the Decline of the West," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 58, no. 5, Summer 1980, pp. 999-1016.

24 West European and American strategic divergence has heightened in recent years and is to be seen also in the European initiative for the Arab-Israeli dispute put forward by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. It remains to be seen however, whether the West European initiative will bear fruit or not. Nevertheless, it highlights the strategic divergence in the alliance.

25 For details regarding the Non-Aligned Lusaka Conference Declarations on economic issues, see, *Documents of the Gatherings of the Non-Aligned Countries*, n. 20, p. 46. See also, K.B. Lal and S.D. Muni, "Non-Alignment and the New Internation Economic Order," in K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayanan (Eds.), *Non-Alignment in Contemporary International Relations* (New Delhi, 1981).

26 Guy Pauker, *Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 1980s* (Rand Corporation Report, Santa Monica, November 1977), p. vii.

27 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

28 For a thought-provoking discussion of what the international system is going to be in the eighties, see, Rajni Kothari, "Source of Conflict in the 80s," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 134 (London, IISS, 1977), pp. 1-8. Adelphi Papers 133 and 134 deal with the theme "The Diffusion of Power and Proliferation of Force," The papers are the proceedings of the IISS's 18th Annual Conference held at Austria in September 1976.

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29 S.D. Muni, "Politics of NIEO : Self Interests," *World Focus* (New Delhi), Vol. 2, no. 16, April 1981, pp. 6-9. The entire issue of this journal is devoted to the theme "New International Economic Order."

30 For a detailed study of the role of Great Powers in Third World conflicts, see, Mohammed Ayoob (Ed.), *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* (London, 1980), Most relevant is the chapter "Roots of Conflict" written by Mohammed Ayoob.

31 S.D. Muni, "South Asia", in Mohammrd Ayoob's *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, n. 30, deals at great length with the role of late Mountbatten in the creation of the Kashmir dispute, the possibilities of US collaboration with Sheikh Abdullah during 1950-53, and the role and interests of the Chinese in keeping Kashmir as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. For details see, pp. 56-72, dealing with the role of the external Powers in the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir.

32 As regards Britain's role in the creation of the state of Israel, see, Maxime Rodinson, *Israel : A Colonial Settler State* ? (New York, 1973). Super Power role in the Middle-Eastern conflict in the post-war years has been ably dealt with by Robert Springborg "The Middle-East," in Mohammed Ayoob, n. 30.

33 Mohammad Ayoob, "The Horn of Africa" in Mohammad Ayoob n. 30. See also Carsten Holbraad, *Super Powers and International Conflict*, n. 15.

34 For figures of arms transfers by the Great Powers to Third World regions, see, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977*, (Washington D.C. 1979), pp. 16-18. For the period after 1977, see SIPRI, *Yearbook of Armaments and Disarmament, 1980-1981* (London, 1980).

35 For a recent writing on America's fears of Soviet Union see, Norman Podhoretz, *The Present Danger* (New York, 1980).

36 Some of the important writings in recent months advocating a policy of refurbished containment are: Robert Legvold, "Containment without Confrontation," *Foreign Policy* (New York), Fall, 1980, pp. 74-98; Robert W. Tucker, "The Purposes of American Power," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 59, no. 2, Winter 1980-81, pp. 241-74; Walter Laqueur, "Containment for the 80s," *Commentary* (New York), Vol. 70, no, 4, October 1980, pp. 33-42.

37 For a recent critique of Super Power behaviour in world politics, see, Hedley Bull, "The Great Irresponsibles: The United States, the Soviet Union and World Order," *International Journal*, Vol. 35 no. 3, Summer 1980. pp. 437-47. In fact, some academics like Professor Micheal Nacht have favoured for the United States a policy of selective indirect activism in the Third World. For details, see his "Towards an American Conception of Regional Security," *Daedalus*, n. 2. See also, Joseph Sisco, "Selective Engagements," *Foreign Policy*, No. 42, Spring 1981, pp. 27-42.

38 For details regarding the emergence of the New Cold War and its impact on world politics, see, *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), Vol. 4, nos. 5-6, August-Septmber 1980.

39 Robert Tucker's, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention" *Commentary*, Vol. 59, no. 1, January 1975, pp. 25 ff.

40 Quoted in *South*, April 1981, p. 3.

41 Even the Western Press has criticised the recent United States stand on the Law of the Sea Treaty. For details see, *Washington Post*, 9 March 1981, *The Times* (London), 10 March 1981 and for a Third World reaction see, Altaf Gauhar's editorial "Who is Afraid of the Sea Law Treaty?" in *South*, April 1981.

42 It is instructive to note that over the years, two of the Western-sponsored military alliances have dissolved—CENTO and SEATO. NATO has lost France, and Germany is inclined to take an independent line. The Warsaw Pact has lost Albania, while the adherence of Rumania is only nominal. Further, the Rio Pact headed by the United States has lost Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Bolivia and Argentina. China has parted company with the Soviet Union.

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43 Quoted in Theo Sommer, "Europe and the American Connection." *Atlantic Community Quarterly* (Washington D.C.), Vol. 18, no. 2. Summer 1980, p. 166, emphasis added.

44 Theo Sommer, n. 43, p. 167, emphasis added.

45 Ibid., p. 169; emphasis added.

46 William Hyland, "The Atlantic Crisis," *Daedalus*, Winter 1981, p. 43, emphasis added. Hyland discusses at length the strategic divergence that has developed between Western Europe and the United States and argues that Europe's emphasis in recent years, on the need for a Euro-strategic balance is an expression of independent European attempts at achieving peace and security in Europe. We might also remember here, France's advocacy of a European disarmament conference. See also, Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis in the West," *New York Review of Books*, 17 July 1980. I. Wallerstein, "Friends As Foes," *Foreign Policy*, No. 40, Fall 1980, pp. 119-31. Robert Tucker, "The Alliance After Afghanistan: A Crisis in US-European Relations," *Atlantic Communtiy Quarterly*, Winter 1981, pp. 394-402 and "The Crumbling Alliance," by Fred Luchsinger, Ibid., pp. 450-52.

47 Quoted in *Time Magazine* (Chicago, Asian edition), 28 April 1980, p. 11.

48 There are many authors who have argued that China has achieved super power status. This argument has gained currency after the ICBM testing by China. See, Jonathan Pollack, "China's Potential as a World Power," *International Journal*, Vol. 35. no. 3, Summer 1980.

49 A vast body of literature has emerged in recent years which questions the usage of the term "Super Power." Important among them are: Carsten Holbraad, *Super Powers and International Conflict*, n. 15, pp. 11-12; William T.R. Fox, "Super Powers: Then and Now," *International Journal*, Vol. 35, no. 3, Summer 1980, pp. 417-36; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York, 1977), p. 203; Adam Ulam, "East-West Relations and the Future," *Survey* (London), Vol. 32, nos. 3-4. Summer-Autumn 1976, p. 147. He feels that even the use of the term "Great Powers" has become anachronistic.

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INDO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

By RAJARAM PANDA*

India and Japan are two economic partners in Asia. Both are important countries on the eastern and western flanks of Asia; while India is the second largest in the world in terms of population, Japan is one of the most economically advanced in the world. During the last quarter century or so, they have made sincere efforts at various levels to consolidate their complementary relationships. They have also endeavoured to diversify and intensify their economic interests by means of trade, industrial collaboration and investment. This bilateral partnership has developed rather slowly and there is obviously great scope for its further diversification and intensification. What is needed in this regard is an atmosphere of warmth, sincerity and reciprocity.

Whilst Japan's imports from India declined from 8.55 per cent of its total imports in 1951 to 0.8 per cent in 1977, its exports to India also declined from 7.39 per cent of the total exports to 0.59 per cent during the same period.[1] *Similarly, Japanese investments in foreign collaboration in India amounted to only $ 32 million on 31 March 1979 or about 0.1 per cent of their total investment abroad of about $ 27 billion on that date. Japan's share in cases of foreign investment approved (capital/technology) by India during the 1957-1979 period totalled 502 collaborations out of a total of 5706 or only 8.8 per cent. Nevertheless, Japan is more important for India than* vice versa. *It is one of India's important trading partners. In 1978-79, India's exports to Japan totalled $ 743 million or 10 per cent of the total exports. Similarly, imports from Japan amounted to $ 705 million or about 6.7 per cent of total imports.*[2]

Indo-Japanese economic co-operation could develop further from its present level in areas of trade, investment, technology transfer, collaboration in third countries, and multilateral issues figuring on the agenda of the North-South dialogue, the United Nations and its agencies, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The scope of this paper is confined to an examination of the problems and prospects of Indo-Japanese economic co-operation in the fields of trade, investment and collaboration in third countries.

TRADE POTENTIALS

Growth in trade between India and Japan, temporarily disrupted during World War II, occurred during the 1950s following major structural changes in the Japanese economy.[3] This latter led to an increasing demand for industrial raw materials and minerals which were largely imported; India was

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able to provide some portion of the Japanese demand. The Agreement on Trade signed on 4 February 1958, provided a framework within which commercial transactions took place between the two countries. It has enabled India to export agricultural products and industrial raw materials and minerals to Japan, and import from the latter such commodities as steel, transport machinery, textile materials, electric and general machinery. Though the commodity composition in the bilateral trade has changed over the years, the basic pattern of complementarity has continued to be a characteristic feature of Indo-Japanese trade. Because of the structural changes in the trade pattern of the two countries, there has been greater scope for expansion of areas of complementarity and co-operation in trade to the mutual advantage of both.[4]

In spite of the fact that both India and Japan are leading nations of Asia, economic relations between the two have been relatively weak. In 1979, India's share in Japan's entire foreign trade was less than 1.0 per cent and Japan's share in India's foreign trade was about 8 per cent. While India's foreign trade has declined in world trade from 1 per cent in 1960-61 to 0.5 per cent in 1978-79, Japan's share in India's trade increased from 5 per cent to 8 per cent during the same period. In absolute terms, however, the turnover of Indo-Japanese trade in 1979 was $ 1.8 billion after having remained around $ 1 billion for many years. Exports to Japan alone accounted for $ 1 billion.

During the pre-War period, raw cotton was the principal item in Indo-Japanese trade. In the post-War years, raw cotton and textile products have been replaced by iron ore and other minerals. Since 1959, India has been a leading supplier of a variety of mineral ores to Japan. Amongst the export items from India to Japan, iron ore accounted for about one-half in 1970 but it declined to one-third in 1979. Thus the progress of diversification of the commodities structure in India's exports to Japan is observable. Besides, because of the heavy concentration on three or four commodities in India's export to Japan, attempts have been made to enlarge the list of merchandise exported. Thus, some quantities of shrimps and prawns, cotton, leather goods, chemicals, apparels, and non-ferrous minerals have shown sizeable increases during 1979.

India's two-way trade with Japan has registered a significant growth during the last few years—from $ 647 million in 1972 to $ 1.8 billion in 1979—with balance of trade remaining in India's favour every year since 1972. The trade deficit for Japan which was $ 63 million in 1974 touched the peak level of $ 424 million in 1976; it was $ 296.3 million in 1977 and $ 273.5 million in 1979. (See Table I) Though India is an important regional partner for Japan, it assumes a very low position *vis-a-vis* Japan's global transactions. In 1976, while India ranked nineteenth among Japan's suppliers, it did not find a place among the top 20 buyers of Japanese goods.

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TABLE I

India's Trade with Japan, 1972-1979

(Unit: Million US $)

Year	Exports to Japan (cif)	Imports from Japan (fob)	Balance of Trade
1972	407	240	+ 167
1973	575	339	+ 236
1974	658	595	+ 63
1975	658	471	+ 187
1976	801.1	377	+ 424.1
1977	800	503.7	+ 296.3
1978	793.1	730.3	+ 62.8
1979	1,053.	779.5	+ 273.5

Source: *White Paper on International Trade 1973-80.* (Japan External Trade Organisation, Tokyo).

Foreign trade is extremely important for Japan to secure imports of natural resources such as petroleum, iron ore, coking coal, lumber and a host of other raw materials. Exports of manufactured goods such as automobiles, electronic equipments, cameras, television sets and so on. are necessary to earn foreign exchange to finance its imports. Such a commodity composition is the main source of trade imbalances with various countries.[5]

As Table I demonstrates, the balance of payments in Indo-Japanese trade has remained consistently unfavourable to Japan; its vertical trade structure has affected the balance of payments. However, so long as Japan enjoys at least an overall balance of payments equilibrium, there would be little interest to correct its trade imbalance with India. Japan has come to accept a multilateral pattern of trade whereby its large import deficit with resource-producing countries as Australia, Canada and the Middle Eastern countries is balanced by export surpluses with some countries of East Africa, Southeast Asia (with the exception of Indonesia), the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC) bloc. In fiscal 1977-78, Japan had a $ 9 billion trade surplus alone with the United States and $ 4.6 billion with the EEC. In 1980, its trade surpluses with the EEC bloc alone amounted to $ 11.5 billion.[6]

India, on the other hand, is passing through a critical balance of payments position and the situation is worsening in the wake of steep and frequent increases in petroleum import bills. The country is faced with an unprecedented balance of trade deficit of the order of Rs. 5,500 crores in 1981-82.[7] As saving of foreign exchange is as good as earning it, equal emphasis and encouragement to both export promotion and import substitution seems to be a desirable approach.

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Activisation of an export effort and sustaining it by the creation of a right climate and viable conditions may be aimed at to correct the balance of payments position. In this connection, the easing of various procedural bottlenecks that are prevailing, besides adopting a more stable and forward-looking export policy, would create a more healthy environment for the export sector.

A good amount of foreign exchange is drained in the import of items such as petroleum, vegetable oil, sugar, cement, steel, coking coal, paper, caustic soda and fertiliser. Given a viable economic environment at home, it is possible to manufacture these items domestically with cost advantage and even some amount of exportable surpluses could be created in some cases. Japan is a prospective market for some of these commodities. Indian entrepreneurs however need a good deal of necessary inputs and infrastructure. Therefore, an inter-linked import and export policy can become an integral part of India's economic development policy which could be demonstrably capable of absorbing changes, initially slowly, in the changing international economic environment. Against this background, an attempt is made to investigate the enormous potentials that exist in raising the level of Indo-Japanese trade in a variety of commodities.

Prospects for Increased Trade

Trade in iron ore, the major Indian traditional export item, has been seriously threatened by the emergence of other exporting countries such as Australia and Brazil. In 1959, India's exports of iron ore accounted for 31.5 per cent of Japan's total imports. In the following years, while Asian sources supplied nearly 71 per cent of Japan's total iron ore requirements, India alone accounted for 27.8 per cent. A decade later, the share held by Asian sources had declined to 23.4 per cent with India contributing a mere 15.8 per cent. By 1973, it shrank further to 16.4 per cent, with India's share remaining at 14 per cent. By 1977, while the total Asian share was a mere 16.1 per cent, India's share remained at 13.6 per cent. On the other hand, the Australian share jumped from nil to 47.8 per cent in 1977.

This aspect has been examined in detail by the author in his book—*Pacific Partnership: Japan-Australia Resource Diplomacy*. Delivery schedules following world-wide recession in the steel industry, particularly in the Japanese steel industry, have led Japan to cut back shipments of iron ore from India. India is, however, persuading Japan to maintain the contract tonnage. The export potentialities of the Kudremukh Iron Ore project,[8] following changing emphasis in Iran for steel production, provides an opportunity to Japan to absorb the exportable surplus of iron ore. Bilateral talks between the two countries to explore the scope for increased trade in Kudremukh iron ore may not be fruitless.

India's export potentials in some of the private sector products such as engineering goods, basic chemicals, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, leather

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and leather products value-added and labour-intensive handicrafts, gems and jewellery, jute manufactures, sports goods, unmanufactured tobacco, raw cotton and handloom goods, spices, marine products, cashew, feed-stuff for animals, tea and coffee are great.[9]

India's export promotion measures have been inadequate; the overseas commercial publicity drive about Indian products has been poor. The limited efforts in this direction made by the Trade Fair Authority (TFA) and other semi-governmental organizations have had no worth-while impact on exports. In order to strengthen the sinews of overseas trade, a massive publicity campaign in all strategic foreign markets is long overdue. In this connection, entrusting the responsibility of organizing trade fairs and exhibitions exclusively to TFA by the Ministry of Commerce does not seem to be based on rational considerations.[10] A great deal of qualitative improvement in displaying quality goods and improving the techniques of display, attracting participants, to match with the best international standards and making use of these contacts so as to ensure effective follow-up are important aspects of the export promotion drive. For example, the Trade Fair Authority's objective is multi-dimensional, i.e., projection of the country's image with a cultural and tourist bias, besides commercial considerations. Similarly, the specialised trade bodies such as the State Trading Corporation, export promotion councils, and commodity boards could participate only in specialised exhibitions. Specialised agencies which are close to exporters could play a more useful role in this area than the Trade Fair Authority. Besides demonstrating India's export potentials in terms of quality and competitiveness, the range of products also should be diversified. Though past experiences in such endeavours have not brought in the desired results, these are some of the ways of promoting exports.

India also possesses abundant coal resources; its effective utilization may be one of the solutions to the energy problem which plagues the world economy today. Addressing the Japan-India Symposium held at New Delhi on 19-20 February 1981, Masayoshi Naito, the President of the Toyo Engineering Corporation, saw infrastructural problems as a major factor inhibiting trade growth in coal. He however felt that it would be "worthwhile for both countries to study the possibility of co-operating in the development of coal and the technology of utilising coal."[11] If both countries were to discuss the matter with sincerity, there is no reason why such co-operative efforts would not become one of the main items of economic co-operation between India and Japan.[12]

The basic pattern of Japanese trade is rooted in the structural characteristics of the Japanese economy. Therefore, despite the export potentials in the areas identified in the preceding pages, it would be unrealistic to expect a sudden dramatic increase in trade with India. However, if sustained efforts are made, bilateral trade flows could expand significantly in the years to come. Japan has pursued a consistent policy of diversifying the geographical pattern of its exports as they are under heavy protectionist fire in the United

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States and the EEC countries. Japan is currently embarrassed with very large trade surpluses of approximately $ 20 billion and therefore would like to reduce it. As India enjoys a favourable bilateral trade balance with Japan, there would understandably be great difficulty in getting Japanese sympathy and co-operation in pushing up exports to that country. Nevertheless, if India can demonstrate its capacity to export the items which Japan needs in terms of quality and competitive prices, there is every possibility that Japan would evince a keen interest in the Indian source.

The Japanese economy has undergone a major structural adjustment in recent years; it has switched over to a pattern of industrial growth, concentrating on knowledge-intensive industries and vacating some industrial areas because of escalating labour costs, shortage of raw materials or pollution problems. Indian exporters have not taken advantage of these opportunities and most of these industries have been absorbed by South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore which have evolved export-oriented developme t strategies. There is a need for fresh thinking with regard to policy instruments, at least in the engineering and electronic fields. Simultaneous efforts need to be made for ensuring security of supplies, quality and delivery schedules. Unfortunately, hardly a fraction of the effort that has been made in European and American markets has been directed towards Japan.

Until 1975, India faced a chronic shortage of foreign exchange and, therefore, followed a consistent policy of import substitution. Imports were restricted essentially to raw materials, intermediate products and capital goods which could not be produced domestically but were vital for development. Until recently, most imports of capital goods were financed by tied-credits; this naturally limited the scope for importing more capital goods from Japan. In recent years, however, India has considerably liberalised its import policy and as a result, overall import needs would naturally rise substantially in the process of development. This would further worsen the balance of payments deficits; in the short run, it would have to be financed, in the medium term, the economy would have to adjust by generating larger export surpluses. Thus the attractiveness of India's growing markets for Japanese products would increase.

INDO-JAPANESE INVESTMENT POTENTIALS

Investment Patterns

Indo-Japanese involvement in this field is rather inadequate even though investment is a more involved form of economic relationship laying the foundations for mutual contacts and a more meaningful relationship in the form of transfer of technology, capital, as well as management and entrepreneurial skills.

Direct Japanese investment in India is extremely small due to the latter's emphasis on import substitution. This emphasis is natural for an economy

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with a small trade/GNP ratio (of the order of 6 per cent). A similar policy approach characterized early Japanese industrialisation programmes. As much as 42 per cent of the early Japanese industrial growth was accounted for by import substitution.[13]

For Japan, foreign investment is an alternative avenue because of a deteriorating domestic climate for investment on account of negative factors such as an appreciating yen, rising labour and energy costs, environmental decay and shortage of industrial sites. Japanese investment abroad began in 1951 when a contract to produce electric wires in India was signed.[14] As of March 1979, the cumulative total of direct private investment from Japan in India amounted to $ 32 million and accounted for only 0.1 per cent of the total Japanese overseas private investments which amounted to $ 27 billion. This is an indication of the fact that for Japanese industries, investment in India is not so attractive as in other parts of the world. Whilst the United Kingdom, the United States and some European countries are increasing their direct investments in India, Japanese investment is stagnating. As a result, Japanese investment accounts for 2 per cent of the entire foreign investment in India as of the end of 1974.

Japanese companies have transferred their technology, managerial skills, and personnel to those developing nation industries which have been losing their international comparative advantage. Japanese investment has thus flown into areas where it has got the maximum advantageous returns.

India seeks foreign investments in areas of importance to the national economy. Japanese investors have variously described such a policy as "selective" or "restrictive". If entertaining foreign investment, depending on the country's specific requirements, is to be characterized as a selective or restrictive policy, India's foreign investment policy has been since 1949 selective. It has not become so recently or suddenly.[15]

Though in India there is a keen desire to co-operate with Japanese companies, there is a measure of diffidence and rigidity on the side of the latter. Potential Japanese investors have often complained that the investment climate in India in such key industries as shipbuilding, steel and electrical machinery is unfavourable. This was also emphasized by Shigeo Nagano, the President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, at the Joint Meeting of the Business Co-operation Committees of both countries held at New Delhi in December 1978.[16] Japan has tried to impose a pattern in India which it has successfully evolved in other parts of the world. Conditions in India, however, are different; foreign investment has been allowed in sectors which do not affect the domestic industries. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese have not fully appreciated it. This Indian policy has been continuing since 1949 and there has not been any drastic change though the emphasis has varied from time to time. A fresh look on India's part at its investment policy appears long overdue. Though it is not suggested that India should create a very liberal attitude towards foreign capital and technology such as that prevailing in Brazil, Indonesia

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or Mexico, which may be detrimental to the fulfilment of our economic goals, it is suggested that India could follow a moderately flexible policy towards foreign capital and technology so as the restore confidence among overseas investors. It is equally desirable for Japanese investors to honour India's policies relating to equity participation, rates of royalty, the period of agreements and preferential treatment given to investments in certain fields.

Japanese statements made from time to time indicate that their main grievances against India are its restrictive rules and regulations. However, India's policies are applicable in the same spirit and content towards all foreign investors, and it is unrealistic for Japan to expect any drastic change or a kind of special policy towards it.

The various control instruments existing in India—such as the exchange control measures, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973, Reserve Bank of India regulations, bureaucratic rigidities, etc., need to be updated and, therefore, require rethinking. These control instruments should act as instruments of growth and not as a constraint. Similarly, potential Japanese investors need to be fed with information regarding India's market size, prospects for profit, taxation and the methods of finance. These considerations have guided the Japanese approach to overseas investment policies, particularly to the countries of Southeast Asia, Taiwan and Hongkong. However, a recent demand recession at home, a balance of payment surplus, increased liquidity with banks, and drying up of investment prospects in South Korea and Taiwan, because of various restrictions, have all combined to make the Japanese multinationals seek fresh investment markets. India could take advantage of this opportunity to attract Japanese investment capital in key sectors by creating a sound investment climate. The recent liberalization policy of the Indian Government towards foreign investment by means of lowering the high rates of royalty and taxation, simplifying the procedures relating to remittance of principal and dividends, and extending residential permits to foreign personnel would further facilitate the marriage of Indian raw materials and cheap labour with Japanese technology and capital for mutual benefit.

Economic collaboration between India and Japan could thus expand from trade to the exchange of capital and management skills. India would welcome these Japanese exploratory avenues of investment in India in areas where advanced frontier technology is to be employed and transferred, and where production is entirely export-oriented.

The Japan Overseas Development Corporation, an affiliate of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, is presently engaged in encouraging Japanese small and medium industries numbering five million to seek partnerships overseas. It is possible to extend such partnerships to India in such industries as textiles, electronics, leather products and engineering goods.

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Technical Collaboration

Japanese enterprises generally prefer technical collaboration to direct investment in the case of India. The number of technical collaborations in which Japanese enterprises have participated accounted for 9 per cent of the total foreign technical collaborations in India during 1957-79 and Japan ranked fourth in this area. A recent report by the India-Japan Study Committee has highlighted the difference in perceptions between Japan and India experienced by Japanese enterprises in their collaborations with their Indian counterparts.[17] The following four cases were picked up in the Report:

1. Collaboration for the construction work of Vishakapatnam port iron ore loading facilities;
2. Transfer of management and technical skills in the case of the Indo-Asahi Glass Company Limited;
3. Collaboration for the construction of fertilizer factories by the Toyo Engineering Company; and
4. Transfer of technology by the Citizen Company to the watch industry in India.

Some of the salient findings of the Report are as follows:

1. Practices developed in the homogeneous Japanese societies sometimes contradict the practices in India developed with the heterogeneous character of the society. The Japanese type of enterprise management has received increasing recognition in other industrial countries.
2. Government regulations on foreign private capital are sometimes a disincentive for Japanese enterprises to make direct investment in India.
3. Japanese industries generally feel technical collaborations are easier to implement in India than direct investment. Out of the total Japanese private collaborations in India of 500 cases those with direct investment are only 70.
4. In spite of various difficulties, there are cases of successful collaborations to the satisfaction of both parties.

Keeping these facts in mind, the future prospects of Indo-Japanese economic relations will depend on the following factors:

1. Degree of success in the economic development of India in general;
2. Policy orientation of the government, in particular with regard to the "openness" of the economy;
3. Degree of success in expanding export trade;
4. Role of private enterprise in India;
5. Prospects of the energy situation in India;

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6. Prospects of the improvement in transport and other infrastructure facilities;
7. Stability of labour conditions; and
8. Success in maintaining good self-sufficiency.

There is vast scope for Indo-Japanese co-operation in areas such as the expansion of the steel industry, in the extension of the fertilizer industry, in chemicals, petrochemicals, the development of export-oriented industrial sectors such as the automobile industry, ship-building and shipping, modernisation of textile industry, leather manufacture, processed food industries, etc., besides the improvement of infrastructural facilities, modern enterprise, management methods, packaging technology and advice for quality control. Both countries could also co-operate in the comparatively virgin fields of energy, including exploration and development of oil and gas, liquification of gas and coal, ways and means of energy conservation, particularly oil and research in renewable forms of energy including solar energy, geothermal energy, tidal and wind energy, hydrogen energy, biogas, biomass, etc., besides oceanography, marine biology, photosynthesis and biological nitrogen fixation. All these happen to be areas of priority in India's Sixth Plan and the decade that lies ahead. Both the countries can also collaborate extensively in the highly sophisticated areas of space technology. The agreement between the Japan Science Society for Promotion of Science and the Indian National Science Academy in June 1976 enabling regular channels of communication between the members of scientific communities will be helpful in facilitating collaborative efforts.

COLLABORATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES

There is also considerable scope for Indo-Japanese collaboration in setting up projects in various sectors of industries, including the labour-intensive sectors, in third countries.

So far however, there has not been any instance of Indo-Japanese joint venture in any third country. There have nevertheless been certain cases of co-operation in the form of sub-contracting with Japanese firms for civil construction projects in West Asian countries. The scope of Indian participation in these projects is again restricted to manpower and service supplies. While the Indian organizations are confident of joining hands with developed countries in engineering, consultancy and design contracts in third countries, one of the important alibis given by the Japanese organization for not involving the Indian organizations in such projects is the former's ignorance of Indian capabilities.

Joint ventures and high-value turnkey projects initiated by Indian entrepreneurs in diverse fields and sectors in the countries of Asia, Africa and, though in a small way, in some developed countries of West Europe and North America, bear testimony to the confidence that has been reposed by

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these countries in Indian enterprise and experience. Indo-Japanese collaboration in third country projects would enjoy the following advantages by way of India's participation.

In the first place, India possesses a gigantic reservoir of trained manpower which can be deployed to work on overseas projects at short notice on a competitive level. The low cost of Indian labour not only lowers the cost of construction of a project but also makes Indian plants and equipment competitive in the export market. India has already had a rich experience of involving unskilled labour in bilateral co-operation for the construction of projects in the Middle East and North Africa. Detailed engineering and Indian consultancy services enjoy comparative advantage. Secondly, geographical proximity to the Middle East and Southeast Asia where the projects are being executed is another major advantage. Supply of labour and materials from India can reduce the cost of a project in terms of freight as well as lead time. India can offer more competitive schedules to clients in West Asia, North Africa and Southeast Asia. Thirdly, Indian and Japanese enterprises are complementary to each other; whilst Japanese companies are in a better position to offer design, detailed engineering and consultancy services, the site implementation of projects abroad can be more profitably done by Indian companies. In fact, in an effort to tone down the exports, Japan has recently begun concentrating on very high technology industries. Lastly, India enjoys comparative advantage in supplying materials in third country ventures for such projects as civil and structural construction, industrial and infrastructural projects, etc.

A beginning has already been made towards Indo-Japanese collaboration in third country projects and such cases need to be multiplied. (See Table II)

Further, specific areas of joint collaboration which could be undertaken in the West and Southeast Asia as well as African countries, from time to time, are as follows:

—Civil construction and structural work;
—Ferrous, non-ferrous and allied industries;
—Steel plants;
—Power projects;
—Petrochemical plants;
—Industrial plants like sugar, cement, paper, transmission lines, water treatment and supply works, sewage treatment and disposal plants, caustic soda, sulphuric acid and calcium carbide plants, etc.;
—Port development;
—Fisheries;
—Railways;
—Hydrocarbon industries;
—Oil refineries;

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TABLE II

Indo-Japanese Joint Projects in Third Countries

Name of the Japanese firm	Name of the Indian firm	Nature of Contract	Value of the Contract ($ m)	Country
Pacific Consultants International (PCI) Japan	Engineering Projects (I) Ltd.	Construction of an integrated modern township as also infrastructural facilities. (India is a prime contractor, while the Japanese firm provides design and architectural services).	256.00	Kuwait
Fujita Corporation, Japan	do	Expansion of Seif Palace	40.00	Kuwait
Sumitomo Corporation, Japan	Best and Crompton, India	Erection of 132-KVA transmission line as also supply of vibration dampers for the Nigerian National Electric Power Authority.	4.68	Nigeria
do	do	Erection of 230/400-KVA transmission line for the Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co.	3.30	Iran
do	do	Supply and erection of 132-KV Switchyard equipment, civil works and cabling, lighting and technical/-consultancy services for 40-MW gas turbine power station.	1.50	Bangladesh
Toyo Engineering Corporation, Japan	Western India Erectors, Ltd.	Erection work of piping installation, fabrication and instrumenation for a petrochemical complex.	1.80	Algeria
Sumitomo Kaisha, Japan	Best and Crompton, India	Erection, testing and commissioning of all 11 nos. 220KV/132KV substation for Malacca-Lluang Saudi Project at Malaysia.	NA	Malaysia

Source: *Report of Workshop on Indian Joint Ventures: Turnkey and Country Projects* (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry: New Delhi, 13 March 1980).

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Even in the ASEAN member-countries where Japan has been extending project assistance of $ 1 billion, there would be scope for associating India to supply materials, technology, consultancy and also various types of sub-contracting. India's capacity is generally restricted to civil construction and electricity transmission and generation. Further, Indian companies are capable of entering into partnership in these fields with major Japanese overseas firms so that they can get sub-contracts, but they have never used the leverage they possess in terms of large orders placed with major Japanese companies to ensure some degree of participation with those companies in third countries. This is because the indentor is often a public sector compay and has no dealings with the Indian firm seeking contracts abroad. There has been much discussion about utilizing Japanese trading firms. This, however, does not appear to have been discussed afresh in any detail.[18]

The entrepreneurs of the two countries can also work out mutually beneficial partnership arrangements for setting up joint enterprises overseas. This may take the forms of joint investment, indirect participation, sub-contracting arrangements and consultancy services.

Based on past experiences and approaches which India and Japan have adopted, the following observations may be made. Though a start has been made in Indo-Japanese collaboration, it is restricted by and large to turnkey projects in the Middle East. This could be extended to cover projects in developing countries of Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbeans where considerable scope for Indo-Japanese collaboration in taking up joint projects exists. Secondly, Japanese companies have collaborated with their Indian counterparts only in the areas of civil and constructional works. India is capable of taking up industrial projects abroad on a turnkey basis. Concerted efforts therefore to increase joint participation for industrial projects is worth-mentioning. Thirdly, a proper system of collation and dissemination of information about the firms and organizations in India and Japan which are capable of and are willing to join hands in establishing joint ventures in third countries is desirable. Fourthly, the establishment of suitable organizations in India and Japan which could monitor all the projects that are executed in third countries would help spread information for mutual help; understanding each other's capability can help identify the potential areas for third country ventures. Fifthly, port and handling facilities need further modernization to handle large cargo ships and accommodate large size freight carriers. Sixthly, the Central Agency for Labour Recruitment is functioning on a nominal level under the Home Ministry. The present agency handles only a limited category. If the power of labour recruitment is transfer ed to the Labour Ministry and a Labour Data Bank opened, a list according to merit could be easily made available. The recruiting agency might be entrusted with the responsibility of training labour in specialized skills and acquainting them with equipment they would have to handle. Lastly, a sub-group of the India-Japan Business Co-operation Committee could be constituted. This sub-group

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could be assigned the responsibility of examining current business opportunities in the area of turnkey projects where Indo-Japanese collaboration could be feasible and where Indian and Japanese companies jointly possess distinct comparative advantage. The sub-group would then be in a position to recommend joint participation by specific Indian and Japanese companies on a project to project basis. Thus Indo-Japanese co-operation in third country projects point out a desirable direction for economic collaboration between the two countries.

CONCLUSION

Of late, Japan has built an image of an Asian industrial giant in league with the West. Japan's image as part of the "North" rather than of the "South" in the great North-South divide of the world is amply demonstrated by its membership in the Trilateral Commission and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ties with the United States for security, host to the Tokyo Summit and image of hard bargainer in aid, trade and investment negotiations. However, the growing complexity of global power equations, emerging crisis in the world economy, growing Soviet presence in Asia in the wake of its schism with China, increasing instability in the Asian power balance following the global assertion of the Arabs and other regional and sub-regional nationalisms and tightening resource position, will all have a profound influence in shaping Japan's external-orientation. India, on the other hand, is rising to the challenge of evolving a new framework of Asian and global relations in a world of shifting global balance of force towards a more pluralist world structure. A regular exchange of views between India and Japan on various multilateral issues could help create a climate conducive to growing international co-operation in an increasingly interdependent world.

Also in the context of the changing international environment and between individual countries, it would be important for both India and Japan to endeavour to deepen mutual understanding and trust by holding frank discussions. If both the countries are interested in developing a more just, stable and peaceful world, Japan should shed its profit-motive mentality while talking of economic collaboration. Reduction of disparity among nations needs international action and joint contribution by India and Japan towards this end would be of immense value. Indo-Japanese economic co-operation may be based on this perspective so that it can ensure the health of the region. Japan's role as a developed nation in the internationalisation of modernisation—the imitative models of development—would be welcome. A long-term perspective should replace the short-term profit-oriented outlook that has characterized Japanese foreign economic policy. Policy emphasis should therefore gradually shift towards "easternisation".

At the bilateral level, the already existing channels for monitoring and co-ordinating relations in different areas could play a positive role in further-

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ing the scope for increased economic relationship. The role played by the bi-national business commission, called the India-Japan Business Co-operation Committee, since 1965 in its annual meetings, alternately at New Delhi and Tokyo, is already serving as a useful channel for business and financial leaders of both the countries towards strengthening trade and economic relations. Similarly, the quasi-official Round Table Meeting of the Committees of India and Japan has widened its scope of activity from narrow bilateral aspects to cover wider aspects like regional co-operation and problems of world peace and stability. Like the businessmen's committee, this committee also meets annually and alternately at New Delhi and Tokyo.

The recent government-backed initiative of advocating a Pacific Basin Community in Japan, Australia and other developed countries in the Pacific would, however, if it materializes, have a profound impact on the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. Other recent developments such as the dramatic transformation of China's external-orientation, growing emphasis in Japan to forge closer economic relationship with China, the growing importance of ASEAN as a powerful regional force, Japan's passive global posture, the Pakistan factor, South Asian nationalism, Sri Lanka's bid to join the ASEAN, other developments in the region with their strategic implication and the accompanying security threat—would all have profound significance in shaping the development of Indo-Japanese economic relations. An atmosphere of warmth and a climate of trust would make such co-operation in the economic field more purposeful and meaningful.

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NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS—THEIR FALLACIES AND IMPLICATIONS

By S.K. JAIN*

One of the important facets of the post war-trade structure was the exclusive use of tariffs as a commercial policy instrument to regulate trade across the frontiers. But in the period after late 1960s, the importance of tariffs steadily declined as tariff reductions under multilateral trade negotiations and non-tariff trade barriers[1] assumed greater significance in the developed market-economy countries to protect their domestic industry from foreign competition.

In this paper, an attempt has been made to critically examine a case for imposing non-tariff barriers by the developed countries on their imports. There has also been an endeavour to assess the implications of such trade distortive measures for the countries imposing these restrictions as well as for the countries whose exports are affected by the application of such measures, with a special reference to the impact on the developing countries which generally have to bear the brunt of these protectionist measures.

INTRODUCTION

Free Trade Utopia

There cannot be two opinions regarding the fact that unrestricted access to national markets yields the maximum world output of goods and services, based on the benefits of international specialisation and division of labour. This in turn maximises world welfare and income. But the "free trade" doctrine rests upon highly heroic and unrealistic assumptions which are rarely satisfied in the real world. The free trade model supposes the existence of effective competition in the national markets for goods and services all over the world wherein instantaneous and costless adjustments can take place in the wake of the changing conditions. Only in such an ideal state of affairs free trade can be claimed as an economic imperative and there can be no other better solution in the trade policy sphere.

But we live in a world where even a cursory examination of international economic relations indicates that there never have existed completely free-trade policies. Tariffs, quotas, export controls and a wide variety of other non-tariff measures have been always applied and will also continue to be applied in future for regulating the flow of goods and services across national borders. Critical assumptions, underlying the free-trade propositions thus do not survive in the cold light of the facts. Labour and capital are not fully mobile; the process of adjustments to changing situations is not costless

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and instantaneous and competition is far from perfect—both among the producers and among the suppliers of productive factors. Moreover, the objective of maximising world welfare in terms of the highest possible increases in per capita income in economic terms alone is in itself a highly controvertible proposition. It is the social welfare as against economic welfare that countries endeavour to maximise, which in addition to mere growth in income, also entails the objective of ensuring a proper distribution of income and high standards of living through the provision of better quality products and other social amenities. Since free-trade does not ensure realisation of all these objectives, as a corollary there emerges a need for making significant departures from the free-trade utopia. Further, even if a country decided to follow a free-trade path, restrictive trade poiicies of other countries may force it to abandon the idea of pursuing such a policy.

As a result, national governments and other state entities have to apply some instruments of control in order to ensure the realization of economic as well as social goals, protection to the domestic suppliers of import-competing goods and services, improvement in the terms of trade, reduction in the balance of payments deficits, maintenance of high employment levels, price stability and satisfactory rates of economic growth, etc.[2]

Deflection from Tariffs to Non-Tariff Measures

Traditionally tariffs had been the principal tool of commercial policy. In the post-war period however the importance of tariffs declined as a result of tariff reductions under multilateral trade negotiations. Now tariffs have become so rigid under the international tariff agreements and negotiations that a country cannot think of increasing them without running the danger of adverse reactions on the part of other countries. Moreover, tariffs are also not always capable of bringing the desired changes in trade flows because their efficacy depends upon the nature of demand and supply.

The declining tariff levels, increasing rigidity and the failure of tariffs to provide import competing suppliers a reliable source of relief, have given a fillip to the growth of NTBs as a logical alternative for securing increased protection. Moreover, as the institutional resistance to increased protection *via* non-tariff barriers is less than the resistance to increases in tariff levels, import-competing groups have preferred to seek relief from competition through a less direct and short-cut path for exerting protectionist pressures to gain some of the lost tariff-protection. As a consequence of these developments, the relative actual and potential importance of non-tariff restrictions has risen, as the tariff levels have fallen, and they will continue to receive greater attention in future trade negotiations although the economic costs associated with their use may on occasions be inordinately high.

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ARGUMENTS AND FALLACIES OF NTBs

Developed countries have adduced several reasons to defend the use of non-tariff barriers, including improvement in the terms of trade, curing balance of payment deficits, redistributing income in favour of productive factors employed in import-competing industries, maintaining high employment levels and price stability in their economies. Some of these important arguments along with their fallacies have been discussed in the following paragraphs.

Curing Deficits in the Balance of Payments

A national government which is subject to serious balance of payment difficulties and a deteriorating international reserve position is highly susceptible to resort to trade restrictions.

In recent years, some countries have faced balance of payment deficits due to increased imports. For example, in the United States imports rose more sharply than exports in yester years. Trade surpluses which averaged $ 3.5 billion annually during 1953-56, declined sharply in 1968 and 1969, and turned into deficits thereafter. Except in 1973 and 1975, it had trade deficits in all the years since 1971. Countries like Denmark and Ireland have also been having consistently unfavourable trade balances for a number of years.

Due to these unfavourable balances these countries sought to avoid trade deficits through the increasing use of NTBs. But the hard fact is that many other countries, not having any trade deficits or any substantial deficits, have also imposed NTBs on their imports.

If we analyze the causes of persistent trade deficits or balance of payment problems in the above countries, we find that unfavourable balances have not taken place solely due to increasing imports. These unfavourable changes in the developed countries could be attributable to a number of different reasons. One major cause has been the quickening pace of economic activity requiring higher and higher levels of goods and services. Another reason has been heavy increases in military expenditure particularly in the United States. Structural shifts in the trade position have also been responsible for growing trade deficits. For example, the United States has become a net importer of mineral fuels, motor vehicles and other manufactures such as textiles, iron and steel, chemicals and machinery.

One very important reason has been their poor performances on the export front. The faster diffusion of technology, the spread of managerial methods and the greater international mobility of capital through the multinational corporations, all have adversely affected their exports and the developed countries no longer possess comparative advantages in many of their important export items.

Another important reason responsible for lower export is relatively higher

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prices of some of their export items, which in turn have been an outcome of the rising domestic prices of the raw materials and rising labour costs in these countries.

In view of such a complicated set of variables which affect the trade balance of a country, how can imports alone be held responsible for trade deficits? Any action to restrict imports may bring retaliation from other countries which would further aggravate the balance of payment problems. A better way to handle the balance of payment problem is to take steps to increase their exports or to use other monetary and fiscal policies. Moreover, the emergence of a flexible exchange rate system has also eliminated the need for protection on the balance of payment grounds.

NTBs As Retaliatory Measures

NTBs have also been applied by the developed countries as retaliatory measures against restrictions imposed by other countries on their exports. For example, US exporters claim unfair treatment to their exports in certain countries which places them in a disadvantageous position. However, the United States itself is not without its own non-tariff barriers which include Buy American Policies, Voluntary Export Restraints (VER's) and other direct unilateral restrictions on imports of dairy products, meat, sugar, oil, etc. These restrictions have been increasing rather than diminishing in number and coverage over time.

Similar is the case with countries of the EEC, Japan, Australia, Newzealand, Switzerland and other developed countries. All of them claim that they have been forced to apply NTBs because of their own disadvantageous position arising out of the imposition of restrictions on their exports by other countries.

Though there may be differences in degrees of protection, the fact remains that all the developed countries are resorting to trade distortion measures. It has been shown particularly in the case of the United States that its claim of having relatively lower tariff and non-tariff barriers is not valid. In a quantitative study by Irving B. Kravis, it is evident that US tariff levels are very near to those of other countries.[3]

Moreover, similar average tariffs may have different restrictive effects in different countries due to differences in the structure of interest rates, elasticities of demand and supply, the share of imports in domestic consumption and the composition of imports in different countries.[4] Taking these factors into account, Professor Belassa, in a study of pre-Kennedy Round Tariff rates, pointed that US tariffs were more restrictive than those of the EEC (old six) and the United Kingdom, though less restrictive than those of Japan.[5] Further, Baldwin has observed that relative to the United Kindgom, the United States had a higher rate of effective protection (when non-tariff as well as tariff barriers are included).[6]

Similar is the case with certain other countries. Their tariffs or non-tariff

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barriers may be lower than those of some other countries but at the same time, may be higher when compared with other countries. Even if comparison is made between two countries only, one may be having lower restrictions in some products but higher ones in others. In such a situation how can the application of non-tariff barriers as retaliatory measures be considered tenable?

Reducing Domestic Unemployment

It is widely alleged by the developed countries that the rapid growth of imports, particularly that of labour-intensive products from the developing countries, had forced a number of their firms to close down and rendered millions of workers jobless. This naturally necessitated imposition of restrictions on imports so as to ameliorate the domestic situation.

The AFL-CIO—the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations have estimated that "the deterioration of the American position in international trade resulted in the net loss of about 900,000 job opportunities from 1966 to 1971...."[7] It should be noted that this estimate refers to the loss of "job opportunities" and not to a reduction in the number of jobs. Again, Charles R. Frank reveals that the loss in job potential in import-competing industries due to foreign trade had been on an average of about 44,000 jobs per year—about 0.2 per cent of total manufacturing employment which constituted a minute fraction of the total United States' labour force. The estimate of 44,000 jobs lost each year in import competing industries is quite lower than the AFL-CIO's estimate of jobs lost due to net foreign trade—half a million between 1966 and 1969, or about 170,000 jobs per year. This difference is surprising since the AFL-CIO figures purport to show the net effect of all trade, including exporting as well as import-competing industries. *Even if the AFL-CIO estimates are accepted as valid, 170,000 jobs per year comes to just about* 0.2 *per cent of the total United States labour force.*[8]

Further, it is to be noted that job losses are not occurring solely due to imports. The other reasons for increasing unemployment in the developed countries have been an increase in productivity (which in practice means use of fewer labourers for producing a given volume of goods), less exports, overall lower growth of domestic demand and production in developed countries, heavy outflow of capital, growing activities of multinational corporations and cyclical and other structural changes in their economies. In an empirical study, decomposing the effects of imports, exports, domestic demand and labour productivity on employment in import competing industries, Frank found that changes in domestic demand and labour productivity were by far the most important factors affecting employment growth adversely in the import-competing industries in the United States during 1963-71. He also observed that loss of job potentials due to increased labour productivity was about six times as great as the loss due to foreign trade.[9]

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Therefore, it can be safely concluded that rising imports alone are not responsible for causing unemployment. It is determined to an overwhelming degree by internal influences. The expansion of international trade certainly does not involve a high level of unemployment. It merely imposes a temporary cost in terms of job displacement and thereby motivates labourers to shift from less efficient uses to more productive and more remunerative jobs. Protecting any less competitive industry or firm means maintaining artificially high prices for commodities that otherwise would not be charged. This also implies freezing the patterns of resource allocation. The jobs that are protected tend to be low-wage jobs relative to those that would be available without protective policies.

At the same time, a policy of import restrictions prevents the expansion of export industries which characteristically pay higher wages. In an economy open to foreign trade, there are opportunities to expand into new markets. Trade policies designed to protect investments and jobs in inefficient industries, by inviting retaliation, may close off export markets and reduce the potentials for higher productive jobs in exporting industries which are technologically more advanced and more remunerative.

Safeguarding Consumer Interests

Further, many a time NTBs have been imposed by the developed countries on the plea of social and environmental necessity, to ensure a better quality of life to their people. Undoubtedly, every state has not only the responsibility but also the right of maintaining better health and sanitary conditions in the country. Heavy restrictions may be applied to the import of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and low quality of infested food-stuffs. Developed countries have in fact applied from time to time various kinds of restrictions on the import of products deemed harmful to consumers or damaging the environment, or to the products which are considered to be processed abroad under less rigorous environmental standards than those existing at home. The concern for environmental management and consumer protection in such cases cannot be challenged. However, it is an indisputable fact that international trade has been unduly restricted by the imposition of stringent product standards in the name of realizing such objectives. In many cases, very rigid health and sanitary conditions were laid down deliberately in order to keep imported goods out.

Moreover, there does not seem to be any logic as to why some common international standards are not acceptable to the developed countries. Why do these standards differ considerably from country to country? As an example, one glaring case of such inconsistent standards has been the ban imposed on the import of Indian potatoes into Denmark. The ban was imposed because Indian potatoes were believed to contain some infected virus endemic in India. If this is true, how has India been successful in exporting the same potatoes to other developed countries?

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It is obvious that realisation of social objectives through rigid health and sanitary regulations, widely differing marking and labelling requirements and expensive standard specifications is not a judicious solution of the problem. "Trade policy is only one of the many paths to the realization of such social goals and it frequently represents a decidedly inferior alternative."[10]

Protecting Industries Important for National Defence

Import restrictions are also employed to protect domestic industries whose output is critical for national defence. In most of the cases these industries include iron and steel industries and certain natural resource products such as petroleum. The importance of such industries in a national emergency is deemed sufficient to more than offset the annual costs incurred in terms of induced inefficiencies and the trade gains foregone.[11] By restricting cheap foreign supplies, these industries are permitted to charge higher prices which are considered necessary to maintain high levels of new discoveries and explorations. If national security is dependent upon the ready domestic availability of large quantities of these strategic products, what is really called for is a programme of subsidization for the exploration of such products and not imposition of non-tariff trade barriers to maintain and protect such strategic industries.

Even if such industries needed protection from imports, use of tariffs would be a far better alternative than the imposition of quotas and other non-tariff restrictions. Further, even if tariffs failed to restrict imports to the extent desired, it would clearly demonstrate a high level of inefficiency and incompetitiveness of these domestic industries which, rationally speaking, should not be allowed to perpetuate at the cost of the rest of the nation.

Kravis has very aptly observed, that there is no need to protect such industries to maintain skills that would be lost otherwise were the industries subjected to unrestricted import competition and a domestic industry would no longer be able to produce the full range of products necessary for national security in a situation of emergency. He cites the cases of the United States, England, Germany and Japan, where in periods of war, these skills emerged very quickly and managed to produce whatever was needed. Moreover, he contends that these arguments levelled in defence of national security have been weakened by the diminished likelihood of a large scale conventional war of long duration. "*A major nuclear war would be brief and horrible and its outcome would not be affected by the size of domestic industries such as oil steel or* . . . ."[12]

However, no nation would be willing to submit to such proposals for liberalizing trade at the cost of national defence and sovereignty. In this area, restrictions are likely to continue irrespective of the high costs incurred and numerous benefits foregone.

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Infant and Old Industry Argument

Another important argument proferred by the developed countries to justify the use of NTB's is the protection of infant and old industries with a view to enable them to acquire international competitiveness. It is quite understandable that certain enterprises unable to enter the line of import-competitive production because of initial high costs would demand protection from cheap foreign supplies. Similarly, old declining industries with out-dated management structures and techniques, obsolete technology and other weaknesses would also demand trade restrictions to obtain protectionism from foreign competition.

These infant "front-edge" industries which have yet to attain competitive advantages, and the old and declining "back-edge" industries which are losing competitiveness form the vanguard of protectionist interests. A national government may be justified in protecting an emerging industry from low cost foreign imports until such time as the industry becomes internationally competitive. But there always exists a danger of carrying these policies to an extreme. Soon vested interests develop which insist on retaining "temporary" protection for periods longer than can be reasonably justified on grounds of adjustment.

Thus, the infant industry argument may carry some weight, but the old industry argument is highly untenable particularly in the case of the developed countries. Free imports serve an important role in the growth process by efficiently cleaning out, particularly the back-edge industries, and releasing productive resources for use in other sectors of the economy, including exporting industries which are more efficient and competitive. This induced shift in resources from less efficient employment to more efficient ones is clearly beneficial from the development view point and represents an important and dynamic function performed by the liberal imports.

It thus becomes clear that the recent resurgence of "new protectionism" is a conspicuous manifestation of the self-interest of certain "restricted-trade" preferring groups in the developed countries. The monetary turmoil, oil price hike and overall low rates of economic growth in the developed market economy countries have further accentuated trade issues and strengthened the hands of these groups in demanding higher levels of restrictions. Further, these restictions have been established for redressing seasonal or temporary difficulties as well as to stabilize prices; there are also cases where they were introduced for political considerations. They have at times been used to achieve a number of purposes simultaneously; their desirability and adequacy as a tool of economic policy depended on specific conditions and aims and must be judged from case to case in the particular setting in which they were applied.

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INTERNAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NTBs

We have already discerned some of the implications of imposing NTBs for the developed countries. Most of the reasons examined have very little to do with maximizing the welfare of the countries imposing these barriers. The focus of the arguments is mainly on the self-interest of specific groups in an economy—"with little or no regard to the impact of these actions on the well-being of the nation as a whole." Every claim for protection, no matter what its form, is a claim for special treatment at general expense. Even these groups do not gain much in the ultimate ecnomic analysis. The following paragraphs set out more systematically the important disadvantages of imposing NTBs.

NTBs, like tariffs, serve to raise the price of imported goods for domestic buyers. As a result of increased prices, some people who could have purchased a given product at a lower price are driven out of the market. Those remaining in the market have to pay higher prices for the product, thus reducing their real income and their ability to purchase other goods. The impact of NTBs on prices can be seen in the findings of a study conducted by the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade. It was estimated that in Newzealand, internal taxes alone zaised the prices of consumer goods by 80 per cent. Similarly in the European Economic Community, the incidence of excise duty and value-added-tax on the retail price of manufactured tobacco in the member countries varied from 61.18 per cent to 84.0 per cent.[14]

In another study by Cline and his associates, it was revealed that in 1971 the total import value of food items under import quotas was $686 million or 24.1 per cent of total food imports. The sum of potential increments from quota removal was estimated to be $ 311 million, or 45.3 per cent of the initial import value and the resulting total welfare gain was estimated to be $232 million which is a considerably high figure.[14]

NTBs also significantly limit the range of consumer choice by making some goods totally unavailable as only selected import items are permitted to enter the domestic market. In case of tariffs, on the other hand, the loss of consumer welfare is relatively less and is also to some extent offset by revenues collected by the government. Further, the choice of the consumers in terms of the availability of different varieties of goods is also not much affected.

Closely allied to consumers are importers, distributors, and retailers of foreign made goods, whose welfare is very much dependent on the flow of imported goods into the national markets. Lower import volumes impinge on their earnings and business activities.

Further, domestic firms, which find it advantageous to buy goods from abroad as either raw materials or components for use in their final products, are severely affected by the imposition of NTBs. The interest of such firms lies in buying inputs as cheaply as possible. If more and more trade barriers

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are applied, the cost of imported inputs rises adversely affecting their output volumes and profitability.

Import restrictions also lead to higher prices of protected products. With time, these increases in prices also percolate to other sectors, thus aggravating the inflationary pressures in all the sectors of the importing countries.

International trade is a two-way process; if less is imported, more cannot be exported. Other countries also take retaliatory measures to restrict their imports which constitute exports for other countries. Developing countries particularly, when they have less foreign exchange (which is due to their lower exports), start restricting their imports from the developed countries. Moreover, import restrictions tend to lead to an artificial over-valued currency which again reduces the exports of the developed countries. As a result of low exports, export firms are closed down or do not grow at the same rate. This leads to low production and low employment in these industries.

Thus we can observe that import restrictions lead to substantial efficiency losses, fiscal revenues foregone and income redistribution from consumers to producers. Domestic and foreign market shocks remain independent of one another—an insulation that tends to aggravate the inflationary pressures in the importing countries. Import competition which serves the purpose of turning factors of production from less efficient to more efficient activities also ceases to exist. Moreover in case of quantitative restrictions, the allocation of quotas is the biggest problem and often leads to corruption, inefficiency and monopolistic market structures. Selective or discriminatory quotas have the additional disadvantage that unlike tariffs, they generally fail to direct imports from the least cost foreign suppliers which in turn leads to a dissipation of world resources.

Therefore, it can be safely asserted that NTBs are more damaging than tariffs to the welfare of the countries applying them. Their effects percolate down into the fabric of national economies both as short-term shocks as well as permanent barriers to export growth. When one particular market gets closed off by the use of NTBs, exporting countries are forced to deflect their exports to other markets, creating problems there and generating forces for the imposition of NTBs in those markets as well.

IMPLICATIONS OF NTBs FOR DEVELOPING AND OTHER EXPORTING COUNTRIES

Apart from their repercussions in the developed countries. NTBs influence considerably the exporting countries in a variety of ways. Their use skews trade patterns and industrial structures of exporting countries away from the dictates of international competitive advantages. Restrictions on exports redirects the investment and employment flows to other less efficient uses which can be quite damaging. The impact is considerably serious, particularly in developing countries, where alternatives to absorb the

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surplus labour and investment released by the exporting industries does not exist.

Use of NTBs also severely affects the growth of the exporting countries. Resources have to be channeled into alternative sectors—sectors other than the high growth sectors which are generally the labour-intensive industries and which possess comparatively higher levels of productivity.

Further, NTBs would make it difficult for them to meet their import requirements. This is because some developing countries are highly export-oriented and import-dependent economies. Negative developments in their export sectors may heavily impinge on their overall levels of income. Their earnings, often concentrated in a fewer product groups, would be affected by NTBs, bringing in callous economic hardships to them. The resultant lower foreign exchange earnings, would force them to forego a large number of their import requirements.

Again, many developing countries carry a heavy burden of externally held debts which they service from their export receipts. Poor export performance would increase their debt burden and also restrict their potentials for additional borrowings.

NTBs would also force the new and small suppliers from developing countries to face a large number of problems in complying with rigorous customs and port formalities.

Last, but not the least, frequent and sudden changes in the import policies of developed countries would affect exports and production of the exporting countries and release productive factors which may remain unemployed for sometime before being reabsorbed in other sectors. In developing countries where alternative employment of productive factors may be extremely limited, both the factor under utilisation and factor misallocation costs resulting from market closures may be far more significant than those for developed importing countries.

Thus, exporting countries find their exports, export production as well as other economic sectors greatly affected by the imposition of NTBs by the developed countries. Particularly, the application of NTBs on labour intensive products exported from the developing countries frustrates the widely recommended export-oriented development policies for these countries. With the sluggish growth in world demand for important primary products, the faster growing markets for labour intensive manufactures which can provide means to significantly increase the developing countries' exports are also closed down due to the application of non-tariff barriers.

Tracy Murray and Ingo Walter have made a quantitative assessment of the impact of "quantitative restrictions" on the developing countries by comparing the export performance of the developing countries in markets controlled by the quantitative restrictions with their performance in markets not subjected to the quantitative restrictions. Upon an analysis of the available trade data, they concluded that in general those OECD countries which administer quantitative restrictions on imports of a particular product

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account for a relatively minor share of the total OECD imports. The developing countries also hold relatively smaller shares of these restricted markets in comparison with their export performance in the unrestricted markets.[15] Therefore, quantitative restrictions do seem to affect the export performance of the developing countries and an elimination of these trade barriers can significantly enhance their export prospect.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A number of reasons have been adduced by the developed countries to defend the application of non-tariff trade barriers but facts fail to support these arguments. Rising balance of payment deficits have not taken place solely due to rising imports. Rather it has been the outcome of increasing military expenditure, poor export performance and excessive capital outflows from their economies. Similarly, high levels of unemployment have emerged as a consequence of increased productivity, overall low growth of domestic demand and production, low exports and the like. Therefore, it is wrong to say that rising imports alone have been responsible for causing hardships to their economies.

The use of such trade restricting policies of the developed countries causes more damage and injury than render any benefit to the world economy as a whole. Further, their imposition does not even benefit the developed countries which endeavour to reduce the unemployment or inflationary pressures in their economies. Rather, non-tariff measures interfere with the free operation of market mechanisms by restricting consumer choice and limiting competition between domestic and foreign producers. Exporting countries, particularly the developing ones, are also adversely affected in their developmental efforts. The imposition of these measures skews trade patterns and industrial structures of the exporting countries away from the dictates of the international competitive advantages and substantially impedes their potential for growth and development.

Despite these apparent inefficiencies, it is not possible to completely rule out the use of these measures. Every state has the responsibility of maintaining stability, full employment and growth in the economy. A policy of completely free and unregulated trade may affect the process of realizing these objectives; some sort of control and regulation over imports would therefore continue to be there in order to keep the economy functioning properly. What is undesirable is the excessive use of these measures and that too for periods longer than necessary.

There has emerged a pressing need to reverse the present trends and restore an atmosphere conducive to the expansion of world trade. Both the importing as well as exporting countries will have to come forward for evolving liberal trade policies. Developed countries would have to make greater use of other monetary and fiscal measures and try to adopt suitable adjustment assistance programmes which are less distortive to trade. The

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exporting countries should also undertake to refrain themselves from exporting goods at prices lower than normal or following other unfair trade practices. There is also a need to redraft the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and an effective mechanism should be evolved for ensuring the implementation of these rules. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations which opened in September 1973 and finally concluded in 1980, has indeed done a remarkable job in evolving a new agreement for administering the application of some of the non-tariff barriers. However, there still remains much to be done. Some of the terms and concepts still continue to lack precision and clarity. There still remains a large number of non-tariff barriers which are to be brought within the GATT framework. It is only through the adoption of free and fair trade policies that we can think of enhancing the levels of income and standards of living all over the world.

May, 1982.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

THE NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER—INDIA'S ROLE

A survey of the World's historical developmental processes beginning from the middle ages upto the present, indicates a singularly common moulding force that permeates various strata of these centuries. It is the quality and quantum of consumable energy available to a particular nation that broadly formed the basis for the degree and quality of its material progress. In fact we can say that this material progress has been directly proportional to the quantum of energy that any nation or nations were able to harness for their use. On this basis countries were judged as leaders or followers. For example, hydro energy was first found in the rivers of the Euphrates and Tigris of the Middle East and the Indus of India. Around them arose the middle eastern and Harappan civilizations and progress. Coming down to the industrial revolution of the West, it was largely the use of steam energy which overtook hydro energy and developed a mighty industrial movement. Electricity and atomic power subsequently enriched this industrial progress. In my view, the West has now almost reached the peak of its industrial development unless it finds new sources of energy. It will remain stable for some time to come. The new energy which will now overtake others would be solar energy; its unlimited availability, coupled with its cheapness, is bound to effect the future direction of the world's economic development. Whichever country can harness solar energy is bound to set the pace of development in future. It is against this setting that we suggest that Asia, Africa and some parts of Latin America can become the vanguard of a new industrial revolution which is now in the offing. Indian scientists, engineers and others should, therefore, prepare themselves to collectively produce mechanical and other appliances for maximum utilization of this unlimited energy source for human welfare. This would mean that economic progress of the world would complete a full circle from the East to the West and then return to the East.

After a lapse of about 200 years, the world is now moving towards a new economic environment which threatens crises as the economic tidal waves dash against the old embattled environment. The world had during the colonial period to bear with economic edifices built by the West. Broadly, they had been based on obtaining cheap raw materials from the colonies and selling the manufactured goods to the colonies at exorbitant prices. No wonder the Western countries grew rich and wealthy. With the withdrawal of these Western Powers from the colonies, the whole economic picture has undergone a dramatic change. The erstwhile colonies became sovereign and independent and set targets to develop their own economy and industries with indigenous raw materials to supply the needs of their own people. In one sense this is a compelling corrective measure to the economic imbalance created during the colonial period. When once this process of reversal is completed, the West would be deprived of the fruits of their ill-gotten assets and settle down to drastic economic adjustments for modest

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economic development. This can be termed as an economic earthquake trying to correct the uneven economic strata of developed and developing countries. This process already started in the Western countries, such as England, is now operating on the World's economy. It forms the most important and significant factor influencing the world's prospective economic revolution. This more than any other cause provides the necessary motive force to Western countries as well as the developing countries to devise a new international economic order.

The present international economic order is in direct conflict with the broad current developments in international political and economic relations. The world economy has had to face repercussions, especially in the developing countries because of their greater vulnerability to external economic impulses. This imbalance in the world economic order is clearly demonstrated by the statistics provided by the United Nations. Briefly, the benefits of technological progress are not shared equitably by all members of the international community; the developing countries which constitute 70 per cent of the world's population account for only 30 per cent of the world's income. It has been found impossible to achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the old system. The gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to widen in a system which was established a long time ago when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent states.

Mass poverty among a sizeable proportion of the world population (as much as 800 million), living in developing countries, is in large part attributable to the inequalities of the present international economic system. Poverty breeds tension, debases human personality and makes a mockery of the achievements of science and technology. The system, therefore, needs serious radical change. We cannot achieve a durable and just peace, a laudable objective of the United Nations, until there is a transformation of the very quality and structure of the present world order, characterized by glaring inequalities and imbalances among nations and the widening chasm between the rich and the poor countries. The existing order continues to work inexorably against the interests of the poorer countries. It is against this background that the concept of a new international economic order has gripped the attention of international bodies, notably the United Nations.

NIEO IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The General Assembly and related associate organizations have since 1974, seriously and in great detail, considered the new international economic order. It was at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 1 May 1974, that a declaration and programme of action of the new international economic order was formulated.

The NIEO Declaration presents principles which should govern the new order; it also provides procedures of action for the establishment of a new

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international economic order. Further, it deals with the fundamental problems of raw materials and primary commodities as related to trade and development. The document has also detailed measures for the amelioration of terms of trade with developing countries, and suggested concrete steps to eliminate chronic trade deficits confronting developing countries. Transportation and insurance has also found a place in this resolution. On the question of industrialization, the United Nations Resolution suggests that all efforts should be made by the international community to take measures to encourage industrialization of the developing countries. It also urges the countries concerned to make all efforts to formulate an international code of conduct for the transfer of technology corresponding to the needs and conditions prevalent in the developing countries. A character of economic rights and duties of states has also been prepared and approved.

But, the international economy remains beset by the malaise that afflicted it soon after the commencement of the current United Nations Development Decade. The developed market economies have had to contend with high rates of inflation and unemployment, sluggish growth of gross domestic product, volatile capital movements contributing to chronic instability in exchange markets and growing resistance to structural changes. These problems have led the developed market economy countries to resort to inward-looking remedies and correctives. There has been a rise of protectionism, a slowing down in the transfer of resources and a general lack of concern about the consequences of their actions on the developing countries. The economic policies of many of the developed nations seems to be dictated by the exigencies of their short-term interest. The broader vision of the Charter appears to be lost and there is a retreat from the high ideals of the immediate post-war years.

The most disturbing manifestation of policies is the resurgence of protectionism in the developed countries witnessed in recent months; through bilateral restrictive agreements checks have been imposed on a large number of products which have demonstrated competitive advantage. But, protectionist measures have not made any distinction between the developed and developing countries and have hit precisely those industries in developing countries in which they have a comparative advantage. As a result, several developing countries have had their access to markets shut off with the consequent disruption of their export-oriented industries and hence of the economy as a whole. Developed countries have resorted to these short-term and short-sighted solutions to deal with admittedly real problems of unemployment. But they should have realized that their current economic problems are hardly due to increase in imports from developing countries. They are rather rooted in the very nature of their present economic structure. The problem is not new; only its dimension has become larger owing to the emergence of selective scarcity of resources as a result of profligate consumption and shift of emphasis in these countries themselves with regard to development objectives and priorities.

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It is now obvious that drastic structural adjustments to deal with this problem are inescapable. The question is whether such adjustment will take place as part of a global policy of restructuring the international economic system as a whole or by fits and starts under pressure of domestic economic compulsions. The leaders of the developed countries should seriously ponder over the disastrous consequences of postponing corrective measures to resolve problems.

One of the few subjects on which there was agreement in principle at the Paris North-South Dialogue was the establishment of the common fund. Lack of progress both in the formal negotiating conference as well as in the subsequent informal consultations carried out by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD has had the unfortunate effect of retrospectively making the Paris Conference even more negative than it appeared in the beginning. The administrative wheels of the United Nations have thus moved painfully slowly and there is bound to be friction.

INDIA'S ROLE

India has over the years strongly advocated the introduction of a new international economic order, if only as a corrective to the chronic imbalances in the world economy. In general terms, India conceives economic co-operation with the international community in a broad three-tier set up : balanced trade, technical assistance and joint ventures. The pace for fruitful co-operation is set by exchange of commodities and products. India also has been doing its best to assist the other countries in their economic development.

In any new world economic order, Indis is potentially in a strong position to help the developing countries with its know-how. Since independence in 1947, India has taken great strides towards the development and modernization of its economy through a programme of planned development under its several Five Year Plans.

India has build over the years, a chain of national laboratories for a variety of disciplines and there are a large number of scientific insititutions and foundations which are devoted to specialized fields of investigation. There are also a number of in-house research and development units within the country. Over a million persons are working in the various scientific and technical institutions in the country and out of these over 1,20,000 persons are employed in R & D establishments. There has also been an expansion of training facilities for technical and scientific personnel. The growth of this technology to suit its own requirements as also to develop new techniques and processes which are more suitable to the small and medium-sized firms is indeed an advance.

The programme of planned development has thus brought about a significant change, among others, in the industrial structure of India from a traditional to a modern one, leading to tremendous expansion in modern

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industries—metallurgical, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemicals and allied industries. With this technological progress on a wide-front, India now ranks tenth among the industrial nations of the world. Further, on account of expansion in facilities for technical education and research, it has the third largest reservoir of technical and scientific man-power in the world. A large number of Indians have gone abroad and are contributing to the development of various countries. Many of them occupy key positions in well-known and renowned institutions in foreign countries. As a result of this modernization in the field of industry, India has acquired a considerable amount of experience and expertise and has now reached a level of competence where it is in a position to share the fruits of its develop-ment with other countries.

India has also developed capabilities in a variety of fields extending from heavy engineering to consumer items. Also, Indian consultancy and con-struction firms are increasingly participating in projects in other developing countries. In the field of consultancy services, India can now collaborate in a wide range of activity covering plan formulation, feasibility studies and detailed project reports, selection and evolution of technology, process and basic engineering, plant design and detailed engineering, product design and value engineering, construction and start-up services and post-operational management consultancy services. Such services can be provided for a variety of industries such as metallurgical plants—iron and steel, aluminium and non-ferrous metallurgical plants, rolling mills, foundaries; process plants such as sugar, cement and chemicals; pulp paper and other forest-based industries; textiles and synthetic fibres; agricultural input plants; food processing industries; engineering and capital goods industries and oil refineries and petro-chemicals.

Apart from the industrial project engineering services, Indian consultancy services are also available for the entire range of infra-structural activities, such as power generation, transmission and distribution, railways, roads, highways and bridges, ports, town planning and architecture, buildings and civil structures, dams, irrigation and flood control schemes, etc.

In addition, there are Indian joint ventures in other countries; several Indian companies have already set up these ventures and the process is gaining momentum. Joint ventures are spread out in 4 continents—Asia, Africa, Europe and North America covering 31 countries. Besides, others have been approved and are in the process of being set up.

With this background and India's consistent role of the United Nations since its inception—in the decolonization process, readiness to assist UN peace-keeping operations in Gaza, Cyprus and Zaire, its initiatives in defusing explosive and tense situations, its pursuit of disarmament and the creation of zones of peace—it is further hoped that its role in the advancing international economic and social objectives would receive added impetus.

March, 1982. PERALA RATNAM*

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THE GATT : IS IT A GOOD "SAMPLE" IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS ? A VIEWPOINT

WHILE it would undoubtedly be somewhat fallacious to attempt to "transplant" as it were, the laws and experiences unfolded in the pursuit of natural sciences directly to those of the social sciences, yet, at the same time, any conviction to denigrate totally or disallow even an intellectual and analytical comparison of heretical value, as between the various branches of human knowledge, would also not be a desirable norm in actual practice. No doubt the topical accent, of late, has been on an inter-disciplinary approach, but one would have to consciously avoid running the risk of counting say, apples and oranges in the same sequence of number series. It could perhaps be an acceptable endeavour to meaningfully attempt to study the eclectic subject areas comparatively, which in the ultimate analysis, all "zero-in" on to human welfare in an international setting.

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

In the history of the evolution of international trade relations, politics and economics have undoubtedly, in a way, occupied the pride of place. This was more than ever confirmed by the Colombo Non-Aligned Summit (1976) when it underlined the "integral connection" between NIEO (New International Economic Order) and world politics. It noted :

> It is incontestable that there is an integral connection between politics and economics and it is erroneous to approach economic affairs in isolation from politics. A complete change of political attitude and demonstration of a new *political will* is an indispensable pre-requisite for the realization of the NIEO.

In fact the politicization of economic affairs and the creation of economic value for political goods is what is revealed in the contemporary transnational age-old adjustments to the latest impact of science and technology. In an era when both domestic and international politics take place primarily in terms of allocation of economic resources, tempered with the innovations in science and technology, only holistic accounts would need to be pressed into service for adequate explanation of observed international phenomenon. Thus politics and economics though important in their respective disciplines can no longer be conceptualized as independent of each other *per se*, or for that matter intrinsically divorced from science and technology too. Such are the interwoven strands, therefore, in the fabric of the world order today.

Theories, understandably are often judged in terms of the notion of "heuristic fruitfulness."[1] It is said that a theory that does not itself yield accurate predictions may nevertheless play a key role in facilitating intellectual progress by suggesting or precipitating the development of

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additional theories that do produce good predictions.[2] Sometimes logical constructs are praised as sources of insight concerning complex problems even when they do not yield accurate predictions. But the employment of logical constructs *per se,* in search for insights is of certain importance in generating interest in the theoretical enterprise in the fields that have not yet produced a *corpus* of viable theories.

It is not intended in this short paper, to construct a semblance of any theory *per se,* instead what is conceived is a modest attempt to study certain aspects of the rules governing international trade (embodied in GATT Articles, which by any opinion have been an outgrowth of reconstruction efforts of Western economies following the Second World War), treating the period spanning the fifties, particularly the decades of the sixties and seventies, as an important phase of the continuing *experiment* in international (trade) relations and global human welfare. With the so-called high water-mark in the culmination of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (after the earlier rounds—Dillon, Kennedy, etc.), the question remains whether adequate *corrections* still do need to be applied in redressing any, *ab-initio,* sources of errors, deviations or is it the case that the Tokyo Round Agreements have already taken cognizance of the need to apply such *correctives* and that attempts have been made to incorporate these already (in the form of an "Enabling Clause"), to the extent that the politics of international behaviour permitted the same ? There is a view now being emphasized increasingly:

> The Enabling Clause evidently falls short of the demands of the developing countries to *modify* the legal structure of the GATT in order to give a contractual status to the preferential treatment of developing states in international trade relations.[3]

EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF GATT

In order to be able to appreciate the "Enabling Clause" or the necessity of a more favourable or special and differential treatment (S and D), it would be essential perhaps to recall the two basic principles of GATT, viz.: (i) All nations should be treated equally in world trade matters and none discriminated under the "most-favoured nation" (MFN) principle, and (ii) if it is recognized that rules governing trade are in need of revision, the new rules should provide for the mutual benefit of all concerned countries, that is, revisions should be negotiated on the basis of reciprocity.

The GATT in fact emerged at a time when the Third World really did not exist. In other words, it was in accord with the political conjuncture then prevailing primarily in the West. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the international political scene underwent a radical change, giving rise to new questions; to them the GATT provides no effective answers. Although the MFN clause remained the basic principle for trade relations under GATT,

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it was felt that exceptions should be provided for conducting trade between the developed and developing countries.[4] The developing countries (Third World), found it rather ideologically objectionable—the injustice of "equal treatment of unequals" as implied by the GATT-MFN clause and the rule of reciprocity in trade negotiations.[5] Although a special dispensation for developing countries to protect new industries was initially included in GATT and strengthened in 1955, this provision alone was regarded as an exception to the main body of rules which were based on the principle of equal treatment of all countries.

The problems of the developing countries were, as we know, not in the forefront when GATT was negotiated. Actually it is in pursuance to a resolution passed by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on 18 February 1946, that the International Conference of Trade and Employment which met at Havana from 21 November 1947 to 24 March 1948 drew up the *Havana Charter* for an International Trade Organization. Apart from its objective clause,[6] the Charter included chapters relating to employment and economic activity, economic development and reconstruction, commercial policy, restrictive business practices, inter-governmental commodity agreements, internal trade organization and procedures for settlement of disputes.

Changing Principles and Evolving Scenario

The problems of the developing world came to the forefront in the international comity of nations only in the fifties as a growing number of countries became independent and raised their voice for a more equalitarian system of international trade relations. Based on the recommendations of a committee of well-known economists, led by Professor Leontieff, a new section was added in 1965, as Part IV to the GATT. In this part certain principles and objectives were laid down to assist the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and certain commitments made in the form of Articles XXXVI and XXXVII.[7]

It is pertinent here, to bear in mind the evolving scenario highlighting (and to a limited extent even achieving corrective solutions), the pressing needs of the newly independent members of the Third World, the concomitant changes in GATT laws keeping in view the protection of industrial development in its nascent phase and a more equalitarian system of international trade relations. Ever since the UNCTAD II New Delhi 1968 Resolution on Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and its adoption by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1971, and later by other Developed Countries (DCs), there has been a persistent demand of the LDCs that GATT should provide for a standing legal basis for GSP, defining its non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory character, maintaining it as a continuing element. Further that there should be a standing legal basis for developing

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countries to negotiate differential binding with developed countries, and for differential and more favourable treatment for the developing countries by the insertion of a general clause in the GATT.

Call for Equality and Reciprocity by Developing Countries

Statements and declarations (formulated by the so-called "framework group" at the Tokyo Round), drafted at the behest of Brazil[8] (supported by India and others), attempted to establish a *legal basis* for providing preferential treatment to developing countries and specifically dealt with trade measures taken for balance of payment purposes and with safeguard actions for development purposes. Further para 5 to the Tokyo Declaration, September 1973, assumed paramount importance for the LDCs underscoring the fallacy and a non-pragmatic approach in trying to apply the principle of reciprocity to relationships between developed and developing countries. It says:

> The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments mady by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariff and other barriers to the trade of developing countries .... Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make concesions *that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs.*

In other words, this Declaration implied that LDCs in particular, deserve to be treated *specially*—(evidently being historically disadvantaged!)

Differential and More Favourable Treatment for Developing Countries

As we know, recently, the contracting parties to the GATT decided that the preferential treatment of LDCs would no longer be inconsistent with the general MFN clause which is the cardinal rule of the GATT. This decision, an outcome of the Tokyo Round (commonly mentioned as the "Enabling Clause" is embodied in a text, the main provisions of which read as follows:

> Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties.[9]

Further, the text enumerated the areas in respect of which differential and more favourable treatment may be extended to developing countries and specified the conditions under which such treatment should be granted. The objective of the LDCs however was to modify the GATT in order to

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give a contractual status (to S and D treatment) and to the preferences exchanged among themselves.

Industrial Nations Protectionist Measures Anti-GATT

While the above "enabling clause" might appear to some as a kind of condescending act by GATT-members (which is popularly labelled as a "Club of the Rich") towards the LDCs rather than regarding it as a crying need for *corrections* of the persisting aberration due to the sheer forces of history, the record of international (trade) behaviour of these rich members themselves continues to be deviating/aberration-producing and patently anti-GATT. Several instances of the industrial nations failing to comply with GATT rules *whenever these were perceived to be not in* accord with their national interests can be quoted. A notable example is the protection extended to the agricultural sector by industrial nations—thus harming the export prospects of the developing countries. Then, of course, the case of textiles for which the degree of protection was intensified in proportion to the international comparative advantage gained in this area by the LDCs, is well known. Ironically enough, a wave of protectionism seems to be currently sweeping through the European Economic Community—a community established on the premise of attaining prosperity through free trade! Indeed, new terminologies derogatory to the spirit of GATT (and even outside GATT), are making an appearance. "Organized free trade," "market-penetration", "dumping allegations and anti-dumping codes," "orderly change" and others, are all euphemisms of varying degrees of protectionist action and negation of the very concept of free trade, so tirelessly projected till recently.

In short, most of the protectionist measures introduced over the past decade contravene the existing rules of international trade, many of them have only a tenuous, and some of them a doubtful base in the domestic law of the countries applying them.[10]

WESTERN WRITERS' VIEWS

Imperious Views

Around the turn of the decade a new view began to be articulated. Two American analysts, writing in 1973, highlight its tenor:

> Consideration should ... be given to writing a code of permissible behaviour (and developing the consensus to make it effective), indicating the conditions under which special restrictions on politically and socially sensitive transactions could be considered internationally justifiable. The objective would not be another "great leap forward" towards

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liberalization but rather the rationalization of a system of limited interdependence that would be consistent with political reality.[11]

Jan Tumlir aptly questions: Is it too far-fetched to *identify* national interest with international order in the age of nuclear proliferation and pervasive economic interdependence? It is emphasized by him that no sacrifice of national goals however defined, let alone a sacrifice of sovereignty, is involved in caring for the international order. Governments are only required to respect the rules to which they have voluntarily subscribed. These rules neither prescribe nor proscribe the *goals* of national policy, they merely require that governments abstain from adopting inefficient and ultimately self-defeating means to attain any goals they may set themselves.

Short of coming across extreme and "imperious" views smacking of a condescending attitude by the rich, alluded to earlier, one reads rather bold views, even in the present era of professed economic interdependence and international co-operation. For example:

> In summary, a new world economic order, with the objective of promoting development in the Third World, cannot be achieved through a "balance of power" system between developed and developing nations. Such a system simply does not yet exist because of the *lack of equal capabilities* on both sides. The alternative is a "concert of power" system in which a number of industrialized nations—purposeful, wealthy, and committed to development set the rules of the game for development in the Third World. As in medieval days when *kings* became the protectors of the common man, so today, powerful nations in the international system ought to be protectors of the common man in the poorer nations. They could adopt criteria for helping poor nations raise the standard of living of their people.[12]

Then there are also assertions in the nature of veiled threats in a way, the rich walking out of the IMF/World Bank! One wonders if the suggestion is that the First World does not need any large markets, strategic raw materials, cheap labour force, etc., in the Third World? Why otherwise is there a view with a punch in the concluding lines?

> Most of the developing countries have only recently gained their independence and freedom from foreign domination. The NIEO Declaration (May 1974 at the United Nations General Assembly) regards this as "the greatest and most significant international achievement during the last decades." They are unlikely to want to surrender it almost immediately, as it were, for the nebulous concept of internationalism and interdependence. Having fought for it, independence must be seen to have been worth the struggle. It must be cherished.... It cannot

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therefore be compromised. Yet this is precisely what must happen if the NIEO is to become a reality. These countries must surrender a substantial amount of their independence and national autonomy if they wish to enjoy the economic benefits of the NIEO.... They will have to move from a stage of political dependence and colonialism, through independence and self-government, to interdependence and internationalism in record time.... Basically this amounts to say that they (LDCs) have to reduce their demands to manageable proportions. They must be prepared to compromise and make sacrifices themselves.... Finally, they should try to assess the position of the developed countries, in order to see just how far they can push the system in their favour. They should look at alternative outcomes. What would happen, for example, if the developed countries became less sympathetic to their development needs, if they opted out of such institutions as the World Bank and the IMF? *Can these institutions function without the developed countries!*[13]

Constructive Suggestions

On the other hand, there are also perceptions, such as those of Hansen in a study of the politics of North-South economic relations and an assessment of their probable evolution.[14] He contends that the *rules* that have governed the behaviour of States in the international milieu for centuries are no longer congruent with the global system, and that industrialized states should give priority to the issues which are of vital importance to developing countries when undertaking international economic reforms.

It is gratifying to note constructive suggestions/concrete alternatives that have already been propounded by analysts,[15] *akin* to the hypothesis in our context of GATT here, viz., adequate precautions/corrections for sources of errors is very much called for, before the success of evolving *experiment* (LDC-DC relationship/demand for NIEO/global interdependence!) can be widely claimed in the field of international relations in general and the GATT in particular—as the body of world trade law.

Gray's suggested corrective mechanism, a 20-year "Compensation Programme" is based on the well known EEC-model (Lome Convention), but he is quick to clarify at the outset that his concept of "Compensation" is quite different from the concept of foreign aid. The latter is a transfer payment occasioned by benevolence and/or by the hope of the purchase of an ally. It is discretionary, frequently tied and usually bilateral. In contrast compensation is largely multilateral and is distributed through multinational agencies in amounts pre-determined by a formula.[16] The 20-year programme would have donor and recipient nations as members. The essence of this "corrective" is that the North should compensate the South in the mechanical sense for the development-retarding character of the international economic system and in a *reparation* sense for any measures which individual

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nations may take which reduce the severity of domestic economic problems. Thus, *compensation* has been defined as:

> Payment for economic harm experienced by a receipient member nation whether or not the donor member is the cause of the harm or merely an actor in a system which is naturally development-retarding.

The author concludes that this compensation programme would contain tangible benefits for the North as well as the South—thus this new initiative from the North that will address itself to the goals of the NIEO and to the reduction of the adjustment difficulties in the North, is inherently desirable.

Though it may not be appropriate to treat the North-South scenario, as to "how much the North ought to do for the South," etc., and the solution may understandably lie in the "mutuality of interests," it does not minimize the factum of (historical) backwardness tied to the late-comers (colonies-LDCs)—which any impartial outsider cannot help pointing out—and hence the need for *effective correctives.* It is true both in the natural and social sciences that "bodies" which are part of the process/experiment, cannot always, by themselves, apply corrections; these have to be *consciously* achieved by an external agency *"communion of interests."*

CONCLUDING REMARKS

On the whole therefore, the question has devolved round as to why the developing countries are so disadvantaged under the GATT and in this context to analyze whether GATT can be deemed as a good "sample," representative enough, to be able to explain the international relations normatively conceived at the time of its inception.

GATT expectedly enough represents the epoch of its origin, as all institutions do and the norms embodied therein were meant primarily to be practised among the rich. The poor entered later; therefore there is a qualitative difference in regard to the norms that it (GATT) represents and those that the Third World expects from it. Perhaps it is also but natural that the West itself would not acquiesce to any institutional change or modification (structural/functional) if it bears a disadvantage for it in relation to the Third World.

It is true that principles of non-discrimination and mutual benefit are really difficult to disagree, yet "equitable" rules of the GATT have not led to an "equitable" benefit for all countries. It is obvious that equitable opportunities are truly equitable only among countries having equal trading ability—which incidentally is the ideal breeding ground for the success of economic interdependence, as in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Without entering into the

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debate of rhetoric *vs.* reality, on the so-called "interdependence" it may suffice to recall Blackhurst:

> The psychological change reflected in the current preference for the word "interdependence" over "integration" may thus be traced to an increase in uncertainity resulting from a weakening of the rules governing international economic relations.[17]

Further, it is apparent that the application of the reciprocity principle has led to substantially reduced trade barriers on products of interest to industrially advanced nations, while products of interest to developing countries have been ignored. And this is so basically, because the LDCs have *no explicit reciprocity to offer*. The latter logically leads to the inference that perhaps *ab initio* injustice/errors have either crept in or deliberately allowed in the era of colonization—the centre-periphery relationship. But whatever the historical reasons or background, the conclusion which is inescapable is that something concrete has got to be done to redress this deviation (source of error) may be, by letting the LDCs reach a stage ("graduate") where the rules of the game can be played "fairly." This however, may not be possible in the long-run until the *rules* themselves are changed/corrected for immediate benefits in the short run, to begin with. Bela Balassa concludes thus:

> The developing countries will also derive benefits from the application of the texts formulated by the so-called "framework group" that provide a *legal basis for special and differential treatment* and allow them to apply measures for balance of payments purposes and safeguard actions for development purposes.... In fact, it would be desirable that a substantial number of developing countries subscribe to the individual codes so that they can act as a pressure group both to ensure the implementation of the provisions which are of interest to them and to contribute to the favourable interpretation and modification of the codes. In turn, the developed countries should abide by the *obligations*, they have taken, should *ensure* the functioning of the dispute settlement and surveillance mechanism, and accept the resolution of disputes that concern them. Most importantly, these countries should make an effort towards the establishment of equitable safeguard procedures.[18]

Thus, the GATT, in order to be treated as a good "sample" in understanding International Relations, is no doubt due for an updating/effecting "corrections." It is thus fortifying to come across perceptions, such as by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Gamani Corea:

> *I think that one cannot be content with the present GATT rules. There is a need to recast them and to take account of all the developments that*

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have occured since they were formulated. The need for the developing countries to give preferences to each other and possibly have a most-favoured nation system of their own, the need to incorporate formally the system of preferences granted to them by industrialized countries into the body of rules, the need to provide for conscious policies of structural adjustment in the industrialized countries, the need to provide for codes whereby a problem caused by competition would be dealt with, not unilaterally but through a system of multilateral consultation and so on—all these are part of the requirements of the time which are not provided for in the present body of GATT rules.[19]

In short therefore, the special and differential treatment and the so-called "Enabling Clause" can be deemed to "steer" GATT in the appropriate direction, incorporating the overdue "correcting mechanism" which tends to project GATT as a fairly reasonable "sample" in understanding international trade relations conceptually. Full-fledged correctives however, are still needed in the nature of the contemplated International Trade Organization (Havana Charter),[20] harmonizing economic interests and human welfare in the international comity of nations—which the imperatives of global interdependence rationally dictate.

SADA SHANKAR SAXENA*

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4 S.S. Saxena, "The EEC, GSP and the Third World" in K.B. Lal and H.S. Chopra, (Eds.), *The EEC and the Third World* (Delhi, 1981), p. 149.

5 Isaiah Frank, "Graduation Issue for LDCs," *Journal of World Trade Law*, Vol. 13, no. 4, July-August 1979, p. 291.

6 S.S. Saxena, no. 4, pp. 137-161. Article 1 of the Charter mentions the objectives and purposes in a kind of a preamble. It refers for example to the assurance of a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, to increase the production, consumption and exchange of goods and thus to contribute to a balanced and expanding world economy; to foster and assist industrial and general economic development to further the enjoyment by all countries on equal terms of access to markets; to promote on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, etc. (See pp. 160-61).

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7 The LDCs handicaps and needs thus began to be perceived in principle at least. Since the objectives, *inter-alia,* included the need for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed contracting parties, given their continued dependence on exportation of a limited range of primary products, the need to provide in the largest possible measure more favourable and acceptable conditions of world markets for these products; commitment to accord high priority to the reduction and elimination of barriers to products of export interest to LDCs; refrain from imposing new fiscal measures, etc., was felt.

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19 Gamani Corea, *Need for Change: Towards the New International Economic Order* (Oxford, 1980), p. 35.

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BOOK REVIEWS

PLANTATION TO POLITICS

A Review Article

WHEN the first group of Indian migrant labour reached Fiji in 1879, few amongst them could have dreamt that within a century their descendents would not merely outnumber all the communities in the Islands but would prosper and flourish in a multi-racial, secular and democratic nation which they had largely helped to shape. The recent and latest General Elections in the Fiji Islands brought the bulk of these people of Indian origin who support the main opposition party—The National Federation Party (NFP)—within two seats of capturing power in a free and fair election. After the 1976 General Election, they even gained a majority, but could not occupy the Treasury benches because for two crucial days, they could not elect a leader.

Fiji, a remarkable nation by any standards of contemporary political and social history, is one of those rare, to my knowledge, pluralistic societies—multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-lingual as well as multi-religious—which has in spite of its inner contradictions maintained an enviable record of peace, prosperity and progress. For the Indian community in Fiji, it has been a long haul from the days they began arriving as virtual slaves into a ruthless colonial system of exploitation.

This book,* in a series of seven articles, traces the history of the Indian settlers in Fiji from the very beginning till the late seventies. Ahmed Ali, a foremost student and chronicler of the Indian saga in the Pacific, brings out the story of his people in this thoroughly researched and concisely written series of articles. Yet, *Plantation to Politics* is not a historical text book, nor does the author claim it to be. The first book on the subject was written by Prof. K.M. Gillion of the National University of Australia entitled *Indian Immigrants of Fiji*. It was dedicated to that doyen of Hindi journalism Pt. Banarsi Das Chaturvedi whose first book *21 Years in Fiji* got proscribed both in Fiji and in India.

Ahmed Ali has written a vivid account of the integration process of Indians in Fijian nationhood, simultaneously depicting the divisive tendencies in Indian polity in Fiji. Himself a brilliant product of this socio-economic scene, Ahmed Ali is a second generation Fiji Indian married to a Fiji Chinese. Soon after Fiji's independence in the early 1970s, when Ali had not flowered into a prolific writer, he joined as a lecturer the newly established regional University of South Pacific at Suva. I invited him to undertake a cultural visit to India. Ali was flushed with pleasure but embarrassed; he was hesitant and repeatedly asked why this favour to him. But a sentimental journey to Eastern Uttar Pradesh from where his ancestors

*Ahmed Ali : *Plantation to Politics : Studies on Fiji Indians.* (University of the South Pacific, The Fiji Times and Herald Ltd., Suva, Fiji, 1980), 222p.

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migrated to Fiji, proved a landmark.

The infamous indentured system came into existence in the 1820s after slavery was officially abolished throughout the British Empire. It was the same ruthless exploitation of cheap labour but with more humane trappings. It took millions of Indians across the seas to Africa, Latin America, West Indies, East Asia and of course to Fiji. An epic battle had to be waged in India by men like C.F. Andrews, etc., before this system came to a belated end in 1920. However, in the meantime, it had swelled the Indian population by about 60,000 people. It is these people and their descendents whose life and times are the focus of Ahmed's penetrating study.

The system had ended but it left behind a community transformed by its ravages yet in many ways adhering fiercely to its traditions and its identity. From the depressed conditions of rural India, enticed into an illusion of a new life in a land of plenty, to a cruel voyage under inhuman conditions to the strikingly beautiful islands that held out a cruel life for them, Ahmed presents a lucid picture of the journey by the first batches of Indians to their expected El Dorado. Then, of course, there were all the typical facets of colonial life and times. A typical example of earlier prejudices and attitudes comes from a quotation on the subject of education for the Indians, by E.W. Fenner, then Manager of the Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR):

> Indian children should be taught by teachers of Indian nationality at various centres, and, in my opinion, no attempt should be made to proselytise them or to teach them English. Professed Christianity and a knowledge of English are almost invariably associated with rascality in the classes of Indians that came to Fiji. I would suggest that in every state-aided school, a Union Jack be hoisted, and that this be saluted by the scholars each morning, as is done with the stars and stripes in America.

However, oppression brings forth its own reactions, even from people dehumanized and brutalized by the most sophisticated of systems. The two most crucial events in this respect are tackled separately by Ahmed. The strike of 1920 was the first collective political stand taken by the Indian community in Fiji. It was to have far-reaching implications and created attitudes that can still be detected in the national consciousness of Fiji as a nation. As Ahmed puts it:

> ... the strike had many implications: though it was essentially economic, its connotation and ramifications were also political. It gave notice that Indians were prepared to resort to direct action to remedy their economic situation. It indicated that, with the indenture system abolished, Indians were no longer prepared to be docile labourers. It also revealed that Europeans began to have reservations about the value of obtaining an unrestricted supply of labour from India. For them, Indians were no

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longer loyal and trustworthy, henceforth they sought these qualities in Fijians who had come to their rescue during the strike. The Government was resentful, especially as it branded Indian behaviour futile and unconstitutional. Fijians had found themselves ranged against Indians and on the side of the Government and Europeans, an alignment that was to acquire greater significance in the following years. For Indians the strike revealed their weakness as a community in their lack of unity. For Fiji, it heralded a new facet of Indians, their assertiveness and willingness to enter into confrontation with other groups in their efforts to obtain what they considered equality of treatment in a land to which they had come as immigrants but where they were fast anchoring permanent roots.

The great sugarcane strike of 1921 further consolidated these trends. In a momentous strike lasting six months, the Acting Governor was himself compelled to inform the Secretary of State that : "no single breach of the peace has occurred except for minor verbal intimidations, such as is general in all strikes, no offence of any kind has been committed." However the impact of this strike too was to sharpen existing conflicts in the island society.

While inter-racial antagonism grew, a new development was the increasing divisions in the Indian community itself. In the classic pattern, the divisions took the insidious route via religion. For obvious reasons the Christian Indians grouped themselves first within the Hindus; the distinctions between Sanatanis, Arya Samajis, and Kabir Panthis began to acquire greater overtones. It was but inevitable that Muslim separatism would raise its head. Starting with complete communal harmony—when all were merely Indians—the typical Indian malaise had set in. While "Divide and Rule" may have done its share, the fault lay within the community itself. Be it Hindu, Muslim or Christian, contradictory Indian chauvinism kept raising its ugly head. And gradually but surely religious organisations within the Indian community acquired political force thus further dividing the community into conflicting groups.

Yet it is in the last two decades that the real success story of Indians in Fiji comes to the fore. In spite of all contradictions and prejudices, not only amongst themselves but with other communities living in Fiji, the Indians have been a magnificant part of the process towards self-determination, independence and peaceful progress. Over the last decade and a half, Fiji has gone through five general elections and a peaceful transfer of power from the British. In spite of extremist elements on both sides, the two main communities—Fijians and Indians—have co-existed peacefully. Fiji has the unique distinction of having an untarnished period of racial and religious co-existence since Independence.

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In spite of occasionally trumpeted feelings of insecurity mostly based on the land tenure system, Indians in Fiji have come to stay. Fiji itself has emerged as a stable democracy and thrown up a mature leadership, tested again and again in the election process. It is unassumingly acquiring the leadership of the Pacific Island States. Further, the Indian himself takes great pride in calling himself a Fijian and to act as such in spite of the technical distinction that exists.

Much has already been written on Fiji where Indians are an important part of the scenario, but until now most of it was a view through the jaundiced eyes of the Anglo-Saxons and written by the colonial pen. Ahmed Ali now emerges as a son of the soil, gifted with an analytical approach and a facile pen. His book *Plantation to Politics* seems to have unwittingly taken him from education to politics! Ali has just been elected to the Fiji Parliament on an Alliance ticket. Ratu Mara, Fiji's Prime Minister since Independence, has picked him up with care. He has a bright future. Let us hope the creative writer in him does not get overshadowed by the glamour and glitter of a ministerial "gaddi."

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THE MRTPA AND BIG BUSINESS

A Review Article

REGULATORY legislation intended to curb concentration of economic power, which stems from an undertaking becoming dominant in its line of activity or because of control of a large volume of productive assets by a few families, have been in vogue in most of the countries where private enterprise exists. Its intensity however, varies from country to country. In India, the sole anti-monopoly legislation, viz., the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTPA) has been a subject of great controversy since its enactment. The most vocal criticism of the Act comes from big business circles which allege that it has unnecessarily hampered the growth of the industrial sector. They mainly blame the MRTPA for slackening the pace of industrial development in the seventies.[1] On the other hand, there are others who think that the MRTPA is a "toothless tiger" and has failed to curb "concentration of economic power which is considered to the common detriment," the main purpose of its enactment.[2]

The two books under review* are among the recent additions to the literature on this controversial piece of legislation. The rationale of reviewing both these books together lies in the fact that while the book by Sengupta dwells on the provisions of the Act, the later work deals with the implementation of the Act in the first seven years of its working and its impact.

Sengupta succinctly discusses the provisions of the Act, section by section, providing detailed notes and illustrations from cases on each provision. As a result of careful study of the provisions of the Act, he is able to point out a number of its deficiencies and loopholes, which might explain its inefficacy in achieving its objectives.

He points for instance, that for determining whether an undertaking was dominant (controlling one third or more share of the market) in any particular product category, one would require data of total production and of imports of such product categories excluding the production by small-scale firms. But no such authoritative official data is available. (p. 26) The *Annual Survey of Industries* usually tends to be out of date by 5-6 years. The data contained in the DGTD *Annual Reports* is partial, being based on factories registered with the DGTD. One is also not sure whether product classification of these statistics is similar to the one applicable for the MRTP Act. He observes that in such conditions, it is hazardous to establish dominance and it would be open to the company to question the basis.

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*N.K. Sengupta: *The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act*, Second Edition (Eastern Law House Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1980), xxix, 444p., Rs. 80.

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The concept of "relevant year" for determining dominance would also be problematic. The Act defines the relevant year as one of the three calendar years preceding the year in which the issue of dominance was being decided, during which the undertaking had the lowest production. It is thus possible for a company to escape the provision of registering under the Act as a dominant undertaking (DU) even if it has been controlling more than a third of the product in all but one year. These limitations, coupled with the more aggregative product classification, as pointed out by Paranjape, may explain how a large number of companies could escape the DU provision while being virtually monopolists in their fields—e.g. Hindustan Lever Limited in detergent cakes, Colgate in toothpaste, Cadburys in chocolates, Averys in weighing machines. Sengupta rightly observes that the Act nowhere defines what is meant by the "concentration of economic power." (p. 73) The same is the case with the terms "manage" or "management." (p. 37) As is clear from the illustrative case of Swadeshi Polytex (pp. 34-37), these lacunae may be used by the companies to avoid registration under the Act. He challenges the usual myth regarding the Act that it "condemns size *per se*" and observes that, "it only stresses the need for regulation once an undertaking reaches a certain size." Even after the said size limit is reached, there is no prohibition on further growth and the Central Government under Section 28, gives proper regard *inter-alia* to the need for achieving the economies of scale and the best use of human and other resources. So long as an undertaking is not a "dominant" one and is already covered under the I (D and R) A's Section 13, it does not require prior approval under the MRTPA even for effecting a substantial expansion under Section 21. On the basis of these two sections, he attacks the popular impression that the MRTPA is an enemy of size. Regarding Section 20, Sengupta however, does not mention an important lacuna on the administrative side of the Act that it has been totally left to an undertaking to decide whether it falls under one or more subsections of the Act and to register with the government. And "under such a situation," as Goyal points out, "it is only to be expected that the large Houses would attempt to keep as many companies out of their House as they possibly could."[3]

Though the Act provides for a penalty under Section 48 for non-registration of undertakings under the Act it is so meagre (Rs. 1, 000), in comparison with the penalty prescribed for other offences, that it provides hardly any substantial pressure for registration. Nor is there any official agency which would continuously review, often complex issues of actual inter-connection. Sengupta also does not mention if this penalty was imposed so far on any company for default of non-registration. It is evident that big Houses have managed to keep a large number of undertakings effectively under their control, outside the purview of the Act.[5] For instance, one would be surprised to know that an undertaking like NELCO, which is known to be under the control of the Tatas, has not registered under the MRTPA so far. Similarly, TISCO and TELCO are registered under the MRTPA as

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independent undertakings rather than as a part of the Tata Group of interconnected undertakings which controls them.

The concept of substantial expansion under Section 21 is defined as 25 per cent or more increase in production or capacity for which a MRTPA company needs to take prior approval. Though Sengupta himself admits, that "it is open to an undertaking to go on expanding itself by less than the 25 per cent, say 10 per cent, 15 per cent, 20 per cent every year without attracting the provision of section 21," he counteracts it by saying that, "no industrial undertaking can, in the modern context, go on expanding itself endlessly without having a definite scheme of expansion. One need not therefore, take an alarmist view of this so-called loophole." (p. 81) What he forgets here is that no official agency certifies capacity actually installed by a company. Even the auditors while auditing the annual accounts of the company take for granted the installed capacities "as certified by the management being a technical matter." Thus it is possible for a company to increase its installed capacity at one stroke but report it in convenient phases.

The other author, Khurana, far from going into the details of provisions and their loopholes, as observed above, deals with the administration of the Act and examines its impact, if any, on the growth of monopolies. In this book, which is the result of his Ph. D. dissertation, he analyzes a large number of orders passed by the government under this Act till 1976-77 (156 out of the 272 orders passed till November 1976 on substantial expansion, all the 125 orders passed on establishment of new undertakings, 24 out of the 37 orders on acquisition/takeover and 12 out of the 24 orders on merger/amalgamation). He however, does not indicate the basis of selection of the orders.

Khurana evaluates the working of the MRTPA by comparing the arguments put forward by the government for approval or rejection of the proposals with the considerations expressed under clauses (a) to (g) of Section 28 of the Act. These considerations, which are supposed to guide the government in processing of any application under Chapter III of the Act, emphasize *inter-alia* the efficiency and economy in production, distribution, best use of men, material and industrial capacity, technical and technological improvements, expansion and diversification of market, encouragement of new enterprises as a countervailing force to the concentration of economic power to the common detriment and reduction of disparities between different regions etc. But Khurana seldom finds any of these considerations resulting in approval or rejection of any case. For instance, among the applications for substantial expansion the major arguments put forth by the government in favour of those approved were such that there was a gap in demand and supply, that large Houses were permitted to enter the industry and that this would result in foreign exchange savings and help export potential. (p. 100) Similarly, the major arguments in support of establishing new undertakings approved were that the project would be

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financed from internal resources of the applicant, that the project would be set up in backward areas and that there was the demand and supply gap. Major arguments cited for rejection of substantial expansion and new undertaking applications were that the application had already been rejected under the I (D & R) A, that no significant demand and supply gap was likely to arise in future, that the applicant did not agree to the conditions laid down by the government etc. Khurana notes that most of these arguments have nothing to do with the concentration of economic power to "the common detriment." (pp. 100, 101, 107)

The administration of the MRTPA is often criticized on the basis that most of the applications received under this Act by the Central Government have been disposed of without any reference to the MRTP Commission.[6] But even in the cases referred to the MRTP Commission, Khurana finds, that similar types of arguments were cited for approval or rejection by the Commission which again "do not seem to be related to the concept of concentration of economic power to the common detriment." (p. 108) In this background he finds it difficult to understand the rationale behind the requirement of special approval under the MRTPA.

Some of the cases were approved (p. 161) by the government subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. The conditions imposed most often were that loans from financial institutions would be subject to the convertibility clause, that import of plant and machinery would be to the satisfaction of the government, that debt equity ratio would be maintained at 2:1, foreign collaboration would be to the satisfaction of the government, etc. It is pertinent to note that financial institutions themselves can insist on the convertibility clause when the party approaches them for finance. Moreover, the Controller of Imports, in any case, would look after the import of plant and machinery. And the Controller of Capital Issues would regulate the debt equity ratio and so on. Thus Khurana observes that "it is not clear as to what objective the Department of Company Affairs, which administers the MRTP Act, was intending to achieve while imposing these conditions." (p. 102)

Impact of the MRTPA with respect to control of restrictive and monopolistic trade practices has also been minimal. Out of over 20,000 arguments filed with the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Practices, enquiries regarding the restrictive trade practices were initiated only for a few hundred agreements. Regarding monopolistic trade practices, the central government has so far referred to the Commission only three cases, all belonging to Multinationals, viz., Coca-Cola, Colgate, and Cadbury, proceedings of all of which were stayed by the Delhi High Court. In addition, the MRTPC had initiated a *suo-moto* enquiry against another multinational: Avery India, in which the company has applied to the Supreme Court. Khurana points out that there is no provision in the MRTPA of recovery of damages caused by the restrictive or monopolistic trade practices from the offenders, and he makes a case for this provision.

He also examines the impact of the MRTPA on the growth of the top 20

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Houses. Within the top 20, he compares the growth of the top 10 with that of the other ten. In his findings he points that the top 10 applied and managed to get disproportionately higher share of investments under the MRTPA. This fact resulted in further concentration of the top 10 Houses within the top 20. On the basis of this finding, Khurana suggests that approval under the MRTPA should only be applicable to the top 10 Houses. But the fact of the top 10 Houses growing at a much faster rate than their counterparts lays open to question the demand for limiting the scope of the Act to only them. *Firstly*, because the next top ten may not be growing as fast as the top ten but they may still be growing faster than the rest of the economy and accentuating concentration. *Secondly*, growth of assets is indeed a very weak indicator of economic power. Nowadays companies with an established marketing framework and reputed brand names may find it more profitable to market goods manufactured by others than producing their own. For instance, the economic power of Philips India which already sells bulbs produced by 3-4 companies, may increase overnight without a corresponding increase in the value of assets if it undertakes to sell the output of one more company.

Nonetheless, these books highlight the fact that India's sole anti-monopoly legislation, which bears the responsibility of curbing concentration of economic power, control of monopolistic and restrictive trade practices suffers from serious lacunae not only in its formulation but also in its administration. Hence it is no wonder that it has failed to achieve any of its objectives. Sengupta ably demonstrates, as one expects from him, ample evidence of a careful study of the Act. Khurana's work in evaluating the efficacy of the MRTPA by qualitatively assessing the arguments put forward by the government while approving or rejecting a case, may be considered a novel one. These books are thus, beyond any doubt a welcome addition to the literature on the subject.

NAGESH KUMAR*

REFERENCES

1 See for instance, H.S. Singhania, *Today and Tomorrow : Perspectives for Indian Economy* (New Delhi, 1980).
2 See for instance, S.K. Goyal, *Monopoly Capital and Public Policy* (New Delhi, 1979) and H.K. Paranjape, "Curbing Monopoly : Plans and Pitfalls," *Mainstream* (New Delhi), 10 and 17 October, 1981.
3 S.K. Goyal, n. 2, p. 24.
4 See for instance, Ibid. and Nagesh Kumar, "Regulating Multinational Monopolies in India," *Economic & Political Weekly* (Bombay), 29 May 1982.
5 Goyal has shown that 20 larger houses alone have managed to keep 512 companies outside the scope of MRTPA which were identified as controlled by them by the Dutt Committee (ILPIC). See Goyal, n. 2, pp. 24-27.
6 See D.P.S. Verma, "A Decade of MRTPC," *Economic Times* (New Delhi), 7, 8 and 9 April, 1981.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Organization

RUDIGER JUTTE and ANNEMARIE GROSSE JUTTE, (*Ed.*): The Future of International Organization. Frances Pinter (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1981, x, 228 p., £ 15.

THE United Nations was set up at the end of the Second World War by the coalition of victorious Powers for collective action against threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, with the assumption that the organization would have only a marginal role in issues involving the Great Powers *inter se*. This was institutionalized through the voting mechanism in the Security Council and the predominant role given to the Security Council *vis-a-vis* the General Assembly in the field of peace and security. The development of the Cold War and consequent inability of the Security Council to act had, no doubt, led to a change in the balance of power from the Security Council to the General Assembly, but issues of international peace and security remained the chief pre-occupation of the Organization till the end of the 1950s.

This, however, changed during the next two decades due to the emergence of a large number of states into nationhood as a result of decolonization and their entry to the United Nations and secondly, because of a shift in the axes of conflict. There has also been a dramatic increase in the complexity of international relations with the inter-mixing of domestic and international issues. How have these developments affected the nature and functions of international organizations, particularly the United Nations? The work under review is "about the role and capacity of international organization (sic) in the management of a growing complexity of international conflicts and global development problems." (p. vii)

The 13 articles in the volume have been grouped around four themes that focus on: growth and change in International Organisation, changes in issues and decision structures, adjustments in normative standards for international behaviour and the management and resolution of conflicts. Of these as many as five (including Prof. Rajan's piece on "Sovereignty over Natural Resources"), deal with various aspects of the on-going dialogue for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

In his introductory essay, Rudiger Jutte argues—contrary to doctrinal thinking—that the United Nations "has in fact been a platform of conflict rather than co-operation from the very beginning," (p. 5) because the Charter's assumptions about a "qualified collective security mechanism" soon became inoperative as a result of the emergence of bipolar politics, and, the shared goals, enumerated in vague terms, were also non-operational. Tracing the development of the United Nations in the context of the changes in its operational environment, Jutte has identified three stages—the *initial*

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co-operative approach to the solution of international problems which was soon replaced by a *conflictual constellation* of forces when the organization was driven to a marginal role in the maintenance of peace and security. In the third phase, the East-West conflict axis was gradually replaced by a North-South conflict constellation. This analysis outlining the basic pattern of evolution of the United Nations is somewhat inadequate. For, the transition from the second to the third phase (if, indeed, one may think of such transitions), had also been characterized by the emergence of *detente* and the consequent "limited adversary partnership" in Super Power relations, that affected the role of the United Nations, particularly in the sphere of management of international conflicts. However, Jutte is optimistic, and argues that the third phase seems to be more promising as it has seen institutional growth to reduce, if not eliminate, the confrontation of goals. There has also been a definite shift in its attention from political/security issues to economic and political issues.

The pattern of growth of international organizations since 1945 also indicates this. Marjo Hoefangels has shown in her paper (Chapter 2) that while IGOs have grown considerably in number since the War, a large number of them were concerned with specific issues and were in fact founded either through the initiative, sponsorship or support from other international organizations. For example, of the 144 new IGOs established between 1960-75, 58 per cent were set up on the initiative of national governments and the rest originated from IGOs. (p. 24) The United Nations itself, and its regional economic commissions have been particularly active in setting up new organizations. However, despite this Parkinsonian growth in the number of IGOs, the position of the nation-state as the primary actor in the international system has not changed, for, the latter still remains "firmly in control of issue areas and policies considered most vital for its survival..." (p. 32), while leaving matters of peripheral interest to the IGOs.

This also explains the reasons for the lack-lustre performance of the United Nations in the management of international conflicts. Rudiger Jutte has pointed out, that of the the 130 cases of conflicts in which the United Nations was involved between 1946-76, it had no impact in 60 per cent of the cases, was only "marginally" or moderately effective in 25 per cent and made a decisive contribution in only 5 per cent. (p. 175) The position becomes even worse if one includes all those conflicts in which there was no UN involvement at all.

One of the redeeming features of the United Nations debates on the issue of sovereignty over (non-agricultural) natural resources is that in recent years both the developed and the developing states have recognized their mutual interdependence and the need for mutual co-operation—a significant change from what was initially seen as a confrontational stance. However, the internatonal legitimization of sovereignty over natural resources may mean nothing more than an academic achievement for the

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developing states unless they themselves acquire the capacity to explore their resources and market them on the basis of equality with the developed states; and the suggestion for "equitable sharing" of international resources will have litle practical significance as long as the international system (and the United Nations), remain wedded to the principle of national sovereignty. Therefore, comments Rajan, like all other inter-governmental organizations, the United Nations "can only be, for the foreseeable future, a midwife of the New International Economic Order, it cannot itself conceive or beget one." (p. 44) Nevertheless, the United Nations cannot be bypassed. As Prof. Gregg has shown in his excellent paper on "Negotiating a New International Economic Order," if negotiations for a NIEO are to succeed, the United Nations must be the principal forum; although this may not always be to the liking of the major Powers who would prefer more congenial foras, smaller in size, and free from the tyranny of the majority. But the United Nations must also undergo some structural changes for eliminating the dysfunctional competition among its various agencies. Equally important would be the need for building a consensus, rather than making partisan demands. The negotiations for a NIEO also reveal the need for a South-South dialogue along with the North-South one.

In his critique on the developing countries' approach to the NIEO, Rajendra Chandisingh questions not only the basic assumptions about the need for a NIEO but also the strategy they have adopted so far. His contention that the reduction of indecent levels of inequalities internationally will need a radical restructuring of the capitalist world economic order as well as of the domestic political order of most of the developing countries (DCs), certainly merits attention, especially because politicians and administrators in the DCs seek to explain their own failures by pointing to the unequal distribution of economic power in the present international system; but the author's ideas on a "progessive stateform" may not be widely shared. He has rightly emphasized the need for expertise and organisation among the DCs in their negotiations with the industrialized countries. One wishes however, the author had done a little homework before comparing the Indian and Chinese systems, since, his assertion that "scores of people die nightly on the streets of Calcutta" (p. 94), is based on hearsay, not on facts.

In the short space of this review, it is not possible to do justice to all the articles included in this volume. Both Jan Bielawski (Chapter 5), and Klaus Burri (Chapter 8), provide interesting sidelights on the socialist states' attitude to the demands of the developing countries as voiced through the different United Nations fora and Annemarie Grosse-Jutte discusses the impact of the non-aligned states on the evolution of the international decision-structures (Chapter 7). Burri's article will be particularly interesting for its analytical rigour, although his conclusions do not appear to be strikingly revealing. As one reads the book, one feels a little uncomfortable about the title, since most of the contributions deal with the impact of the

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new states on the United Nations and its functions, and not a single essay deals with the future of the International Organization (except, of course, the oblique reference to it in the Introduction.) The choice of the singular "organization" instead of its plural, in the title indeed raises one's hopes about some discussion on the future of the United Nations in the context of the changes in the international system. To say this, however, is not to deny the merit of the book which will certainly be a valuable addition to the literature on International Relations and Organizations.

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International Economic Order

NANDINI JOSHI: The Challenge of Poverty: The Developing Countries in the New International Economic Order. Arnold Heinemann, New Delhi, 1978, xiv, 101p., Rs. 25.

NANDINI JOSHI : Power vs. Poverty : A View of UNCTAD, The New Order Book Co., Ahmedabad, 1980, viii, 76p.

HOW does one talk about imbalances in the present international economic order? The discussion is likely to be divided into two stages. In the first stage the researcher depicts a picture of the existing imbalances among countries in quantitative terms with the help of inter-country data on various aspects of production, investment, technology, resource utilization, international trade, resource transfer etc. To any competent researcher this is not a very difficult task. The second stage demands a more imaginative approach. It is at this stage where the researcher must provide the reader with a framework for understanding the multi-dimensional problems of the world economy. The two books under review do not seem to go much beyond the first stage.

The first book, as the title indicates, deals with the various dimensions of poverty in the developing world in terms of availability of basic necessities of life, levels and rates of growth of per capita GNP, declining terms of trade and purchasing power of exports, uncertainty in the international prices of primary products, increasing size of external debt and interest obligations, declining trend in developmental assistance from advanced economies and limitations of technology transfers. The "challenge" refers to a movement initiated by the developing countries for bringing about a change in the existing structure of the international economic relations.

The book looks into a broad category of problems affecting the interests of the developing countries in the areas of international trade, international payments and technology. The solutions offered in the book have been

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widely discussed in government organizations, academic circles and international bodies and thus become well-known to many of us. In fact, protectionism, commodity problems, international debt and technology were placed on the agenda of the fifth UNCTAD. The author could have chosen some issues on which the developing countries may not have a consensus, because a proper understanding of the conflict of interest among the developing countries is an important step towards the South-South co-operation. In its present form the book, establishing the needs of the developing countries and indicating the "special responsibility" of the advanced contries, seems to be of no great value.

The second book on the fifth UNCTAD, written in the style of fiction writing, may appeal to those looking for a running commentary on the proceedings of the Conference. The author attended the Manila meetings and later used her personal notes to write this book. The seriousness of the problems faced by the developing nations is demonstrated with sincerity and their frustration due to the developed nations' lukewarm response is presented in a dramatic format.

Nandini Joshi however, appears to have left a few unelaborated themes in the two books, taken together. One of them deserves mention. The existing international economic order produces harmful results not only for the developing nations who are struggling hard to change it but also for the developed nations who resist a radical change in any direction. This is best illustrated by the protectionist restrictions on manufactured and semi-manufactured exports from the developing countries. Such restrictions not only limit industrial growth and export diversification in the developing countries but also put a heavy burden on the developed countries' consumers causing economic stagnation by perpetuating protection of low-productivity industries. In the short run some jobs are saved in the developed countries. In the long run everybody turns out a loser. If the author has something like this on her mind, it deserves much deeper exploration than she has done in her books.

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International Law

V.S. MANI: International Adjudication: Procedural Aspects. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 456p., Rs. 130.

INTERNATIONAL procedure, called the "Antarctica of International Law," is a fascinating study; Dr. Mani has made it even more fascinating. He has confined his study to certain select aspects of international procedure alone; what has been chosen is relevant chiefly to what

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Mani calls the "communicative process." He does not, therefore, deal with aspects such as those relating to special chambers, settlement, withdrawal and discontinuance of proceedings, default, deliberations and formulation of decisions by tribunals and post-decisional procedures like appeal, revision, re-hearing etc. Nor does he concern himself with administrative matters, the secretariat, etc. Policy aspects of the mechanics and dynamics of internal decisional process have been left to the reader to pursue separately.

Mani has thus left himself free to come to grips with what he calls "procedural norms" and "procedural rights" (as part of international procedure). For instance, even the evaluation of evidence produced by the parties before the international tribunal in demonstration of the respective claims of the parties has an important "communicative role." The cluster of problems constituting initiation of proceedings (they are both doctrinal and practical) and interim measures of protection, have each operational significance. It would be really procedure "before" the tribunal, though it may well include the procedure adopted by it, either *suo motu* or at the initiative of parties.

Certain "minimum procedural standards" appear necessary, whether it is international procedure or its municipal counterpart, certain fundamental procedural rights have to be safeguarded. Two fundamentally important norms will be *audi alteram patem* and equality of parties; they are indeed complementary—inseparable from the concept of impartiality. Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter implies that "every state has the right to equality *in law* with every other state." This is indispensable for instilling confidence in the minds of the litigant states (concerning both efficacy and impartiality of its mechanism), serving sovereign sensibilities of states, facilitating effective conduct of adjudication, causing effective participation and ensuring that neither party derives any special and material procedural advantage over the other.

Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice requires the Court to apply, *inter alia* "the general principles of law recognized by the civilized nations:" it is thus possible to have recourse to private procedural law through the instrumentality of the said Article. The World Court has done so on innumerable occasions. Mani has instanced what M.C. Chagla, Judge *ad hoc,* stated in his dissenting opinion in the Right of Passage (Preliminary Objections) case; the operationality of a general principle of law depends upon its degree of congruity and harmony with the inherent peculiarities of contemporary international law.

The right to the composition of a tribunal emerges as an important fundamental procedural right claimable by a party to an international proceeding. But this right underwent a significant transformation when the Permanent Court of International Justice took shape in 1920. Article 31 of the Statute of the Court enabled a state in controversy, which did not have a judge on the Bench, to appoint a temporary judge to take part in the trial and determination of the case; this was at once a concession to the

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principles of equality of states, impartiality and expediency. This was also one means by which there could be on the Bench someone well acquainted with the exceptional features of the national constitution which the non-national judges may not know. But the institution of national judges has come under severe criticism. It should not be difficult to educate the court on all concerned matters, though according to Judge Hughes, this practice has worked well in the past. The Rules of 1978 of the International Court, have brought to focus a new dimension to the right to composition of the Court. By virtue of Article 34(2), the Rules recognize the right of a party to invite the Court's attention to relevant facts leading to disqualification of any member of this Court—such a right may have been well-considered to be implicit even in Article 17(2) of the Statute, which was already there.

Obviously, the most important among the procedural rights is yet to be heard. Due deliberation by the tribunal is not merely formal requirement, but the culmination of the whole expanse of the communicative process, of which pleadings and hearings are the most valuable part. What has to be ultimately depended upon for extricating the tribunal from a possible charge of having entertained any preconceived conclusions, is a well-reasoned and logical judgment; over time it should also be possible to evolve internally consistent inter-related policies—a consistent jurisprudence promoting the development of international law. There is nothing else beside a reasoned judgment to help make it appear that justice is done. Even as early as 1875, Draft Regulations of the Institute of International Law provided that the arbitral award must be reduced to writing and contain a statement of reasons, unless that is dispensed with under the stipulations of the *compromise*. There may be interventions either based on multilateral conventions (an instance of intervention as of right), or by leave of the court on showing of a special interest.

Except where the proceedings are commenced on the basis of a *compromise*, when as a general measure greater reliance is placed on the terms of reference, than on pleadings of parties, pleadings are very important. The degree of effectiveness of pleadings, however, depends upon the manner in which each document of pleading is timed and presented. The pleadings may be presented simultaneously and successively. The communicative significance of oral proceedings is also recognized by international procedure; a logical continuation of the written proceedings can help the tribunal in analyzing the large mass of evidence usually adduced before it. The pleadings, both oral and written, are of a persuasive character. The tribunal is also free to adopt arguments or hypotheses which it may consider reasonable and applicable in the circumstances of each case. There is also the right of each party to demand discovery and production of documents in the possession and control of the other.

Especially in the matter of adopting interim measures of protection it becomes necessary for the tribunal to form a *prima facie* view of the existence

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of interest and *prima facie* absence or lack of jurisdiction. These are matters of great complexity often.

Dr. Mani's lucid presentation, in an analytical and cogent manner of a somewhat difficult and not well-known area of international procedure, is praiseworthy. His work has become specially valuable on account not only of his having access to a large amount of material, some of which not even published previously, but also by reason of his having had the privilege of interviewing a number of scholars and even judges. I am indeed happy that he has been able to present, in a lasting form, the results of his research.

Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, New Delhi. S. RANGARAJAN

S. BHATT: Aviation Environment and World Order. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xv, 181p., Rs. 55.

THIS book is the outcome of the author's experiences in the fields of aeronautics and international law. Having started his career as a bomber-pilot, Bhatt has switched over to the study of international law, especially space law, still with one foot in aeronautics. However, this book is an indication that he has made a niche for himself in the realm of international law.

The book comprising of ten chapters, with a foreword by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer of the Supreme Court of India, contains an exposition of the current problems confronting the aviation world and the solutions thereof. Ever since the adoption of the Chicago Convention of 1944—a multilateral treaty which governs the activities of states parties to it in the field of international civil aviation—the world has undergone tremendous changes. But the basic premise, state sovereignty over airspace, on which the Convention was founded appears to remain unaltered because of the insular attitude of states. It was this rock against which the efforts of the Chicago Conference to internationalize airspace foundered. The outcome was return to a narrow bilateralism.

But for the orderly development of international civil aviation, the world would not have made great strides in international relations after the Second World War. International civil aviation is the forerunner of international co-operation; the extent of co-operation which the world is witnessing today would not have been possible had the national state remained impervious to the changes which took place after that War. Bhatt argues, with the dexterity of a lawyer, that the concept of air sovereignty has lost much of its significance in a world subject to unprecedented changes by fast developing technology and science after the War. To establish this he spreads out his arguments over a wide canvass—among them, the

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ever-increasing craze for air travel, the conquest by man of space and the invention of supersonic aircraft are quite a few worthy of mention. He also pleads for an amendment of the Chicago Convention to accommodate the increasing needs of the international community. Bhatt has however, not probed the reverse side of the picture, namely the growing protectionism evinced by every state in matters relating to its national airspace. It is operating as a damper to the development of international civil aviation.

Then again, the author has chosen to dispose off the very significant problems of air safety measures in a very summary manner. In one chapter "Air Safety in the Supersonic Age," he has dealt with most of the measures; factors affecting safety, methods of investigation, liability for air accidents, role of air traffic control in accident prevention and problems confronting air traffic control in general. When even the least degree of inadvertence on the part of anybody engaged in international civil aviation causes havoc to human life and resources., to prevent calamity in the air is the utmost obligation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and its member-states. Towards this purpose, the ICAO has taken several steps.

On the very important issue about the protection and preservation of the environment also Bhatt has expressed his sympathy in a rather restrained manner without associating himself much with the band-wagon of the environmentalists. After reading the chapter on "The Law and the Science of Weather Modification Activities," one does not fail to enquire about the link between this chapter and the main theme. One plausible answer may be that aviation causes weather modification.

Despite these shortcomings however, the chapters "Relationship of Environmental Law and Air Law" and "Impact of Aviation Activities on the Environment: Noise and Aerial Pollution"—are really worthy of mention for the author's efforts to make a contribution to the development of international law.

Finally, "Aviation Environment and World Order" is a rich contribution by an Asian to the development of international law. The author is already well-known for his contributions to the development of space law. In fact he is one of the few Asian writers to have established that international law is not the monopoly of Western scholars.

New Delhi

K. VENKATARAMIAH

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Foreign Policy

EAST ASIA

FOX BUTTERFIELD: China : Alive in the Bitter Sea. Times Books, New York, 1982, 468p.

FOX BUTTERFIELD went to Beijing as the *New York Times* Bureau Chief and covered China from mid-1979 to early 1981. That his twenty-month experience as an American journalist, the first since 1949, would be published in the form of a book is not something unusual. It would also not be surprising if this book were to become controversial since Butterfield has tried to magnify and focus on things that are derogatory in contemporary Chinese society. China's successes get only a passing reference. Butterfield has collected the material for this book mainly by talking to people who either narrated their own experience or that of others and in some other instances he writes about his own personal experiences.

Even if one were not to doubt the accuracy of his account it must be borne in mind by all readers that most of his interviewees and acquaintances were narrating the horrors of the Cultural Revolution and were looking at the entire thirty-year history of the People's Republic with eyes seriously affected by that chaotic and futile political movement. It appears from Butterfield's account that large numbers of Chinese in the urban areas are far from having recovered from the onslaughts of the Cultural Revolution.

The book consists of twenty chapters and an epilogue divided into five parts. The first part called *Connections* points out the nepotism and favouritism which the author sees rampant in China. Getting things done through the "back door", as it is called, has become an accepted norm of Chinese society. Even for the smallest items like tickets to a movie or an extra bottle of cooking oil people have to go through a Party cadre or else would never get it. Good connections or *guan-xi* is therefore of vital importance to everybody. Party members, Butterfield tells us, remain a privilged class (as in the Soviet Union) with their own apartments, stores, chauffeur-driven cars etc. He is also appalled at the lack of egalitarianism in China. In this part he also discusses the unique way in which the entire Chinese society is organized. Every individual belongs to a *danwei* or unit which generally coincides with his or her place of work. The *danwei* makes an effort, though not always successfully to offer cradle-to-grave services to its members. Butterfield believes that from the government's point of view the *danwei* structure is as much a security system as a social or economic system. He puts forth the idea that "if the hallmark of the feudal system in medieval Europe and Japan was the peasant's inescapable bondage to the land, the essence of the Chinese system ... was the individual's ties to his *danwei*, a kind of industrial feudalism."

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Part Two of the book called *Passages* deals with youth, women, sex and other related matters of Chinese life. Basing his opinion on the conversations he had with many Chinese women he infers "that (they) do not enjoy sex, or feel that they shouldn't, that a number of Chinese men do not know how to satisfy their partners, and that there is a widespread ignorance about sexual performances and fulfilment in China." To this reviewer it seems that the author is using Western sexual conduct as the yardstick to judge the Chinese. In this part he also narrates the sad incident of a woman acquaintance of his who was arrested and sent to a labour reform camp for talking to him openly about her sex life.

Equality between the sexes is still an unachieved goal in China like all other societies. Chinese women, however, cannot choose between a career and full-time devotion to the family as by law it is compulsory for everybody to work. Household work almost always is done by women which makes them work harder than their husbands.

Cynicism, bitterness and suspicion of the entire environment in which they operate are some of the striking characteristics common to most Chinese youth. This fact has been confirmed by many others who have been to China recently, but it apparently seems to be more an urban phenomenon and therefore may not be true of the whole country. This is not to suggest that the problem is any less serious. The Cultural Revolution has not only disappointed, frustrated and antagonized its victims but also those who were victimized. Former Red Guards feel deceived by Mao and the Communist Party to the point that they have begun to doubt if China really wants Communism. Here again one must keep in mind that the disgruntled elements, huge as their numbers may be, constitute only a small percentage of the Chinese populace.

Part Three on *Systems* is a description-cum-analysis of rural and urban organizations, economic management and planning, running of the bureaucracy and so forth. Butterfield (from the limited field experience he had) holds that hardly any employee in China takes his job seriously—shopping, bathing, resting etc. are all done during office hours. Nobody fears being fired as it is prohibited by law. Unless one commits a crime like murder or robbery one is never removed from his job. This part of the book is more informative and substantive than the rest.

The most sensitive part of the book is titled *Persuasions* (Part Four). Here is an elaborate discussion of the secretive nature of the Chinese Communist System, in particular the internal control system typical of most authoritarian societies. "The ubiquity and intensity of the control apparatus have generated tremendous psychological pressures on the Chinese, creating mental strains that few foreigners can imagine," remarks Butterfield. The Chinese do not confide in anybody including their spouses, he discovered, as they are not sure when the political wind would change direction and cause them trouble. In this section Butterfield brings in the Ministry of Public Security for sharp criticism which we know is the main centre of

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internal and external intelligence. This part also contains vivid descriptions of the persecution, repression and torture a vast number of intellectuals had to experience during the Cultural Revolution.

Part Five of the book is called *Messages*. It deals mainly with the media and the new forces of dissent that have or had emerged in the People's Republic in the early post-Cultural Revolution period. Butterfield re-affirms the widely-held opinion that there is too much censorship of news and information from both within the country and outside. However he remarks with a sense of satisfaction that none of his news dispatches sent to the United States were ever interfered with by the Chinese Information Department. While discussing dissent Butterfield writes about the short-lived Democracy Wall Movement and its subsequent suppression by the present regime. He also tells us the story of his secret visit to the house of a dissident where he collected first-hand information regarding the movement, its members and goals. An interesting observation the author makes, calling our attention to a lesser known aspect of present-day China, viz., religion, is that the same is being revived. Islam, Buddhism, Christianity as also the Chinese folk religion (which is an amalgam of Buddhism, Taoism, ancestor worship and superstition) are becoming popular.

The Epilogue to the book ends on a pessimistic note and is also somewhat disappointing in the opinion of this reviewer. Instead of analyzing why China is what it is (of course the book is written for everybody and not just the specialist but I am sure all readers would welcome a simple though not simplistic analysis), he says at the end that unless China absorbs or transforms Communism the way it has assimilated Buddhism centuries ago there remains little hope. If China fails then all capable Chinese, he concludes, would migrate or want to migrate to the United States. This forecast made at the end of the book in a tiny paragraph cannot be taken seriously as it is both naive and unrealistic.

As far as Butterfield's writing skills are concerned there are absolutely no questions. By making the book easy to read and by providing many amusing anecdotes the writer succeeds in establishing a rapport with the reader. The book possesses many qualities of a best-seller. It would not be fair to end the review without making a comment on the production of the book. For the price ($19.95 for the hardcover edition) the publisher deserves praise. The photographs inserted in the middle of the volume, taken mostly by Liu Heung Shing and Fox Butterfield himself are impressive. The beautiful calligraphy done by Charles Chu adorns the book from beginning to end.

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SREEMATI CHAKRABARTI

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SOUTH EAST ASIA

JAYASHRI DESHPANDE: Indonesia : The Impossible Dream—United States and the 1958 Rebellion. Prachi Prakashan, New Delhi, 1981, x, 180p, Rs. 60.

THE post-Second World War period set in motion the decolonization process in Asia. In some cases, the process of transfer of power was peaceful, in others it was characterized by a protracted struggle. Indonesia falls into the latter category; it was trying to break the shackles of colonialism and emerge as an independent state when the Cold War had already started and the world was divided between the Western bloc led by the United States and the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. In Asia at the same time a political evolution was underway within the backdrop of increasing rivalry between these two blocs—each trying to extend its influence in the Third World countries—affecting the domestic constellation of forces.

By and large, the leaders of the newly independent countries were Western-educated elites who had turned into ardent nationalists. A close and often sustained association with certain western values like individual freedom, human dignity and a right to shape their own destiny without any interference from external forces had often tuned the pitch of their leadership. They focused the limelight on a commitment to an upliftment of their own people through democratic experiments. Naturally they, during their struggle for independence and during the nation-building phase, looked more towards the United States as the torch-bearer of democracy for moral support, economic and technical assistance for bringing about the necessary modernization of their own societies. At the same time, many of them, though not attracted to the Communist ideology as such, were impressed by the gains of the Russian Revolution. Inevitably, therefore, after their attainment of freedom from hunger, some socialist thoughts influenced their political ideology and their attempt to restructure their own societies. An attempt on the part of some of these leaders to steer clear of the ideological confrontation of the two power blocs and pursue an independent foreign policy has been the logical fall-out of what one may brand as—an ideological ambivalence.

The United States' foreign policy, however, was primarily guided by the considerations of containment of the Soviet Union and a global crusade against "International Communism guided and controlled from Moscow." The policy that evolved during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations towards the Asian countries was in essence based on an American understanding that communism posed a threat to the security and integrity of the newly independent countries. It postulated that a "free world" could be established if only the leaders of Asian countries followed the American global leadership. Keeping the nations "oriented to the West" was regarded

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as a very important policy objective in the global compaign against "Communist expansion." In the process, the urge of the Asian leaders to pursue an independent path free from external influence, and what late President Kennedy later described as their "new nationalism" was mistaken as their leaning towards Communism. John Foster Dulles branded "non-alignment" as "immoral" and viewed all non-aligned nations with deep suspicion and mistrust. Every effort was made through covert and overt actions to destabilize the political base in countries which neither shared the American perceptions nor accepted their charted path. Alternative elite groups were encouraged and propped up through clandestine operations both by the diplomatic outfits and the intelligence network for subversive actions.

Jayashri Deshpande's book deals fairly efficiently and competently with some of these aspects of American foreign policy with particular reference to Indonesia. The book is divided into six chapters—the first two trace the evolution of American policy towards Indonesia under the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations; differing world views and the threat perceptions that each had towards the other. The subsequent chapters deal in great detail with two critical issues that affected US-Indonesian relations, namely the West Irian and the PRRI rebellion of 1958. On both issues, United States policy was detrimental to the interests of Indonesia and contributed to a large extent in destabilizing the political situation. In fact, Indonesia's failure to get back the West Irian from the Dutch, the consequent reprisals against Dutch interests and the final rebellion of 1958 released forces radicalizing the entire political process and finally culminated in the decline of the parliamentary system and the introduction of "guided democracy" by Sukarno.

While Deshpande has used a wide variety of materials in the analysis of United States policy towards Indonesia and its implications, unfortunately she has not been able to integrate them into a theoretical framework. In fact, the domestic politics of a country is not primarily manifest or intelligible within the confines of the nation state, and the political process of a country cannot be understood in isolation from the international developments and the global strategies of super powers. Her book would have been richer if she could bring out this linkage between the domestic politics of new states and the international configuration and develop it into a theory of political development. This, however, does not minimize the worth of the book which is an important contribution to the understanding of American policy towards Indonesia.

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BALADAS GHOSAL

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S.R. SUDHAMANI: Political Development in Thailand. Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, 1980, ix, 235p.

THE author, Sudhamani, has succeeded in presenting a readable narration of the serious happenings in Thailand during the period 1958-63. For this purpose, she has consulted a vast amount of material written by specialists and others on Thailand; the notes appended at the end of each of the five chapters which include references to other books will prove useful for those who wish to pursue the subject further.

The introduction in Chapter I is systematic and written in great detail though an academic discussion of the meaning of "political development" could have been avoided. On the other hand, the most important theme of Marshal Sarit Thanarat's regime has been described with proper emphasis on its essentials, especially on the methods used to strengthen his absolute rule to the detriment of furthering the cause of democracy. Marshal Sarit was able to build a powerful regime by effectively making use of three strong pillars—the military, the bureaucracy and the monarchy. This aspect has been very clearly described. Problems of national integration and security are described in Chapter IV without any ambiguity. In analyzing Thailand's foreign relations, especially with its neighbours, the author's description of the meaningful relations is good. Thailand's continuing cardinal foreign policy principle—enable it to exist without being occupied by any foreign Power—has been referred to. This is a unique case and has been made possible by the country's flexible foreign policy—a policy of "bend with the wind." In the 1960s, when Thailand had close friendly relations with the Europeans and Americans, some even said that the Thais lived as "Brown Sahibs."

Having said the above, I would conclude with the following comments. The book is good for its systematic narration of events as they took place. In my view however, it would have been more useful if the author had analyzed in detail the materials collected; though I realize that the range of the subject is limited and, therefore, it would have been difficult to initiate interpretation of events.

Political developments during 1958-63 in Thailand did not fit into any political theories, says the author. It followed a different pattern which enjoyed an independent status unlike its neighbours who were ruled by foreign powers. What are the causes for this? Something about this would have been of value.

During the period 1933-57, at least five general elections were held. What caused the elected to be ineffective in ruling the country?

The living standards of the people in the villages had not significantly improved. The author should have given some account of it.

We observed a number of *coups* taking place in Thailand. This is not the case with its neighbours. Can we give some reasons for it? Is it because that unlike its neighbours, Thailand has been free from foreign occupation?

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Finally, the author, perhaps, may wish to correct in the next issue some spelling and grammatical errors that have crept into this book, e g., pages 189, 213.

New Delhi PERALA RATNAM

WEST ASIA

JOEL S. MIGDAL, (*Ed.*): Palestinian Society and Politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980, xvi, 290p., $ 25.

IN modern times Palestine has been ruled by four different regimes—the Ottoman, the British, the Jordanian and the Israeli. The varying socio-economic policies pursued by these regimes naturally had their impact on the Palestinian society, but it is not easy to measure this impact. The book under review is a commendable attempt in this direction. It tries to find out the effect of different regimes (environmental) on the Palestinians, particularly of the West Bank. The purpose of the author is "to present a serious scholarly research that would aid in fostering a meaningful understanding of the complex relations between society and politics among the Palestinian Arabs."

The book is divided into two parts. Book I, the contribution of the editor himself, presents an overview of the major changes in Palestinian society and politics during the last century. Book II, which contains eight papers by different authors, is divided into three parts. Part one focuses on the Palestinian village (in three articles)—Gabrial Baer on village Mukhtar, Ylana Miller on the impact of British norms, and Shimon Shamiron on the West Bank refugees. Part second (in three articles) deals with Palestinian urban elites—Shrul Mishal on the West Bank-Amman relations, Mark Heller on social change in the West Bank and Donna Divine on the dialectics of Palestinian politics. Part three (in two articles) focuses on modes of interaction between elites and masses by Kenneth Stein and Rachelle Taqou.

In Book I, the editor has developed a model that would make the numerous and diverse policies of different regimes comparable. For this purpose three governmental policies—security, investments (or lack of it) and alliance (with whom the regime chose to deal)—are chosen. He then analyses the impact of these three policies of different regimes on Palestinian stratification and population. The author argues, quite reasonably, that many critical changes at the base of the society—the village—as well as those at the level of social and political leadership can be understood in the context of major changes in these policies of the regimes. It is also suggested that these policies are of prime importance in explaining the changing

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nature of the population and of the leadership. This factor was more powerful than the internal dynamics of Palestinian society.

Palestinian politics, to trace the history, was controlled by the old notable families under the Ottoman and the British. The influence of these families declined under the impact of the new situation created after the defeat of 1948. Under Jordanian rule, as Shrul Mishal points out in his essay, the demoralized local leadership was never allowed to occupy high positions in the Hashemite hierarchy. The West Bank also declined economically under Jordanian rule.

The Six Day War dramatically transformed the situation. It brought the West Bank under the control of the Israeli Army. The stern Israeli security policies attempted to prevent the emergence of a new unified leadership in that area. But the exposure of the West Bank society to the Israeli economy, culture and technology brought about radical changes. This coupled with the higher Israeli wages, Gabrial Baer points out in his article on village Mukhtar, weakened the hold of traditional village leadership. A new counter-elite brought up in the new atmosphere and with a new sense of Palestinian identity emerged. The emergence of PLO after 1967, as a major organization of the Palestinian people has to be seen in this background.

The book, thus, is a systematic analysis of the impact of external rule on Palestinian society. The comparative framework provided by the editor himself in his essay (Book I) for studying the numerous and diverse policies of different regimes is an impressive attempt. This sets the tone for the rest. Each of the eight separate studies contained in the book makes a contribution to our knowledge of Palestinian society and its political history. Together they give us a new insight into the historical sociology of Palestinian Arabs.

The book however, is not without drawbacks; each of the eight separate studies in Book II even though of high quality, do not form part of the common framework. They also differ in style and methodology. The book could have been far more valuable with a common thematic framework. One also regrets, along with the editor, for the absence of contributions from Palestinian scholars.

Despite these drawbacks Migdal's work, as pointed out earlier, is a systematic analysis of the impact of external rule on Palestinian society and true to its aims sheds light on certain crucial aspects of Palestinian Arab life.

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A.B. SAWANT

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INDIA

History—Pre-Modern and Modern India

BALAKRISHNA GOVIND GOKHALE: Surat in the Seventeenth Century : A Study of Urban History of Pre-Modern India. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1979, 222p., Rs. 100.

SURAT, the prime port of Mughal India, continues to attract and elude historians seeking to explain its dynamism and wealth, in the seventeenth century—and the weaknesses, latent and apparent, which were one day going to deprive the city of its near two century long commercial pre-eminence. It is primarily as an urban historian that the author examines the unique phenomenon that Surat represented, being neither a renowned place of pilgrimage nor a provincial capital, but nevertheless of extra-ordinary interest in the urban history of pre-modern India. This was due to the intensely alive spectacle of a large, prosperous mercantile community the city presented. Its civic experience, mainly that of operating through a number of institutionalized organizations helped Surat to develop a "genuine community" of its own. And it was "perhaps the only great city of its time in India where the humble, submissive and much maligned Bania broker was the hero." (p. 49)

Gokhale makes these claims on behalf of the city quite early in his book, after having described the city and the people in the first two chapters. Some initial discussions on definition and typology of cities seem rather unrelated to the competent description of Surat with its location on the river Tapi, the fort and other important landmarks, the houses and gardens. After dealing briefly with the distinct groups—the Muslims, the Hindus, the Parsis and Armenians (Khwaja Minaz figures both as a Muslim and an Armenian), the author returns to dwell on "the Banias, the most easily visible of the social groups in Surat" (p. 39), whom he considers to be the "creator(s) of its values and the custodian(s) of its civic conscience." (p. 49)

At this point one would have expected a more comprehensive discussion by the author of what he considers as the values and civic conscience of the city, and in what sense the Bania is taken to represent these. The following chapters, dealing with the city government, its hinterland and markets, the merchant communities—Indian and European, do not however converge to develop this significant point. We hear once more of the bureaucratic oppressions to which Hindu merchants were more subject than others, of the famine of the 1630s and above all of the two raids by Shivaji. Their combined impact was too devastating, the author concludes, for the merchant communities to withstand.

It is difficult to draw a line between urban and economic history in dealing with the case of such an "unusual urban conglomeration" as seventeenth century Surat; this the author has very rightly pointed out. However, in the

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last analysis, the book offers much more information on the trade of Surat than the urban phenomenon the city represented. Surat's links with Indian markets, and its dependence on the hinterland get considerable attention from the author, but the primordial importance of the Red Sea trade for the city's prosperity is nowhere clearly discernible. This is reflected also in the detailed sketch of Virji or Baharji Vora, the "merchant prince" of whom we have already learnt a lot from scholars like W.H. Moreland and Surendra Gopal. It is he who is considered to be the one figure to have dominated "the commercial and urban history of Surat," while the shipowning Muslim merchant magnates, like Abdul Ghafur or the Chellabies, hardly get the mention which they deserve. And finally, it is actually the European traders, formally relegated to the last chapter, who emerge as the most domineering mercantile group in Surat. Whereas down to the second half of the 17th century servants of the european companies felt that theirs was but a small presence in Surat (as K.N. Chaudhuri points out in his recent study: *English East India Company and the Trading World of Asia*), Gokhale already anticipates the ominous implications of "the English almost taking over the inter-Asian and carrying traders." (p. 161) His hero, already staggering under feudal tyranny, is too soon reduced to the position of a *dalal*, casting "only a fleeting shadow across the landscape" during the century under review. (p. 136) He notes the definite decline of Surat by the end of that century. The process of going down had no doubt set in by then, but it in fact took another four or five decades, as well as a much more complex set of developments to finally push the leading Indian merchants of Surat to ruin, as we find from the masterly survey of Ashin Das Gupta : *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat.*

If the transformation of the bania seems too abrupt, and the city's decline overshadowing its prosperity too early, much of this is due to both the nature of sources utilized and the questions put to them. The promises and pitfalls of sources like the archives of the various European East India Companies, so far indispensable for any study of commerce and commercial centres of medieval India, are being examined by researchers for quite some time. These sources will continue to shape our viewpoints for some time to come. However, there is still scope to make fuller utilisation of source materials in different languages. The author seems to have relied much more on the English mss and printed records, in spite of his competence to handle material in Dutch. Among the travelogues I find the absence of Tavernier's work surprising. It is debatable, how far these sources are capable of furnishing an answer to such questions as to whether Surat evolved a "genuine community" within itself. Is it a feasible attempt moreover, to find out what was unique about the "urban experience" in Surat without entering into some amount of detailed comparison with other urban centres?

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences,
Calcutta. INDRANI RAY

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PARSHOTAM MEHRA: The North-Eastern Frontier: A Documentary Study of the Internecine Rivalry Between India, Tibet and China. Volume I, 1906-14. Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1979, xliii, 226p., Rs. 50/-

IN the 1960s we had a rash of books on the Sino-Indian frontier, many of which were a re-arrangement of material from the White Papers or the Sino-Indian Official's Report. The last one decade has, however, seen a number of very useful works coming out. One of those was Parshotam Mehra's *The McMahon Line and After* (Macmillan 1974). The present volume on the North-Eastern Frontier is a compilation of a number of documents connected with what happened in 1914. Some of these are basic documents already available to the public, while others are made available to the general public for the first time. Nothing extraordinarily interesting or original comes from the volume. But, the work as a whole makes it possible for the student of India's north-eastern frontier to be better able to follow what had happened.

Mehra has concentrated on the historical part and deliberately stays away from formation of boundaries and solving of boundary problems. He does, however, implicitly recognize that there is a difference between the knowledge that the Central Government has of the limits of the international boundary and the extent to which they will have to depend on the local administration. The key phrase is "finding out Tibetan limits" on pp. xv-xvi. One must however take issue with him about the extent to which Chao's men penetrated the Cis-Himalayan area. They really touched the Himalayan watershed only at a few points and left out many others, the most important being Tawang. Pemako and Poyul have always been the major routes of entry from Tibet into North-Eastern India. Little importance need be given to the stray reference to Chao contemplating Chinese settlement in the district. I must also say that Mehra overrates Chung-Ying. He was never in the same class as Chao or his illustrious predecessor Ao Hui. One also wishes that the 1912 negotiations regarding evacuation of Chinese troops *via* India was dealt with in a little more detail. This is a subject which many of us who are interested in Tibet, have been skipping.

On pages xxiv-xxvii, Mehra refers to the shifting of the British emphasis to *Tibetan status from the Tibetan frontier.* One can be curious as to how and when this shifting took place. I have sometimes felt that it is not a question of shift, but that the Government of India was always more interested in the frontier (Curzon's Romanes lectures) while the Home Government was always seeing the Tibet problem as a part of its wider interests in China. What happened was more a convergence of the Home Government's and the Government of India's viewpoints on what line should be taken at this particular point of time.

The problem of imperial interests clashing with Indian interests again occurs on page xxix, in the 1913 discussions with Russia. Grey to Buchan in St. Petersburg is very similar to the stand that the Government of India

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now takes. (In his earlier work also Mehra refers to the hypersensitivity of Jordan to developments on the Indo-Tibetan border affecting British interests in China). On pages 202-03 we again see in Jordan's communications to Colville how imperial considerations operated to the disadvantage of India and Tibet. The same thing is repeated in Hardinge to Crewe on 11 June 1914. (page 211)

Jawaharlal Nehru never liked the term "McMahon Line" and what appears on page 178 shows McMahon's own confusion about the administrative boundary and the political boundary and treating NEFA as a buffer. It is doubtful whether China can make any use of it. But the error really starts from McMahon treating the boundary of the British controlled territory at a particular point of time without noting the existence of the traditional boundary betwen India and Tibet. McMahon should not have done it, seeing that he was fully aware of the difference between the southern limits of Tibet and what he fonnd at a particular time as the northern administration boundary of the British Administration. One would not treat British India's international boundary in the North-West in 1840 as India's traditional boundary in the North-West with Central Asia.

On page 39, one notices significance being attached to the alleged January 1912 notification at Menilkrai. Is this really more significant than the Jammu and Kashmir police post at Shahidulla?

The General Staff's 1 June 1912 note is informative from the point of view of data, but less so about the political and legal aspects. It is really more a summary of information than a General Staff appreciation. There is a document somewhat later, also by the General Staff, which is only occasionally referred to by various authors though yet to be published in full. Bell's view on page 83 about "unrealistice demands" should be properly seen as restricted to the demand for temporal control in Inner Tibet.

Ku Weiling's memorandum of 25 April 1914 is often mentioned by China. Its full text now being available makes it clear that China was talking of the Sino-Tibetan boundary and was saying nothing about the Indo-Tibetan boundary. This is also clear from the 14-15 April 1914 discussions between Rose and Ch'en. In fact, the only possible reference is in 5 C of the Wai Chiao Pu letter that follows.

Of more interest is the 13 June 1914 memorandum of Sun Pao-ch'i, showing how varying were the lines that China had put forth from time to time. Lu hsing-chi's message of 9 July 1913 is evidence that China was aware of the British activities in the area now comprising Arunachal but was not interested in protesting about it. Many of us will also be amused at Peking asking Ch'en yi-fan on 24 December 1913 not to use the Tang Chronicles.

The Dalai Lama's letter of 2 May 1910 is an important document and the fifth of his demands on China—a clear statement of the reality of Sino-Tibetan relations. Wai Chiao Pu's memorandum of 29 June 1914 again shows that China wanted Great Britain to mediate betwen it and Tibet and the conference was really not something which had been rammed down

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the throat of a weak China by an imperialist Great Britain. The intercepted telegrams which follow substantiate a point which I had made some years ago about attitudes in secret correspondence not being evidence to show faith, if there is variation between the secret correspondence and the public attitude.

There are references to Fu Sung-mu on pages 168 and 186-93. This is not the whole of what Fu wanted to say. There is another chronicle of Chieng-mai, that the Chinese referred to in 1960. Neither of these documents had been released in full by China.

There are some printing errors. On page 1, why is surprise expressed at Teng Shao-yi's designation? On page xvi, 1916 should be 1906. One hopes that a complete index will be made available in Volume II,

The book is a good buy and one can look forward eagerly to the second volume.

Agartala. T.S. MURTY

MANI LAL BOSE: British Policy in the North-East Frontier Agency. Concept Publishing Co; New Delhi, 1979, xiii, 236 p., Rs. 90.

THE geo-political frontiers of the British possessions in north-east India extended upto the Himalayan foothills with the conquest and annexation of Assam in 1826; but the *terra incognito* beyond these frontiers remained as a buffer between Assam and Tibet. Barring a few pockets where Tibetan administration had penetrated, this buffer region remained largely a no-man's land inhabited by stateless tribes, still living in their primitive conditions.

The British, however, established political relations with the neighbouring tribes found close to their frontiers and went on gradually extending a system of loose political control over them, while China and Tibet were doing the same near their frontiers. By 1914 the British objective of pushing the border, more or less, upto the crest of the Himalayas emerged as a well-defined policy. By 1924, three administrative units for select frontier tracts, close to the plains, were organized under British political officers. However, because of diplomatic complications arising out of the Simla Conference of 1914, the British objective of pushing the frontiers upto the disputed McMahon Line was not effectively pursued until the 1930s, to avoid protests from Tibet and China.

During the years 1938-47, the policy of extending the frontiers upto the claimed international boundary, i.e. the McMahon Line, was resumed and Tibetan Officers were ousted from several areas. Yet, even by the time of Indian independence, the line of *de facto* British-Indian possessions remained a little short of the McMahon Line. It was in the early 1950s that the objective, as conceived by McMahon in 1914, was fully achieved. The whole

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frontier region was then reconstituted as the North-East Frontier Agency of India in 1954.

The book under review is a consolidated survey of the British forward policy in the region, of the growth of the administrative set-up there and of the ethnology of the various tribes concerned. All these are discussed in five chapters which are followed by five appendices reproducing some diplomatic and administrative documents relevant to the period 1873-1914. Despite the author's professed objective of bringing the peoples of the region into the central focus of his study, it is frontier-making that has emerged as the major theme of the book; all information given about the tribes in Chapter One (and here and there in the remaining text) appear to be inadequate and colourless. So far as the major theme is concerned, it stands so well-charted by now that the author has hardly any new light to throw or new interpretation to offer.

Even the presentation of the results of the Simla Conference and of the implementation of the McMahon Line is inadequate. The reader is kept totally ignorant of the recent discovery by Sir John Addis, a British diplomat working as a research scholar at the Harvard University, of the existence of two versions in print of the 1929 edition of C.V. Aitchison's *Treaties...*, Vol. 14—a work which is often referred to for validating the Simla Agreement. It is common knowledge by now that the version, now current, was printed in the late 1930s to accommodate a revised note on the Simla Conference and that almost all the copies of the earlier version were destroyed. It is a case of fraud in diplomatic record-keeping. The conclusions of the study would have attained more weight and credibility had the author not ommited such crucial facts and had he introduced and discussed some of the relevant controversies raised by Alastair Lamb, Neville Maxwell, Woodman and Karunakar Gupta. Gupta's *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier* (Calcutta, 1974) is mentioned both in the Preface and the Bibliography, but it apperently failed to provoke Bose to react.

Despite the inadequacies and shortcomings mentioned above, the work may be found by many as a useful reference material on the area that is Arunachal today, particularly for its varied documented information, painstakingly sifted from archival materials and official publications. It is a pity that the publishers did not insist on adding a map of the region to the book to help the reader.

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences,
Calcutta.

AMALENDU GUHA

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Political Problems and Processes

R.K. BHARDWAJ: Democracy in India. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xii, 344 p., Rs. 90.

THIS scholarly volume by Dr. Bhardwaj makes a successful attempt at giving an account of democracy as it actually functions in India though it suffers in its earlier chapters from a number of serious defects. The concept of democracy in Chapter 1 contains a number of observations which are wanting in definition and precision and unrelated to each other. Chapter 2 entitled "Democracy in Ancient India," says nothing about the subject but refers to the 1857 Revolt and several reforms introduced by the British after the government was taken over by the Crown. Chapter 3 bears the title "Evolution of Democracy in the Country" but deals actually with the main contents of the present Constitution and some of its features. Chapter 4 is entitled "The Impact of Western Political Ideas" but contains a number of extracts from the speeches and writings of Dadabhai Naoroji and his stand on the theory of economic drain. It says nothing of nationalism and democracy, the ideas which were borrowed from the west by the English educated classes in the country and which shaped the course of events leading to the freedom movement and its successful conclusion. Chapter 5 traces at great length the history of the struggle for independence and the various stages through which it passed. All this is unnecessary to arrive at the conclusion that there could be no democracy in the country so long as it was under foreign rule. Chapter 6, "The Framework of the Indian Constitution" and 7, "The Union Parliament and Independent Judiciary" should be read together as they deal with essential features of the Indian Constitution which make it a real democracy. The importance of the Supreme Court as the guardian of the Constitution and as the protector of fundamental rights of equality and various kinds of freedom is clearly brought out on the basis of its judgment in the Golaknath Case.

In the actual functioning of democracy, important roles have to be played by individual voters, by the politicians whom they elect to represent them in Parliament at the center and to the Assemblies in the states, by the political parties whose function is to educate the voters and shape public opinion on various issues with which the counry is faced, by the government which comes to power as a result of periodical elections because of the majority which it commands in the Lok Sabha at the centre and in the Vidhan Sabhas in states and by the Civil Service. The author critically examines these roles during the last thirty years and holds the view that the roles they played have not been satisfactory.

All adults of 21 years and above have been given the right to vote at elections. The assumption is that they would exercise this right on the basis of the performance of political parties which contest the elections, but the truth is that they do not. Their fundamental problem is one of poverty

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and unemployment. The Congress Party which has been in power during the years after independence has done little to solve this problem. The percentage of people below the poverty line has been on the increase but people have continued to vote for the Congress, carried away first by the charisma of Pandit Nehru and now by that of Indira Gandhi. Most of them are illiterate and the government has not done much to remove illiteracy though the Directive Principles in the Constitution call upon the states to provide free and compulsory education to children between the ages of 6 and 14 within 10 years after the Constitution is brought into effect. (pp. 134-5)

Politicians who seek election are highly corrupt; they spend lakhs for winning the elections and after they have been elected they use their positon in the legislatures to make as much money as possible. Corruption has been on the increase among them. (pp. 308-11) What motivates them is their personal interest and not the interest of society and the country as a whole. This is also one of the causes of defections from one party to another.

The number of political parties in the country is unnecessarily large. Besides the candidates set up by them for election there are large number of independents standing for elections. Voters find it difficult to make a right choice from among so many candidates and this is one of the reasons why the Congress Party has been able to come to power in every election before 1977. The existence of too many parties leads to authoritarianism of the Congress Party. They cannot act as an effective check on the Congress Party. The election system also suffers from several other defects and this has enabled the Congress at times to secure a 2/3rd majority in the Lok Sabha even though it secured only 46 or 47 per cent of the valid votes polled. According to the author, authoritarianism is inherent in this system of elections (pp. 198-200), and in the multi-party system prevailing in the country. All parties know this but they have not taken so far any effective steps to remedy the situation. It is no wonder that though the Congress adheres to forms of democrary its functioning has been dictatorial.

In the functioning of democracy the role of the Civil Services is of crucial importance. Ministers who are at the helm of various departments lack administrative experience in most cases and they need the advice of civil servants in determining to what extent their policies would be practicable. Members of the Civil Services are expected to tender advice honestly and sincerely in the light of their professional experience whichever be the party that holds power at any particular time. This is what is meant by the neutrality of the Civil Service. It is however the view of the author that in this respect there has been considerable deterioration in recent years. Ministers resent the advice given to them if it is not to their liking and there are several instances of civil servants being victimised. This has affected administrative efficiency. There is much truth in the following observation of the author:

The services have lowered their standard because of the impact of

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political powers at the helm of affairs. The politician is becoming mostly averse to objective advice and the civil servants for fear of becoming victimised and also to get personal preference, are becoming servile and unobjective to their duties. The position adopted by the Civil Service in this state of timidity and servility is affecting the administrative structures considerably. (p. 217)

All the measures taken by the Union Public Service Commission to hold competitive examinations and select candidates for recruitment to the IAS and IPS on the basis of merit appear to be wasteful in the new set up of relations between ministers on one side and civil servants on the other.

It is not possible within the space of a short review to deal with the views of the author on trade unions in the country, which have become powerful pressure groups enabling them to get a large share of emoluments from the government and from the employers in both the public and private sectors, while unorganized labour, especially in rural areas, does not even get a living wage. He has also dealt with centre-state relations at great length and with the demands of states for greater autonomy, for more financial resources in the form of unconditional grants and for a larger voice in shaping the five-year plans. Democrary has according to him failed to solve the problem of poverty or bring about more of economic equality. From this point of view Chapter 14 entitled "How Democratic is Indian Democracy?" has special significance.

The book concludes with an excellent chapter on the emergency and its excesses. During this period of 19 months, democracy was eclipsed and Shrimati Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister and the caucus which gathered around her established a dictatorial form of government under which all fundamental rights practically disappeared and thousands of people and all leaders belonging to the opposition parties were kept in prison without trial. Even the Supreme Court felt helpless in the discharge of its functions.

The book is invaluable as a study of the successes and failures of democracy as it functioned in India from 1950 to 1977 when the Janata Party was voted to power.

Hyderabad — M. VENKATARANGAIYA

H.D. LAKSHMINARAYANA: Democracy in Rural India: Problems and Process. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, vi, 128 p., Rs. 50.

THIS book has an intriguing title and an uncommonly attractive dust jacket, but that is about all one can say for it. Unless, of course, one regards the fact that it is not very demanding of a reader's time to be another plus point in its favour. Those who are familiar with the literature

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on Panchayati Raj (particularly as it functions at the village level), will find that they can read this book in thirty minutes flat. Not only because it is short (pp. 128, including an appendix and the footnotes), but also because there is nothing in it to hold their attention either in terms of insights, arguments, or even plain descriptive data.

Not that the latter is absent; it is very much there. But it describes for us something with which we are already very familiar, viz., the social and economic configuration of rural communities, in this case one relatively big village and the other much smaller. Since Dr. Lakshminarayana does not show that his two villages are not like other big or small villages in Karnataka or, for that matter, in the rest of the country, his data does not compel the reader's attention. It will be naive in the extreme to expect otherwise. In fact, the feeling is inescapable that this book is at least 20 years too late. During this period numerous studies have given us the bare facts of the kind the book under review gives, while quite a few have even gone beyond such a simple description to the more fruitful level of theory and explanation.

As already stated, Lakshminarayana makes no attempt at either; he merely describes his two villages in five identical chapters for each. These chapters are devoted to the physical lay-out of the village, its economy (i.e. occupation and distribution of landholdings by caste), its social life (i.e. number and size of the castes, traditional norms of commensality and endogamy, etc.), its political life (basically a "who's who" of the Village Panchayat) and to what is called the "functioning of statutory panchayat." For the larger of the two villages (Hibhalu), in this book there is an additional chapter called "Programme Implementation." The reason for this is not clear, for programme implementation is discussed for the smaller village (Agrahara) as part of the chapter on the functioning of the panchayat.

There is no concluding chapter and no attempt to pull together the facts presented throughout the book. It is left entirely to the reader to determine the interconnections, if any, and draw his own generalizations. The "Introduction" does not help either; it does not provide any kind of theoretical perspective, nor does it formulate a set of questions which could help the reader to understand the significance of the data in the chapters that follow. All that the "Introduction" does is to give, in the style of the Time-Capsule, buried near the Red Fort (and subsequently dug-up), a brief history of local self-government since the Ripon Resolution of 1882.

Books worth reading can all be classified into two types: those that provide answers and those that stimulate questions. The book under review falls in the second category, except that the question it gives rise to is: Why was this book published at all?

Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.

BASHIRUDDIN AHMED

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UMASADAY BHATTACHARJYA: Local Government in Khasi Hills. Vivek Publishing Co., Delhi, 1980, xv, 263 p., Rs. 70.

LOCAL Government in the Khasi Hills is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the subject. It should however have commenced with the development of local government in the Khasi Hills and not with a profile. Second, the author should have stated clearly that there were two classes of local government institutions, statutory and non-statutory. Third, the author has included *Syiemship* as a local government institution. The *Syiemship* was however, not a local government institution; before the conquest of the Khasi Hills by the British, the *Syiemship* was a sovereign state. From 1836 to 1859, relations between the Syiems and the British were determined by agreements, executed by the former. In 1859, side by side with the agreements, sanads were also issued and tendered to the Syiems for their acceptance. In 1877, the agreements were abolished and sanads were retained. They were the only means by which relations between the Syiems and the British were regulated except in the case of Lyngdohs and Sardars with whom relations were regulated by Parwanas. I think that this was done by the British with a view to reduce the status and influence of the Khasi Chiefs; by abolishing the agreements the Syiems were not recognized as contracting parties. A Sanad, in political parlance, was generally issued indicating a grant of recognition from the Crown to the rulers of the states. It was intended to create the feeling and foster the idea of an absolutely subordinate position occupied by the chiefs in relation to the British. Thus, the Syiems were not local government institutions in the accepted sense of the term.

Again, the author says (p.35), that the Lt. Governor of East Bengal and Assam proposed to convert the Shillong Station Committee into a municipality under the Act of "1844". It was not the Act of 1844 but the Act of 1884 under which the action was proposed to be taken. The Bengal Municipal Act 1876, was repealed by the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884. But the Government retained the Act of 1876 because it provided for the establishment of the Town Committees. The Act of 1884 made no such provision.

The chapter on the District Councils is comprehensive; the author has dealt with the subject competently and comprehensively.

Again dealing with election of members, the auther traces the introduction of the elective system in the local authorities and the extension of franchise to Khasi women alone and not to other women. Although franchise was extended to Khasi women, they did not participate in local politics in large numbers. This however is the case in all countries where there is adult franchise. Even in England we find a small number of women in the House of Commons. The author need not regret this!

The author says that the British Government did not interfere with the functioning of the *Syiemship*. This is not true. The British Government,

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rather the Political Agent exercised grandmotherly authority over the Syiems. The Government determined the succession of the Syiems; they settled all disputed elections; they arbitrated all disputes between the Syiems and their subjects and treated the Syiems as their messenger boys.

Again, the author suggests that *Syiemship* should not be abolished. This is a surprising conclusion. We have abolished the Zamindari System in the country, the chieftainship in the Mizo Hills. We have democratised local government, but in the Khasi Hills the feudal system is still retained. The Syiems are not effectively controlled by the District Councils. We consider *Syiemship* as an anachronism in a country wedded to democracy. The author seems to have been guided by extraneous considerations when he suggested the retention of the *Syiemship*. These observations nevertheless, do not in any way diminish the value of the publication. This is the only book on the subject at present.

Gauhati University,
Gauhati.

V. VENKATA RAO

R.D. DIXIT: Civil Disobedience: A Philosophical Study. GDK Publications, New Delhi, 1980, xix, 104 p., Rs. 35.

THE term "civil disobedience" was given currency by Henry Thoreau's famous essay on the subject. But its philosophical roots are found in the whole gamut of Western political thought. For, ultimately it hinges on the problem of political obligation and individual freedom; so one can find its basis in the writings of Plato, Cicero, the early Christians, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, Henry Thoreau, etc. Their general plea is that the state cannot command complete obedience of the individual because of the existence of a higher law, call it Divine Law, Natural Law or Right Reason, that sets the norms for all laws and the individual has the right to resist any law of the political authority if it violates the higher law finding expression through an individual's conscience or rules of morality.

The present author has rightly started his study from Socrates who was the first to formulate the core of the modern argument for civil disobedience. This is also important because Gandhi who is credited with having developed the concept and technique of civil disobedience in clear terms in the modern times, derived inspiration from Socrates' trial as stated in Plato's *Apology*. He summarized it in Gujrati and serialised it in *Indian Opinion* in 1908. What impressed Gandhi most was Socrates' moral strength to follow virtue even at the cost of his life. He looked upon him as the first satyagrahi. The author then moves on to the examination of the concept of civil disobedience of John Locke (Chapter 2) and Henry Thoreau (Chapter 3) before analysing Gandhi's view of civil disobedience (Chapter 4).

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The study would have been more useful had the author also discussed arguments of several other ancient, medieval and modern western political thinkers claiming superiority of Divine Law or Natural Law over the laws of the state. For instance, "A true law," according to Cicero, "applies to all men and neither the Senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law." Similarly, Aquinas holds that "unjust laws are acts of violence rather than laws and that such laws do not bind in conscience."

Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the concept of civil disobedience and the last Chapter distinguishes it from the concepts of rebellion and revolution while studying its justification in the context of law and order. The burden of this thesis is that civil disobedience is different from rebellion and revolution, for its object is not the overthrow of the government or abolition of the political order but is limited only to the violation of a particular law of the state which violates the conscience of a civil disobedience practitioner who is a law-abiding person but is constrained to violate an unjust law because of a moral compulsion. Civil disobedience is defined as an illegal, public, non-violent and conscientious act committed to change what is considered to be the unjust laws and policies of the government. (p 69) A civil disobedience practitioner works within the framework of the government and readily accepts punishment for the violation of the law of the established authority.

This may be true to some extent. But this was not the case with the civil disobedience movement carried on by Gandhi. The author admits that Gandhi's Satyagraha was far more comprehensive than civil disobedience which was only a branch of Satyagraha. But it is not correct to say that Gandhi's civil disobedience had only a limited purpose of protesting against unjust laws and not elimination of the British rule. This is how the author argues: "It was by Satyagraha as non-co-operation and not as civil disobedience that Gandhi wanted to overthrow the British regime. Civil disobedience on the contrary was concerned with redress of specific grievances which originated from laws considered to be unjust by the civil disobedient."

It is true that the civil resistance programme at Bardoli in 1922 had a limited object. But it was integrally connected with the non-co-operation movement. It was the next stage in the sequence of the non-co-operaiion movement. Its scope and area were kept limited, because of the strategy of the Satyagraha or non-violent technique of fighting imperialism. Similarly, though the objects of the civil disobedience of 1930 was limited, it is not correct to say that it did not aim at freedom. Civil disobedience can develop into a rebellion. As Gandhi said: "Complete civil disobedience is a state of peaceful rebellion—a refusal to obey every single state-made law." Civil disobedience can be of various types depending upon the situation and the goals of the satyagrahis or practitioners of civil disobedience. The subject, therefore, demands more exhaustive and deeper study in the light of

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Gandhi's various movements. Historical and political perspectives cannot be ignored in studying such subjects.

Punjab University, Chandigarh. S.L. MALHOTRA

S.L. MALHOTRA: From Civil Disobedience to Quit India : Gandhi and the Freedom Movement in Punjab and Haryana—1932-42. Punjab University, Chandigarh, 1979, xii, 188p., Rs. 40.

THIS is a short study of the political developments in undivided Punjab during the period 1932-42 by a Gandhian scholar. It begins with the resumption of the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1932, after Gandhi's return from London where he attended the Round Table Conference and ends with the launching of the Quit India Movement in 1942. It would have been much better if the author had included the first phase of the Civil Disobedience Movement (1930-31) also in this study and had carried though the development of the Quit India Movement till the time of its withdrawal in 1944. This would have enabled him to give a more full and compact treatment to the two movements in one region. It would have also helped him in drawing more appropriate conclusions.

In the Civil Disobedience Movement, Punjab's contribution was considerable; out of sixty or seventy thousand persons who had been arrested all over India, seven thousand belonged to the Punjab. The AICC recorded that the highest provincial totals of convictions during the Movement of 1930-31, were those of Bihar, Orissa, Bengal, UP and Punjab. The author does not give the figures of the second phase of the Movement, nor does he attempt a detailed social analysis of the participants. He has been content to state that they came from the urban middle classes. Lahore, Amritsar and Rohtak were the most active districts in this Movement.

Then again, the Quit India Movement has been treated in a sketchy manner. In fact, he has written more about the government policy and the all-India character of the Movement than about the course and character of the Movement in the Punjab region. Heavy reliance is placed on official reports; no attempt is made to collect and utilize local data, either in the form of interviews or pamphlets and bulletins. Lyallpur and Rohtak districts played an important role in this Movement. On the whole, Punjab gave a poor show—and this is attributed by Dr. Malhotra to factionalism which was rampant in the then state.

There is also a good deal of discussion of Unionist Party policies as also the politics of the Muslisms, the Sikhs and the Hindu Mahasabha in this region. This gives some insights. The author also shows that the Muslims by and large kept aloof from these two Movements but the Sikhs responded

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enthusiastically in the case of the Civil Disobedience Movement but withdrew support from the Quit India Movement. Malhotra shows that the Governor played an active role in the politics of the Punjab by dividing the communities and achieved considerable success in this because of the factional and elite character of the politics of the province.

In conclusion, the author shows how, in a province known as the sword-arm of India, Gandhi's name was widely respected, however much the people there may have differed on the use of non-violence or the spinning-wheel as weapons to fight a mighty power. This study is a useful addition to the growing literature on the national movement in a regional setting, though the work lacks depth.

New Delhi — AMBA PRASAD

Economic Development and Social Institutions

S. JAYAPANDIAN: Convertibility Clause and Investment Climate—An IFMR Survey. Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1980, xiii, 68p., Rs. 15.

D. ARUNA: Social Cost Benefit Analysis. Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1980, xiii, 124p., Rs. 25.

SUCCESS in promoting industrial development depends mainly on the effective utilization of resources available to the industrial enterprises. Any attempt to tamper with this process is bound to have a deleterious effect on the pace of industrialization. The *Convertibility Guidelines* issued by the Government of India in 1971 to all Indian term-lending institutions have had the effect of impeding the growth of investment and dampening industrial climate in the country. This is, in essence, the conclusion of a study undertaken by Professor S. Jayapandian—*Convertibility Clause And Investment Climate—An IFMR Survey.*

The study based on an Institute for Financial Management and Research survey of a fairly representative group of companies likely to attract the provisions of the convertibility clause concludes with a strong plea to the government for discontinuation of the experiment, before it irretrievably damages the already impaired economy of the country. Jayapandian feels that, on purely economic consideration, there is no justification for the continuance of the convertibility clause. However, unlike S.L.N. Simha who would not compromise on anything less than complete withdrawal, the author seems to be content with the mere removal of the major irritants attached to the clause. Notwithstanding these differences, their agreement on the adverse impact of the convertibility clause is fairly clear.

While the publication of the book might not set at rest the controversy surrounding the convertibility clause, the merit of Jayapandian's work lies

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in successfully extracting the impressions of some 35 companies (the IFMR Questionnaire was, in fact, sent to 230 companies of which only 48 responded), on various issues relating to the operation of the convertibility clause and putting them in a compact and readable form. These are contained in Chapter 2 of the book. In the preceding chapter, the author has attempted to study the convertibility stipulation in a historical perspective, enumerated various dimensions of the convertibility provision, and finally presented available data on the operation of the conversion option. While acknowledging the importance of convertible debentures in raising long-term resources, Jayapandian does not favour indiscriminate conversion of loans into equity by lending institutions. He, in fact, provides illustrations of the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) and the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) resorting to the convertibility clause only as a measure of extending relief to assisted companies.

It is in Chapter 3, that the author summarizes the consensus opinion of the companies interviewed by the IFMR and advances a few remedies to mitigate the harmful effects of the convertibility clause in case it is retained. Almost all the respondents to the IFMR questionnaire opposed the introduction of the convertibility clause predominantly on the ground that this was a surreptitious attempt to nationalise the private sector. Even though there are no precedents to the use of the convertibility clause as a pretext for taking over management, such a possibility is not ruled out. It is essentially this apprehension which prevents entrepreneurs from undertaking expansion and modernization programmes. The author of the book provides strength to the argument of industrialists by challenging the very justification of the Dutt Committee recommendations. The fact that government should share equitably in the fruits of successful industrial enterprise does not, according to the author, warrant the use of the convertibility clause. He cites a whole range of fiscal instruments at the government's command which enable it to achieve the above mentioned objective.

In the event of the government not agreeing to the withdrawal of the convertibility clause, Jayapandian makes a number of useful suggestions intended to remove the irritants attached to the clause. While advocating that there should be no discrimination in the use of the convertibility option and that there should be a concessional rate of interest on the convertible part of the loan and early disposal of shares acquired as a result of conversion, he makes an appeal to the government to declare its intention of not resorting to take-over in the form of a policy decision. Repeated assurances by financial institutions or even the latest modifications announced by the finance minister in his 1980-81 budget speech are not enough to help in reviving the industrial climate and raising the rate of investment.

Market imperfections are, perhaps, more pronounced in developing countries than in advanced industrialized countries. The government's frequent intervention in international trade, persistent inflation and the

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existence of widespread disguised unemployment, all go on to make market prices unrepresentative of the true contribution of real goods and services to the society's aggregate consumption. Consequently, the private profitablity of investment in a particular project differs from its social profitability. It is this divergence between the two which suggests the need for adopting the social cost-benefit analysis approach for taking resource allocation decisions. Social cost-benefit analysis is considered all the more essential in developing countries in view of the high intensity of the imperfections enumerated above.

The book by Ms. D. Aruna provides a simple and fairly comprehensive introduction to the social cost-benefit analysis. Steering herself through theoretical controversies, the author starts by making the reader familiar with some of the major issues relating to cost-benefit analysis in Chapter 1. Next, she attempts to establish a theoretical case for adopting the social cost benefit analysis for purposes of taking investment decisions. Persistent deviations from the world of perfect competition, particularly in developing countries, have been invoked as the main argument in favour of the use of the so-called (or accounting) prices in cost-benefit computations. The second chapter also provides a brief outline on accounting prices and the mechanics of cost-benefit analysis.

In the next two chapters, the author provides, in considerable detail, a survey of the existing literature on the cost-benefit approach concentrating mainly on the three predominant approaches that have been developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Bank. Aruna's added contribution lies mainly in bringing out, quite effectively, major elements of similarities and dissimilarities between different approaches. If only for the sake of completeness, it may be desirable to point out that notwithstanding differences in matters of detail all the three methods of project evaluation provide a judicious blend of the benefits of a decentralized pricing system and national objectives such as equitable distribution of income.

In the last chapter, the author discusses the application of cost-benefit analysis in the Indian context elaborating on the methods of evaluation used by the World Bank, ICICI and PAD (Project Appraisal Division in the Planning Commission), the three pioneering institutions actively associated with project execution in one way or the other. In the concluding section, Aruna pinpoints the necessity of incorporating cost-benefit analysis in our planning and developmental exercises on a more or less permanent basis. The planning authority, in the author's view, should be entrusted the task of computing "accounting prices" for all the national parameters likely to affect cost-benefit calculus of an entrepreneur. Aruna is fully conscious of the conceptual and operational difficulties involved in the use of shadow prices. Accordingly, she feels that the information supplied by the planning

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authority should only be considered as guidelines to resource allocation exercise and not just the decision in favour of a given project.

Fertilizer Association of India,
New Delhi.

UTTAM C. GUPTA

LEON SWARTZBERG, Jr.: The North Indian Peasant Goes to Market. Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1979, xiii, 163p., Rs. 50.

THE book gives an account of the socio-economic system of a north Indian village which, being situated on the fringe of an urban settlement, has been exposed to the operation of market forces. It is based primarily on information and data gathered by the author through the participant observation method supplemented by information obtained through secondary sources like village records, district gazeteers, other books and documents. The author lived for a period of eighteen months from the beginning of 1964 to the middle of 1965 in the village—Phulia Tola situated near the town of Khagaul, near Danapore Railway Station (in the Patna district of Bihar), which is on the main railway route to Calcutta. The manuscript originally prepared for the Ph.D. thesis of an American University has now been published as a book. However, no attempt has been made to update the information and review the text while placing it before a wider circle of readers including those from India who being familiar with most of what is presented in the book may not find it of much interest and use. There are pages after pages which give useless details of persons and events which could have been either avoided or abridged substantially. There are quotations several of which are not very relevant or useful. I feel that the book would have had a more interesting reading had its size been reduced by atleast one third.

The title of the book is a little misleading. It arouses expectations which are not fulfilled. The study is not based on a cross-section of several north Indian villages, but only one village which itself cannot be described as representative of the state or the district in which it is situated, not to say of the entire north India as a whole. Phulia Tola is an uni-caste village whereas most of the villages are multi-caste. Hence the book does not provide any information on interactions between different castes and occupations which is such an important feature of rural life in India. Moreover crop production is the most important part of village output and the bulk of the peasants come in contact with the market economy through marketing of crops. But the village selected is such that it does not provide any scope for this. Instead attention is focussed on marketing of milk, butter and ghee, i.e. the dairy products in which the inhabitants of the village who belong to the Yadava caste specialise. Even here, the author fails to give a graphic account of the operation of the market forces, the determination of prices, the

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differences between the price received by the village producers and that paid by the urban consumers, etc. Contrary to what the title suggests, there is not much on the interaction between household economy and market economy.

The book however, gives a good description as well as an analysis of the socio-economic condition of the selected village during the period of observation. It is to the credit of the author that, unlike many other foreigners, he has been able to understand and grasp the basic realities of the social and economic life of an Indian village. The book shows how ownership and possession of land occupies an important place in the village, how savings generated out of income of land or any other source such as dairying or trading, or government service, are invested in acquiring more land, fair and foul means are used to keep the land within the family, how disputes over land are the most common cause of conflict. There is a detailed description of the working of the joint family system—how it is useful, how it survives and how it breaks down. There are elaborate descriptions accompanied by perceptive analysis of the marriage system and celeberations, law suits, characteristics of a peasant economy, etc. The book also throws light on the process of formation and expansion of a new village settlement with particular reference to the important part played in it by caste and kingship. It draws our attention to the changes being brought about in village life on account of the pressure of increasing population and influence of urban life and culture resulting in the emergence of tea stalls as new social centres, movement for upcasting of certain backward castes led by the new rich among them, increasing value of receiving education and securing government service, reduced availability of land for grazing due to extension of crop cultivation on account of rising population, more frequent contact with urban centres as participants in wage and commodity markets and so on. It shows how a rise in income from dairying led to less aid and less consumption of milk by villagers themselves. Milk thus became "too valuable to drink." It also led to substitution of women by men for going to the market to sell milk and milk products as they became "too important" to be left "in the hands of women."

The style is lucid, presentation effective and at times the analysis becomes really penetrating. Some of the details mentioned in the book speak well of the author's keen sense of observation. On the whole, the book may be more useful to foreign readers interested in familiarising themselves with the basic facts of village life in the country, than to those in India who may find very little that is new.

KAMPTA PRASAD

Indian Institute of Public Administration,
New Delhi.

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ARVIND K. SHARMA: Management Development in Public Enterprise. Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1979, xxiii, 503p., Rs. 120.

THE chronic attitudes at governmental decision-making levels, especially the financial control points, that have plagued the public sector in India since its very beginning has been the bureaucratic *non-possumus* : "Put up your factory first, then you will have something to manage, and we can then see about provisioning for its management," and only the most determined and untiring struggle by a few at the very top has had any effect, a scattered effect at that. This attitude has been about the most significant of the prime causes of the shortfalls in management efficiency and of the enormous losses that have come upon the tax-payer in India, from whose pockets have come the huge investments of public funds and the administrative establishments for the public sector.

While it takes less than three years to contract for and set down on the ground a major industrial project, such as a fertilizer plant or a steelworks, how long does it take a country like India to build up practically from scratch, the vast managerial and technological cadres and to develop management efficacy to man those projects at different levels ? It is the lack of sufficient realisation of this and of the neglect to develop management cadres and skills, even after the negative experience of a quarter century or more, that has left India towards the end of 1980 with many of its largest and most critical public enterprises literally top-less, without chairmen, without managing directors and so on lower down the management rungs.

In a situation such as this, a book like Sharma's *Management Development in Public Enterprises* is doubly welcome. Although the author deals almost exclusively with the situation in England, where the structures and methods in public enterprise are in several ways different from India and cannot be applied here, with simple extrapolation, it provides many guideposts and indeed many cautionary tales, that those at the top decision-making levels could with profit take to heart and act before the piling up of losses becomes truly unmanageable.

The main body of the book is the substance of a doctoral thesis in an English University by an Indian aspirant to the Ph.D. there and is a commendable contribution towards better public sector management and control. It does not attempt to cover the whole gamut of management and management problems; this is all to the good. The author examines a precisely defined problem area, namely, the career/training/development of managers in English public enterprises; within this chosen topic, the presentation is almost definitive. Sharma presents some original discoveries (handsomely acknowledged by his mentor Professor Tivey) and fresh thinking in the process of his research. The text is succinct, the author's diction (for a change in India) good English.

The comparisons made between the different modes of training on-the-job, institutions, and so on, for the different managerial levels is instructive, as

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also the role of those engaged in training. I share a bias in favour of in-plant training, with occasional institutional refresher courses; and there should be far better arrangements than there are for management exposure to the rapidly increasing scientific and technological availabilities as an integral part of managerial development. These are topics that could do with serious efforts in India.

Almost half of this large volume is given over to appendices; a matter that must draw a reviewer's critical examination. In this case, the texts and tables in the appendices could with advantage be presented in more summary form without loss of substance.

A very short, but selective section has been added by the author, dealing with management development in public undertakings in India. One may express the hope that Sharma will undertake, or guide (if indeed he has not already done so), a fuller examination of the Indian scene. It would be a valuable addition to the still pathetically small amount of Indian literature on the public sector.

New Delhi. S.S. KHERA

MAN SINGH DAS and PANOS D. BARDIS (*Eds.*): The Family in Asia. Vikas Publishing House (Pvt.) Ltd., New Delhi, 1978, xxviii, 431p., Rs. 95.

THE book aims at introducing family structures and family relationships in countries of the Asian region. These present a wide variety of socio-cultural and economic conditions. The countries which have received attention are: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Japan, South Korea. Thailand and the Philippines.

There are thirteen contributors to the volume, including the two editors who, besides writing an introduction and a conclusion, have also presented results of sample studies carried out by them. The Foreword by Lynn Smith contains a biography of Karl Zimmerman in whose honour the book has been produced. The opening essay on theoretical overview by Robert J. Lazer is organised around a comparison of the traditional and modern forms of the Asian family and society. Except three sample studies from India, all the other essays in this collection are generalized accounts of the traditional structures and changing aspects of the institution of family. A majority of the contributors have made use of relevant area-specific empirical, analytical, and conceptual writings produced in the last few decades. In some cases field experiences and results of sample studies carried out by the authors themselves have also gone into these essays.

In terms of information base, approach and presentation, contributions differ in quality, but on the whole *The Family in Asia* is a useful compendium of sociological analyses of the family in some of the most heavily populated parts of the world. Given a reasonably efficient distribution, the book can

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prove to be of much help in updating and reorganizing specialized courses in the area of the family and marriage in universities.

It is the editor's hope that these accounts would help the readers to discuss the similarities and differences in the family structures of a wide variety of countries. To a serious reader the volume certainly holds this promise. While a broad framework provided by the editors has ensured common thematic coverage of the field (such as historical background, forms of family/household, child rearing practices and socialisation, sex and age roles, and authority pattern—with a consideration of changes in all these areas), contributors have tried to bring out much that is specific and significant about the instituion and its correlates as also their wider contexts; some have of course been more successful than the others in this respect. Only a few references can be made here. While dealing with the emergence of the modern Chinese family after the revolution, Aline Wong lays stress on the decline of clan authority, development of egalitarian relationships between husband-and-wife, change in the authority pattern, and replacement of centrality of father-son relationship by that of husband-wife relationship. Harold Smith's lucidly written essay on the rural family in Thailand emphasises the flexibility in division of labour, choice of marital residence, respect for age, role of the extended kin groups, and the need to curb the typical male attitude of irresponsibility. By contrast, in Afghanistan, as pointed out by Jamil Hanafi, the most important unit is patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal extended family household, there is a clear cut division of labour and a contrast between males and females with a distinct superiority of the male. The role of Taifeh or larger network of relatives in Iran has been well brought out by Jacquiline Rudolph-Touber. The Filipino family, by Gloria V. Javillonar, is a well-informed piece which gives adequate evidence of the author's grasp of the culture and society in the Philippines.

Though somewhat ramblingly done, Dae H. Chang's essay on the Korean family gives the principles traditionally governing the institutions of marriage and the family; namely, continuity of the line and ancestor worship and takes us through the past, beginning 14th century to the present day and also to future prospects. Minako Korokawa Maykovich utilises a number of social scientific studies on Japan to present a comparison between the pre-Second World War situation, when Japan took to westernisation in the material and instrumental areas but retained family values, and the post-World War Japanese family heading towards radical change. An examination of the family in Pakistan from the point of view of modernization and social change attempted by J. Henry Korson lacks cogency and therefore gives only a hazy picture.

India has received special attention from the editors. In all there are five essays on India. In his article on the joint family, Giriraj Gupta has chosen to support his statements with references to empirical data in anthropological and sociological studies for over thirty years. Besides mutilating the dimension of time this style has seriously marred the continuity and flow of

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the essay. Man Singh Das has contributed two sample studies on inter-caste and inter-religious marriages while Panos Bardis presents results of a sample study on attitudes towards abortion among university students. These three studies provide clear indications of changes occurring in the area of the family and marriage. Promila Kapur's innovative attempt to deal contextually with various aspects of the institutions of the family and marriage, while keeping the main focus on women and their status and problems, is creditable.

In the Introduction by the editors, the countries included in the book have been classified into most developed, developing, and less developed. Japan falls in the category of highly developed, while Afghanistan and Thailand are put in the category of less developed. All the rest are in the category of "developing" countries. The basis and logic of this classification are however not clear and its explanatory value appears to be negligible. Moreover, the comparison of family structures in less developed and highly developed countries attempted by the editors is not at all convincing; in fact it is misleading to a great extent. Further, this comparative statement does not take into account the differences in family structures due to contrasting kinship systems nor does it consider the influence of differences of ecology, etc. For example Thailand and Afghanistan, both of which have been classified as less developed countries, have very different family systems.

The Family in Asia can be of use to scholars and students provided its limitations are borne in mind.

Institute of Rural Management,
Anand.

LEELA DUBE

BINOD C. AGRAWAL: Cultural Contours of Religion and Economics in Hindu Universe. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, viii, 216p., Rs. 80.

RAGHUVIR SINHA: Family to Religion: A Theoretical Exposition of Basic Social Institutions. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xi, 222p., Rs. 60.

THE first book by Agrawal is based on data collected in the district of Dhar in Central India. The author sought to explore, presumably, the economic life of the people taking into consideration, not only the organization of *jati* relationships but also spatial networks. This was a good decision to have taken, as it enabled him to combine the advantages of intensive and sustained questioning and observation with a reasonably extensive spatial coverage. While he explored the universe of his study, employing the concept of "networks", he sought to integrate his findings by adopting the "systems approach."

He explains how he came to choose Dhar and how he found it useful to organise his fieldwork in terms of the yearly calendar of activities. He, then,

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presents an interesting discussion of how the district boundaries came to be defined immediately before the British imperium and, then, how the district became on open sub-system through the extension of various kinds of "frontiers". The people and their social and economic organisation are then analysed, leading the reader to the "religio-economic networks" of Dhar.

Agrawal provides a well-written and focused account of various dimensions of life at a number of levels, with the district level treated as a hinge, as it were. This is welcome because studies of this kind are not many.

Agrawal contends that his researches revealed the inapplicability of the mutually exclusive categories of "economics" and "religion" in the context of Hindu society. "A new category has been proposed," writes the author, "to analyze such data of the Hindu universe. The term 'religio-economic' has been coined to refer to the new category." (p. 182) This is, he further clarifies, a "middle category" which belongs to the domain of *emic* concepts.

I am generally suspicious of hyphenated terms and Agrawal's "religio-economic category does little to dispel my scepticism. If religio-economic represents an *emic* category, why does not a "native" term for it exist? It would seem that the author did not proceed far enough in his analysis: if he had, he might have come to the conclusion that when "middle categories" are posited, the search for the encompassing category must be pursued relentlessly so that both the economic and the religious categories may be transcended. Another manner of approaching the problem would have been to ask: Is the "Hindu universe" so structured that religion is constitutive of society? It is to be regretted that Agarwal, having identified an important problem, chose to be satisfied with a superficial solution.

Another general conclusion of Agrawal's book to which I would like to draw attention is his characterization of the relations between the *jatis* participating in the *jajmani* relationships as dualistic (though he does not use this word). Thus, while the client/patron households are said to look upon the services of a priest as "religious acts," the priest's perspective is a different one—"economic." I draw attention to this for two reasons.

First, Agrawal rightly acknowledges the importance of the dualistic perspective because what we are concerned with are relationships and, in their simplest form, these are dyadic; so there may be two ways of looking at the same relationship. But we must go beyond saying just that.

Second, Agrawal suddenly abandons his religio-economic category without explaining the reasons for doing so. Surely, the "religious act" has economic costs for the *jajman;* and the priests (some priests at any rate!) do believe that what they do is more than earn their living. In short, Agrawal does not seem to have extracted from his data as much as he might have. The book is, however, to be recommended for the data that it does contain and the researchable questions it raises.

It may also be added, that Agrawal's book, which has grown out of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Wisconsin, has taken six years

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to appear after the publishers accepted it. This is one of the many aspects of the exploitatative relationships that exist between Indian Publishers and their hapless authors. It is time something was done about it!

If Agrawal did not seek enough by way of general conclusion, Raghuvir Sinha, author of the second book under review, proclaims in the opening sentences of the Preface that he has "been deeply interested in theories and concepts from the day I knew anthropology. And the more I knew it, I wished to write a book on the theory of social anthropology." Regrettably, what he has produced is an old-fashioned and out-of-date text book. He deals with the family, marriage, kinship, clanship, magic science and religion. He sees in this assemblage of themes "a continuity of historical perspective," "the nucleus" of human society, and , therefore, also "the nucleus" of "all anthropological sciences." Frankly, I am puzzled by all this!

The quality of the work may be judged from the opening sentence of the first chapter—"When God made the world, He must have first thought of a marriage and through it of a family." (p. 1) No comment is necessary. One feels very uncomfortable reading about kinship in this book without a mention even in the bibliography of *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* or of Fortes's *magnum opus, Kinship and the Social Order*. The debate between descent and alliance theorists is ignored. As for religion and ritual, Victor Turner's work or Veena Das's does not seem to have come to Sinha's notice; Srinivas, the students would conclude. wrote nothing on the subject; his Coorg book occurs in the bibliography, but is mistitled as *Marriage and Society among the Coorgs of South India*.

One feels sorry, for the author had earlier made some useful contributions to Indian ethnography. He is a sincere person and, obviously, also hard-working. The world of scholarship is, however, very demanding and Sinha's book is very disappointing. Even the text books he has drawn upon are fairly old. One hopes the author will, in future, concentrate on what he is able to do well.

Institute of Economic Growth,
Delhi.

T.N. MADAN

R. JAYARAMAN: Caste and Class : Dynamics of Inequality in Indian Society. Hindustan Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1981, viii, 168p., Rs. 60.

TO write on caste and class today immediately assures one of attention from both the laity and the academicians. This theme has by now attained the dimensions of a fad much as village studies had a decade earlier. This is probably the most important reason why this book was published at all, or even why the author decided to bring together eight essays published over ten years in the form of a book. It is quite obvious that the author did not have a singular "tack" in mind while writing these essays, though in the

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introduction to the book he says he did and that he is greateful to his students for bearing with him. Different concerns seem to have prompted R. Jayaraman to write these pieces, and, as far as Chapter 4 is concerned, one has to exercise one's imagination to the utmost to justify how this chapter was at all included.

As for the tack the author is purportedly pursuing, the reviewer fails to realize anything novel about it and is at a loss as to why the author should thank his students for their fortitude and for their acting as effective sounding boards. In the opening chapters of the book, the author states his agreement with the orthodox Srinivas approach that caste is caste no matter what. If castes are competing economically, politically, ritually, and so on, they still are acting fundamentally as castes. From here, the author proceeds to say, and perhaps the "tack" is here, that castes have always competed politically even though they may not have done so in other spheres. But in his own study of village politics the author cites examples of economic competition which characterise, and indeed to a great extent contribute to caste and village politics. So then, instead of one tack we are infact faced with two, where one tack attacks another.

As a matter of fact in Chapter 7, the best essay in the book, the author's documentation reveals that past political performance and economic competition are the primary factors which influenced the voting behaviour of the inhabitants of the villages under study. He also shows multiple sources of conflict most of which have very little connection with casteism as such. And yet he concludes, like a good student of Srinivas, that caste, kinship, and other primordial loyalties determine the political attitudes and responses of the villagers. The conclusion comes as a shock to any one who has carefully gone through his data. However, despite this forced conclusion this chapter still remains the most interesting chapter. The readers will be surprised to know that the Brahmins, of the village under study, were behind the DMK. It is the situational specificity rather than political ideologies that seem to matter most to the electorate. The study of the Tamil migrants in Ceylon is also interesting as it details the persistance of casteism aided by the process by which Tamil migrants secured employment outside the traditional village occupation, and outside the traditional village itself. The role of the *Kanganis* (who seem to be the local variant of the Sirdar system in the North East), and the security that the *Kanganis* are able to assure the employers strengthens the dependence of the migrants on other castes and keeps alive the notion of casteism among them. But as this emerges out of a situation of abject dependence and not so much out of traditional unreflexive sentiments, it helps us to understand the social roots behind compliance to the caste system in general.

Except for these two chapters the book has nothing substantial to offer. Srinivas and Beteille's positions have been restated through most of the book, atleast in the first three chapters. There is a smattering of the modernization theorists here and there, cursory references to Weber, and thoroughly

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inadequate quotes from Marx. In publishing these essays in a book form under a provocative title, the author can only hope to capitalise on the current fad for caste and class studies.

Jawaharlal Nehru University, DIPANKAR GUPTA
New Delhi.

Indian Art

S.P. GUPTA: The Roots of Indian Art. B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1980, xx, 378p., Rs. 300.

SINCE the inception of critical studies of Indian Art a century ago, there has been considerable speculation in regard to the beginnings of the Indian artistic traditions particularly architecture and sculpture. Opinions have been sharply divided on periodisation and stylistic origins. While one group of scholars have argued that there is a marked continuity from the neolithic and chaleolithic period into what has been called the historic period, others have drawn attention to the constant inflow of foreign influences and the borrowings from Central Asian and Western Indian civilizations. For nearly a hundred years, there has been a debate on the origins of the Ashokan Pillar. No historian of Indian art has remained untouched by this controversy. Critical scholarship on this issue is second in volume and earnestness only to that other debate on the origins of the Buddha image. Just when people had begun to accept the near conclusive statement of Coomaraswamy about its Indian origin, Van Lohuzian's latest work re-opened it. John Irwin, on the other hand, has been responsible for re-opening the debate on early Mauryan Art. It is against the background of this lively debate that Gupta's contribution has to be understood and evaluated. This is clearly a contextual study coming in the wake of a long history of debate. For students of Indian art and architecture, it is meaningful and interesting as a further step in an ongoing scholastic debate rather than as an original re-assessment which begins to look at the traditions afresh. Indeed the author is fully conscious of this background and his goal of re-evaluating recent critical opinions on the subject. His introductory remarks clearly state that it was John Irwin's lectures and a subsequent exchange of letters which stimulated and resulted in this impressive volume of 340 pages with 4 coloured plates, 120 monochrome plates and a large number of line drawings.

The period of Gupta's study is the formative period of Indian Art—third and second centuries B.C.—Mauryan and late Mauryan. The author begins by attempting to provide a conceptual base for his study in the chapter entitled "Backdrop." Therafter the data is examined and divided neatly into: "The Pillars," "The Ringstones," "The Sculpture and Art Motifs"

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and "The Terracottas." This is followed by two chapters, one each on the "Rock Cut Caves" and the "Architectural Remains of Old Pataliputra"—Vaisali, Piprawah, Amravati, etc. The last chapter entitled "The Polemics," deals with an outline history of Western Asia and its relationship with the Pre-Mauryan and Mauryan Art especially in the development of motifs such as the Nāga and Nāgapushpa, lotus, Srivats, Triratna, Trishula, etc. A short final chapter sums up the findings of the author. The volume is useful for the sheer extensive nature of the data collected and the marshalling of evidence drawn from a very large variety of sources, primary, secondary and tertiary.

In the Preface, the author states that since the delivery of John Irwin's lecture on the Ashokan Pillar in 1975, questions arose in his mind regarding the hypothesis presented by John Irwin wherein he attributed the pillars to concepts described in Vedic literature. The author thus sets to reconcile the views of the two opposing schools, one led by (Late) Dr. Nihar Ranjan Ray who believed that the Greeks and the Persians provided the inspiration and possibly the skills, and the other headed by Vasudev Saran Agrawal who argued that the pillars and the motifs were deeply rooted in Vedic thought. Gupta finds both lop-sided. His book is an effort to prove the pitfalls of either school. In order to fully grasp the author's conclusion of presenting an alternate model at the end of his study, it is necessary to briefly follow his argument in the chapters enumerated above.

In the chapter called "Backdrop," Gupta sums up the entire history of scholarship on Indian art in two pithy sentences: "There are two clear-cut views on the roots of Indian art—one tracing them to the Vedic mythology and the other to West Asian art and architecture." Although this may be partially true, the history of critical scholarship alas is neither that simple nor clear cut. Also, although, he takes great pains to put forth the views of scholars ranging from R.P. Chanda to Marshall, Wheeler to Nihar Ranjan Ray and Percy Brown and others, the weakness of the agrument lies in the author not questioning further the hypothesis that "religions" and "secular" have been considered absolute categories by many of these authors. It lalso lies in the inability of the author to clearly identify what he calls the primitive folk village and town levels of society, the pre-literate and literate levels of society. This is all the more surprising because the author reproduces a graphic model showing this interaction used by Dr. Subhash C. Malik in his book on Indian civilization. If the interaction amongst the levels of society is an ongoing process quite clearly in historical terms, it would be erroneous to attribute the making of great sculpture to periods of urbanisation and of smaller pieces of art to village societies. It is apparent that while Gupta is keen not to identify himself with either of the two groups of art historians and is anxious to take up a sociological position, he is unable to clearly define his own sociological perimeters and the categories and thus the nature of the process. He may have done well to re-evaluate the primary categories used by his predecessors. He does not question these; instead he

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accepts them but questions the deductions. For example, he identifies the King's will and social mobility as the two main factors in the emergence of the nature of the artistic work, particularly motifs and their tenacity for survival. He makes a subtle distinction between the will of the King in Egypt, the will of the King in India and Greece; he argues that West Asian art was the handmaid of royalty and that in India, it was not that of religion but ethical and moral values and cosmic symbolism. Further he argues that only an economically well-organised society with surplus production brings about trade and commerce and thus cultural interaction and social mobility of one group of people (of a country with another). Closely analyzed, the argument is neither about monarchy and its impact on art, nor on social levels of society in a given region and their mutual interaction, but an attempt to prove that since the nature of monarchy was different than that obtaining in West Asia, and since the king was more accountable to the moral and cultural values which he shared with his subjects, the nature of the art was different. Also, because artistic activity was fostered and could only be fostered in a milieu of surplus economy and social mobility, there was interaction with other cultures and civilization but not slavish imitation.

Perhaps no fundamental issue can be taken with such an argument which is summed up as an alternate model called the historical situation, but whether this makes for a truly alternate model to the two opposing views is seriously debatable.

The above then is the core of Gupta's argument through the five intervening chapters. In each he tries to point at the indigenous situation, the socio-economic factors and the processes of interaction. He also points out the state of teachnology which conditions the artistc creation by delienating at some length the scientific and technological developments of particular periods.

In order to demonstrate his thesis of what may be called "historical situation" and the processes he conducts, case studies of the architectural pillars and the free-standing pillars, the honey-suckle motif, the padma lotus motif, the lion, bull, elephant capitals, the *purnaghata,* the motifs of the *Srivatsa,* the *triratna* and others. In each case, his methodology is identical. He presents the varying points of view, then delineates the archaeological numismatic data, literary sources and then sums up how neither the borrowing theory nor the theory of purely Indian origins is tenable and that the truth lies somewhere inbetween or by taking the totality of both. Gupta's main objection to the theory of West Asian or Persian models is that in India the function and purpose of this art is very different. It is no longer purely secular but has a moral ethical or ritualistic purpose. His objection to tracing the origins of most artistic motifs to Vedic mythology and cosmology is that there is no archaeological evidence to support the continuity. The value of Gupta's work lies in his collecting together data, specially on the history of critical evaluation, and not on his presenting a totally new hypothesis.

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For some decades now it has been generally accepted that India is not only a country of long continuities but also of change, mutation and transformation. Indeed this has now been accepted for most vital living civilizations which have an inbuilt rhythm of growth which provides for assimilation rejection, transformation and overlayering.

It is the overlayering which is the distinctive feature of the cultural traditions of India and if once this is conceded, then the controversies of both absolute borrowings or total attribution to Vedic mythology lose their edges and sharpness. To take the very case of the Ashokan free standing pillar or architectural pillar, can one really discount the monumental literary evidence in the Vedas relating to the *stambha, stampha* or the *yupa*? Is it also not a fact that precisely because the ritual-making of the altar and the establishment of the *yupa* was with purpose of design an ephemeral activity which was destroyed, there is no archaeological evidence. But does this tantamount to there being no continuity of this tradition? Do we not witness this phenomenon in the making of the images of Durga and Saraswati in contemporary India and their immersion in waters? Will it then amount to discounting that Durga puja is not held? Also the author himself repeatedly points at the principles of earth and sky which guide the destinies of Indian art throughout the historical period and that all the arts without exception and all Indian cosmologies whether Hindu, Buddhist or Jain follow these consistently. If so, then can the Vedic substratum of the conception of the "pillar" be totally discarded? Again, nature, plant, animal and man relationship is inherent to an Indian world view at any given period despite its innumerable permutations and combinations, and is this not most clearly articulated in Vedic Upanishadic thought and Brahamanical ritual? So why throw overboard the entire argument? Also, is it not borne out that in many historical periods many developments take place concurrently, and so the fecundity theme or the mother goddess was known to many regions of the ancient world; it was the most logical result of a perceived natural phenomenon. In such a situation, equally understandably, interactions and fusions take place sometimes called by the term "diffusionist" tendencies and autocthonous situations. If this be so, then the influence or role of the Iranian or West Asian art in the development of Indian art should not be surprising. The fact that the form is accepted without the contextual concept, or vice-versa occasionally where the form is constant and the content changes, should not be very surprising or new. The line of both continuity and change of an indigenous substratum which is constantly overlayered is fairly selfevident in the Indian tradition. It would thus appear to be labouring a point which today does not require advocates.

The discussion on the kingstones, for example, begins with an impressive marshalling of all data on kingstones. This is welcome for its own sake. Then the author goes on to demolish the identification of these figures with Śri of the *Śri Sukta* by V.S. Agrawala. Thereafter the auther examines the views of Moti Chandra and Pramod Chandra and comes to the conclusion

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that the methodology of referring to a literary description for identification should be discarded and that the iconographical description of *Sri* in *Sri Sukta* is vastly different from the actual representation of the nude goddess. The author then comes to the conclusion that the figures perhaps depict death and rebirth and regeneration; this argument is indeed the very thin edge of the wedge. Is fertility not connected with death? Gupta then goes on to state that the goddess perhaps represents many folk cults which are not easy to identify and which were not assimilated into the Vedic pantheon.

While it is true that Vedic cults did not or may not have assimilated all folk cults, it would be fallacious to presume that the magico-religious origin of some of these Ringstones was totally dissociated from the concept of the *Sri* in the *Sri Sukta*. The concept of *Sri* may well have emerged from the folk and tribal levels of society, as has been argued by Kosambi, and plurality of meaning and form is the core of Indian civilization. Nevertheless, it would be plain hair-splitting to believe that the identification of these images as mother goddesses or *Sri* of *Sri Sukta* and Gupta's identification of these images as representing the cycle of birth and death are fundamentally opposed to each other.

Though Gupta's documentation, his presentation of the history of interpretation is systematic, with an enviable clarity and comprehensiveness, yet all this marshalling of chronological data and the varying viewpoints is not used by the author to present a radically new interpretation. The study thus fails to be a convincing presentation demonstrating that the indigenous and the borrowing theory are both totally wrong. It only leads to the conclusion that there is some measure of truth in both but neither is complete. However, the mere collection of data, primary and secondary, is a challenging task and for this Gupta must be congratulated. If he has failed to present a new conceptual hypothesis or has occasionally argued on both sides or tried to reconcile views, it only goes to prove that despite a century and a half of historical critical writing on Indian art and its roots, it is still too vast and a complex field for final judgments and pronouncements. This is nevertheless a very brave and courageous attempt at collection of data drawn from literary, archaeological and inscriptional sources and at demonstrating that India both received and gave and that both archaeological and literary sources with a clearly defined chronology should be taken into account for identifying the proccesses of interaction, mutual influence amongst levels of society and different countries.

New Delhi KAPILA VATSYAYAN

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By **Ashok Jambhekar**

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences. (Managing Editor)

BALASUBRAMANIAN, K. *Inquiry Commission Against Gandhian Institutions: Why?* All India Gandhian Institutions Employees Union, Delhi, 1982, 35p., Rs. 3, Paper.

Welcoming the setting up of the Kudal Commission, this booklet attacks the functioning of the Gandhian institutions and some of its functionaries for their mismanagement.

CHATURVEDI, T.N. *Transfer of Technology Among Developing Countries: Need for Strengthening Co-operation.* Gitanjali, New Delhi, 1982, xii, 102p., Rs. 60.

Examines the various issues and experiences involved in the process of transfer of technology from the Developed to the Developing Countries. In this background it discusses the growing and wide scope of transfer of technology among developing countries themselves to their mutual advantage based on the study of Indian experience. The book also contains an illustrative list of industries where no foreign collaboration, financial or technical, is considered necessary by India and the areas of Indian know-how for industries and consultative services. A list of Indian Joint Ventures abroad —country-wise—as of June 1980 and the general guidelines governing clearance of Indian participation in joint ventures abroad is also appended.

CONTRACTOR, Minocher K. *Our Language Problem and Unity of India: An Approach.* The author, Surat, 1982. vi, 198p., Rs. 18.25, Paper.

Discusses the problem of the implementation of the three language formula and makes suggestions to overcome it in order to achieve national integration in its true spirit. The scheme of the author provides for adoption of two languages—Bharati (Hindi in roman script) and English—as the media of education by the entire country and urges that the roman script should be allowed over time to become the link script for the diverse languages that have been recognized by the Constitution of India as also Bharati and English.

DIWAKAR, R.R., *Bhagawan Buddha* (Bhavan's Book University, 67), Edn. 3, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980, x, 191 p., Rs. 13, Paper.

A comprehensive study of the life and teachings of the Apostle of Peace highlighting human appeal theme.

GULATI, I.S. *IMF Conditionality and Low Income Countries* (R.R. Kale Memorial Lecture, 1982). Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, 1982, 16 p., Paper.

Lecture deals with the general question of IMF conditionality in the context of the balance of payments, financing needs of low income developing countries, which according to IMF were the countries with per capita GNP of $ 300 or less in 1977.

IYER, K.V. *Liberalization of Industrial Policy.* The author, New Delhi, 1982, ii, 64p., Rs. 16, Paper.

Analyses industrial policy liberalisations beginning from the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948—the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951, the liberalisations announced in 1970, 1973 and 1980 and the policy statements made by the Minister for Industries, Steel and Mines on 21 April 1982 along with numerous related Press Notes and Notifications to help industrialists to get their capacity re-endorsement without undergoing the time-consuming formalities of obtaining a substantial expansion licence.

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JAIN, S.N. *Official Secrecy and the Press* (Silver Jubilee of the Indian Law Institute Publication, 1). N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, on behalf of Indian Law Institute and the Press Council of India, 1982, vi, 48 p., Rs. 15, Paper.

Discusses Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act 1923, with a focus on the need for an open government, obligation on the government to supply official information and the rights of journalists for obtaining information on account of their responsbility in a democratic polity. Press Council of India's recommendations for amending Section 5 are given in the Appendix.

KAMATH, M.V. (*Ed*)., *The India of Our Dreams: The Fourth Estate Speaks.* IBH Publishing Co., Bombay, 1982, xxii, 226 p., Rs. 25, Paper.

Representatives of the Press postulate their thoughts and stances on public issues as diverse as over-population, progressive education, inter-state cordiality, development of agriculture and industry and national solidarity, in an attempt to create a positive image of themselves and for assessment of the positive role which the Fourth Estate is capable of playing

NAIK, J.P. *Educational Reform in India: A Historical Review* (R.R. Kale Memorial Lecture, 1978) Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, 1978, 17 p., Paper.

Well-known and renowned educationist divides the history of education in modern India into three periods and discusses major educational reforms during these periods.

NARASIMHAIAH, B. *Neolithic and Megalithic Cultures in Tamil Nadu.* Sundeep, Delhi, 1980, xii, 257 p., Plates, Rs. 200.

Revised version of thesis based on the results of exploration in District Dharmapuri, Northern and Western taluks of District North Arcot and potential areas in South Arcot and Salem Districts.

SHIRI, Godwin. *Christian Social Thought in India: 1962-1977* (Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society: Social Concern Series), Christian Literature Society, Madras, on behalf of The Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society, Bangalore, 1982, xi, 195p., Rs. 20, Paper.

Revised version of Ph. D. thesis. It analyzes the responses of Indian Christian social thinkers during the period and the role of Indian Churches and Christians in developing a useful social analysis and a relevant Christian social thought which could motivate and help them to effectively confront the problems facing India. These are examined in the light of Christian social thought as was developed by the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society (CISRS). One chapter is devoted to the growth and activities of the CISRS from 1962 to 1977.

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ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews: Geography (half yearly)
Subscription: Single copy: Rs. 10, $2, Annual: Rs. 20, $4 (institutions) Rs. 15 (individuals).
ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews: Political Science (half yearly)
Subscription: Single copy: Rs. 10, $2, Annual: Rs. 20, $4 (institutions). Rs. 15 (individuals).

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PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT OR ONE PARTY DICTATORSHIP? THE CASE OF SRI LANKA*

By W.A. WISWA WARNAPALA**

The comparative parliamentary stability which Sri Lanka has been experiencing in the last three decades has been attributed to the strength of the country's political system. Some observers refer to "the survival of something close to a two-party parliamentary system, where the two major political parties, more often in association with the fragmented Left and the disintegrating communalist forces, compete for political power."[1] *The electoral changes in the period* 1956-77 *explain the existence of a two party system unique in character; it was this phenomenon which assisted in the working of a comparatively stable political system in the island. Despite the divergent ideologies which the political parties professed, they perhaps were committed to the orthodox characteristics of the Westminster model. Marxists were even more adamant than their political enemies in insisting on the observance of the rules, procedures and conventions of the parliamentary game of politics.*[2] *The* 1977 *electoral change and the subsequent political developments brought about a decline in the system of parliamentary government in Sri Lanka. The aim of this essay is to substantiate this view.*

I
BEGINNINGS OF DECLINE

1972 Constitution Erodes Confidence in Parliamentary Model

Some of the characteristics of this decline appeared long before the dawn of the victory of the United National Party (UNP) in July 1977. It was during the period of rule of the United Front led by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, when power was concentrated in an unicameral legislature, that the Constitution of 1972 came to be enacted. Though it remained essentially loyal to the Westminster model, the changes sponsored under its auspices eroded confidence in the parliamentary model; the special legislation introduced in connection with such issues as the April revolt, the National Press, foreign exchange offences and all varieties of judicial change reflected this trend in the parliamentary politics of the country. It was charged that there was a veiled attempt to interfere with the judiciary, and the parliamentary majority which sponsored these changes came to be dubbed the "tyranny of the two-thirds majority." The extension of the life of Parliament for a

*This is a revised version of a paper read at the South Asian Studies Seminar, University of Jaffna on 6 April 1982.

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period of five years from the date of promulgation of the 1972 Constitution was also opposed because Parliament would then run for a period of seven years. The Constituent Assembly indicated that this was contrary of the mandate obtained from the people in 1970.[3] The opposition took the view that periodic elections were necessary to maintain the confidence in the system of government, and the life of Parliament irrespective of the adoption of the Constitution of 1972 should be five years. In other words, they wanted the term of the 1970 Parliament to end in May 1975. The UNP made this a key issue in its opposition to the government; J.R. Jayawardene, the leader of the UNP, resigned his seat in Parliament. His return at the by-election, he emphasized was a vindication of the position that the electorate did not approve of the extension of Parliament's life for a period of seven years.

Two significant issues emerged from this UNP strategy, and they, in my view, threatened the continuity of parliamentary traditions in the country. A section of the parliamentary group of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by the Deputy Minister of Trade P.R. Ratnayake, attempted to introduce a resolution in the National State Assembly to prevent the MPs, who resigned their seats voluntarily, seeking re-election in the lifetime of the functioning of the National State Assembly. This resolution was placed before the government's parliamentary group and as many as 85 members supported the move to weaken the role of the private member in the National State Assembly.[4] The leadership of the United Front Government took a firm stand against this resolution and the opposition of a considerable section of the party led to its abandonment. The next move was to postpone the elections; a minister and several deputy ministers openly supported it while an influential section of the government condemned any attempt to postpone elections. The general controversy over this issue compelled the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike to make a categoric statement to the effect that elections would be held according to the requirements laid down in the Constitution.[5] Earlier, while discussing the issue of elections, she stated that her decision to hold elections was not in response to threats by the Opposition.[6] Though this statement, settled the issue relating to the postponement of elections it did not completely dispel the fear that the parliamentary system would be undermined.

Trade Union Activity Creates Crisis in Government Ranks

The parliamentary system was reduced to a sort of mockery during the last phase of the United Front Government. The railway strike in December 1976, and the subsequent trade union activity displayed in the form of a general strike, created a crisis within the ranks of the government. Such measures as the banning of public meetings, press censorship, the detention of people without trial and the use of the Essential Services Order against the workers compelled the Opposition to request the Prime Minister to negotiate with the workers who were on strike. This request was however

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not granted and came to be described as an attempt to disregard the role of the Opposition.

Parliament Prorogued

Two issues exposed the attitude of the government towards the parliamentary system. Two motions of no-confidence were pending against the government of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike; the first was in respect of the government's conduct in the December-January strike and the second related to the killing of a university student of the Peradeniya Campus. To avoid a confrontation with the Opposition on these motions of no-confidence, the government devised a form of parliamentary strategy. Parliament was prorogued on 10 February 1977; this prorogation remained operative till two days before the expiry of the life of the National State Assembly on 19 May 1977.

In the meantime, yet another development took place within the ranks of the government party. A radical group of MPs, associated with a trade union which took part in the December-January strike, broke away from the SLFP and formed themselves into the Sri Lanka People's Democratic Party. The Communist Party, which remained the only left wing group of the United Front after the expulsion of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) in December 1975, also broke away from the government on 19 February 1977. They, in fact, stated that the prorogation of Parliament had been effected without informing either the party or its representative in the Cabinet.[7] It was known that Peter Keuneman, the Minister of Housing and Construction, who was the Communist Party representative in the Cabinet, did not attend Cabinet meetings during this period of the crisis. The next important resignation was that of T.B. Subasinghe, the Minister of Industries and Scientific Affairs, who charged that there was "an invisible" government operating inside the government proper. Though such fissures within the ranks of the government immediately provoked it to prorogue Parliament, it strengthened the Opposition, which saw the whole exercise as an attempt to undermine its role.

The prorogation, in effect, meant that all business would be suspended until Parliament was summoned again; further, not only were sittings of Parliament at an end but all proceedings pending at the time were terminated. Hence every bill not yet passed would have to be reintroduced. This, in fact, represented the procedure adopted in the House of Commons. The 1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka however provided a different procedure as was enshrined in Section 41 (3). According to it, if the National State Assembly were prorogued, any bill introduced before such prorogation would have to be taken up from the stage at which the discussion was stopped prior to prorogation.[8] The most important provision embodied in the Constitution related to the interval between the termination of one session of the National State Assembly and the beginnings of another session.

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According to Section 41 (1) of the Constitution, the National State Assembly was to be "summoned to meet at least once a year;"[9] this, in effect, meant that a session of Parliament lasted about a year. The question, therefore, arose whether this condition could be satisfied in the context of a pending dissolution of Parliament. The primary purpose of the prorogation was thus to prevent any parliamentary drama being staged by the Ministers and Members of Parliament who had broken away from the Government ranks. Above all, the prorogation prevented them from making the customary explanations in the National State Assembly. All this indicates the utter disrespect by the government for parliamentary conventions.

During the period that Parliament had been prorogued, the government adopted certain measures which demonstrated its stand to the accepted modes of parliamentary behaviour. It referred two bills—the Abolition of Rajakariya Bill and the Banking Corporation of Sri Lanka Bill, which envisaged the nationalisation of privately owned foreign banks to the Constitutional Court as urgent bills. This created yet another controversy. The LSSP, referring to Section 54 of the Constitution, made representations to the Speaker that "it was unconstitutional to refer bills to the Constitutional Court when they have not been made available to the members of the National State Assembly."[10] In reply, the Speaker, on the basis of Section 55 of the Constitution, indicated his right to refer urgent bills to the Court. Dr. N.M. Perera, in an open letter to the Speaker, argued that he (Speaker) could not refer the bills to the Constitutional Court during the period of recess or hibernation.[11] He further stated that "it is only after the ceremonial opening of Parliament by the President that the Parliament starts to breathe again to become alive and active."[12] The Speaker, it was argued, had acted contrary to both the procedure adopted in Parliament and the precedents established over a period of decades in Sri Lanka. Section 55, on which the Speaker relied, had been conceived as a means of obviating the need for a Gazette Notification and any prolonged discussion in the Constitutional Court. This section, it was emphasized, was not devised in order to circumvent the normal procedure which had to be followed in the case of non-urgent bills. Above all, the two bills were not measures that merited the utilization of the urgency provisions of Section 55. The whole procedure, therefore, came to be criticized as anti-democratic and a violation of the spirit of the Constitution. Though the Ministers responsible for the introduction of the two bills indicated that they would be debated in the National State Assembly on 19 May 1977, the dissolution of the latter body completely negated the procedure adopted in respect of the two bills.

The prorogation and the subsequent dissolution of the National State Assembly created an anomolous situation in terms of parliamentary government and its conventions because the country was to be ruled thereafter for nearly six months without a functioning Parliament. This, in the eyes of the Opposition, was undemocratic because it afforded an opportunity

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for the Caretaker Government to function without the supervision of an elected Parliament.[13] Further, the failure to give the elected Parliament the opportunity to discuss the issue of the revaluation of the Sri Lanka Rupee was criticized as another attempt to ignore proper parliamentary procedure.[14] Though the dissolution of the National State Assembly was notified in the Gazette issued on 19 May 1977, it created yet another problem for the future government because the Gazette Notification announced the dates fixed for the General Election and the summoning of the new Parliament. According to the Presidential Proclamation, the date fixed for the summoning of the new Parliament was 26 August 1977. This was in accordance with Section 41 (6) which stated that the new NSA was to be summoned "to meet on a date not later than four months from the date of the Proclamation."[15] The Constitution had very explicity stated this position and it was obligatory on the part of the President to fix the date for both the General Elections and the summoning of the new Parliament. The gap between the date of the General Elections—21 July 1977—and the summoning of the new Parliament—26 August 1977—was five weeks and this, in effect, meant that the new Parliament could not meet before that to begin its work. Sections 98 and 99 of the Constitution of 1972 were no obstacle to the appointement of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The need, however, was to summon Parliament because there would be certain matters which required parliamentary authority in order to ensure the smooth working of the administration. The strategy of this extended date of summoning Parliament was devised by the outgoing Prime Minister in order to see whether she could "manoeuvre and bargain with the other parties to ensure her continuance as Prime Minister of the country."[16] She did not think of the predicament of the new government and conveniently ignored the fact that the country's legislature had been silenced for more than six months. The new Prime Minister, realizing the implications of the issue of the extended date, advanced the date of the summoning of the NSA to 4 August 1977. This, says Perera, was a violation of the spirit and letter of the Constitution because "only a Proclamation issued by Parliament at the time of dissolution can summon Parliament."[17] In such a situation it was suggested that an amendment, empowering the President to change the proclaimed date, should be passed with retrospective effect. This alone would remedy the constitutional irregularity.

II
UNP VICTORY FAILS TO STEM DECLINE

Absence of Effective Parliamentary Opposition

Though the massive electoral victory of the UNP in July 1977, indicated the political maturity of the Sri Lankan electorate, it failed to create the

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requisites for the effective functioning of the parliamentary system of government. The UNP, which had fielded 154 candidates at the General Election of 1977, obtained 140 seats in a legislature the strength of which was 168. The Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) candidate, who won the multi-member constituency of Nuwara Eliya-Maskeliya, openly declared his support for the UNP. At the same time, the SLFP, which had secured 90 seats at the 1970 elections, was able to win only 8 seats; this, in terms of parliamentary strength, could be compared with its first parliamentary elections in 1952. Then again, though political parties of the Marxist Left had some representation in Parliament from its very inception, they were eliminated as a parliamentary force. These two factors, in effect explain the absence of a parliamentary opposition representative of national politics. In this event, the main parliamentary opposition came to be the 18 members of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), whose main platform is the creation of a separate state in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island. Thus it was for the first time that a political party, representing the interests of a minority, came to form the main element in the Opposition. Its leader—A. Amirthalingam—however stated that he did not consider himself as an alternative Prime Minister.[18] The Opposition therefore came to be ineffective because its major segment advocated a separate state and this, together with the absence of Marxists who now concentrate on extra-parliamentary forms of opposition, created a vacuum in the arena of parliamentary politics. The election of Sarath Muththettuwegama of the Sri Lanka Communist Party at the controversial by-election of Kalawana in January 1981, has however added a new dimension to the role of the opposition, which, in the beginning of the UNP regime in 1977 remained docile. Sarath Muththettuwegama, within a brief period, has utilized all the available parliamentary opportunities to embarass the government.

The significant aspect of the battle is now outside Parliament and the organized Left, with its established base in the trade union sector, is emerging as a powerful force for the opposition. The government, realizing the potentialities of the trade union movement as an instrument of organized opposition, utilised the strike of July 1980 to weaken this base of the opposition parties. The unprecedented action of the government in dismissing nearly 40,000 or more workers and treating them as having vacated their posts was sufficient indication of its arrogance and disregard for democratic rights. Some of these strategies are however weak because they cannot make an impact inside Parliament; in previous parliaments, parliamentary tactics were combined with trade union struggles and other extra-parliamentary methods to enhance the effectiveness of the Opposition. The absence of this form of struggle by the Opposition, which anyhow was numerically negligible inside Parliament and numerically large outside, is certainly not conducive for parliamentary stability.

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Election Violence Erodes Public Confidence

Election violence—various violent incidents which took place immediately after the conclusion of the General Election—is yet another factor that threatened the stability of the parliamentary system. Violence during and after elections has been a recurring feature since 1931. The Soulbury Commission, appointed to study the issue, thought that "the spread of education, the training of character in schools and the increase of political experience will do more than rules and regulations to create conditions inimical to the continuance of these malpractices."[19] The events of the past two decades do not indicate any decline in post-election violence, which has in fact, assumed dangerous proportions in the post-1965 period. One important reason is the emergence of two coalitions of parties with accompanying effects on the nature of political competition at the constituency level. The system of political patronage—the extension of favours to the loyal supporters of the party in power—has introduced a new element in party competition and brought groups and individuals in electorates to be involved in the distribution of patronage. Political patronage relating to the distribution of jobs in the public sector on the basis of recognition or recommendation of Parliament members has assumed a new role in constituency politics. The nature of political competition in the constituencies, therefore, has come to be associated with competition for employment. Instead of promoting healthy party rivalry this has encouraged enmities among the constituents because political loyalty has replaced merit and qualifications.

A committee headed by D.B.I.P.S. Siriwardene, the Secretary to the Ministry of Public Administration, which investigated the acts of violence or breaches of peace in connection with the 1970 General Elections, reported that "there were 1226 cases of violence reported immediately after the 1970 General Election."[20] Some of the incidents related to such offences as murder, arson and looting. According to this report, the losses sustained by the people, on the basis of a rough estimate, was in the area of 3.5 million Rupees. The Report of the Siriwardene Committee further stated that "many of them have been visited with the destruction normally associated with some natural calamity and their plight as described is truly pathetic."[21] The extent of the damage was such that "the complainants had evidently to start life all over again with new investments in houses, furniture and stock-in-trade."[22] The electorates, where these incidents occurred, were largely rural areas, and prompt police intervention, the Report pointed, "could have minimised the magnitude of the disaster." "The general commotion which prevails immediately after the elections prevents the police from taking action because they are frightened of reprisals and they," the Report added, "refused to entertain complaints or were manifestly indifferent."[23] This, in effect, meant that the police, fearing reprisals from the new political leadership, deliberately avoided a confrontation with the supporters of the

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new regime. Above all, the sporadic nature of the incidents and their mob-orientation prevented the police from taking immediate action.

Election violence in July 1977 was in fact similar to that of 1970, and though the magnitude of the disaster still remains to be investigated it was more serious than in 1970. The complete elimination of the party in power at the 1977 elections encouraged the followers of the victorious party to indulge in acts of violence which lasted for nearly two weeks. Dr. Colvin R. De Silva, the then Deputy Leader of the LSSP, remarked that "Sri Lanka had never before seen post-election violence and brutality on that awful and intimidatory scale."[24] The outgoing Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike wanted her supporters to show restraint while Dr. N.M. Perera, the leader of the LSSP, informed the newly elected Prime Minister about the incidence of violence in his own electorate. Maitripala Senanayake, on behalf of the supporters of the SLFP throughout the country, interviewed the Prime Minister, J.R. Jayawardene to appraise him of the grave situation and requested him to take measures to curb violence.[25] The perpetrators of violence expected their opponents to abstain from taking the risk of opposing them. Such a development is certainly not in the interest of parliamentary political competition based on a party system. Then again, the occurrence of violence of this kind once every six years, is certain to discourage people from identifying themselves with political parties, and if this process continues it would bring about an erosion of public confidence in the parliamentary system of government.

Deterioration in Standards of Parliamentary Debate

The standard of debate in the present Parliament has also deteriorated. An examination of the nature and composition of the present Parliament would be useful to understand this development. It has 105 members who have been elected for the first time; this means that 62.5 per cent of the membership comes within the category of freshmen. Yet another unique feature is that 45.5. per cent of its members are under 35 years of age; there are only three senior parliamentarians—a State Councillor of the Donoughmore period (1931-1946) and two members from the first Parliament of 1947.[26] Maitripala Senanayake, the leader of the SLFP, is the only Member of Parliament who had never been defeated at a General Election since 1947.[26] Maitripala Senanayake, the leader of the SLFP, is the only Member of Parliament who had never been defeated at a General Election since 1947. These specific features of its composition certainly effect the role of parliamentary government and, this is reflected in its proceedings.

The debates, which took place during the first year, included those relating to the Statement of Policy, the Budget, the Second Amendment to the Constitution and the Greater Colombo Economic Commission Bill. A perusal of the speeches made on these occasions illustrates the extents to which the debates in the NSA had deteriorated, and they, in effect, became occasions

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for ridiculing a certain segment of the opposition in Parliament. This, however, does not mean that no serious speeches were made on those subjects which came before Parliament. But the emphasis was always on the irrelevance relating to the performance of the previous regime. The Budget Speech, which according to convention was in the form of an annual financial statement of the government, was delivered in an unconventional fashion; the Minister of Finance spoke in Sinhala, simultaneously inserting passages translated into English, and debated it. In other words, he made use of the same occasion to comment, explain and add political arguments; all this could have been done at the last stage of the debate. Again, the debate on the Second Amendment to the Constitution of 1972 demonstrated more or less the same features because it concentrated on the political arguments for a change in the Constitution, overlooking the more important constitutional arguments.

Yet another feature responsible for deterioration in standards is that very few members of Parliament—compared to the extent of participation of the ordinary members in the previous Parliaments—take part in the debates; this apathy, which is not in the interest of a healthy parliamentary system, can be attributed both to the ineffective nature of the opposition and to the arrogant majority of the party in power. No "great debate" demonstrating the effectiveness of Parliament, took place during this period. The parliamentary weapon of question time has been utilized to seek information relating to the performance of the previous regime and though relevant in some ways it was used as an exercise in party politics. Also, "politically embarassing questions" were asked by the members of the government party; the motive always being party politics. Such post-mortem-oriented questions have provoked the opposition to think on these lines and this was clearly seen in the questions relating to the trips abroad which for former Prime Minister and the Ministers had made during their period of office. This shows that the conventional role of question time as a means of keeping government in check has also undergone a change.

Yet another manifestation of this deterioration in the standards of debate was the behaviour of backbenchers who indulged in irrelevant issues and interruptions. Numerous interruptions, and the use of language unsuited to the accepted norms of parliamentary debates, compelled the Speaker to remind certain backbenchers of the need to maintain proper standards in the debates. Though the first Speaker of this Parliament, Aranda Tissa de Alwis, entered Parliament for the first time in 1977 he played a conscientious and able role. A code of conduct for Ministers and Members of Parliament has been devised with a view to improving their performance as representatives of the people. Though this code of conduct relates largely to the behaviour of parliamentarians outside Parliament it also demonstrated the weakness of the institution as an effective organ of Government.

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New Constitutional Amendments Create Further Decline

The constitutional changes introduced in February 1978 brought about a further decline in certain vital aspects of parliamentary government in Sri Lanka. The abolition of the institution of the nominal executive was in itself a deviation from the Westminster model. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of 1972 brought into existence a President who, according to clause 3 of the Amendment, would be the supreme instrument of State power—executive power, including the defence of the country. This clause however, made no mention of the Cabinet of Ministers, which according to Section 5 of the 1972 Constitution, had hitherto exercised executive power including the defence of Sri Lanka. Further, Section 92(2) of the Constitution of 1972 has also been amended in such a way as to ensure that the President would be the head of the Cabinet of Ministers but he could continue in office regardless of its dissolution. Then again, by repealing Section 94 of the 1972 Constitution the President was to be the sole authority to determine the size of the Cabinet, the assignment of subjects and functions among the respective ministries and the appointment of ministers. On the basis of the same provision, he could take charge of any subject or function not assigned to the Prime Minister or other Minister. It also empowered him to "change the assignment of subjects and functions and the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers." It was mainly on this ground that the President took charge of the Katunayake airport in May 1978. Further, the Department of Civil Aviation and the Fertilizer Corporation came under his authority. The latter, which was until then under the Minister of Agriculture, was brought under the President's aegis in March 1982.

The Prime Minister who, according to the provisions of the constitutional amendment of 1972 was expected to "commard the confidence of the National State Assembly," enjoyed no powers relating to the formation of the Cabinet; he in fact was himself another member of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister was to be in effect the principal parliamentary agent of the President. The role of the Prime Minister in the first two years supported this assessment; in effect, he played the role of the majority leader in Parliament. The Prime Minister had no power to name ministers for inclusion in the Cabinet, and it is not known whether he would be consulted when new appointments had to be made. Thus, there was no special office for the Prime Minister as the Cabinet became the President's appendage. The Prime Minister's office has now largely become ceremonial and it is not known whether he can play a co-ordinating role in regard to the work of other ministries. The existence of three types of ministers—Cabinet Ministers, non-Cabinet Ministers in charge of specific subjects and District Ministers—all part of the distribution of presidential patronage—is certain to complicate the process of parliamentary government because conflicts among the three groups are inevitable. All these characteristics are indicative of the changes in the Westminster model.

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The original constitutional plan was to provide for the appointment of an acting President; the Prime Minister was expected to function in this capacity whenever the President was unable to exercise the powers, duties and functions due to illness or absence from Sri Lanka.[27] However, the appointment of the Prime Minister as acting President would in turn necessitate the appointment of a member of the Cabinet of Ministers to act as Prime Minister. The President, J.R. Jayawardene's visit to Australia in February 1978 to take part in the Commonwealth Regional Conference, was an opportunity to appoint an acting President but no such appointment was made. It has now become the practice of the government not to appoint an acting head of state even when the latter is abroad. On this issue, the government spokesman argued that the stability of the government made such an appointment unnecessary. The reasons however were largely based on party politics and it was rumoured that there were more than one claimant for the post of acting Prime Minister—this was before the enactment of the Constitution of 1978. The same practice of not appointing an acting head of state has been followed even after the enactment of the 1978 Constitution. The non-appointment of an acting head of state has now created a precedent in the history of parliamentary government in Sri Lanka. It may be mentioned here that this provision, embodied in both the Soulbury and Republican Constitutions, had been strictly followed in the past three decades. Then again, there was a case for the appointment of an acting President because of the nature of the present Constitution. An adjustment was made by appointing the respective Deputy Ministers in charge of the ministries which came under the President. The acting Minister of Defence, in the absence of the President, became more powerful than the Prime Minister who remained the Minister of Local Government and Housing.

Yet another anamoly was the failure to appoint a Leader of the House in Parliament. The Leader of the House, R. Premadasa, was appointed Prime Minister on 6 February 1978 when the presidential system was initiated. According to the parliamentary traditions the appointment of a Leader of the House was necessary. However, a minor conflict within the party over this issue—among several senior parliamentarians and two young ministers who held office for the first time—prevented this appointment. R. Premadasa, in addition to his office as Prime Minister, functions as the Leader of the House. Though this is against the tradition, it conforms to the present role of the Prime Minister as the parliamentary agent of the President.

The next significant issue which demonstrated the lack of respect for the Constitution (1972), related to the change of name of the Republic of Sri Lanka. During the visit of Phan Van Dong, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, the country was designated as the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Earlier it was known as the Republic of Sri Lanka. The new name appeared in the official Joint Communique signed on 5 March 1978

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between the two leaders.[28] This, the Opposition, indicated was a violation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution.[29] The name and title, it said, was clearly stated in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution and could therefore be changed only by a two-thirds majority of the National State Assembly. No such procedure was however followed and the name was changed by the fiat of the President. The issue, apart from its political gimmickery, was of a far-reaching nature because it indicated an arbitary attempt to tamper with the sovereignty of the people. Such a strategy, though it may have been politically advantageous at the time, was certainly not in keeping with the traditions of parliamentary democracy.

Legislative Measures Undermine Parliamentary Norms

The passage of two important bills—the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Amendment Law of 1978 and the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1978—further demonstrated the decline in the parliamentary form of government. The privileges of Parliament in Sri Lanka are, unlike those of the House of Commons, not derived from tradition and usage. It, exercising the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, passed the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act No. 21 of 1953. The State Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance No. 27 of 1942 constituted the source of the privileges of Parliament till the enactment of the Privileges Act of 1953.[30] The inadequacy of Ordinance No. 27 of 1942 was that it conferred on the State Council only some of the privileges enjoyed by the House of Commons and it was, therefore, felt that a comprehensive act dealing with its immunities, privileges and powers was necessary.[31] The appointment of a select committee to investigate "the queer animals" statement by Dr. N.M. Perera (who had said that there were "queer animals" in the House of Representatives) reported that the privileges in the State Council Ordinance of 1942 are such that "no reflection on members of the House would constitute a breach of privilege." A Joint Select Committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate was appointed to report on this question and the 1953 Act was, in fact, enacted on the basis of the recommendations of this Select Committee. The main question which came to be discussed in the context of the formulation of the 1953 Act, related to the issue of transforming the legislature into a Court of Justice. It was decided that Parliament should not be invested with the powers of a Court, and it was on the basis of this agreement that the Parliamentary Privileges Act of 1953 provided for two schedules A and B. In other words, offences were divided into those which could be dealt with by the House and those that could be dealt with by the Supreme Court. The Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Amendment Law No. 5 of 1978, which became law in February 1978, repealed the sections relating to those aspects in the 1953 Act. It stated that "every breach of the privileges of Parliament shall be an offence punishable by the National State Assembly."[32] The Amendment Act made the NSA

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a Court with the power to impose on a member of the public a maximum fine of Rs. 5000 or imprisonment upto a maximum period of two years. The 1953 Act vested such powers in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. The Amendment Bill was passed on 1 February 1978, and it was a day later, that the NSA assumed the role of a Court to deal with a question of privileges involving a photograph published in the *Ceylon Observer*. The editors of the newspaper were brought before the NSA to deal with a breach of privilege committed on 30 January 1978. The Opposition pointed that sufficient notice had not been given to show cause and the House, irrespective of the objections, questioned the two editors. The questioning of the two editors by the House covered a total of 23 columns in *Hansard* and at the end the House imposed a fine of Rs. 1000 on each of them.[33] The criticism of the adoption of the Amendment of 1978, especially in the light of the incident already referred to, is that such action could hamper the functioning of a Press. Above all, to clothe the Assembly with the powers of a Court is not in the interests of good parliamentary traditions. A Privileges Committee, consisting of nine members, was set up with a view to correcting the weaknesses inherent in the Amendment Law of February 1978, and this again, deviated from the accepted traditions of parliamentary government because the issue of parliamentary privileges did not demand the institution of a permanent Committee. The Privileges Committee should have been an *ad hoc* committee which could be set up from time to time for a specific purpose. The creation of a Standing Privileges Committee, as Perera pointed, is yet another example of the deviation from the accepted norms of parliamentary government.

Most of the important pieces of legislation which came to be enacted during the first year became law without much discussion and debate in and outside Parliament. It was the utilization of Section 55 of the Constitution dealing with urgent bills that prevented discussion and debate. Section 55(1) states that bills which are considered urgent in the national interest by the Cabinet could be referred to the Constitutional Court. They are now referred to the Supreme Court. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of 1972, the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Amendment Law, the Special Presidential Commission's Inquiry Law and Law Proscribing the Operation of Tiger Movement were enacted on the basis of this section of the Constitution. The Special Presidential Commission's Inquiry Law of 1978 empowers the Commission of Inquiry to recommend the imposition of civic diabilities. This could mean the disqualification of a person (1) from being an elector, (2) from being nominated as a candidate at an election, (3) from being elected as a member of NSA or any local authority and (4) from being employed as a public officer. The most frightening aspect of this law is that its findings and recommendations, which are considered final and conclusive, cannot be questioned in any court of law. The political parties in the Opposition have entertained fears that the law would be used against political opponents; they argue that the enactment of the law was adeaviation from parliamentary traditions. The recommendations of civic

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disability on the basis of Section 9 of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry Law, No. 7 of 1978, and the subsequent explusion of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike demonstrated the venom with which a hostile majority could make use of this law against its opponents.[34] Despite the pronouncements by its authors of its validity as an instrument against the abuse of power and political corruption, this law is likely to interfere with the rights and privileges of members of Parliament. Members of Parliament—like the person whose conduct is now being investigated[35]—could be brought before the Commission and this, apart from the question of its legality, would certainly weaken Parliament as the supreme institution of government. In consequence, this procedure of bringing sitting members of Parliament before this Commission—instead of using the instrument of the Parliamentary Select Committee—would further erode public confidence in the system of parliamentary government. This kind of law, as the Civil Rights Movement rightly pointed out, undermines the democratic process.

Again, the Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Law of 1978, the Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam Law, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1979 and other similar laws contain so many draconian features which interfere with the very process of political activity in the country. The Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Law has been enacted primarily to restrict "the release on bail by certain courts of persons who surrender or are produced in connection with the commission of certain offences." The denial of bail, in effect, interferes with the liberty of the individual in a democratic society. The proscribing of Liberation Tigers Law gives enormous powers to the executive to interfere with the activities of political organisations. The Ministers of the Government have been given power to order the detention of people and the forfeiture of property.[36] Section 59 of the Tigers Law further deals with the control of publications pertaining to the proscribed organisations and this, in effect, means that a censorship of newspapers could be made operative. The rules and regulations which were normally introduced in times of emergency under the Public Security Act, have now been made part of ordinary statutes. The nature of these bills was such that there was really no justification for adopting the procedure enshrined in the urgent bills clause, and it is now believed, that the continued utilisation of this provision in the Constitution to enact important laws is certain to erode popular confidence in the system of parliamentary government.

Growing Political Interference

Another development that has brought about considerable decline in parliamentary norms is the growing political interference in public affairs over the past two decades. This aspect has developed to such an extent that no distinction can now be drawn between politics and administration in Sri Lanka. Sections 113 to 120 of the Constitution deal with the appointment

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and transfer of officials; the provisions in these sections expressly preclude Members of Parliament from playing any role pertaining to such matters. However the latter, irrespective of this provision in the Constitution, interfere in both appointments and transfers of public officials. Recommendation of parliamentary members—only of those belonging to the party in power—has become an obligatory requirement for selection or appointment. The Minister of Public Administration of the United Front Government of 1970-77 stated that a letter from a Member of Parliament needs to be produced by a person seeking a job in the Government Clerical Service.[37] This, in effect, meant that the letter of an MP was a vital qualification and "the chit system"—the MP's letter of recommendation—became the mode of recrutiment to certain categories of employment in the state sector. This system has now been replaced by a Job Bank—a formalisation of the chit system—and Electoral Placement Committees have been set up by the UNP Government; each Member of Parliament has been given one thousand application forms to be distributed among the unemployed in the area—exclusively to his own supporters. This shows that most jobs falling outside the category of staff grades, would be given according to political criteria, resulting in the politicisation of the lower levels of the Administration. The political victimisation of certain categories of the Administration has been yet another result of the growing politicisation of the Administration in the last three decades. The Political Victimisation Committee, which this government set up under the Ministry of Public Administration, was appointed to investigate the cases of political victimisation in the period 1970-77; it reported that 13,000 public servants complained of political victimisation. The decisions relating to promotions, retirement benefits, transfers and extension of service have been taken on the basis of political criteria and this has naturally affected the morale and performance of the Administration. The tendency to interfere in these spheres of the Administration by the parliamentarians has become more marked because of institutional changes. The District Political Authority has now acquired more political control over the bureaucracy. This trend has been strengthened by some of the features inherent in the Second Amendment to the Constitution of 1978. The growing politicisation of the Administration and the open participation of the politician in public affairs is certain to interfere with the traditional role of the former in a parliamentary system. This, again, augurs ill for the continuity of parliamentary traditions.

Cabinet Changes Controvert Parliamentary System

Changes made in the cabinet system, apart from its deviation from the Westminster model, show the extent to which parliamentary system has been transformed in Sri Lanka. Though the Constitution of 1978, stated that "there shall be a Cabinet of Ministers charged with the direction and control of the Government of the Republic, it provided for the inclusion of the

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President as a member of the Cabinet of Ministers."[38] The President was to be the head of the Cabinet; he would continue in office even if there was dissolution. This, according to critics, afforded him an opportunity to function as a one-man Cabinet. Though the President could consult the Prime Minister in forming the Cabinet, he was not required to do so. This therefore would mean that the President would enjoy the power of forming the Cabinet without consulting the Prime Minister, whose support would nevertheless be necessary to carry out his policies *via* the Cabinet and the Legislature. In addition to this power, Section 44(2) provided that the President may assign himself any subject or function and may remain in charge of any subject or function not assigned to any other minister. This provision has, as already mentioned earlier, been used to bring the functions of the Department of Civil Aviation and the Fertilizer Corporation under his control.

The size of the Cabinet is an important feature in a parliamentary system and various factors, which are peculiar to a particular country, affect the size of the Cabinet. The need to give representation to certain interests has unnecessarily enlarged the Cabinet. The Cabinet of the UNP Government is quite big. It consists of 23 ministers—several ministeries having been split to create more portfolios. This formula has interfered with both decision-making and co-ordination at the ministerial level because subjects have not been combined on the basis of a rational criteria. Section 45(1) of the Constitution provides for the appointment of ministers who are not members of the Cabinet; they include both non-Cabinet Ministers in charge of specific subjects and the District Ministers. The non-Cabinet Ministers of Proscribed Movements, Colombo Hospitals, Coconut Industry, Educational Services and the Home Guards—5 in all—resemble the Ministers of State in Britain. The District Ministers, whose roots are in the District Political Authority System, which came into existence during the last regime, have been appointed under Section 45 of the Constitution to be in charge of the 24 districts, but no subjects and functions have been formally assigned to them.[39] In the present constitutional system therefore, the District Minister is a political head and this naturally interferes with the concept of ministerial responsibility. The appointment of a large number of ministers—nearly 80 of varying rank—has strengthened the executive and accentuated the decline of the role of Parliament.

New Electoral System Adds to Decline

The nature of the new electoral system, the abolition of by-elections and the Second Amendment to the Constitution of 1978—which allowed the members of the Opposition to cross over to the Government without forfeiting their seats in Parliament—are all examples of further degeneration. The high cut-off point—12-1/2 per cent of the total vote—was tantamount to a virtual disfranchisement of a segment of the population, and this above

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all, interfered with the parliamentary politics of smaller political parties whose socialisation into the parliamentary process could be a vital element in the stability of the political system. The abolition of by-elections, though motivated by the need to maintain stability, became a part of the scheme of representation, and the appointment of Members of Parliament—such appointments were made for Kamburupitiya, Baddegama, Wattala, Mawanella, Pottuvil, Hanguranketa and Karandeniya—virtually disfranchised the voters of these electorates. The appointments—in some cases the sister, the son or the wife of the former MP—demonstrated the influence of the party leadership in the selection of persons who were not likely to be elected by the people. On the other hand, it was very unlikely that the grass-roots organisations of the party would have recommended the persons who had been nominated by the party leadership. This form of selection of MPs, apart from its debilitating effect on the popular electorate, eroded popular confidence in the system of government.

The issue of the Kalawana by-election, apart from the constitutional controversy which it created, exposed the attitude of the government to accepted norms of parliamentary government. Abeyratne Pilapitiya—who was elected in the 1977 General Election—with a view to frustrating the attempt of his rival to unseat him through an election petition, utilised Article 66(f) of the Constitution which provided that the seat of a member shall become vacant if he absented himself from the sittings of Parliament during a continuous period of three months, and got himself renominated on the basis of Article 99(13) of the Constitution. Abeyratne Pilapitiya was nominated as the new member for Kalawana in July 1979; the Election Judge, however, adopted the position that it was the original election in 1977 which had been challenged. The declaration that his original election in 1977 was void created a new situation and the UNP, fearing a by-election where they were certain to be defeated, wanted Pilapitiya to continue as MP for Kalawana. Contending that he was the duly nominated member for Kalawana he wanted the Speaker to give a ruling; the ruling of the Speaker issued on 9 December 1980 recognised Pilapitiya's membership. The ruling, apart from its partisan character, did not take conv ntions into consideration and above all, created a constitutional crisis unprecedented in the history of the country.

"Arrogant Majority" Makes Parliamentary Practice Farcical

As in the case of the ruling of the Speaker, the vote of no confidence in the Speaker moved jointly by the Opposition became yet another unique event which demonstrated the extent of declining parliamentary standards. Though the opposition agreed initially to debate this motion, it later decided to postpone the debate realising the legal implications involved in the by-election for which all arrangements had been made. The Opposition, therefore, wanted the vote of no confidence in the Speaker to be debated

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after the by-election. The government however, wanted to debate the vote before the by-election. The Government Party, for the first time in the history of parliamentary government in Sri Lanka, moved the vote of no confidence which was on the Order Paper as a motion of the Opposition and debated it in the absence of the Opposition. The government created yet another parliamentary precedent by getting two of its members to propose and second the motion which stood in the name of the 22 Opposition members. The decision to debate this motion showed the cavalier fashion with which the government treated the official parliamentary Opposition.

Another farcical situation which arose in Parliament centered around the attempt to protect the appointed member for Kalawana with a view to working out a constitutional strategy before 12 January 1981 (the date on which the by-elections were due), the government introduced the abortive Third Amendment to the Constitution. The amendment proposed to alter Article 161 of the Constitution so as to make provision for two members of parliament to represent the same electorate of Kalawana. The Supreme Court saw this proposed amendment as an attempt to interfere with the franchise and the sovereignty of the people. It further agreed that an extra member could not be accommodated without a mandate from the people. The Third Amendment—including the issues surrounding it—was an attempt to undermine the entire parliamentary process and though the government passed it with a two-thirds majority, it was later abandoned because public opinion was against this move which would destroy the very foundations of parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka. Even though this constitutional strategy failed it exposed the government's machiavellian approach to the norms and practices of parliamentary government.

Further, the composition of the Government Party and the size of its majority—which made it arrogant—were such that the Opposition, due to both its numbers and the dominant position of the TULF, could not emerge as a viable alternative to the government. The same reasons obstructed its effective functioning as a parliamentary opposition; but despite the hostility of the arrogant majority, it (Opposition) gradually asserted its official role and its effectiveness increased with the simultaneous decrease in the popularity of the government. Yet the government, despite its overt pronouncements acted without regard to parliamentary conventions relating to the role of the parliamentary Opposition. The most glaring instance was the deplorable debate on the vote of no confidence in the leader of the Opposition. The Government Party reversed parliamentary procedures and made the theory and practice of parliamentary government a mockery; the vote of no confidence in the leader of the Opposition, moved and debated by the government more in the form of a fascist vituperative exercise, showed that the dignified Westminster model now had no meaning in Sri Lanka. The motion was sponsored by 37 members of Parliament including Dr. Neville Fernando who moved it.[40] Though the Government Party later wanted a

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number of MPs to withdraw some of its unparliamentary and violent statements made in the course of this debate, it extended its support and the Chief Government Whip in a letter dated 10 July 1981, to all members of the government parliamentary group, called on them to be present on the occasion as "the voting for the above motion will be absolutely essential."[41] This provides ample evidence, as transpired at the inquiry into the expulsion of Fernando from the UNP, that the motion against the leader of the Opposition had been introduced with the support of the government parliamentary group. Fernando, in the course of his evidence before the Select Committee, stated that the Cabinet decided that "they move a vote of no confidence on the leader of the Opposition."[42] This shows that, irrespective of the conventions governing the position of the leader of the Opposition in a parliamentary system, the government wanted this vote of censure to obtain political advantage.

The tenor of the debate and the tone of the speeches, while confirming this judgement, illustrate the extent to which the parliamentary process had declined. The speeches, which took nearly 512 columns of the *Hansard,* were made by 24 members, and the debate, in comparison to debates held in the past four years, attracted the participation of a large number of parliamentary members. Though the speeches were full of unparliamentary and derogatory references to the leader of the Opposition they also contained a lot of information which indicates the existence of a Sinhala chauvinistic organisation behind this parliamentary exercise. Some speeches contained well-researched information and they, in my view, could not have been collected by the speakers who delivered them at the debate. Another important feature of the debate was the obvious violence in some of the utterances. The whole debate was in fact a vicious exercise in "parliamentary communalism," and the utterances, recommending various forms of punishments for the leader of the Opposition, showed that no understanding could be worked out with the leaders of the Tamil community.[43] Yet another feature was the demand that the leader of the Opposition be expelled from Parliament.[44] Though this debate on the vote of no confidence represented the most glaring example of "parliamentary communalism" in Sri Lanka it was passed with 121 voting for it. Two members of Parliament—S. Thondaman, the Minister of Rural Industrial Development and Shelton Rangraja, the Deputy Minister of Justice—declined the vote. This debate was thus not only indicative of the violation of the accepted norms of parliamentary procedure but was also a pointer to the nature and temperament of the island's legislators whose communalism was certainly not consistent with standards of a democratic society.

The massive display of "parliamentary communalism" has had its own impact on the masses; communal violence took place in areas where there was a concentration of Indian Tamils. The August 1981 communal flare up took a new form when helpless Indian Tamils on estates were made the subject of new attacks. It has been said that these attacks came in the form of

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a retaliation for the "Eelam demand."[45] However, what is more likely is that it derived inspiration/direct support from the "parliamentary communalism" of July 1981. Meanwhile, the government, on the basis of its conduct code for members of the Government Party, called for the withdrawal of the unparliamentary and violent references made to the Opposition leader. This move was effected to pacify the leaders of the Tamil community and to safeguard the *dharmista* image of the government.

The expulsion of the MP for Panadura, Neville Fernando, also came as a matter closely linked with the debate on "parliamentary communalism," nevertheless it needs to be examined from the point of view also of the traditions of parliamentary government. A member of Parliament, elected on the basis of the single member constituency system, should have had the freedom to disagree with the policies of his party, though such a disagreement would naturally result in resignation or explusion from the party. It should not however have resulted in forfeiture of the seat. According to the Second Amendment to the Constitution of 1978, Article 161 had been altered in such a way as to provide for an MP, who had been expelled from his party, to petition to the Supreme Court for determining if the expulsion was valid. This had to be done within one month of the date of such expulsion. Thereafter, the Supreme Court would be expected to make the determination within a period of two months. A matter, which was well within the purview of a political party, had now been made a subject for adjudication by the highest court in the country. This was quite unnecessary because the political party was capable of arranging its own mechanics of internal administration. The matter, in this particular context, demanded adjudication by the Supreme Court because expulsion or resignation from the political party would result in the forfeiture of a seat in Parliament. The next innovation was that a Select Committee of Parliament be appointed to inquire into the report on the circumstances which led to the resignation or the explusion. After consideration of the report by the Select Committee, Parliament, by a resolution passed by not less than 85 members voting in its favour, could expel a member of Parliament. This procedure was followed in the case of Neville Fernando, who, on the other hand, did not seek a determination from the Court. An internal matter of a political party had thus become a subject for the legislature, and though such innovations give a different status to the political party under the Constitution they also tend to interfere with the freedom of the private member in Parliament. Apart from this, such novel features in the Constitution do interfere with the franchise and the rights of the voter. Since this Parliament has not been elected on the basis of the list system of the PR variety, the expulsion of the MPs who had been elected on the basis of the single member constituency scheme and the appointment of MPs in their place could not be justified. Yet another feature was that political parties in Sri Lanka have become organisations which have been given the right to change respresentatives of an electorate—solely by its leadership—without holding a by-election. The

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appointment of MPs by the fiat of the party leadership is an absolute negaggtion of parliamentary democracy and this in itself represents another glaring instance of the worsening of parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka.

June 1982.

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ROLE OF THE MILITARY ELITE IN BRAZIL

By RAM RATTAN*

The Military is one institution that has managed to gain "stability and power" in most Latin American countries.[1] *Except in Costa Rica which has no military establishment, and Mexico, which has succeeded in bringing the "soldiers firmly to heel,"*[2] *the Military dominates the politics of more than half of them. They are, as Stephen Clissold puts it, "a familiar feature of the political scene."*[3]

Military's intervention in the politics of major Latin American countries has had a number of common features, which are at once unique and interesting. To Willard Beaulac, the most notable feature is that the armed forces "rarely act alone."[4] *They are often invited to "intervene" by the civilians themselves who "prefer victory with military support to defeat without it."*[5] *And, once they are in power, they no longer consider their intervention in political life as "provisional" or "transitory" between two civilian administrations.*[6] *They are then in no hurry to quit or give in, they tend to stay on and consolidate their position!*

Over the years, military intervention in Latin American countries has also come to wear "an increasingly anti-Communist face."[7] *Rather, "communist" became a convenient label for any civilian politician whom the Military wanted to remove. The major exception to this anti-communist stance is provided by Fidel Castro's Communist State of Cuba which keeps fighting for "liberation from Yankee imperialism."*[8]

In most Latin American countries where the Military rules the roost, the men-in-uniform are no longer satisfied with their role either as "moderators" or ruthless "directors." They see themselves as "monitors" of the government's performance.[9] *And, their monitoring role has come to be sanctioned not only by tradition, but also by law. As Beaulac says: "Some fifteen of the Latin American Constitutions designate the Military as guardians of the Constitution."*[10] *This monitoring role gives them an informal veto power over the decisions of civilian agencies, including those of the presidency itself. Consequently, today the Military in Latin America does not confine its role merely to being "the upholders of order" and "guardians of the nation's constitution;"*[11] *they increasingly emphasize their role as "promoters of progress" or "instruments of economic and social change."*[12] *They engage themselves in "civic action" rather seriously.*

As "development" is the major problem of the Third World the Military's increasing willingness to undertake this task of "nation-building" has made its position more secure than that of its civilian counterparts. What is surprising in their eagerness to take up this role is the fact that they have been encouraged

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in this effort by their own war colleges whose primary aim is to "militarize" civilians, rather than "civilianize" the Military.[13] *That, probably, may be the reason as to why Latin America "still spends proportionately less on arms than any other developing area of the world, apart from Africa south of the Sahara."*[14] *Infact, Latin America needs every penny of its money for its development. It is in view primarily of their contribution in the area of "nation-building" that the Military in several Latin American Republics cannot just be talked or written out of existence. Johnson has aptly concluded, that the Military in Latin America will continue to have "a spoon in every soup."*[15]

With these common features as a backgrounder, the present paper would attempt to study the changing roles of the Military, particularly the Brazilian military-elite vis-a-vis *their civilian counterparts in the politics of Brazil, the largest and the most populous state in Latin America.*

I
INTRODUCTION

Carles Lacerda, Governor of Guanabara in the 1960s and a "maverick" among Brazilian political leaders, once interpreted the fundamental problem of Brazil as "the lack of an elite organized and ready to govern."[16] In explicit terms, the civilian elites are diverse, scattered and unmarshalled, while the military elites (rather the army elites) had, until March 1964, been reluctant to run the administration of the state by themselves. Gordon Campbell attributes their inability and/or disinclination principally to the following factors:

1 The nation-wide deficiencies in education;
2 the inability of the political parties to present and follow imaginative, valid national programmes; and
3 the apparent lack of institutions taking a broad, coherent view of the country's problems and training people to understand them.[17]

Nevertheless, the civilians as well as "the people-in-uniform"[18] have traditionally joined hands to realize their shared twin objectives of "security"[19] and "development,"[20] and to make and unmake their constitutions in tune with time and circumstances.[21] This need-based civil-military political alliance has persisted over almost a century ever since 1889.[22] The first "elite-dominated Republic" was established fifty-seven years after the Declaration of Independence from Portugal in 1822.[23]

The role of the Military Elite in the political and constitution-making process has been distinct, yet concordant with the civilian elites. In fact, military intervention in the political life of Brazil is part of a process that started with the deposition of Emperor Dom Pedro II and the inauguration of the Republic in 1889 with Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca and Marshal Floriano Peixoto who presided over the Republic in quick succession in its

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formative years until 1894. The army had come to power "almost unawares" and "fumblingly," but once in power, it showed "strong determination to retain control."[24] It made its voice increasingly heard and it developed a "self-confidence" that contributed to its emergence as an "elite."[25]

The naval revolt of 1893-94, combined with the challenge in the south, however, reversed this process and instead initiated an era of civilian presidents, beginning with President Prudente Jose de Moraes Barros.[26] And, with the exception of a relapse into military-based government of Marshal Hermes da Fonseca (1910-1914), the civilians ruled Brazil for sixty six years until 1964, when the Army again took over the political administration with General Humberto Castello Branco as the President. Since then, Brazil has had four more top army men as Presidents in succession—General Arthur da Costa Silva (1967-69), General Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-74), General Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) and Marshal Joao Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979—).[27] This uninterrupted succession of military Presidents indicates that when the Army resumed political power after a long interval of half a century in 1964, it was not only "united" and "tenacious" but also "confident in its ability and convinced of the righteousness of its self-appointed mission."[28]

II
ROLE OF MILITARY ELITE

During the period under study, the Military Elite played three distinct roles:

1 Moderation—1914-1964;
2 Repressive Direction—1964-1969; and
3 Gradual Political Liberalism—1969.

The Era of Moderation—1914-1964

In the pre-1964 republics, the Brazilian civilians "politicized" army-officers and frequently used them "to further their own political goals." The army elite in fact became "a potential balancing factor in politics,"[29] and had several opportunities to "moderate" the political system at times of crisis.[30] The Constitutions of 1891, 1934 and 1946 included clauses that the Army should exercise "a moderating power." These constitutional provisions enabled the armed forces "to intervene in the event of crisis in relations between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, thus giving the Army "the power of checking the actions of the Executive."[31] And, in this moderating pattern of civil-military relations, as it existed until 1964, the Army "frequently overthrew the Executive without, however, actually assuming political power themselves."[32] The key components of

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this *Moderator Model* of civil-military relations have been catalogued as follows:

1 All major political actors attempt to co-opt the Military. A politicized military was thus the norm.
2 The Military though politically heterogeneous sought to maintain a degree of institutional unity.
3 The relevant political actors grant legitimacy to the Military under certain circumstances to act as moderators of the political process and to check or overthrow the Executive or to avoid the breakdown of the system.
4 Approval given by civilian elites to the politically heterogeneous military to overthrow the Executive greatly facilitates the construction of a winning *coup* coalition.
5 There is a strong belief among civilian elites and military officers that while it is legitimate for the Military to intervence in the political process and exercise temporary political power, it is illegitimate for it to assume the direction of the political system for long periods of time.
6 The military officer's social and intellectual deference facilitates military co-option and continued civilian leadership.

Consequently, the phenomena prevalent in pre-1964 Brazil was not that of militarism, but "civil-militarism."

The Era of Repressive Direction—1964-1974

In 1964 however, Brazil faced major crisis-situations as a result of which the civilian government lost ground and practically all civilian elitist groups (State Governors, Political Parties, Women's Organizations, Student Unions, Business Groups, Catholic Church and the leading journalists) lobbied for the Army to take political action "to check President Goulart."[34] The assumption by the Army of governmental power in 1964 with Marshal Humberto Castello Branco as the President, represented a collapse of the "moderator" role of the Army, and its emergence as "director" of the political system. It now subscribed to the policy of "system change" in place of the traditional "system maintenance." And, in that process, it became a sub-system that responded to changes in the overall political system.[35]

In the years following the *coup* of 31 March 1964, the military governments gave priority to the problem of "national security" and that, too, from the viewpoint of "internal security" and "political stability." The problem of "development" therefore became subservient to that of "national security." The 18-year long spell of military rule made Brazilians realize that the need of the hour was to accelerate the rate of development. And,

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for this both the Military and the civilian elites should have a better understanding of their complementary roles. They should also cultivate the habit of "working together" in a "missionary spirit."[36]

The 1964 *coup* was interpreted as a victory over "subversion" and "communism," both in the economic and political fields. In the economic field, Brazil was once again put firmly in line with the "system of Western capitalism under the leadership, if not control, of the United States."[37] It came to be favourable to foreign businessmen and financiers. In the political field, through a long series of Institutional and Complementary Acts culminating in the new Constitution of 1967, a number of far-reaching steps were taken towards substantially, rather radically, amending the 1946-Constitution. The new Constitution was not only "centralizing" but also "authoritarian." Its major provisions were as follows:

1 The President was now authorized to propose constitutional amendments which must be acted on by the Congress within thirty days by an absolute, rather than 2/3, majority.
2 The President was allowed to suspend Congress and govern by decree, to dismiss government employees and elected officials, and suspend the political rights of citizens for ten years.
3 The President could also cancel, within 60 days, the credentials of any official for a period of 10 years. Accordingly, the political rights of some 250 civilian-elites, including political rights of former Presidents Kubitschek, Quadros and Goulart and a number of Congressmen and Senators were suspended for a period of 10 years;
4 The Congress must also act within 30 days on ordinary Bills sent by the President, failing which these would be considered to have been approved;
5 The Supreme Court was given the power to cancel the mandates of Congressmen and elected members of the State and Municipal Assemblies and Councils;
6 In place of the party system, which had functioned for the last 20 years, a new arrangement was made, asking the political parties to register themselves after securing support of at least 20 Senators and 120 Federal Deputies. The Government put its weight behind a new grouping ARENA (National Renovating Alliance), which was joined by more than twice the minimum number of Senators and Deputies, leaving possible only one alternate grouping which came into existence as MDB (the Brazilian Democratic Movement). Within these two political bodies, all previous political parties had now to merge to some kind of an uneasy compromise;
7 The State Governors were no longer to be elected directly, but chosen by state legislatures.[38]

Thus the Military Elite, under the leadership of Castello Branco, played

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its major role to run down the civilians, assert its authority and lay down the hard foundations of authoritarian capitalism. Later, under Costa de Silva who had talked much of his desire to "humanize" the regime, there was "an intensification of the move towards more arbitrary government, a failure to concede reform demand and the strengthening of a state apparatus increasingly geared to harsh repression."[39] Through the Institutional Act No 5 of 13 December 1969, Costa de Silva assumed extraordinary powers. This Act conferred on the President powers of far-reaching importance:

1 The President of the Republic may decree recess of the National Congress, the State Assemblies, and the municipal chambers through complementary edicts whether or not a state of siege is in force. They will be called into session again only by the President of the Republic. (Article 2)
2 The President of the Republic in the national interest may decree intervention in the states and municipalities without the limitations set forth in the Constitution. The *interventores* in the states and municipalities will be appointed by the President of the Republic and will exercise all functions and duties which are the respective responsibility of the Governors or Mayors and will enjoy all privileges, salaries and benefits fixed by law. (Article 3)
3 In the interest of preserving the revolution, the President of the Republic, after consultations with the National Security Council and without the limitations established in the Constitution, will be able to suspend the political rights of any citizen for ten years, and to cassate federal, state or municipal elective mandates. Federal, state and municipal legislative members whose mandates are cassated will not be replaced and the parliamentary quorum will be adjusted in accord with the number of places effectively filled. (Article 4)[40]

Following this act political opposition was further emasculated. Prominent critics like Carlos Lacerda lost their political rights. Congress was closed indefinitely. Important state legislatures were put under indefinite recess. Mandates of 4 Senators, 33 Congressmen, 77 Federal Deputies and 3 Supreme Court Judges were cancelled. Several hundred Brazilians were removed from their jobs. The Press and other media were also hit. The use of torture as an instrument of terror and repression was liberal. And, all elections due to be held before November 1970 were cancelled. Relations between the State and the Church on the one hand, and between the State and the students on the other, became more tense. All these developments gradually "isolated" the President.[41] His illness in August 1969 produced a major crisis. As per the Constitution, his place should have been taken by the Vice-President Pedro Aleixo, a civilian. But, the most senior military officers decided in favour of a Junta, composed of military ministers Aleixo.

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The process of the presidential successor was finally completed in October when General Garrastazu Medici formally took office.

During Medici's regime, new measures further reinforced the authoritarian state. Amendment No. 1 to the Constitution of 1967 was promulgated on 17 October. This further strengthened the powers of the Federal Government in relation to the states and significantly reduced the immunity and powers of the Congress. Consideration of national security now took precedence over the rights of members of Congress, while the power of the Executive to issue decree laws was strengthened. The government's power to deprive political opponents of political rights for ten years was now reinforced by much tougher provisions under a new Article 153, allowing for banishment, confiscation of property and even the death penalty for intention to subvert the democratic regime or corruption, Medici, thus, came to office with a virtual mandate to maintain tight control. His regime soon achieved its aim of crushing effectively and quickly attempts at direct opposition and left a record of presiding over "the most repressive period of Brazilian politics."[42] The Presidency was marred by the worst excesses of torture and abuse of human rights.

Yet, it was during Medici's presidency, that Brazil basked most warmly in the sun of international financial and business approval as a "stable" system, safe for investment. Medici and Delfin Neto had achieved what they wished.

The Era Of Gradual Political Liberalism—1974

Medici's successor General Ernesto Geisel chose to maintain a much more direct control even though initially he seemed eager to relax the more extreme methods of control Medici had initiated. He was anxious to find the "second leg" of wider popular control. As the Congressional and other elections scheduled for November 1974 approached, it became clear that the government was willing to allow freer debate than at any time since 1964. Opponents of the regime were allowed television time and uncensored press coverage for the expression of their views "on such previously forbidden topics as human rights... and role of multinational corporations in Brazil."[43] Opposition leaders, themselves surprised and rather taken aback by the extent of their success, were the first to acknowlegde the importance of President Geisel's role in allowing the elections to take place smoothly. But Geisel was quick to take due credit for a successful move to reopen political debate.

He emphasized his acceptance of a more open system, allowing room for public disagreement, but stressed the need for an overriding consensus. And, in this whole process, he had no time for corruption or torture. Rather, his main aim was a "humane, integrated development."[44] He was eager to refurbish the image of Brazil, attain a sufficient measure of popular support and also to prove that he could take an independent stand. An

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important instance is the termination of the 1952 agreement for military aid from the United States. Nevertheless, Geisel's liberalism had its own sharply defined limits. What he wanted was "a controlled democracy," within rules and boundaries defined by his own perception of national interest, which, in turn, would reflect fairly closely the thinking of the National War College, the Escola Superieur de Guerra (ESG). When he was faced with a refusal by Congress to provide a 2/3 majority requested for a judicial reform bill, Geisel summarily annulled Congress. Later, he introduced new measures calculated to improve the position of ARENA.

In April 1977, the following constitutional amendments were promulgated by a presidential decree:

1 The presidential term of office was increased from five to six years as from the expiry of the then incumbents' term 15 March 1979, and the date for the presidential elections was brought forward from January 1979 to October 1978.
2 Henceforth, constitutional amendments must be approved by Congress by a simple majority, not the two-thirds majority as at present.
3 From 1978, State Governors and one-third of the members in the Senate were to be elected indirectly by an electoral college, comprising members of the state assemblies and municipal councils. Those elected (including mayors) in November 1976 were to hold office until 1982, instead of 1980.
4 Federal Deputies to be allocated on the basis of population and not on the number of registered voters as before. Each state was to elect not less than 6 and not more than 55 representatives.
5 Non-budgetary measures will no longer require congressional approval.
6 No election candidates to be allowed to appear on radio or television to discuss campaign issues.[45]

Students protested and demonstrated against these measures. Intellectuals, journalists and churchmen issued dissenting manifestoes and argued for change. Congress was in full cry with demands for a Constituent Assembly, a demand which fell on deaf ears. Generally, opposition to the regime was strong and getting stronger. The Brazilian people refused to provide for the regime that "second leg" the soldiers and technocrats wanted. It was an appeal for popular support which Brazilians would not extend. The key question confronting the people at this time was as stated by Peter Flynn: "Could the system be changed, humanized, opened up, perhaps with a different emphasis in social and economic priorities?" The answer seemed to be "Yes", but only to a certain degree. After a certain point, the brakes were put on. The result was, adds Flynn, that in all the political and economic debates of 1964-1978, "the most neglected and disparaged elements has been the people of Brazil."[46]

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In January 1978, General Joao Baptista de Figueiredo was chosen by President Geisel as his successor. This decision was endorsed by the national convention of ARENA. General Figueiredo was duly elected President by an electoral college in October 1978 and took office in March 1979. On assumption of office, he declared that he "intended to continue the gradual democratization initiated by President Geisel and to maintain current economic policies aimed at reducing the rate of inflation, at keeping the Brazilian debt under control and at achieving a more equal distribution of wealth."[47]

The Congress meanwhile, in the face of growing political agitation, had approved various political reforms proposed by President Geisel, including the repeal of the controversial Institutional Act No. 5 adopted in 1968. The proposed amendments came into force from January 1979. They were as under:

1 The repeal of Institutional Act No. 5 which gave the President the power to anull Congress, suspend a citizen's political rights for 10 years and remove members of the Federal, State or Municipal legislatures.
2 The repeal of Article 185 of the Constitution which imposed political ineligibility for life on those citizens penalized under the Institutional Act No. 5.
3 The promulgation of a new National Security Law under which the death penalty, perpetual imprisonment and banishment were abrogated and under which the right of *habeas corpus* was restored for political detainees.
4 The creation of a Constitutional Council with the President as Chairman and comprising of the Vice-President, the President of the Senate and representatives of the Armed Forces, to approve presidential decrees with regard to measures designed to safeguard national security;
(a) emergency measures where public order is gravely disturbed in specific regions;
(b) state of emergency for 90 days, renewable where public security is threatened;
(c) state of siege for 180 days, includes powers of detention, censorship, etc.
5 The creation of a new law on the formation of political parties under which a new party must have 10 per cent of the votes in Congress, or the support of 5 per cent of the electorate.[48]

On 18 July 1979, under the provisions of a Government Decree, a national office for the dismantling of the bureaucracy was established under the co-ordination of Helio Beltrao, with the aim of improving the functioning of the Federal Government's administrative machinery.[49] Another liberal

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measure was the Partial Amnesty Act of August 1972, under which President Figueiredo granted amnesty to those who were imprisoned or exiled for political crimes between September 1961 and August 1979, excepting those held for acts of "terrorism" and "armed resistance to the regime."[50] The new law allowed the exiles to return and restored political rights to those who had been stripped of them under the Institutional Acts. Consequently, several prominent leaders who were in exile returned home.

In September 1979, the President announced his programme for the re-organization of political parties on the pattern of one government party and one or more opposition parties. All parties were however to be democratic and adhere to the Constitution. Accordingly, towards the end of 1979 the Congress approved the dissolution of the ARENA, MDB and other existing parties and provided afresh for the creation of a single government party and several opposition parties.[51] In succession to ARENA, the Social Democratic Party (PDS) was established as the government party. The MDB was succeeded by the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) with Ulisses Guimaraes as its leader. The other new oppositon parties which simultaneously came into being were: the right wing Popular Party (PP) led by Tancredo Neves; the trade-union-based Workers Party (PT) led by Luis Inacio da Silva; the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) led by Leonel Damoira Brizola and the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) led by Ivete Vargas. The Moscow and Peking-based unrecognized communist parties supported the PMDB.

In August 1980, a working party was set up to draft a new constitution by the end of 1981 so that it could be ready for promulgation in March 1982.[52] The policy of gradual liberalization also continued and amnesty was granted to more political prisoners and exiles; the country's last political prisoner being reported released in October 1980.[53]

General Figueiredo also announced the reintroduction of direct elections for state governors and all the senators. A Constitutional Amendment to this effect was approved by the Brazilian Congress in November 1980, to take effect from November 1982—the time of the parliamentary and gubernatorial elections.[54] In the first half of 1981, the President continued to implement the policy of gradual political liberalization, initiated by his predecessor despite opposition from the hardline section of the Brazilian Army. The latter was particularly critical of the freedom allowed to the Press, and the regime's increasing toleration of moderate left-wing parties which gave rise to "fears in military circles that the Euro-Communist style Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) might ultimately be legalized."[55] Trade union activities were also reactivized; a conference of the Working Classes (CONCLAT) decided to establish a Trade Union Central, whose constituent congress was scheduled to take place in August 1982.[56]

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III
CONCLUSIONS

The long spell of military rule has convinced the civil elites that the former, inspite of its liberal encouragement to and collusion with the Multinational Corporations (MNCs)[57] cannot, despite their best efforts, "solve the political problems of development."[58] The civilian elites have also come to realize the futility of their assumption that "if they encourage the Military to overthrow a President the Military will refrain from assuming power themselves."[59] At the same time, the pattern of civil-military relations which the Military initated after 1964 has in fact created internal schisms and increasingly isolated them from the civilians.[60] This special feature Brazil shares with most Latin American States having military rule.

However, in the case of Brazil it can safely be assumed that the present phase of "Gradual Political Liberalism" would some day take the country back to the pre-1964 phase of civilian rule, in which the military elite would themselves replay their role of "moderation" and let Brazil proceed on the road of development emerging as the "fifth Big Power" on the international scenario, a fiat which most other Latin American Republics would find difficult and too distant.

September 1982.

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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS: CONTRASTING CASES OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA

By VEENA KUKEREJA*

It is interesting to note that, although the Pakistani and Indian political systems share many common features relating to history, military organization and an overall areal culture, the two systems have displayed contrasting patterns of civil-military relations. The armies of both the countries inherited the British Indian military traditions of non-involvement in politics, but in Pakistan the Army eroded this tradition by intervening decisively and frequently whereas in India, the principle of civilian supremacy remains intact. Their post-independence development, composition, and relationship with the civilian authority has been markedly different. This had a direct bearing upon the divergent roles of the armies of the two countries.

Given the variety of hypotheses that have been suggested as explanations for the contrasting behaviour of the two successor armies of British India, this article would examine several variables and relationships in comparative perspective under two sets of theoretical explanatory variables that are too often kept separate. These are: 1 the internal features of the military establishment[1] and 2 the external or environmental variables.[2]

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT VARIABLES

This set of variables includes all the factors pertaining to military institutions in Pakistan and India such as their size, defence expenditure, recruitment and representativeness, level of cohesion and autonomy, hierarchical structure, level of professionalization, corporate interests, as well as the officers' class backgrounds, communal attitudes, etc. Case studies of military interventions in Pakistan illustrate that although the military organization inherited by that country was comparatively less well organized and small with greater shortage of the commissioned officers than in India, yet it altered the pattern of civil-military relations after eleven years of its birth. In fact, one finds that certain ideological and structural features of the Pakistani Military—in part inherited from the British, but in part a purely Pakistani phenomenon—facilitated replacement of the civilian elite by the military elite.

Size of Military Forces Not Meaningfully Comparable

The partition of India and Pakistan resulted in the division of the military forces between the two nations on a three-to-one ratio. While India received

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sixteen cavalry regiments, eighteen artillery regiments and eighty-two infantry battalions, Pakistan's share was six, nine, and forty-five, respectively. Similarly, hardware, ordinance factories and barracks were also allotted on a three-to-one basis.[3] However, the size of the two armies cannot be meaningfully compared in absolute terms; if one takes into account the size of the two armies in relation to their population, it reveals that in Pakistan the military participation ratio is about .51 per cent whereas in India it is .16 per cent.[4]

Major Portion of Pakistani Revenue Defence-Oriented

So far as defence expenditure is concerned, one finds that a major portion of Pakistan's total revenues has been spent to modernize the military apparatus. The Pakistani political leaders' concept of a hostile India, its identity crisis, and its border tensions with Afghanistan have all resulted in boosting military expenditures. In contrast, India's policy of non-alignment with its accompanying principles of *panchsheel* (peaceful co-existence), led to a de-emphasis of military build-up and modernization (especially until the 1962 Chinese aggression) and allowed it to make a start in tackling its enormous social and economic problems.[5] The following tables give details of the Pakistani and Indian defence expenditures.

Table I shows that on an average Pakistan spent 59.15 per cent of its total governmental expenditure on defence during the period 1948-59. It

Table I

Defence Expenditures of Pakistan and India During 1947-59

Year	Pakistan		India	
	Defence Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Percentage of Total Expenditure	Defence Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Percentage of Total Expenditure
1947-48*	236.0	65.16	866.3	44.5
1948-49	461.5	71.32	1460.5	46.9
1949-50	625.4	73.06	1488.6	46.6
1950-51	649.9	51.32	1641.2	44.1
1951-52	792.4	54.96	1709.5	45.3
1952-53	725.7	56.68	1795.2	45.5
1953-54	633.2	58.7	1998.3	44.1
1954-55	640.5	57.5	1866.6	37.1
1955-56	917.7	64.0	1722.3	38.3
1956-57	800.9	60.1	1921.5	37.5
1957-58	854.2	56.1	2567.2	32.8
1958-59	996.6	50.9	2509.3	

Source: *15th August 1947 to March 1978.
Adapted from Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (Lahore, 1976), pp. 56-57.

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cannot be denied that Pakistan was spending more on defence than its resources could afford. On the other hand, India's defence expenditure during this period never went beyond 47 per cent despite the fact that the Indian Military is numerically more than the Pakistani Military. Table II also demonstrates the continuously high budgetary allocation to the military and reflects defence as a priority over other requirements of the nation. The result has been that it has not only modernized the Pakistani Army but also enhanced its resources, prestige, and influence *vis-a-vis* other social sub-systems whose development suffered due to the over-emphasis on the fulfilment of the military needs.

Table II

Defence Expenditures of Pakistan and India During 1960-79

Year	Pakistan		India	
	Defence Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product	Defence Expenditure (in million Rs.)	Defence Expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
1960	978	2.8	2274	1.9*
1961	984	2.6	3046	1.9
1962	938	2.4	4336	2.6
1963	1029	2.4	7306	3.8
1964	1208	2.6	8084	3.6
1965	2059	4.0	8651	3.6
1966	2578	4.4	9027	3.4
1967	2240	3.5	9535	3.0
1968	2307	8.3	10170	3.1
1969	2588	3.5	10840	3.0
1970	2975	3.7*	11747	3.0
1971	3730	6.6	14438	3.4
1972	4083	6.8	16205	3.5
1973	4695	6.1	16737	3.0
1974	5932	6.6	20043	3.0
1975	7412	6.1	23823	3.3
1976	7952	5.6	25793	3.4
1977	8697	5.4	27174	3.2
1978	9780	5.3	28966	3.1
1979	10850	5.1	31910	**

Conventions: *Imputed values, with a high degree of uncertainty.
**Information not available or not applicable.

Source: This table is prepared on the basis of information of world military expenditure available in *World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook* (Cambridge and Mass.), 1974 to 1981.

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Contrasting Cases of Recruitment and Social Representativeness

Pakistan and India also present contrasting cases of the impact of recruitment and social representativeness of the military establishment on the behaviour of the military in terms of the proposition that the more widely is the army representative of the nation, the lesser is the probability of military intervention or vice versa. The British Indian Army was recruited from the most politically inert and "reliable" sectors of Indian society, and it was even taken care to balance and distribute representation to prevent the remaining elements from developing a sense of unity. Upon achieving independence, both Pakistan and India took steps to remove some of the imbalances in the recruitment of officers and the rank and file. An army drawn largely from the Punjab was incompatible with the nationalist integrationist and egalitarian objectives of both the countries. These objectives stemmed from either Islamic or democratic principles. However, it soon became apparent that the problem of military re-organization was far more acute in Pakistan than in India. In the pre-war Indian Military Punjabi Muslims dominated the muslim representation with over 75 per-cent representation, and even when they were diluted during World War II, they still constituted over half of all the muslims in the Military Force. On the other hand, among the sections of the military that remained with India, none constituted more than 13 per cent (Jat Sikhs), except for the Gurkhas of Nepal (14 per cent), who were in any case to be divided between the Indian and British armies.[6] The differences in ethnic representation in the officer *corps* was also not less striking. Only a handful of Bengali Muslims went to the Pakistani Army; Punjabi Muslims again constituted at least 60 per cent of the officer *corps,* with Pathans being the second largest component (35 per cent). In India, on the other hand, officers' recruitment was even more diverse than the recruitment of the jawans; a substantial number of Tamilians, Bengalis, and Western Indians found their way into the commissioned ranks of the Indian Military. The different regional origins of the Chiefs of the Army Staff, as also the majority contribntion of Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, and Western Uttar Pradesh to the officer *corps* reflects this divesrity.[7]

After independence, Pakistani civilian as well as military rulers never attempted to broaden the recruitment base of the Pakistani Army. Rather, they firmly stuck to the myth of martial races created by the British. They used the same arguments as used by the British to justify the Punjabi-dominated composition of the colonial army, arguing that the Bengalis were not suited for army life as they were short in height and lacked martial tradition. That is why, although estimates vary, there does not appear to have been more than 4-6 per cent Bengalis in the Pakistani Army.[8] This sectional imbalance in the army was not as much inspired by racial and regional traditions as by political consideration, which was at the root of the failure to accommodate the Pakistani Army itself to the countrys's needs.

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In India, even before independence, the British Indian Army was constantly criticized by the leaders of the Congress movement for its hopelessly feudal, inequalitarian and caste-bound composition.[9] Following independence, the martial races theory was replaced by a "secular" approach.[10] According to Cohen, although the Indian approach substituted one myth for another, it has worked very well to accommodate the so-called non-martial races of India in the military and perhaps was the only solution for euch a heterogeneous society wedded to democracy.[11]

In this context it is important to note that in Pakistan the predominantly Punjabi and Pathan composition of the army contributed to a greater cohesiveness within the army and engendered political ambitions among the officers. It confirms the hypothesis that the higher the levet of cohesion, the higher the possibility of success of military intervention. in contrast to the Pakistani case, army officers in India were not as homogeneous and closely well-knit as in Pakistan. Jawans, officers, and the chiefs of staff of the army, airforce, and navy came from various regions, communities, and castes. Thus, the process of broad-based recruitment of officers carried out on an all-India basis, with merit as the sole criterion for selection, kept the possibility of any regional clique developing in the officer cadre and political ambitions in effective check. Recently, the Indian Army has introduced reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes a policy of "protective discrimination" in favour of the backward classes. In Pakistan the military enjoys greater autonomy in several fields in comparison to India. After the expiry of the period of initial recruitment a soldier in Pakistan could enrol again for a maximum of eighteen years of service. This recruitment policy, and the long service involved may be seen as enhancing the *esprit de corps* of the army and the control of its officers.[12] In India military officers upto the rank of Lt. Colonel generally get promotion by selection. We do find some cases of supersession[13] but they have always been subjected to strong criticism. But in Pakistan they are more common and do not seem to evoke simliar resentment or protest.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

The various factors grouped under the second set of variables, namely the external or environmental variables, are as follows: political democratic tradition, level of political institutionalization, role of elections, role of the military in the maintenance of law and order, repercussions of war on military behaviour, the performance and legitimacy of the government, the actions of civilian leaders, nature of the society and culture, politicization of various classes of the society, the severity of communal conflicts, the extent of socio-economic modernization, rate/impact of economic growth and the impact of foreign aid and military *coups* in other countries etc.

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Varying Levels of Political Institutionalization

Both Pakistan and India, under the British, shared the same administrative and political traditions. But this is an oversimplification for the British colonial system in India had many facets; at the core was a highly centralized bureaucratic viceregal system of authority with some domocratic trappings of limited institutions of self-government. Outside the government, political awakening was limited to the port cities while rural India and the provinces were in practice ruled authoritatively. Pakistan inherited mainly the rural areas of undivided India and along with it the rural idiom of politics. Lahore was its only genuine city; it was the capital of the most bureaucraticized and carefully controlled province in India—the Punjab. The only Muslims of the sub-continent who enjoyed the benefits of participation under the British rule were the communal minorities of Western India. Pakistan's provinces were parts of an authoritarian political culture. Punjab and Sind were ruled by feudal landowning families who were jealous of their autocratic prerogatives and scornful of popular politics.[14]

In contrast to India, the other significant elite from the Muslim provinces was the civil and military bureaucracy also scornful of the notion that the masses should direct the activities of the state. Thus the strongest traditions and structures of politics inherited by Pakistan were autocratic and viceregal. Also, on independence India opted for a democratic constitution while Pakistan chose to continue the viceregal system with slight modifications.

Although the basic political tradition in ancient India was normally monarchical, other elements such as the institutions of *samiti, panchayat,* and the concept of *Brahmin* as the adviser to the king, etc., put constraints on monarchical power and therefore seemed supportive of some notions of democracy.[15] Thus when after independence the Westminster model of democracy was introduced in India, some of these older institutional ideas (such as *Panchayati Raj*) were picked up and selectively introduced.

In sum, Jinnah's identification with the viceregal traditions and Nehru's preference for parliamentarianism represent the two great traditions of modern politics which the sub-continent experienced under British rule.[16]

Military intervention in politics in Pakistan was a manifestation of the political system's institutional poverty. In India on the other hand, a greater institutionalization of democracy, coupled with skilled and mature political leadership, helped prevent such an eventuality. It is evident that due to institutional failure Pakistan did not enjoy the same level of political stability as India did. As long as there was a strong charismatic leader like Jinnah with a national stature, the country seemed stable. After his death factionalism, regionalism, opportunism and instability characterized the politics of Pakistan. And the political system came under heavy strain from all sides.

Furthermore, an examination of the party system of Pakistan shows that the Muslim League was never able to establish the same level of political

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dominance in Pakistan that the Congress did in India. Unlike the Congress Party, the Muslim League failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a broad-based national party seeking to lead the nation on the road to democracy and planned economic development due to its weak and narrow political support base. The Muslim League was also not comparable in organizational terms to the Congress Party. Although it took credit for the creation of Pakistan, it failed to perform the twin tasks of institution-building and political mobilization, whereas in India the Congress Party not only had a mass base but also performed the tasks of interest articulation and aggregation and has played a predominant role in the politics of the country for three decades.[17]

Apart from the organizational weakness, the Muslim League was overshadowed by Jinnah's towering personality. Unfortunately he passed away within a year of independence; he could thus neither transfer part of his charisma to the Muslim League nor develop conventions and consensus for the aggregation of diverse interests in the party. Thus in 1948, the Muslim League had no leader of the same standing as *Quaid-i-Azam*. Liaquat Ali Khan tried hard to fill the vacuum of leadership but he was assassinated in 1951. India on the other hand, after independence was indeed very fortunate to have an appreciable degree of political stability provided by a skillful and mature political leadership with a wide and firm popular base. A democrat, Jawaharlal Nehru, ably steered the ship of the Indian state for the first two decades of independence. In this respect the Indian experience was very different from that of Pakistan.

Pak Army's Rise Facilitated by Absence of Democratic Factors

Another factor which facilitated the army's rise to power in Pakistan was that the country had no democratic elections for eleven years after independence and democratic values had scarcely struck roots. On the other hand, the electoral process in India during the same period and subsequently seemed to have a considerable functional significance for the political system as well as for the voters.[18]

The survival and stability of political democracy in India may be explained to a significant extent in terms of continuous, regular, free and fair holding of elections in this country. As M.P. Singh observes: "In Pakistan, the vitiation of the electoral process led to continuous narrowing and increasing unrepresentativeness and unresponsiveness of a self-perpetuating political elite that so irretrievably discredited the parliamentary structure and processes that it got brushed aside by the military elite only a decade after its birth."[19]

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Governmental Reliaice on the Military Increases Political Involvement

A significant factor in the politicization of the Pakistani Army was the tendency of the government to lean too heavily on the military to control civil strife and maintain law and order. The old British Indian Army had been continually engaged in aiding the civilian authority during the phase of the mass nationalist movement, but following independence these activities were carried to greater lengths in Pakistan than in India. The Pakistani Army came to be deeply involved in aiding the civil authorities. Further, many of these activities were more "political" in nature. Making a virtue of the necessity, the Pakistani Military developed various professional justifications for its increased involvement in civilian matters. In sharp contrast, in India a systematic and relatively successful attempt has been made to relieve the military of its civilian activities. Most of the Indian states as well as the Union Government maintain sizeable paramilitary units such as the Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and armed police to deal with internal disorder.[20] The number of civil disorders in recent years has increased but the overall trend is a lessening use of the Indian Army to contain them. The paramilitary forces are used more frequently for this purpose in India; the army is thus deployed only in extreme situations which proved too serious to be controlled by the police, such as floods, famine and other national disasters. In this also however, the Indian Military has strongly resisted civilian attempts to involve them. They appreciate the favourable publicity such activities may yield, especially disaster relief, but have always returned to barracks with relief; preferring to emphasize professional military training.[21] In Pakistan on the other hand, with the passage of time, dependence on the military increased, gving them not only the experience to handle civilian problems but also showed the incompetence of the civil government to settle these cases. This led the military to believe that it was the only institution which could lend stability to the nation. Thus in the case of Pakistan various incidents of the army's intrusion into the realms of civilian concern, ranging from the restoration of order in Lahore to General Ayub's formulation of a constitutional plan, serve to illustrate how from 1953-58 the political atmosphere became more conducive to military control rather than civilian control. In India, at the same time, the military organization was always discouraged from becoming involved in the political decision-making process. Nehru in fact, frequently expressed his feelings on the matter in Parliament.[22]

War Repercussions Lead to Army's Role Expansion

Apart from the above mentioned factors, the earliest period of the Pakistani Army's history was greatly influenced by the consequences of war with India and contributed towards its role expansion. Unexpected war,

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first in the plains of the Punjab and then in Kashmir, communal violence in the Punjab and the massive exchange of population had a predominant impact on the morale of the Pakistani Army. But the decisive implication of the violence was that it politicized and militarized the army and the Punjab generally.

Moreover, the Pakistani Army enjoyed leverage or support from the masses as far as the Kashmir issue was concerned. This was due to the fact that both the elites and masses believed that the army would be able to handle the issue more effectively (than the political strata) and this feeling became explicit especially after Jinnah.

Diversity of Society Lowers Probability of Military Intervention

The different patterns of relationship that obtained between the army and society in Pakistan and India illustrate the hypothesis that the greater the diversified complexity of the society, the lower the probability of military intervention in politics. The size and diversity of Indian population may have discouraged military intervention. Unlike in Pakistan, political power in India cannot be won by taking over the capital city, or even the four major metropolitan cities. The size and regional deversity in India would not only make it difficult for the various sections of the army to work together for interventionist purposes but would also tend to prevent one particular section of the officer corps from acting on its own. India is a country of continental dimensions with wide disparities in ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic and racial composition of the people inhabiting the country. Although India's diversity and pluralism is so often thought to be a handicap in nation-building, it may have acted as a deterrent to military intervention. It is generally accepted that large countries of this size and disparity are spared from military *coups* because it is very difficult to govern a heterogeneous and highly diversified and stratified society through means other than democratic.

On the other hand, Pakistan is not as diverse as India; also it was somewhat artificially polarized due to the lack of geographical contiguity before 1971. However, Pakistan is diverse enough for a medium size country even after the 1971 secession. But, what is significant is that these diversities have hardly been reflected in the composition of its army or even in the governmental policies. This led to the polarization of society. Unlike in India, every conflict issue came down to a question of East versus West. This polarity also cropped up in the military, the one institution in which recruitment and promotion should have been based purely upon ability.

In India, a federal framework was adopted as a solution to the diversity and a common identity between the different groups and subcultures, constituting the Indian Union, was established. In sharp contrast, in Pakistan the federal form failed to evolve a loose common identity between its western and eastern wings. This was because in Pakistan democratic principles were

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never given a try. Furthermore, in terms of political culture Pakistan is relatively backward, intolerant and suspicious; consequently it failed to assimilate the different groups and their aspirations and demands into the mainstream of the nation which ultimately led to the disintegration of the country.

Low Political Culture Lowers Scope of Political Activity

Pakistan, in terms of Finer's classification, belongs to the category of "low political culture."[23] During the pre-1968 period, public involvement in and attachment to civilian institutions in Pakistan was practically non-existent in comparison with India. Therefore, one finds that politics in Pakistan, characterized by low political mobilization witnessed a low scope of political activity and did not stimulate any demands on the system. Now things have changed. However, the level of political mobilization in Pakistan continues to be lower than in India. It is evident that resistance to military distatorship in Pakistan has been largely an urban phenomenon; whereas in India political mobilization and politicization of the masses through elections is much deeper and widespread throughout the country.[24]

In Pakistan public opinion never insisted that the holders of power conform to the spirit of the Constitution. It was partly due to the fact that Pakistan in contrast to India inherited a relatively smaller middle class in the social structure. Whereas India was fortunate enough to have a larger middle class, which provided the bulwark for the preservation and functioning of democracy in India, the near absence of such classes formed the political scene in Pakistan in its early years contributing to the prolonged eclipse of democracy in the country.

By the late 1960s however, one finds the levels of political mobilization increasing in Pakistan. It can be exemplified by the fact that the urban middle classes consisting of doctors, lawyers, teachers and students is growing and becoming more politicized. Moreover, the politicization of the lower classes, both industrial and agrarian, has also begun. The less privileged elements in Pakistani society—the landless peasants of Punjab and Sind, for example—are becoming aware that their traditional passivity in the face of exploitation has gained them nothing. Change is in the air in response to the middle and lower class demands for increased participation in the political process for a more equitable distribution of rewards and its impact is likely to be felt more severely on the government than in the past.[25]

International Developments Favour Pak Military Regime

If one examines the factor of the international environment, one finds that since independence both the armies have had wide and varied international contacts. The Pakistani Army, in sharp contrast to India's, was for

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many years formally associated with two military alliances SEATO and CENTO. This naturally led to close military ties with the United States, Jordan, Iran and Turkey. All these links, most of which were derived from the American alliance, had a profound effect on the Pakistani military and politics. For example, the military strength tended to increase *vis-a-vis* other social institutions quantitatively as well as qualitatively. In India however, the policy of non-alignment, together with the priority given to economic development, caused the government to lower allocation to the army in the years following independence. The government was in any case unwilling to join any military alliance or pact, as disassociation from the Cold War and military pacts was the prerequisite of non-alignment. Nevertheless, one does find that the Indian Army was associated with a number of United Nations operations in Korea, the Congo, and the Middle East, and India helped to train several foreign armies especially those of Nepal and Ethiopia. There have also been the usual commonwealth exchange programmes. With the exception of a few incidents all these contacts have been initiated by civilian authorities, run under civilian supervision and terminated when the civilians wished them to end. Apart from this, current international developments seem to have favourable implications for the military regime in Pakistan in terms of massive military aid. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has radically altered the power equation in South Asia leading to the re-emergence of the Cold War between the Super Powers. Having vital global stakes, the United States strategic requirements, especially its anxiety to ensure the flow of oil from the Gulf region also appears to have compelled it to provide massive and technologically highly sophisticated arms to Pakistan.[26] Being aware of this fact Zia appears to be determined to exploit it to the maximum extent possible to achieve his cherished goals, namely, nuclear weapons capacity and an Islamic Pakistan with himself as the Pakistani Ataturk.

APPRAISAL

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the political culture developed within India has crystallized civil-military relations within a definite pattern.[27] In the post-independence period Indians proceeded to strengthen the tradition of civilian control. Pakistan, in sharp contrast, not only kept the pre-independence military set-up intact but the political leadership also failed to establish army norms of civilian supremacy; they were busy in solving their own political problems so that they hardly had time to spare. During this period Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers but one Army Chief, General Ayub Khan, who got two extensions. This continued stay in office not only gave him a chance to watch the degeneration of politics from very close quarters but also to consolidate his position in the army. Except for a short period, the defence portfolio was held by the Prime Minister providing an opportunity to the Chiefs of the three services

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(especially the army), to remain in close touch with him instead of communicating through the Defence Minister. This was again in complete contrast to the Indian political scene. India has had the most highly professional armed forces set up, completely in conformity with the democratic traditions of the country. It speaks volumes for the political perspicacity of Nehru that he planted the seeds of civilian control firmly in this country. In the political stability that he provided to the nation the seeds sprouted and the plant grew from strength to strength.

One of the earliest governmental decisions of independent India was the abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief on 15 August 1947. He, under the British, had been ranked second to the Viceroy. Under the Constitution the President is the Supreme Commander of the Aramed Forces and the Defence Minister has always been a civilian.[28] The newly created offices of the individual chiefs of staff of the three services were placed lower down the bureaucratic hierarchy. The civilian secretaries in the Government of India, who had previously ranked lower than lieutenant generals, became equivalent in status to full generals. In addition, the generals were now required to approach the Defence Minister through the Defence Secretary. During the British period, ranking army officers had direct access to the executive. Another important administrative change which was made to improve civilian control was the interposition of the politically-oriented Defence Ministry in the military decision-making process. The Ministry of Finance had for many years been working very closely with the military; now an additional corps of civilian administrators were involved in the process, scrutinizing military requests for their political implications just as the Finance Ministry looked up to them for fiscal acceptability.[29]

On a more practical level, the policy towards the armed forces seems to have been based on the principle of divide and rule which was followed to prevent the politicization of the armed forces. From 1947 onwards, there has been no united supreme military commander of the three services; instead each service has its own chief who reports directly to the Defence Minister. Finally, several committees, composed of non-military officials, such as the Defence Committee and Chiefs of Staff Committee were set up. Thus the present system is fragmented with several decision-making levels.

Pakistan, on the other hand, retained the office of the Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, he also doubled as Defence Minister, with no serious civilian supervision over either budget or operations.[30] In 1973, for the first time in Pakistani history, Bhutto reformed the military set up in several ways; the office of the Commander-in-Chief was abolished, the role of the army was determined by the Constitution and a para-military force of 14,000 was established. But all these structural reforms failed to establish civilian supremacy, as later Bhutto was compelled to call the armed forces frequently to maintain law and order and to control the anti-Bhutto agitations. In return, the army was given several concessions. Nevertheless,

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ultimately Bhutto himself was removed and later liquidated by Zia, the Chief of the Army Staff, who seized power on 5 July 1977.

It is important to note that the credit for the political non-involvement of the Indian Military also goes to the military elite; their approach to civilian-military matters has been quite sophisticated. The military leadership puts great stress on military professionalism and during the training period of new cadets the principles of civilian control of the administration are emphasized. Junior officers in the Indian Army are thought to be politically neutral and are content to remain so, concentrating on "purely professional" matters. Those few generals who have earned a reputation for political expertise or at least familiarity with politicians, such as B.M. Kaul, have not been popular with their colleagues.[31]

In Pakistan, however, it was demonstrated that, military professionalism notwithstanding, military intervention in politics could take place if civilian authority decayed. Professional corporateness curbed one potential *coup* (i.e. Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case of 1951) and several years later insured the success of another *coup*.[32]

Pakistan demonstrates that professionalism alone does not prevent military involvement in politics. Not only must the military be taught that civilian control is the norm, civilians must demonstrate their own effectiveness. A government which lacks legitimacy can no longer presume itself to be the arbiter of morality. In case of Pakistan, the fragile legitimacy of the government and political default on the part of the civilian leaders sucked the army into the political spheres. Moreover, religion also had an impact on professionalism in the Pakistani Army. The Indian Army has nothing comparable to the compelling force of Islam as in the Pakistani Army, which often thinks that it has not just to protect the state but its religion as well. The military *coup* thus becomes a crusade.

The Indian Military, alternatively, is illustrative of Huntington's view that civilian control is achieved "...not because the military groups share in the social values and political ideologies of society but because they are indifferent to such values and ideologies. If society goes to war the military fight not because they believe in the goals of the wars, but because it is their function to fight successfully for whatever ends the government wishes to pursue."[33]

June 1982.

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REAGAN'S STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA

By MAYA CHADDA*

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States in August 1982 was seen by many as the beginnings of a new era in Indo-US relations. The American and Indian press hailed it as a turning point in US policies towards the sub-continent, but the Indian Prime Minister cautioned that it was no more than an exchange of views. In concrete terms, the United States agreed to supply fuel to the Tarapur Nuclear Power Plant and promised a more sympathetic response to India's requests for loans and credits to the IMF and the World Bank.[1] *But on all security matters the two remained as far apart as ever. There was no agreement on US arms to Pakistan, the growing militarisation of the Indian Ocean or, Afghanistan.*

Those who perceived the visit as a positive sign for the future argued that summit meetings never produce dramatic results but in this instance, it crystallised and gave shape to a whole range of imperceptible shifts in the region.[2] *The willingness on the part of the United States and India to seek closer ties reflected their desire to gain advantages from the changing alignment of power in South West Asia. For instance, India's attempts to distance itself from the Soviet Union were noted in Washington and so also Pakistan's friendly overtures to India. The United States was aware of the slight but discernible thaw in Sino-Indian relations. They further pointed that this general relaxation of tensions was viewed by them (United States) to be in its interest since it at the same time denied the Soviet Union opportunities to expand its influence.*

Although it is true that India and Pakistan have been exchanging views on the "No War Pact," China too has held preliminary negotiations with India on their common borders, Indira Gandhi has distanced herself from the Communist Party of India signalling displeasure with Soviet policies in South and South West Asia[3] *and some new tensions between the United States and Pakistan have arisen, but the question still remains whether these disparate actions add up to a major re-alignment of power in the region and whether this is likely to trigger an equally serious change in the United States policies.*

If we were to assume that such a change is indeed in progress, it can only be a result of changed perceptions of threats and opportunities in Washington, threats that emanate from the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and opportunities that arise from the strengthening of pro-American elements in the region. Because, in the first place, it was the fear of Soviet expansion that brought enhanced US presence to South West Asia, particularly to Pakistan. Before 1979, the sub-continent was either ignored

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or perceived as only a test case for Carter's human rights and nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is therefore important to ask how and in what way has the Reagan assessment of Soviet intentions towards South West Asia changed to warrant a fundamental departure from commitments and ties with Pakistan forged just over a year ago. Secondly, how far such a re-alignment is likely to go and what do the nations in question—US, India and Pakistan gain from it?

Since the Reagan Administration's policies have been motivated by an overwhelming concern for the vital interests of the United States in the region, these questions can only be answered by first examining precisely how the United States sought to safeguard these. This would necessitate discussion of four main questions:

1 *The strategic rationale behind President Reagan's policies and the change in perceptions that led to the reversal of the Carter approach;*
2 *the role assigned to South West Asia and particularly to Pakistan in this strategy;*
3 *the alternative courses of action open to the United States as a result of changing perspectives in the region; and*
4 *whether the policies and recent adjustments towards South Asia signal a real departure from the strategic postures of 1980, or merely a continuation of the same approach but within a different diplomatic framework?*

The aim of this paper is to show that the present US initiatives signalled by the invitation to Mrs. Gandhi may ease tensions in the region but does not constitute a fundamental change in the strategic posture of its perceptions of the covert threats to its interests in the region.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS' : REVERSAL OF CARTER APPROACH

For more than a quarter of a century, from the Dullesian era to the Bangladesh War, US policy towards the sub-continent sought to make an ally of Pakistan in its "grand design" to contain Soviet expansionism, and to buttress Indian democracy with economic aid.[4] Indo-Pak hostilities however, made the two-pronged policy intolerable and forced the United States to first tilt one way and then the other. But after the separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan in 1971 and as the Vietnam War approached its denouement the sub-continent faded in importance altogether. President Nixon had belatedly adopted a tilt towards Pakistan during the Bangladesh War, but such support was seen by the latter for what it was, altogether too little and came too late to do any good.[5] Relations with India also remained strained until Carter came into the White House. The new President, committed as he was to human rights, nuclear non-proliferation and third world self-determination, once again recast the main thrust of US policy towards

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the region. The Carter approach to Pakistan revolved around three considerations:

1 Pakistan's effort to become a nuclear power;
2 fear of antagonizing India; and
3 the repressive nature of the Zia regime and its uncertain political future.

In line with this policy to discourage nuclear proliferation, Carter evoked the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which barred US aid to any country that seemed to undertake the development of nuclear weapons. In April 1979, the United States cut off all aid to Pakistan on the grounds that such aid violated its non-proliferation policy.[6] On the other hand, President Carter had set out to improve relations with India and redress the balance of its policies towards the sub-continent with a definite tilt in its favour. After the Bangladesh War, Pakistan's role as a regional power had already diminished considerably. Building it up as counterweight to India therefore no longer made political sense. On the other hand, India had emerged as a leading power in the region. The Carter Administration therefore acknowledged India as a pre-eminant regional influence and moved to correct the earlier pro-Pakistani bias in its policy. Carter visited India in 1978 and responded favourably to Indian requests for nuclear fuel for Tarapur. These developments coincided with the restoration of democracy in India and the announcement by Prime Minister Desai that India would move towards what he called a "proper non-alignment." He also made it a point to emphasize that the days of a special role for the Russians in India were over.

While India reasserted its commitment to democracy in 1977, Pakistan ushered in military dictatorship. Zia-ul-Haq, the new President of Pakistan showed no inclination to restore democracy but instead stepped up repressive measures to keep political dissent under tight control. Reacting to this, the Carter Administration pressurized Islamabad to correct its internal policies and cancelled the sale of 110 A-7 fighter planes because the latter refused to rescind its nuclear agreement with France.[7] Angered by this, Pakistan retaliated by pulling out of the CENTO in 1979 and declaring itself a member of the non-aligned forum.[8] At the end of the first three years of the Carter Administration therefore, Indo-US ties had moved a fair way back to the high point achieved during the Kennedy era when United States' relations with Pakistan had soured.

However this was not to last long since the foundation of Carter's liberal internationalism were also already coming undone. Contradictions had begun to appear everywhere:[9] the human rights focus had become an obstacle to the SALT II process and had greatly angered the Soviet Union. It had provoked a sense of betrayal in capitals that were traditionally pro-US. Similarly, toleration of revolutionary nationalism and a decrease in the use

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of covert and overt operations had failed to win him friends in the Third World, instead, it brought a growing fear that America's international influence was on a decline and its military posture weak. With the dramatic events of 1979—the fall of the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the second oil shock—the remaining props of Carter's policies in the Gulf and South West Asia also came tumbling down.

The Events

The fall of the Shah and the fundamentalist revolution in Iran destroyed the very foundations on which United States policies had been based. The Shah was replaced by a regime that was not only hostile to the United States but determined to remove every ounce of the latter's influence from the region. Its potential for spreading instability was therefore immense. Following hard on the heals of the Iranian revolution, 80,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan posing a threat it seemed not only to Pakistan and Iran, the two immediate neighbours, but also to the entire region.[10] The combined presence of hostile forces in Iran and Afghanistan threatened as never before the continued supply of oil as well as trade routes to the West. Such dangers to the very life-line of America, not to speak of Europe and Japan, struck fear in Washington, raised a storm of criticism over Carter's failures and evoked a demand for immediate action to abort what appeared to some as a Soviet grand design. The Iranian seizure of hostages completed Carter's discomfiture. American public was appalled by the naked demonstration of Soviet military power in Afghanistan in contrast with the American inability to prevent a weak power such as Iran from taking American citizens as hostages. When viewed against the background of what had begun to be perceived as a systematic and massive build-up of Soviet strategic and conventional weapons,[11] the conclusion was inevitable—that the United States was weak and its international prestige in perilous decline, its military strength had been whittled away by years of neglect and guilt felt after Vietnam and now it was in imminent danger of facing an enemy that was not only immensely powerful but bent upon acquiring control over the Middle East and the Gulf.

In the face of these developments, the Carter Administration reversed all its earlier policies and undertook three definite courses of action—the first, to shore up Pakistan; second, to make the Soviet Union pay a price in terms of its general relationship with the West and third, a greatly stepped up longer term effort to strengthen the American military presence and striking power in the area and to develop a network of security ties and military facilities in the littoral states of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

In the most dramatic single act of his administration, Carter in his January 1980 State of the Union Speech declared the Gulf to be within the parameters of US security and warned that any interference there would lead to immediate military retaliation by the United States.[12] The Gulf doctrine, as it

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later came to be known, drew a line at Pakistan setting this to be the limit beyond which the United States would not tolerate Soviet expansion. With Pakistan however, the Carter Administration faced a difficult and awkward situation. Relations between it and the United States had deteriorated even further; about a month before, in November 1980, mobs in Islamabad had burned the American Embassy while the Pakistani Government had made no great effort to protect it.[13]

In view of the Afghan invasion however, the Carter Administration promptly extended $400 million in military and economic aid to Pakistan. In February of that year, Pakistan rejected the offer as totally inadequate; it reacted that even at such a crucial moment, the United States had shown greater sensitivity to India than Pakistan. Carter was careful to keep the amount and type of arms offered to a modest level "so as not to cause difficulty in the area, particularly with reference to India."[14] It was at this point that Ronald Reagan swept into the White House.

Problems In South West Asia

Though the "Carter doctrine" had initiated the process of rebuilding American power abroad, it was evident to all that neither the military power nor the political co-operation needed to give full meaning to his words existed.[15] In the Gulf, only Oman was willing to offer facilities to the United States. The arrangement for base facilities in Kenya and Somalia could be of only peripheral significance in case the Gulf needed to be defended. Thus Carter's pronouncements had to be backed by both immediate and long-term military and diplomatic moves to establish US presence in the area. The Reaganites brought to this task a full-blooded commitment, free from any doubts and feelings of guilt which had been singularly lacking in Carter's regime. In their view, the US had to stop vacillating, because such indecisiveness had greatly damaged its security interests. It had contributed to the fall of the Shah and alienated an ally such as Pakistan.[16] What is more, pressures on the latter had perhaps convinced the Kremlin that the United States would not be overly concerned if the Soviet Union forced a change in the neutral status of Afghanistan. The second Reagan resolve therefore was that the United States must act resolutely and with toughness.

Thirdly, it was necessary to build a whole range of responses to various kinds of conventional and nuclear threats from the Soviet Union.[17] Till 1979, in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean US forces had remained at a low level—even after the British withdrawal. US nuclear superiority was therefore the ultimate gurantor against any Soviet thrust directed at Iran or Pakistan, or the areas around and beyond them. But even that superiority was it was felt now replaced by an overall situation of nuclear parity, so that the picture or a US that could be all powerful if it came to the crunch was dimmed. In terms of conventional forces, the problem was that the area lay close to the Soviet Union while the United States was a peripheral power in

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military terms, compelled to bring forces from a distance and in any case hard put to maintain them in strength for any length of time unless regional powers allowed full use of their military facilities.

With these problems in mind the Reagan Administration abandoned all previous attempts to delicately balance the United States' role in regional disputes and concentrated singlemindedly on reasserting once again America's global power and influence.[18] In brief, its approach was based on the following assumptions:

1 The Soviet Union was the primary threat to the region that supplied about 35 per cent of oil consumed by the free world economies.
2 In order to concentrate on thwarting Moscow's expansionism, Washington should de-emphasize efforts to solve regional disputes, i.e., Arab-Israeli or India-Pakistan conflicts.
3 Soviet power could best be contained militarily by putting more money and muscle in the Rapid Deployment Force.
4 A "consensus of stragetic concerns" should be developed among the countries stretching from Pakistan westward through Saudi Arabia to Egypt and Turkey, including Israel.
5 If a strategic entity could be created among these countries some of the regional states could be persuaded to accept US ground forces—a necessary requirement if the Soviet threat had to be effectively countered.

In terms of the Soviet Union's overall strategy in the Middle East and the Gulf, President Reagan's advisors claimed that it (Soviet Union) wanted to out-flank and isolate Egypt with the PLO on one side and Libya on the other. What was more, Soviet forces already threatened Pakistan and would not be averse to dividing it up with the help of India and the Baluchi insurgents. The latter had been agitating for separation from Pakistan since the late sixties.[19] This would give the Soviet Union an undeniable hold over Iran as well as direct access to the Arabian Sea. As a bonus they argued, this would help it and its various surrogates to destabilise Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE and take it a good deal further to completing the geo-political link-up of friendly states in the Gulf and North Africa.

There were, of course, differences within the United States Administration in its perceptions of Soviet intentions, but it cannot be denied that the Soviet actions of the past decade (Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen and arms to Libya), whatever their real motivations, reflected just enough of such intentions for the Reagan Administration to be able to claim that it was a "grand plan" that the United States must abort.

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ALTERNATIVE COURSES

RDF the Spearhead of Reagan Strategy

The five points of Reagan's policy can be reduced to essentially one overall objective: denial of the region to Soviet expansionism. Since diplomacy had failed (Carter experience), in the Reagan view, military build-up was the only answer.

The RDF consisting of combined contingents from all the three divisions of the United States Armed Forces was to spearhead Reagan's policy of security in the Middle East and South West Asia. Its purpose was to move in rapidly and prevent and abort developments that would endanger United States interests in the region, particularly the supply of oil. However, from its very inception, military planners have faced three difficulties:

1 determining the kind of threat the RDF was meant to repell;
2 a severe transport shortage, and
3 a lack of military bases.

Threats to US interests range from the direct Soviet intervention of the Afghanistan-type to attempts to subvert pro-west regimes in nations such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Both the type and the level of response required therefore varies and so also the kind of weapons and base support. According to one scenario, the RDF under the state of preparedness in 1981 could be no more than a tripwire force "around the oil fields of say Southern Iran or Saudi Arabia." Since then however, the RDF has taken a more concrete shape. According to the recent Defence Guidance Document,[20] a top secret plan relating to the thinking of the Defence Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the senior field commanders, civilian planners and technical experts, the RDF is to be a truly awesome military force. It is to consist of no less than five army divisions, two marine divisions, two wings of B-52 bombers, three aircraft carriers and a large number of escort and supply ships. Significantly it is to be a separate command directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The goals of the RDF, as defined by the document, are not only to stop infiltration or invasion until reinforcements arrive, but also any kind of instability that might prove dangerous to US interests in the area. The Defence Guidance Document became public in May 1982, a year and a half after Reagan took office and two months prior to Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the United States. Obviously, whatever the motivations of the 1982 overtures to India, the Reagan Administration has not hesitated in fleshing out the RDF and the operational requirements for its Gulf strategy.

Similarly, in the beginnings of 1981, there were hardly enough transport planes to fly troops and equipment to trouble spots; throughout the 70s the number of such planes had dropped by a quarter. As of March 1981, the

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United States had just enough amphibious crafts to enable a marine assault group of about 60,000 men to storm a defended beach but not to land heavy equipment that they would need for a major battle.[21] In Afghanistan the Soviet Union had moved in with 80,000 troops equipped with heavy armoured tanks and helicopters. If the RDF was meant to confront such a force, it would certainly need many more troops and equipment than what was available at the beginning of 1981.

In case of the second difficulty, lack of transport, the Defence Department has moved to fill the deficiency rapidly over the next couple of years.[22] Therefore, all present schemes for the use of the RDF must assume that it will be invited by a friendly government.

There is yet another implication that makes it necessary for the United States to acquire base facilities for the RDF. The current Military Aircraft Command Transport (C-5) can fly long distances given air to air refuelling but cannot parachute men and equipment into a target area and the C-141 that can do so, do not fly long range and cannot be refuelled in mid-air.[23] The newly proposed MAC CX transport of the future may be an answer to both these problems but they will take at least another five or more years to build.

It is obvious from the above that the RDF which is the focus of Reagan's security strategy must have a series of local staging posts if it is to be a credible deterrent force at all. But the regional powers, for obvious political reasons, have been reluctant to allow American troops on their soil. Despite such reluctance over the past two years, the United States has succeeded in extending its military presence to Oman, Bahrain, Somalia, Diego Garcia, Morocco, Egypt, and last but not least, Pakistan.[24]

However, the extension of US military power and the RDF needed requisite political and diplomatic collaboration. Base facilities meant underwriting at least some of the security objectives of the host nation. Such co-operation was however dangerous; supporting security objectives of say Saudi Arabia, created fear in Israel that the United States might sell out its interest in exchange for continued access to oil. The reverse of this was equally true. Similarly, close military co-operation with Pakistan was bound to anger New Delhi while an attempt to balance relations with both was certain to make Islamabad less amenable to US strategy. But there was no gainsaying the fact that in the Middle East and the Gulf, Pakistan was the only other credible military power apart from Israel that was also ready to endorse strategic collaboration with the United States. After 1979, Iran was out of the United States orbit and infact a hostile force. Iraq was engaged in a war with Iran and unlikely to assent to proposals for RDF or other kinds of co-operation. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait possess no credible defence force of their own and must in fact rely on others to protect them.

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Pakistan's Role in US Strategy

At the beginnings of 1981 and subsequently there appeared few alternatives to the strategy that was taking shape in Washington, and in this Pakistan was assigned an important role. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan aroused fears that it might open a corridor through Pakistan towards the Arabian Sea gaining not only an access to warm water ports but a naval base that was within striking distance of the crucial Straits of Hormuz.[25] This had to be prevented at any cost. Pakistan therefore became the pivot of United States strategy in South West Asia.

Reagan advisors further pointed other advantages in supporting Pakistan. First, it would enable containment of Soviet influence. It was argued that whatever Pakistan's positive value, it had considerable negative value as a client or an ally of the Soviet Union, and Soviet control over Pakistan would mean that the entire South Asian coastline, from Kuwait to Thailand, would be in the hands of regimes unsympathetic to the United States (note the inclusion of India).[26] This had to be avoided. The second advantage would be the possibility of providing direct American aid to the Mujahedeens in Afghanistan. This would not only increase the cost of occupation for the Soviets but also force them to either step up their involvement in Afghanistan or withdraw from it. The third advantage Pakistan offered to the United States was its strategic location at the head of the Persian Gulf; its ties with the muslim world and its growing presence in the region would enable its use as an extremely important *entrepot* for a RDF moving into the Persian Gulf from the east i.e., from Diego Garcia or the Philippines.

Based on the above contentions, the Reagan Administration focused on promoting a strong military relationship with Pakistan. It offered Pakistan $3.2 billion in economic and military aid over the first half of the 80s and approved the sale of 40 F-16 fighters to strengthen the latter's air defence.[27] The Carter opposition to Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear capacity was quietly dropped although the Reagan Administration argued that the offer of conventional weapons might in fact dissuade Pakistan from going nuclear. Reagan did not seem to care about the adverse impact on Indo-US relations or the rise in suspicions and tensions between India and Pakistan.

While the United States presence in Pakistan meant what is known in military parlance a "target denial" to the enemy, Pakistan's Gulf connections provided a positive opportunity to build America's security infrastructure for the entire region—particularly Saudi Arabia. This strategy had three elements; first the stockpiling of arms, second, development of bases and military facilities and third, closer integration of Pakistan's security planning with that of the regional powers.

The $3.2 billion arms and economic aid agreement provided for the rapid modernisation and beefing up of the arms stock-piles. According to the Institute of Defense Studies in New Delhi, Pakistan's shopping list for arms in 1981 could easily cost $ 8-9 billion but the acceptable minimum was

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estimated to be about $ 3/4 billion. The arms and equipment included F-16 fighters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, Sam batteries, anti-aircraft guns naval warships and submarines.[28]

Although Pakistan denies making arrangements for providing naval base facilities for the United States Sixth Fleet, American official and academic literature is full of proposals for the development of the Karachi port and Gwadar, as well as base facilities in Peshawar. A more complete scenario for the use of these facilities was given by Admiral Thomas Moorer, former head of the United States Navy and Alvin Cotrell. Talking of "alternatives to the Island of Masirah in Oman, in view of the Kingdom's reluctance to allow American soldiers on its soil" they wrote, "one such territory is the former Omani territory across the Arabian Sea from Oman, the Pakistani port at the fishing village of Gwadar in Baluchistan."[29] Bhutto offered this to the United States in 1973/74 in lieu of lifting the arms embargo, but the offer was not taken up by the US. Gwadar, they say, "is an ideal spot just where the Gulf of Oman becomes the Arabian Sea...." And what did Moorer propose for Masirah in Oman, to which Gwadar was an alternate? According to him, Masirah could be "a staging post for 25,000 American troops, a first springboard for the RDF." Moreover, Pakistan can offer the proposed RDF an air defense and other back-up support in case of crisis. A recent article in *Wall Street Journal* reviewing US-Pakistani military's collaboration, noted the top-notch skills and combat readiness of the Pakistani pilots and their ability to fly sophisticated planes.[30]

As to the third element of the strategy, Pakistan has a growing military presence in the Gulf.[31] Although Pakistan denies that an arrangement had been made with Saudi Arabia to station 10,000 Pak troops there in return for arms worth $ 1.2 billion, there has been extensive reporting of just such a deal throughout 1980 and the first quarter of 1981. In addition, Pakistan has military missions in 22 countries of the Third World with the largest contingent in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Abu Dhabi.[32] Pakistani pilots are also reported to be flying and training local pilots in the air force all over the Middle East. No doubt economic reasons play an important part but it cannot be denied that Pakistani interests run parallel with those of the United States. It was also the opinion of scholars and officials at the Defense Analysis Institute in New Delhi that although Pakistan and the United States both deny making any base arrangements, in all likelihood there is a tacit agreement between them to allow the Americans the use of such facilities in case of an emergency in the Gulf.[33] Why otherwise, they argue, should the United States sell such large quantities of weapons to Islamabad.

Limits Of Strategic Collaboration

Pakistan is obviously an important strategic ally for the United States but their relationship has not been without problems. The difficulties arise from

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the fact that both are motivated by different reasons on agreeing to co-operate on security matters.

Pakistan has always feared India and has tried to cope with this by making alliances with powers that are external to the region. In the 50s, it was a formal treaty with the United States while in the 70s it was close ties with China. Secondly, having experienced abrupt reversals in relations with the United States and having suffered from the latter's "even-handed" approach during Carter's presidency, Pakistan believes it a sensible idea to refrain from angering the Soviets too much or provoking India excessively. The Zia regime is not sure that the United States can be relied upon to make good its promises, although on the other hand, it also realises that amicable relations with the Soviet Union or close military ties with China cannot be a substitute for alliance with the United States. Caught on the horns of this dilemma, President Zia seems to want to balance his country's regional interest with its role in American global strategy, but the compromise has not been a happy one for either the United States or Pakistan.

Pakistani policy has therefore followed two tracks. It has solicited arms aid and political backing from America and has shaped its foreign policy in ways that speak directly to the strategic concerns that dominate the thinking in Washington. At the same time, it has held back on arms and ammunition supplies to the Afghan fighters,[34] blown hot and cold in the proposed "No War Pact" with India,[35] and kept the door open for limited contact with the Soviet Union.[36] These initiatives have kept India off balance, it has conveyed an impression to Moscow that Pakistan may be responsive to friendly overtures and at the same time secured for Pakistan a firm US military commitment.

However there is a limit to how far the two tracks are allowed to separate and go their own way. Because ultimately a meaningful strategic and military relationship, despite occasional deviations, is the central imperative of its policy.

If Pakistan's policies are characterised by a degree of ambiguity, the Reagan Administration is also alive to the dangers of an excessive dependence on a regime that is unpopular at home and buffeted by pressures from secular liberal as well as Muslim fundamentalist forces. Too close an embrace by America could very well lead to a repetition of the Iran scenario. However the fact still remains that the Soviet Union is standing pat on the Durand Line and shows no inclination to withdraw. So far as the United States is concerned, the Soviet Union has therefore to be deterred from any further advance. The commitment of military support, arms and economic assistance to Pakistan is meant to accomplish precisely this. The question still remains as to how far President Zia will go in commiting Pakistan to US objectives in the region. Here the answer is not very clear. Secondly, how far should the United States underwrite Pakistan's regional objectives. Here too an alternative approach to South Asia has gained powerful advocates.[37] This was the option of promoting regional peace

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between India and Pakistan, a kind of collective security that might deter the Soviet Union from making further moves because of its ties with India. Those who argue for this also assert that Reagan's South West Asia policy was bound to fail because:

(i) Militarisation of Pakistan is certain to lead to an arms race with India driving New Delhi further into the Soviet orbit;

(ii) The historical as well as current security perceptions of Pakistan are focused on India and not on the Soviet Union. Weapons to Pakistan could increase the chances of a war between the two without increasing to any significant degree Pakistan's ability to defend itself against direct or subversive Soviet threats;

(iii) The support of Pakistan under Zia was bound to be perceived as US support for a repressive dictatorship. In case Zia is overthrown, there is a likelihood of a wave of anti-American sentiment that could swing Pakistan into allying itself with the Soviet Union and create the very situation the United States would want to avoid;

(iv) There is no evidence to support the Administration's contention that the supply of conventional weapons will help forestall Pakistan's nuclear programme. This new element is bound to destabilise the region with incalculable consequences for the sub-continent;

(v) Last but not least, Pakistan's ambiguous policy is indicative of the fact that as an ally it cannot be fully depended upon to serve American interests.

All the above objections are also arguments for the United States to pursue a more India-centered policy, but this has come up against the Reagan belief that India is in the Soviet camp. Secondly, even if it is not, a regional security agreement is hardly likely to be an effective check to Soviet military power. Finally, when all is said and done, Pakistan is still the frontline state and the United States has to make a stand there to oppose a possible southward thrust by the USSR. In other words, US policy towards South Asia, particularly Pakistan, depends on its assessment of Soviet intentions and on this there is no indication that the Administration has changed its mind.

CHANGING INDIAN PERSPECTIVES

While support to the security of Pakistan is constantly affirmed by the United States, it does not mean that its relations with India have to be frozen in a state of mutual hostility. There is always room for manoeuvre; if India shows signs of wanting more amicable ties with the United States then it has little to lose from responding favourably.

Such rethinking has been increasingly evident in New Delhi over the past year. Although India remained inflexibly opposed to Pakistani militarisation, its worst fears of a hostile China-US-Pakistan alliance against itself has not materialised. US-China relations appear to have bogged down in controversy over arms sales to Taiwan while Pakistan has made at least

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sporadic attempts to discuss a "No War Pact" with India. On the other hand, the Indian Government is slowly reconciling itself to the fact that the new Cold War has come to stay in South West Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union does not seem inclined to withdraw from Afghanistan, and the United States has immensely enhanced it presence in the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and North and East Africa. India has neither the power to prevent this nor to oppose it. Despite the military build-up in Pakistan, India feels fairly confident of dealing with any Pakistani threat particularly in a protracted conflict.[38] There also does not seem to be any imminent threat to India's security from China. New Delhi therefore feels that it is time to reasses its attitude towards US presence in the sub-continent and perhaps to correct its excessively pro-Moscow image abroad. It is this self-examination that has made India attempt to improve its relations with the United States.

If these were Mrs. Gandhi's reasons, what were the motives of the United States in responding so warmly to the Indian Premier's visit? The enthusiasm with which she was received at the White House in August 1982 made many wonder if the United States had not now decided to tilt towards India, and whether it was seeking to distance itself from Pakistan by swinging to a more evenhanded approach to the region. This question itself however raises a more fundamental issue—What do the United States and India gain from this?

We have already discussed the causes of tension between Pakistan and the United States and the rationale of Reagan's decision to commit this country to Pakistan's security. Nevertheless, doubts about Pakistan's reliability as a strategic ally continued to plague Washington. The best way to reconcile these internal differences was by friendly overtures to India particularly since all the aid and arms sales to Pakistan were already approved by the Congress. Moreover, the reduction of tension in South Asia and amicable relations with India appeared advantageous since, (i) the United States could encourage the recent Indian attempts to distance itself from the Soviet Union.[29] If India could be pried lose from the Soviet orbit that in itself would diminish the latter's influence in the area. (ii) A war between India and Pakistan could not serve American interest; the United States could be called upon to make good its promises of support to Pakistan, and if the United States remained aloof, it was likely to undermine its entire strategic relationship with Pakistan. In any case, an outbreak of hostilities between the two would certainly bring the USSR firmly on the India side. (iii) A hand of friendship at this time was likely to encourage the growing pro-Pakistan lobby in India and persuade the Indian Government to approach Pakistani proposals more positively. The United States could then parallel its efforts with that of Pakistan lending the entire process greater credibility.

On the other hand, if Zia was not serious about making peace with India, in view of improving Indo-US ties, he would be forced to think twice before using the "No War Pact" as a mere propaganda ploy. After all South Asia

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is not the Middle East and Pakistan is not Israel to force a compromise on the adversary by conquest and a position of military strength. Reagan's advisors realise that although Pakistan is an important link in the US Gulf strategy, at best, it is a weak link. The United States therefore has a stake in preventing the ties from being put to a test. Peaceful settlement of diputes between India and Pakistan is therefore a desirable goal of US policy.

However, none of the above is to be at the expense of Pakistan's security although its positive role in promoting US Gulf interests may need further clarification. The scope for a further strengthening of ties with India is therefore limited by its need to keep its ties with Pakistan intact. After all, so long as the Soviet Union remained in Afghanistan, its Afghan bases would be within striking distance of the Gulf and its troops would threaten both Iran and Pakistan. In view of this, no understanding with India could possibly be a greater advantage to the United States than its strategic ties with Pakistan. In any case India neither wishes to serve nor does it intend to alter in any substantial way its relations with the USSR. Mrs. Gandhi infact visited Moscow in September 1982 to balance her visit to Washington a month before that. Nor has India altered its public stand on Afghanistan. What India has gained in all this is a leverage against Pakistan and perhaps the Soviet Union.

Not surprisingly therefore, the United States too has not indicated any change in its global strategy or the priority it has given to the defense of the Gulf and South West Asia. No doubt the glut in the oil market has diminished the urgency of this objective somewhat and the post Lebanon realignment in the Middle East has successfully ousted the Soviets for the time being from the region. The situation nevertheless remains highly volatile.

These interim developments have therefore allowed greater flexibility to the United States in pursuing its foreign policy objectives, but such flexibility hardly vitiates from the fundamental long-term security goals of the United States. The planning, funds and preparation to achieve these goals have gone full speed ahead whatever its diplomacy in South Asia. It is not without significance that just two months before Mrs. Gandhi's visit, the Defence Department clearly stated its resolve to prepare for a protracted war with the Soviet Union simultaneously in three theatres—Europe, South West Asia and Korea. The priority given to South West Asia was significant. It also emphasized military aid to friendly nations and establishment of a "Special Defense Acquisition Fund" to facilitate stockpiles to weapons that could be transported to various parts of the globe. This preoccupation with military security was further evident from the fact that the plan directed American forces to be ready to force their way in if necessary and not to wait for an invitation from a friendly government in the Gulf and South West Asia (which means Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). What is more, the strategic plan does not seem to overly care where military collaboration with South West Asian nations is likely to lead. It clearly states that the primary

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objective of American military power in that region (South West Asia) would be to stop Soviet infiltration or invasion and not necessarily to head off the invasion of one nation by another. Clearly, the United States does not take its obligations to restrain its ally, say Israel or Pakistan, too seriously.

How then does the United States propose to reconcile its recent support for regional peace with the long-term plans for strategic and military superiority published just over a month before that? Obviously, the first must not be allowed to interfere with the second. On the one hand, the initiatives towards India may gain for the United States substantial advantages, but on the other, such a ploy might weaken the Pakistani resolve to promote US interests. However if the United States fails to seize the present opportunity and continues its unequivocal support of Pakistan against India, it could only result in increasing tensions between the two. This obviously would be dangerous, particularly for Pakistan. The present diplomatic flexibility towards India seeks therefore to mitigate this but not to the extent that it could endanger its ties with Pakistan.

The Defense Guidance Document infact rules out initiatives that are likely to alienate US's military allies. This is because the plan requires clear-cut division of role and responsibility, a dovetailing of strategies and advance knowledge of what the United States can expect from its allies in case of crisis. The improving US-India ties are thus not meant to substitute the US-Pak strategic planning for South West Asia and the Gulf, it merely gives the United States greater freedom of action in the region.

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SOUTH AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

ANIRUDHA GUPTA*

In South Africa's apartheid the United Nations has met with its own anti-thesis. For, apartheid repudiates almost universally everything that the United Nations stands for. It is not merely a "form of racial discrimination,"[1] it is also a system that permanently denies, "through laws, administrative decrees and practices...any role for the 19 million Blacks (in South Africa) and confers on the 4.5 million Whites a monopoly of economic, political and social power,"[2] Such a system, as stated by the International Court of Justice on the Namibian issue, "is a violation of a norm, or rule, or standard of the international community."[3] And, as the apartheid regime has over the years grown more aggressive both in its domestic and external policies, the world community has come to increasingly recognize the system to be a crime against humanity which "constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security."[4]

The point is that despite its abhorrent "crimes," South Africa continues to be a member of the United Nations and, by logic therefore, also a member of the world community. This raises an interesting question: Should the United Nations in order to be consistent to its own Charter and declarations expel South Africa and technically resolve its anti-thesis in the system of apartheid? But would this be a real solution? Whether South Africa remains a member of the United Nations or not, the oppressed population under apartheid would still constitute a part of humanity. Hence, in order to liberate this "part" the world community must act in unison to uproot apartheid from the very face of the earth. This is enjoined as much by the Declaration on all Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1965 to the effect that: "any doctrine of differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimination in theory or in practice anywhere." If this declaration has to be given a practical effect, the United Nations must deny South Africa under apartheid all attributes of an independent sovereign state. For human rights, as enshrined by the two covenants of 1948, are indivisible; hence it would depend on lawyers and jurists to provide for such rules in international law as would forfeit the right of a state to exist until it restores social, economic and political rights of its citizens in consonance with the principal ethics of the international community. To combat apartheid, we must isolate its political reality *from its* territorial base. *In other words, the United Nations must declare that South Africa, as a territory, ceases to exist so long as apartheid has not been completely eliminated! As we shall see, this is a distinction which has not been given proper attention in the*

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numerous debates and deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) over the means to combat apartheid.

I
INTRODUCTION

To put the issue in such a direct form would however not do justice to the multi-faced campaign against apartheid the United Nations has been conducting over the past 30 years. In the process, the world body has been able to establish new rules of international law and practices regarding (i) the right to self-determination and racial equality of all peoples and communities; (ii) the legitimcy of a particular government that violates accepted laws of nations in regard to human rights; (iii) the legality of the struggle by oppressed peoples of South Africa against apartheid, and (iv) extension of the struggle against apartheid to include those powers and multi-national corporations which support or collaborate with apartheid and, thus, constitute the "main obstacle to the liquidation of the racist regime."[5]

New Balamce Ushered in by the Third World

In making its stand unambiguous on the above issues, the United Nations has come to establish an international machine to oversee the observance of its provisions. But in order to review these important stages of development, we must keep in view the changing character of the UN membership itself. From early 1960 onwards, the influx of new members from the Third World has virtually changed the character and composition of the General Assembly. Most of these new members, which had once been colonies of different European powers, had experienced in varying degrees humiliation of colonial servitude and racial arrogance. This historical background explains the dynamism and determination of the General Assembly to wage an unremitting war against colonial and racial domination the world over.

It is therefore no accident of history that between 1960-66 the United Nations adopted a resolution on granting of independence to colonial countries (1960) and also the covenants on elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (1965-66). Through these resolutions and their legal developments, the international community has recognized that apartheid and the situation in South Africa are special cases, requiring special responses from both the world body and from international law. To wit, as Kader Asmal puts it: "This period has seen the clarification and confirmation of principles in the Charter and development of new rules of international law and practice within the organs of the United Nations, reflecting the new balance in the political, economic and social forces within the world community...."[6] Thus, until these new Afro-Asian members dared to

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challenge old assumptions underlying different forms of racial and colonial domination, the basic direction of international law had continued to be governed by those very states which "utilized military force to suppress the desire for independence, emancipation and freedom of subject peoples."[7]

Judging from this viewpoint, United Nation's world-wide struggle against apartheid would appear to be also an extension of the struggle of the new nations to establish norms of international behaviour based on equality and justice for all. This gives a new angle to our attempt at conceptualizing the phenomenon of apartheid. So long as racial discrimination in crystallized form continues to operate in South Africa, the Afro-Asian states cannot accept that their struggle for national liberation is over. In other words, they cannot accept a world *status quo* just as much as they cannot condone violation of human rights in South Africa. The recognition of this *link* itself gives rise to intermittent friction between the older and the newer versions of international law. In terms of political, economic and military power, those who support the traditional view of international law (basically, a theoretical construct for the preservation of international status-quo), cannot be challenged by the Third World. But this notwithstanding, the latter has challenged the former's stand on wide-ranging issues. As a result, it is not surprising to see the UNGA clashing time and again with some permanent members of the Security Council.

On the specific issue of apartheid, three permanent members (France, UK and USA) have repeatedly used their veto to frustrate the resolutions of the Assembly (latest instance being the demand for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa raised in the Security Council and vetoed in April 1981). It is important to note that these very powers which have used the veto to scuttle the resolutions of UNGA are also those which have continued to collaborate with and provide military and economic aid to South Africa. This is one aspect to which the second session of the International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of Apartheid (Angola, 30 January-3 February 1981) drew attention. It reported that:

> The systematic and open violations of international law by the South African regime are only possible due to the direct and indirect complicity of a certain number of States which respect neither the spirit nor the letter of the United Nations resolutions and conventions, which are thus rendered ineffective. Certain NATO member states (notably the United States of America and France), Isreal, China and certain Latin American and Caribbean States, together with transnational corporations supported by the big Western Powers, effectively provide South Africa and its army with the means to carry out their policies of apartheid and oppression. This complicity has reached the point of allowing South Africa to acquire nuclear military capability. The states which are *de facto* allies of the South African regime, as well as the transnational corporations which collaborate with it, thus contribute actively to turn South Africa into one

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of the main threats to the maintenance of peace and security in the world. They jeopardize the fundamental precepts of the Charter.[8]

II
UN CAMPAIGNS AGAINST APARTHEID

But to relate these dimensions of world power politics, we must go back to the early 1950's to examine how the UN first attempted to grapple with its *antithesis* in apartheid. During this decade, the General Assembly was content on making appeals to the government of South Africa to change its racist policies. At times, it censored and even condemaed the Pretoria regime. But in view of the West's "mechanical majority" in the Assembly, even this was not found to be an easy job. As the main culprit, South Africa refused to accept UN jurisdiction to consider its internal policies. It took shelter under Article II, paragraph 7 of the Charter, to bar even discussion on apartheid in the General Assembly. In general, Western powers and the United States endorsed this stand of South Africa.

The point at issue at this time was whether or not South Africa's racist policies constituted a violation of the UN Charter and threatened world peace. By 1953, the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa made at least one thing clear; it stated that "the doctrine of racial differentiation and superiority on which the apartheid policy is based is scientifically false, extremely dangerous to international peace and international relations, as is proved by the tragic experience of the world in the past twenty years, and contrary to the dignity and worth of the human person."[9] Nevertheless, the Commission entertained the belief that a "simple gesture" (!) by South Africa to review its racial policies "might even now clear the air and open a new path of justice and peace to the development of the Union of South Africa within the United Nations."[10]

From Conciliation to Condemnation

The stand of the United Nations remained conciliatory throughout the 1950s, regardless of the adamantly non-co-operative attitude of South Africa. But in 1960, the admission of 16 newly independent African states substantially altered the composition of, and balance of power in, the General Assembly. In the same year, reports of the Sharpeville killings aroused world conscience to a new pitch; even the Western Powers shifted their original stand to condemn policies of the Pretoria regime. The British delegate feared that pursuit of apartheid would disastrously affect "not only the peoples of South Africa but also reach far beyond its borders."[11] The United States' delegate declared that "deliberate deprivation of human rights had always been and must continue to be the legitimate concern of the United Nations."[12]

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Under pressure of the Afro-Asian members, the Security Council adopted for the first time a resolution in which it recognized that the situation in South Africa, if continued, "might endanger international peace and security, deplored the policies and actions of the Government of South Africa which gave rise to the situation and called upon the Union Government to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality in order to ensure that the present situation does not continue or recur and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination."[13]

The shortcomings of this resolution were apparent. Though there was a shift in the attitude of Western powers, they still did not concede that South Africa's apartheid constituted a threat to international peace and security. For had they agreed to grant this, the Security Council would have been bound by its own resolution to act under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which is concerned with action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.

From 1960 to this day, the three permanent members (France, UK and USA) have, in regard to apartheid, preferred the phrase "disturbing" to "endangering" of international peace and security. This allows them technical protection to over-ride any move by the General Assembly to embark on punitive measures against South Africa.

The second shortcoming of the resolution can be seen in its assumption that apartheid represents policies and not the essence of a political system in South Africa. The excesses of the South African Government and its various legislations such as Pass Laws, Terrorism Act, Bantu law, imprisonment without trial, etc., have been condemned, but little attention has been given to the fact that all these excesses are no more than mere results of racist oppression in South Africa.

This point needs stressing because even to this day a large number of governmental and non-governmental organizations consider negation of human rights an aberration rather than a logical sequence of the South African system. Even the Amnesty International's comprehensive report on prisons in South Africa criticised these acts in terms of law (super-structure) rather than as the foundations of a racist system. Similarly, Andrew Young's advice to South African Blacks to stage "peaceful boycotts" of White business failed to take into account the fact that apartheid did not even allow "non-participation" by non-whites in the country's social-economic relations because it banned not only "the expression of political dissent, but also the wish to change the present system by peaceful means contrary to law rather than contrary to political practice."[14]

General Assembly Links Issue of Racial Equality with National Self-Determination

Once the United Nations had disposed of the issue of "internal jurisdiction," it proceeded to establish a link between the issue of racial equality

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and the principle of national self-determination. The establishment of such a link was important because in case the United Nation's proved that the non-whites in South-Africa were denied their right to self-determination it could also take *concrete action* to restore their rights in conformity with its numerous declarations on decolonization and self-determination of colonial peoples. In legal terms, the situation in South Africa needed to be established as not very different from that of Namibia. For, in both the territories, "the machinery of coercion and repression operates in relation to the black population as a colonial army of occupation does."[15]

Basing on the reports of the Committee on Apartheid, the General Assembly could establish the fact that the South African regime divided its citizens into two categories—the Whites and the Blacks. Under the Constitution, the second category was deprived of all rights so that the first category could survive and dominate! As Albie Sachs puts it: "By their own theory and law, the rulers of South Africa treat the majority of the population as a separate and alien people."[16] The characteristics of the South African system thus come close to approximating "the classic imperialist-colonialist situation in which the ruling class of the dominant nation owns and controls the colonial territory and uses its instruments of force to maintain its economic, political and military supremacy against any would-be external competitors."[17]

The creation of so-called independent *Bantustans* further exposed the colonial nature of apartheid. With these *Bantustans* South Africa attempted to deprive Africans of their rights as *citizens* by forcing them to accept citizenship of the tribally constructed "homelands." This showed that the republic had clearly become a colonial power and placed itself subject to the provisions of Articles 73 and 74 of the Charter, which spelled out the obligations of members with respect to non-self-governing territories.[18] This view swayed the United Nations to deny all forms of recognition to the so-called *Bantustans.*

Once the principle of self-determination came to be integrated with the new rules of non-discrimination among the races, the Assembly could begin questioning the legitimacy of a state that subsisted on total negation of the rights of the majority. This brought to the fore two associated issues, whether a regime which violated as a matter of policy norms of the international community could be given recognition by the United Nations and that of the right to protection of all those who struggled against the racist regime to establish their human rights as a collective group.

Assembly Rejects South Africa's Credentials

In regard to the non-recognition of the regime, the General Assembly approved in 1970 the Report of the Credentials Committee to refuse recognition to the representative of the Government of South Africa. In the following year, the Assembly rejected South Africa's credentials. In 1974, the Assembly called upon the Security Council to "review the relationship

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between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the provisions of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The operative part of the resolution, which called for South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations was not adopted because of the veto used by France, UK and the United States. On the basis of this the General Assembly President ruled that the refusal of the Assembly to accept the credentials of the so-called South African representative was "tantamount to saying in explicit terms that the General Assembly refused to allow the delegation of South Africa to participate in its work."[19] This ruling was up-held by a vote of 91 to 22, with 19 abstentions.

Legitimacy of Struggle Recognized

From this ruling followed a number of associated decisions which can be briefly summarized here as follows: 1. The norm of non-discrimination made it obligatory on the part of all states and societies to desist from any action which could encourage or strengthen apartheid; 2. The enunciation of individual responsibility for crimes against humanity as laid down in the judgement of the Nuremburg Tribunal in 1946. Under this, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), described apartheid as an act of "genocide" and imputed individual criminal responsibility, "irrespective of the motive involved, to individuals, members of organizations and institutions and representatives of the state, whether residing in the territory of the state in which the acts are perpetrated or in some other state," and "such responsibility is incurred for the commissions, participation, conspiring or incitement of the acts or the aiding, abetting encouragement or co-operation in the crime of apartheid."[40]

In regard to the second issue, there was no doubt by 1970-71 that the African people in South Africa were seeking a total overthrow of apartheid because they could achieve their emancipation only by such means. Endorsing this position, the General Assembly took a major step in 1975 to give recognition to the fact of "the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movement... for the *seizure* of power by the people and the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination."[21]

Secondly, the United Nations acknowledged that intervention against a liberation movement may be unlawful and that assistance to the movement would be lawful.[22] This principle came to be adopted by the Assembly's resolution defining aggression in 1974; it provided that nothing in the definition of aggression can prejudice the right of self-determination, freedom and independence of peoples under "unlawful and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination," nor the right of these people to struggle to that end and to recieve support.[23]

The recognition of liberation movements as "authentic representatives" of the aspirations of the people thus came as a logical sequence. In the case

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of Namibia, the United Nations had recognized SWAPO as the sole and genuine respresentative of majority aspiration. In regard to the national organizations in South Africa, the General Assembly called upon member states and other entities to give all possible aid and assistance to the struggle of the oppressed people. These developments drew a significant observation from one commentator: "It is clear that the right to revolution has been recognized more forthrightly and explicitly by the international community than it earlier had been."[24]

With the liberation movement thus recognized and supported by the United Nations and its various agencies, the struggle against apartheid has acquired an international dimension. Theoretically speaking, in South Africa today there exist two types of authority: 1. an illegitimate government guilty of committing "genocide," and 2. legitimate organizations and representatives of the people who must by all means be supported by the members-states of the United Nations. Accordingly, those powers which give succour to or collaborate with the South African regime must be considered "accomplices" in the acts of "genocide." It is this international dimension of the struggle that has increasingly become prominent in recent years. Since 1972-73, the General Assembly has been passing a number of resolutions condemning governments and the transnational companies which continue to have their economic, political and military links with South Africa.

Under pressures built up within the General Assembly, the Security Council was also forced to take in 1977 a decision under Chapter 7 of the Charter imposing limited arms embargo on South Africa. The resolution declared that acquisition by South Africa of arms and related materials "constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security."[25] This was a historic development in the sense that for the first time both the Assembly and the Security Council took a joint step to combat the "crime of apartheid."

So far, however, the imposition of mandatory embargo has been repeatedly violated by the Western Powers and their collaborators. These powers would not still concede that it is not merely "acquisition of arms, etc.," but apartheid itself that poses a threat to international peace and security. To make the United Nations' measures against apartheid more effective, arms embargo must be extended to include mandatory economic sanctions. This, as we have already noted, France, UK and USA will not accept!

Nevertheless, the stages of development traced above do point out the extent to which the UNGA has been able to transform world opinion on the subject of apartheid. A brief review of the transformation can be had from the following summary of a report of a UNITAR colloquium held in October 1980. Among other things the Report emphasized that:

— in the case of apartheid, states have a duty to assist the liberation movements legitimately engaged in the struggle for national liberation;

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— the Security Council's Committee concerning the question of South Africa should establish an "enforcement secretariat" to develop techniques necessary for effective detection of violations;
— States should, as a matter of urgency, adapt domestic laws (in accordance with the example of Sweden) to control and discourage investment in South Africa;
— States should enact laws permitting discovery of the documents of export, investment and shipping companies to permit plaintiffs, including the United Nations, to obtain evidence of clandestine violations of the arms embargo against South Africa;
— because of a change in the nature of racism (it is now covert rather than overt), all states should adopt Article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racism, which permits private petition; and
— the tools of inquiry developed by the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization should be adapted by other international organs to facilitate the fight against racism.

The Report also called for a unified strategy for the implementation of UN decisions not only against South Africa but also against those who persisted on providing economic, military and other aids to the illegitimate regime. It stated, "Combating apartheid, racism and all forms of racial discrimination was an integral part of the struggle to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Against this background, we can see that the United Nations anti-apartheid campaign has entered into a new phase wherein struggle against racism has come to represent the extreme political expression of a general movement on the part of world's poorer nations to build a new international economic and political order! This link has been emphasized by the UNITAR Report in these words:

> In addition, this unified strategy must be made relevant to the broader development strategy for the implementation of a new international economic order, for, beneath apartheid, racism and denials of self-determination lie many of the same factors that make for economic subjugation.[25]

April 1982.

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DISCOVERY OF THE SEA-ROUTE TO INDIA

By AMBA PRASAD

Vasco da Gama's name has figured in all history books, whether they relate to World, European,[1] *Asian or Indian history,*[2] *as a great sailor and adventurer. He has been solely credited with the honour of having discovered the sea-route from Europe to India* via *the Cape of Good Hope. At the same time, the name of another great sailor—Ibn Majid—who actually piloted Vasco da Gama's ship from Malindi on the east coast of Africa to Calicut in India, has been ignored. His name has gone unnoticed due to several reasons. In the first place there is a general lack of information about his career and achievements. Secondly, the euro-centric approach sees all progress in history, science and art from the high pedestal built by the European scholars for Western civilization.*[3] *And lastly, the Arab historians held back the true facts about Ibn Majid being the pilot of Vasco da Gama's ship. This article attempts to piece together the evidence collected from various sources in Europe, Africa and India.*

I
ORIGINS OF INDIAN OCEAN TRADE

Malabar: Important Centre For Trade

There is ample evidence to show that Malabar was an important center for trade activity with the Western Asian countries and the Roman world even way back as the first century A.D.[4] It had acquired international recognition for its spices and pepper, which were in great demand in Europe.[5] The spices were also needed for use as preservative. These were precious commodities and trade in them brought huge profits for the merchants all along the line. Calicut on the Malabar coast (in Arabic "Kalikut" and in Malayalam "Kozhikode"), had become the emporium of the trade of the Indian Ocean. Spices and pepper were collected here from different places in India, as also from Ceylon and South East Asia, for export and re-export.

In the beginning this trade was in the hands of Indians. However, after the fall of Sri Vijaya and the disappearance of the Chola supremacy, Indian Ocean trade passed almost exclusively to Arab traders. The Arabs had come to the Malabar coast in A.D. 705-15. By the fourth and fifth centuries they began to settle in the region.[6] Their immigration further increased two hundred years after the *hijra* of the Prophet. A side-effect of this increasing inflow was that quite a large part of the Malabari population accepted Islam.[7] By the eighth century, the Arab settlements received considerable patronage

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of the Zamorin who obviously was interested in promoting Malabar's trade. He not only encouraged the Arab immigrants to settle but also permitted them to marry Hindu girls of his state.[8] Ibn Batuta, who visited Calicut in 1324, noticed four thousand Mohammadan merchants in the city of Mangalore itself and bears eloquent testimony to the part played by the Arab merchants in the spice trade. The observation of another traveller was that, Calicut had as many as fifteen thousand Mohammadan merchants.[9] There were also Jews and Christian settlers, "Banias" of Gujarat and Chettis from the Coromandal coast. The Malayalee by themselves did not show much interest in trade. However, the Arab predominance in Malabar's spice trade is testified to by all the travellers who visited these areas.[10]

Role of The Arabs

Arab predominance in the region was due to their trading activities which brought great wealth to them and to the Zamorin, and their superiority in nautical sciences and excellence as sailors.[11] They mastered the art and science of navigation, astronomy, astrology, oceanography and ship-building.[12] Even Albuquerque acknowledged their superiority in these arts. In his letter written in 1514 to the King of Portugal, he said: "The Moors possessed very large ships and traded very largely; and that the Hindu rulers were very much in league with them, by reason of the profit they bring yearly."[13] The Arabs were indeed the carriers of the trade of the Indian Occean before the advent of the Portuguese.[14] They often combined the functions of traders and carriers. It was a usual practice for the merchants to have their own ships. They owned sometimes as many as 40 ships, each valued at 50,000 gold pieces. This explains their rise and growth as a class of rich merchants.

The Arab position however, was not without its own shortcomings. First, they did not attempt to establish a strong naval power as for them navigation developed through the activities of merchant adventurers rather than that of the state. Secondly, as Moreland points out, their weakness was also due to their defective ship structures; they used strings made of coconut fibre and wooden pins instead of iron nails. Their ships were described by the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* as the "seven boats."[15] The structure of the Indian ships found at Malindi during the second voyage of the Portuguese under Cabral, was noted as follows: "They were of about 100 tons, very well built, of good timber and well-stitched with cords, for they have no nails."[16] The use of hard woods forbade the use of iron nails. Possibly the absence of iron was a weakness which prevented the Arabs from rounding the Cape of Good Hope and going into the Atlantic. Another factor was their defective knowledge of the geography of the seas, particularly of the southern seas. Their thinking was still dominated by the age old Ptolemic concept of *terra-incognita.* Al-Binini held the belief that there was a channel between the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic, south of the Mountains of the Moon. Ibn Majid's own description of the coast south

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of Sofala (based probably on information from the Portuguese themselves) envisaged a *madkhal*—a place of entry from the Atlantic into the Indian Ocean.[17]

II
VASCO DA GAMA'S VOYAGE

Portuguese Attempts to Reach India

Apart from the profit motive involved in this venture were also the chances of leading a crusade against Islam and spreading the gospel. Indian commodities such as pepper, ginger and other spices, sugar, silks and cottons, and dye-stuff were in great demand in Europe from the early centuries of the Christian era. Though the quantities needed were relatively small, their economic significance was as high as their intrinsic value. In the last quarter of the fifteenth century under the patronage of the rulers of Portugal —Prince Henry and King John II—began a search for an all sea-route to India—"the land of golden dreams, and of wealth and spices."

Before the successful voyage of Vasco da Gama, there were several attempts to reach India both by land and sea. Pedro da Covilha was sent in 1488; he took an Arab ship from Aden to the Malabar coast, visited Calicut, collected valuable information about Indian trade and about the sea-routes to India and, after a stay of about four years, returned to Cairo where he is known to have met the Jewish emissary of King John, to whom he made his report. From Cairo, he was instruted to proceed to Abyssinia (the land of Prester John), where he spent the rest of his life. Whether Covilha's report reached the King before Vasco da Gama set out on his voyage is not certain. In all probability it did not and that is why probably the Portuguese were ill-informed about the coastal states of East Africa and the Malabar and their rulers. According to Ethel Pope however, it was probably this information which inspired the King to send Vasco da Gama's expedition to India.[18]

Whatever the controversy, one thing is certain that the Portuguese believed that the nearest way to India would be around the African coast and following a sea-route all the way. The expedition of Bartholomew Diaz in 1487-1488, led to the circum-navigation of the western and southern coasts of Africa. He avoided the Cape of Good Hope and landed at Mossel Bay in February 1488. On the return voyage, he sighted the Cape and named it "the Stormy Cape." But King John changed the name to "Cape of Good Hope," as this held out the promise of reaching India by sea. In 1496 John died. Dom Manuel inherited the enthusiasm of the family for maritime enterprises. Hence, an expedition led by Vasco da Gama, un unknown courtier of noble stock, set sail on 8 July 1497 with three ships varying in size from 60 to 120 tons.[19]

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Vasco da Gama's Voyage

The story of Vasco da Gama's voyage and Ibn Majid's part in its successful completion has been studied here briefly on the basis of; 1 Arab wiritings, including the testimony of Ibn Majid himself; 2 Portuguese writings, including the accounts of the companions of Vasco da Gama; 3 the local oral traditions of the Arab lands and of East Africa and Malabar; 4 the Chronicles of Kilwa (an African city-state) and 5 other sources.[20]

From Lisbon (from where he set sail on 8 July 1497) to Calicut (where his ships laid anchor on 20 May 1498), one may review the voyage in four stages. The first stage is the journey upto Mozambique after rounding the Cape of Good Hope. This should be considered as an important achievement of the Portuguese. The Arabs had made frequent voyages to Sofala and northern Madagascar. There are references to ship wrecks of Arab ships when they entered the dangerous Mozambique Channel. Arab geographers and navigators described it as the "mad sea." It was believed that there was a mountain in the Mozambique Channel and the island of Madagascar stretched west to east to the north of this mountain. It was this mountain which caused ship wrecks and was a problem for the navigators. Ships reaching it either crashed against the mountain or were carried away by strong currents of the Channel. It was therefore, a feat for the Portuguese led by Vasco da Gama to have crossed this Channel and reach Mozambique. Ibn Majid was so impressed by this that he advised his pupils to learn from the Portuguese[21]

The second stage of Vasco da Gama's voyage was from Mozambique to Malindi. At Mozambique, he secured the help of an Arab pilot who guided him safely to Malindi[22] with the help of sea-charts, quadrants and compasses which the Arabs possessed. Vasco da Gama arrived in Mombassa on 8 April 1498 and in Malindi, a week later, on 15 April.

The third and the most crucial stage was from Malindi to Calicut, across the Indian Ocean. Vasco da Gama requested the Sheikh of Malindi for the services of an exprienced pilot to take his ship to Calicut; the latter provided the service of Ahmed-bin Majid. With this pilot on board, the Portuguese ships set sail on 24 April 1498, crossing the Indian Ocean of 700 leagues in twenty-two days without any difficulty.

The Portuguese records uniformally confirm that Vasco da Gama crossed the Indian Ocean from Malindi to Calicut with the help of an Indian pilot. They, however, differ in respect of details. *The Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama* (1497-99) which is a primary source, being a log book (record made on 15 April 1498 at Malindi), shows that the Portuguese were in desperate need of pilots who could take them to India and had no knowledge or confidence in themselves so as to undertake the voyage across the Indian Ocean. The log book reads: "The Moors (who had been captured by the Portuguese going on a boat in Mozambique) told us that there were at this city of Malindi four vessels belonging to Christians from India, and

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that, if it pleased us to take them there, they would provide us, instead of them, Christian pilots and all we stood in need of, including water, food and other things."[23] These so-called "Indian Christians" were actually Hindus from India, and the Portuguese were unaware of Indians who could be other than "Moors" or "Christians."

A week later, on 22 April, according to the *Journal*, the Sultan sent a "Christian pilot" to pilot their ship to India.[24] According to Vasco da Gama's own testimony, the person who piloted his ship was a "Christian" and a "native of Gujarat." The Portuguese historians—Goes and Castanheda —of the 16th century however, say that Vasco da Gama's ship was piloted by a "Moor of the Gujarati nation," named "Malemo Cana." Sernigi, a merchant of Florence, says that Vasco da Gama found a pilot at Malindi who was "an Indian Muslim." The discrepancy in this respect between Vasco da Gama's description of the religion of the pilot and that of later Portuguese accounts is explained by the fact that, at that stage, Vasco da Gama did not understand the difference in the religions of India.

Joao de Barros writes that among the people Vasco da Gama met, "there was a Moor of Gujarat, called Malemo Cana ... who showed him a map of the whole coast of India drawn up in the Moorish style, with meridians and parallels (degrees of latitude and longitude) in great detail, but without indicating the rhumbus of the winds." He also showed an instrument of three boards which the sailors of India used for measuring distances. Vasco da Gama was so pleased that he thought that in Ibn Majid he had found "a great treasure;" and "in order not to lose him, as soon as he had erected in the place (Malindi) ... a memorial pillar in the name of the Holy Ghost ... he set sail for India."[25]

The Arabic sources are more reliable, though less-eloquent than the Portuguese. Among the extant works of Ibn Majid, there is no direct reference to the fact of his having piloted Vasco da Gama's ship to India. There are, however, indirect references showing his regret for having shown them the way, as the Portuguese proved to be the worst enemies of Islam and the Arabs and indulged in treachery, plunder and wars to establish their ascendancy in the Indian Ocean. He records in one of his sailing descriptions: "They (Portuguese) came to Calicut. There they bought and sold, ruled and oppressed the local princes. They brought with them hatred towards Islam. The people were very much afraid and worried....If I knew what kinds of people they were...."[26]

However, there is the direct testimony of Kutb-al-Din-al-Nahrwali (1511-1582), a Gujarati Muslim historian, who accepted a teaching assignment in Mecca. His *ol Bark al-Yamanifi' l fath al-Uthmani* (History of the Turkish Conquest of Yemen), confirms the story.[27] Referring to Vasco da Gama as a Portuguese Admiral, he describes the entry of the "cursed Portuguese" into the Indian Ocean "as one of the most exceptional and terrorising events of the period." He explains how Vasco da Gama used to cleverly seek news about the sea (all along his voyage from his entry into the Indian Ocean)

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and, how finally Ahmad-bin Majid, an experienced sailor, showed him the way. Nahrwali adds that, while in Malindi, the Portuguese Admiral had become friendly with Ibn Majid as he used to offer him drinks. The sailor, being thus placed under obligation by offers of drinks showed the route to Vasco da Gama, and gave to the Portuguese such secrets of the sea-route to India that they found sailing in the Indian Ocean safe and smooth.[28] He is reported to have said, "Do not approach the coast in this part (of the east coast of Africa north of Malindi), steer straight for the open sea; you will then reach the coast of India and be sheltered from the waves."[29] By following these instructions, says Nahrwali, a large number of Portuguese ships avoided ship-wrecks and reached the sea of western India.

It does not however, seem convincing that Ibn Majid gave the secrets of the Indian Ocean sailing to the Portuguese under the influence of drinks and in a state of intoxication. This was perhaps an excuse invented to explain an action which was considered unpardonable by the Arabs and which resulted in the loss of Arab ascendancy of the Indian Ocean. Portuguese sources have attributed the motive of the expectation of a handsome reward. Nevertheless, for a great pilot of the standing of Ibn Majid, drinks or monetary inducements were not so important as his regard for the wishes of the Sheikh of Malindi and for maintaining the prestige of his profession and his desire to live up to his reputation as a great sailor. No one at that time could foresee the consequences. He probably agreed to pilot Vasco da Gama's ship because of a pardonable ignorance on his part about the real motives and intentions of the Portuguese.

The Chronicles of Kilwa have recorded that "the Portuguese demanded a pilot from the Sheikh of Malindi and departed first for India and then for their own 'accursed country.' "[30] Alan Villiers in his collection of oral traditions—*Sons of Sindbad* says that, "a Nejdi sailor told him that Vasco da Gama was not even a sailor and, as for the voyage, it was merely an over-publicised piece of carefully exploited good fortune. The success of the voyage had been made possible by the use of Arab pilots who were compelled to show the Portuguese the way, for they came in well-armed ships and forced the Arabs to pilot them."[31] The Arabs are believed to have told Villiers that Ibn Majid had been a great pilot and his safe conduct of Vasco da Gama from Africa to Calicut was the only thing against him.

Among more modern references, also based on local traditions gathered in Zanzibar, one finds that Major Pearce (1920), and Ingrams (1931), are of the view that a native of Gujarat named Malemo Cana, piloted Vasco da Gama's ship safely to India.[32] C.R. Boxer, a researcher of early Portuguese activities in Africa, says, in a recent work, that "it was the Sheikh of Malindi who supplied Vasco da Gama with the famous pilot Ibn Majid, thus enabling the Sao Gabriel and his consort to reach Calicut without further misadventure."[33]

There are other references to Ibn Majid in studies made by Gabriel Ferrand,[34] the great French scholar; Maqbul Ahmad and Sulaiman Madvi,

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two Indian scholars[36] and T.A. Shumovsky, a Russian scholar.[36] Their conclusion is that it was Ibn Majid who piloted Vasco da Gama's ship. Ferrand held this view as early as 1922 and published his articles in *Journal de Asiatique 1919* and *Annuals of Geography 1922.*

The foregoing narration poses two questions; first whether "Mallemo Cana," "Malemo Canaqua" and "Kanaka" of the Portuguese sources can be reconciled with Ibn Majid of the Arab sources. Ferrand found that Ibn Majid, as mentioned by Nahrwali, was the name of the sailor and that the word *muallim* was an Arabic word meaning "master (of navigation)" and the second word "Canaqua" or "Kanaka" is the Tamil form of the Sanskrit kanaka, meaning "astrological or (astronomical) navigation." He made it clear that the Portuguese sources were using just the descriptive expressions for the sailor Ibn Majid and that there was no room for doubt that Ahmad-bin Majid was indeed a "master of astronomical navigation."[37]

The second question is whether Ibn Majid was an Indian or an Omani citizen. Portuguese chronicles and accounts (including West African oral tradition)[38] regarded him to be a "Gujarati Moor" or a "Muslim of Gujarat" whereas the testimony of Nahrwali and Sidi Ali (both of the 16th century) is that he was a native of Djulfar in the state of Oman. Vasco da Gama's earliest impression that he was a Christian (meaning perhaps Hindu) of Gujarat is based on ignorance. It is very likely that he was an Arab Muslim, born at Djulfar and who had settled in Gujarat.

There is thus, ample evidence which shows that Vasco da Gama does not deserve the exclusive credit for having discovered the sea-route from Europe to India. He did not even possess adequate knowledge of the Indian Ocean to move out of Malindi and sail to Calicut. Even for sailing from Mozambique to Malindi he had to depend on the Arab sailors. It was, therefore, his good luck that he found an able sailor as Ibn Majid to pilot his ship to Calicut.

Some historians however, would not like to associate Ibn Majid's name with Vasco da Gama's discovery simply because his assistance led to the Portuguese advent in Asia and later, to their mastery over the Indian Ocean and finally, to the loss of Arab ascendancy. Nevertheless, Ibn Majid's greatness as a sailor and his piloting Vasco da Gama's ship from Malindi to Calicut should be emphasised so that Vasco da Gama is seen in true historical perspective. Majid was true to his profession, loyal to the Sheikh of Malindi and to his Indian merchant friends and admirers. He, thus, was simply doing his duty. Malindi, it may be noted, remained considerably loyal to the Portuguese Crown for over hundred years. It became the protected satellite of Portugal. Further, Majid had no information about the real motives and intentions of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean region. The Sheikh of Malindi and the Zamorin of Calicut, who entertained Vasco da Gama, were themselves unaware that by their action they were exposing their countries, nay Africa and Asia, to new dangers.

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Vasco da Gama in Calicut

A brief note may be made of Vasco da Gama's ship, piloted by Ibn Majid, arriving in Calicut. The time taken by the expedition from Malindi was about 22 days, though different dates are given in the accounts. The probable date of arrival in Calicut was 17 or 20 May, 1498.[39] As soon as they reached Calicut, Majid's significant words to Vasco da Gama were : "If my art does not betray me, before us is the Calicut State. This is India which you are searching and your goodness will be satisfied when you alight from the ship on th e Indian soil."[40]

III
CONCLUSION

Three points need to be noted here by way of conclusion. First, that the Zamorin, as was his practice, gave them a warm welcome; Vasco da Gama was received at a special *durbar*, as he gave out that he was the Ambassador of the King of Portugal. Next day when he sent his presents to the Zamorin, they created a poor impression of their King as the presents were very trivial. Second, the Arabs began to suspect the real motives of the Portuguese because of their insolent behaviour. It was at this time that the prophecy long known among the Arabs was revived, namely, that a vessel would come from a far off country bringing the destroyers of the Muhammadans and the enemies of the Hindus.[41] The real motives of the Portuguese were apparent from a letter which King Dom Manuel wrote to the King and Queen of Castille after Vasco da Gama's successful return to Lisbon. In this Dom Manuel stated: "The Moors will be destroyed and conquests will follow in these parts."[42] So the Arabs and other local people and the Zamorin were justified in doubting the real intentions of the foreigners. Third, the Portuguese, even after reaching Calicut believed that the people of India, except the Muslim settlers, were "Christians." As happened in Malindi, they thought that the people worshipping the image of the Hindu goddesses were "Christians," that the goddess was Virgin Mary (Our Lady), and that the temples were the "Christian Churches." So they entered the temples and worshipped there. But, after their sojourn in Calicut and Cannanore they found that the so-called Christians, were non-Christians.[43]

After a sojourn of about three months, the Portuguese left Calicut on 29 August 1498. They stayed in Cannanore upto 20 November 1498 arriving in Lisbon in August 1499. They took with them a rich cargo of spices and pepper which, according to one estimate, was sixty times the cost of the trip. Vasco da Gama showed no regard for human life, as was proved during his later voyage of 1502 when he is known to have killed a large number of fishermen,[44] Vasco da Gama's glorification by historians is, thus, undeserved. It hardly bears the scrutiny of historical evidence.

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REFERENCES

1 There is only one indirect reference in the *New Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. I (Cambridge, 1965), p. 425, which while praising the achievements of Vasco da Gama says that early in 1498, after reaching the coast of East Africa a pilot was obtained. However, no mention is made of the pilot or his nationality. See also H H. Dodwell (Ed.), *Cambridge History of India,* Vol. V (Cambridge, 1929), p. 1, where Vasco da Gama is credited with "the discovery of the new route to an old-world."

2 Historical writings by Indian historians have without exception repeated the same view. They all credit Vasco da Gama for discovering the sea-route to India.

3 Western historiography has been euro-centric; events have been viewed from Western Europe as the centre of the world and also as determining the course of its history. For instance, monsoon shipping was known to the Indians long before the "discovery" by Hippalus, in the first century AD, of the sea-route from Aden to the Malabar Coast of India. This route to India was held to be a dicovery of such importance that the name of "Hippalus" was given to the wind which enabled him to perform the voyage.

4 There are Hebrew names for Indian articles of export to the Roman world which included pepper, cinnamon, rice, coral, tortoise and ivory.

5 A young Venetian, Nicolo Conti, who came to Calicut in the early part of the 15th century, described it as "a noble emporium for all India, abounding in pepper, lac, ginger, a large kind of cinnamon, myrobalans and zedravy." "Travels of Conti" in R.H. Major (Ed.), *India in the Fifteenth Century* (London, 1857), p. 20. Likewise, the testimony of a 15th century, Russian traveller, Athanasius Niktin, who also visited Calicut, is that "it produced pepper, ginger, colour plants, cloves, cinnamon, aromatic roots, adrach and every description of spices, in R.H. Major, Ibid., p. 20.

6 A.H.L. Heeren, *Historical Researches: Africa,* Vol. II (translated from German), (London, 1838), p. 438.

7 William Logan, *Malabar,* Vol. I (Madras, 1887), pp. 193-194.

8 H.A.R. Gibbs, *Travels of Ibn Batuta* (London, 1929), p. 169.

9 Verthema, *Travels I* (1928), p. 151.

10 "Travels of Nicolo Conti" in R.H. Major, *India in the 15th Century,* n. 5, p. 21.

11 A.H.L. Heeren, *Historical Researches: Africa,* Vol. I (translated from German), (London, 1838), p. 230.

12 The Arabs were authors of several treatises on the science of navigation and oceanography. From Masudi's account we learn that each sea had its expert sailors. The Arabs made several improvements in the compass, an instrument to indicate direction which was first invented by the Chinese. It is certain that Ibn Majid had a better astralab than the Portuguese.

13 Letter No. LXX, 25 October 1514, *Portuguese MSS,* Vol. III, India Office Library, London. See also "The Narrative of Abder-Razzak," pp. 13-14 (tr. into English by R.H. Major, in R.H. Major, n. 5. Abder-Razzak had visited Calicut in 1442 A.D. See also, G. Sernigi, *First Letter to a Gentleman of Florence* (London 1910), p. 127. He says that during the three-month Portuguese stay from 21 May to 25 August in Calicut, 1500 morish vessels in search of spices arrived.

14 As far as ownership of big ships was concerned, the Arabs may be ranked as the most important owners, with the Gujarati Banias next, the Malabari third and the Konkanis last. W.H. Moreland, "The Ships of the Arabian Sea About 1500 A.D.," in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* 1939 (London) pp. 173-192.

15 Ibid., p. 74. As against this view, C.N. Parkinson, *Trade in the Eastern Seas* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 6, attributes their failure to their want of courage.

16 F.L. Castanheda's Chronicle I in G.M. Theal, *Records of South-Eastern Africa,* Vol. V (Cape Town, 1908) p. 100. Duarte Barbosa's account in *The Book of Duarte Barbosa—1500-1516* (London, 1918), p. 437.

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17 *Geography of Claudius Ptolemy VII* (trs. by E.L. Stevenson, 1932), pp. 159-160. See also S. Maqbul Ahmad, "Travels of Abu'I-Hassan Ali b. al-Hasayn al-Masudi," *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad), Vol. XXVIII, no. 4, October 1954, p. 524. According to Ptolemy, the Indian Ocean was like a gulf bounded on all sides by land except the opening towards the east which connected the ocean with the Pacific. He held that there was *terra incognito* in the southern hemisphere which formed an extension of the East African Coast. Thus the Arabs could not visualize a connection between the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic towards the west. They thought of encircling the ocean in the east which connected with the North Sea only and finally with the Atlantic. The presence in the 10th century of some planks of boats belonging to the Indian Ocean, near the Island of Crete in the Mediterranean, when there was no direct connection of waters of the two seas, caused a stir in the Arabic scholars of the period. It was thought that they floated into the Mediterranean through the Sea of China and the North Sea. Because of defective geographical ideas based on *Ptolemy's Geography*, they did not realize that the planks were floating into the Atlantic *via* South Africa. The Arabs also held that all the seas were one great community of waters. S. Nadvi, "Arab Navigation," *Islamic Culture*, Vol. 15, 1941, p. 181.

18 Ethel M. Pope's *India in Portuguese Literature* (Lisbon, 1937), p. 16; *The New Cambridge Modern History*, n. 1, p. 424 and R.P. Rao's *Portuguese Rule in India*, p. 23 have expressed the opinion that the information did probably reach King John II.

19 The three ships were "S. Gabriel"—120 tons, commanded by Vasco da Gama; the "S. Raphael"—100 tons, commanded by Paulo da Gama (brother of Vasco da Gama); and the "Berrio"—60 tons, captained by Nicolau Coelho.

20 See *Note on Sources-Appendix I.* Also note that on 22 January 1498 his ships arrived on the African coast according to *the Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama 1497-1499*, E.G. Ravenstein (London, 1898). After two months, the ships arrived in Mozambique on 21 March 1498.

21 Ibn Majid mentions ship wrecks of Portuguese ships off Sofala before the entry of Vasco da Gama. Possibly, therefore, the Portuguese may have made some serious attempts before Vasco da Gama crossed the Channel. T. A. Shumovsky "The Rutter of Sofala," in *Three Unknown Rutters of Ahmad bin Majid, the Arab Pilot of Vasco da Gama* (Moscow, 1957).

22 This is based on a local Arab tradition on the coast of Africa. Adam Anderson, *Historical and Chronological Deductions of the Origins of Commerce*, Vol. I, p. 550. There is also an indirect reference to the help taken of the Arab pilots from Mozambique in Duarte Barbosa's *The Castanheda Chronicle III*, p. 23. He writes that during Vasco da Gama's first trip, he was tricked by his Mozambique pilot, who was an Arab, into believing that there was a Christian population at Kilwa. These so-called "Christians" were actually Hindus.

23 *The Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama*, 1497-1499, n. 20, p. 40.

24 Ibid., p. 45.

25 Joa de Barros, Appendix I in G.M. Theal, *Records of the South-Eastern Africa*, n. 16, pp. 185-186.

26 T.A. Shumovsky, n. 21.

27 See *Appendix I.*

28 Gabriel Ferrand, "Shihab Al-Din-Ahmad B. Majid," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. IV, (London, 1934), pp. 362-363.

29 Ibid.

30 See *Appendix I.*

31 Allan Villiers, *Sons of Sindbad* (London, 1940), pp. 158-159.

32 See *Appendix I.*

33 C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese in Mombassa, 1593-1729* (London, 1960), p. 18.

34 Gabriel Ferrand, "Shihab Al-Din-Ahmad B. Majid," n. 28, p. 365.

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35 S. Sulaiman Nadvi, *Arbon Ki Jahazrani* (in Urdu) his writings in *Islamic Culture*, Vol. 15, 1941, and Vol. 16, 1942. S. Maqbul Ahmad, "Ibn Majid" *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition), Vol. III, Pt. 2 (London, 1968-71), pp. 856-859.

36 T.A. Shumovsky, n. 21. Also see, Gervase Mathew, "The Culture of the East African Coast in the 17th and 18th Centuries in the light of Recent Archaeological Discoveries," *Man* (London), Vol. LVI, May 1956, pp. 66-67.

37 Gabriel Ferrand, n. 28, pp. 364-65.

38 G.S.P. Freeman Grenville, who has done much research on East Africa and the Arab world and stayed for long in those areas, holds the view that Majid was an Indian Muslim. *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (Dar-es-Salaam), September 1960, no. 55, p. 305.

39 The broad time-table of dates is indicated here. They left Lisbon on 8 July 1497, arrived on the African coast on 22 January 1498; from there they reached Mozambique on 21 March 1498, Mombassa on 22 or 26 April and arrived in Calicut on 17 or 20 May 1498.

40 L. Camoes and O.S. Lusiadas, quoted in Shumovsky, n. 21.

41 K.M. Panikkar, "Malabar and the Portuguese" in Ethel M. Pope, n. 18, pp. 23-33.

42 The letter is quoted in Ethel M. Pope, n. 18, pp. 23-26.

43 G. Sernigi's *Second Letter to a Gentleman of Florence* (London, 1910).

44 He captured 800 innocent fishermen in Calicut in 1502 and chopped off their hands, legs and heads, R.P. Rao, *Portuguese Rule in Goa, 1510-1961* (Bombay, 1963), p. 26.

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APPENDIX I

NOTE ON THE SOURCES

The most important source is Ibn Majid himself who had more than a 50-year sea life. He wrote profusely on his sailing experiences in the Indian Ocean on different routes as well as on concepts of navigation, oceanography and science of stars. He started writing in 1462, and we find him writing still in 1521 and 1527. He also kept log books or rutters.

The noted French savant, Gabriel Ferrand discovered in 1922 that Ibn Majid was the greatest Arab pilot of the fifteenth century and later, contributed to the *Encylopaedia Of Islam* a learned article on him. T.A. Shumovsky of the USSR published in 1957—*Three Unknown Rutters of Ahmad-bin Majid* in Arabic, with Russian translation and introduction. Qutb al-Din al-Nahrwali (1511-1582), who was a Muslim of Gujarat but served as a teacher in Mecca, wrote *History of Mecca* and *History of the Turkish Conquest of Yemen.* He gives a contemporary account of the Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean and consequences thereof. The Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali of the 16th century in his sailing instructions entitled *al-Muhit* refers to Ibn Majid. Alan Villiers in his *Sons of Sindbad* (1940), has made reference to the oral Arab tradition. Major Pearce in his book *Zanzibar* (1920), and Ingrams in his work *Zanzibar* (1931), refer to an Indian pilot Malemo Cana on the basis of local East African oral traditions. *The Chronicles of Kilwa,* an Arabic MSS in the British Museum, refers to the Sheikh of Malindi who provided the services of Ibn Majid to Vasco da Gama. So far no chronicle of Malindi has been traced, in spite of the efforts of historians and archivists such as Arthur E. Robinson in *Tanganyika Notes and Records, 1937,* No. 3 p. 42. Robinson however says that the town seems to have been a semi-pagan settlement until a comparatively late period. Gervase Mathew holds that the Arab conquest was not very effective and it is doubtful if it was influenced by the Persians. He enlightened the author of this paper on several points. So also did Justice Gray of Zanzibar High Court, with whom the author had several interviews. There is an interesting account in a historical novel of the romance of two sea pirates Vijli and Kanji Mallam, the latter is said to have piloted the ship of Vasco da Gama.

The Portuguese sources, after subjection to a critical examination, supply valuable information in respect of the expedition of Vasco da Gama and the role of Ibn Majid as they are contemporary or almost contemporary sources. *A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama—(1497-99)* (trs. by E.G. Ravenstein, 1898); Correa, *The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama* (trs. E.J. Stanley, 1869) throw considerable light on the subject. The Portuguese historians of the 16th century, notably, Damiao de Goes (his chronicle), Barbosa and Castanheda, throw more light on the voyage. Joao De Barros (1496-1570) has chapters relating to the first voyage of Vasco da Gama (trs. by G.M. Theal in his *Records of South Eastern Africa,* Vol. VI, 1900, and has been regarded as occupying the first place among Portuguese historians. He was the treasurer of an India Department at the Portuguese office at Lisbon. F.L. Castanheda's *Chronicle* (Chapters relating to Vasco da Gama's voyage trs. by G.M. Theal, Vol. V, 1901, and *The Book of Duarte Barbosa 1500-1516,* completed in 1516 and translated by M.L. Dameo in 1981 are useful sources available in English. Barbosa was a writer in the service of the Portuguese Government in India and had learnt the Malayalam language. Barbosa is considered as a good witness. His credit for general accuracy has been fully established by his modern editors. There is also a collection of Portuguese records in the India Office Library, translated into English by M.L. Dameo, which the author of this paper has consulted.

There is another useful contemporary source. A merchant of Florence who had settled in Lisbon, Girolamo Sernigi, wrote three letters to a *Gentleman of Florence.* In the first, he refers to Vasco da Gama's expedition and the role of an Indian pilot. He says that he was an Indian Muslim. These seem to have been written immediately after the arrival of Coelho on 10 July 1499. (trs. by Ravenstein) Faria Y. Sousa, *The Portuguese Asia* (1695) is a historical account. Some modern writings on early Portuguese history in Africa are

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also noteworthy, such as C.R. Boxer's *The Portuguese in Mombasa 1593-1729* and Eric Axelson's *South East Africa 1488-1530*.

Among the important primary as well as secondary sources, mention may be made of the contribution of Gabriel Ferrand in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. IV and T.A. Shumovsky's translation with the notes of three Arabic manuscripts viz., *Three Unknown Rutters of Ahmad Ibn-Majid—The Arab Pilot of Vasco da Gama* (1957). On the basis of a critical assessment and evaluation of the above sources, a fairly objective account can be given of Vasco da Gama's voyage and Ibn Majid's role.

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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD

As the industrial nations of the West, in the era of Reaganomics, administer more and more budgetary cuts, the poor nations of the Third World are being forced to give up their dependence on foreign aid and instead rely on foreign direct investment as dictated by the "magic of the market place." So far it remains doubtful whether multinational corporations, the main conduits of foreign direct investment, will channel their resources to Third World countries to fill the void created by aid cutbacks.

MNC-Third World Relations Characterized by Mutual Suspicion

Historically, the relationship between multinational corporations and Third World nations has been characterized by mutual suspicion. Third World nations view multinational corporations as meddlesome in domestic matters and in the interest of their profits as completely disregarding economic and political considerations of the host-country. On the other hand, multinational corporations believe Third World nations to be politically and economically unstable and therefore unattractive for business investment.

However, contrary to common belief, this suspicion of multinational corporations is by no means limited to Third World nations. Nor is it of recent origin. As early as 1902, F.A. MacKenzie, alarmed by the expansion of American companies in England, among them Otis Elevator, Singer Company, and General Electric, wrote his famous book *The American Invaders* analyzing the impact of American direct investments abroad. And as recently as 1975, the West German Government toyed with restrictive proposals that would subject all foreign capital investments in excess of ten per cent of corporation's capital with specific turnover, or investments in excess of a specified size, to prior notification to the West German Economic Ministry and the German Federal Bank before the conclusion of the purchase—thus allowing the government to exercise moral pressure on the negotiations. In the United States, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-Jersey), proposed the Foreign Investment Act of 1975 aimed at authorizing the President to screen and block foreign investment, and the prominent American business executive Felix G. Rohatyn proposed to create a foreign investment review board to screen all foreign investments. These moves reflect American uneasiness over foreign takeovers of American businesses. In 1979, the former Massachusetts Banking Commissioner Carol Greenwald, testifying before a House Sub-committee, observed: "When the history of this period is written, I'm sure that historians will marvel at the spectacle of a powerful nation surrendering its economic might without resistance." More recently, the debate over foreign investment in the United States and the uncomfortable ambivalence that surrounds it has intensified since the announcement last year (October 1981) of a $2.5 billion bid for Santa Fe

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International Corporation by the government-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.

Why this suspicion of multinational corporations? After all, in the history of capitalism, the development of world-wide markets preceded even the emergence of domestic ones. From its inception in Western Europe nearly 500 years ago, capitalism was based on an international division of labour that included the Americas, as well as significant portions of Africa and Asia. In the eighteenth century, the British East India Company's control over India far exceeded the contemporary power of any American or European-based multinational corporation in the Third World. Likewise, foreign direct investment has been a critical feature of world commerce since the Industrial Revolution; indeed, much of the capital that made American economic growth possible came from England and Holland. Nor is there anything novel about the current degree of international economic interdependence; the nations involved in the world economy were far more affected by each other's behaviour during the 100 years of Pax Britannica in the nineteenth century than they have been at anytime in the twentieth.

In this context, it is instructive to remember that although the image does not necessarily correspond with reality (sometimes the two are identical, often they differ), reality is grasped through image. In the post-World War II period, multinational corporations have been a key to the internationalization of business. It is not only the real nature of multinational corporations but also their public image that governs the actions and attitudes toward them of various governments, groups, and individuals. The contemporary multinational corporation is distinguished primarily by the degree of centralization within the enterprise. The home office of each multinational corporation—at least in theory—has the economic and technological resources to integrate the decisions of each of its host-country-subsidiaries into a global business strategy. At the same time, the overall concentration of economic activity in the hands of these institutions has dramatically increased. It is estimated that multinational corporations currently account for more than one-quarter of world market output (one study has predicted that multinational corporations, if unchecked, may account for more than half of the world's industrial output and own an overwhelming proportion of all productive assets in non-communist nations, with control concentrated in as few as two or three hundred giant enterprises). As a result, the current level of global centralization of economic decision-making is unprecedented. And while the particular power of each multinational corporation *vis-a-vis* any particular nation-state varies widely, the world is now confronted with a relatively small number of non-governmental institutions whose leadership enjoys an influence over the global allocation of economic resources previously associated only with empires.

Paralleling these increases in the size and scope of international economic institutions is a second critical development—the dramatic decline in the legitimacy of the market mechanisms of allocation. This has occurred both

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within the advanced capitalist nations and among the nation-states themselves. Professor David Vogel has argued that less powerful nations and less privileged citizens are far less willing to accept the distribution of goods and services as dictated by marketplace competition than they were a generation ago. Public expectations of the domestic and international economic order have increased dramatically. Elites in authoritarian nations and interest groups within more democratic nations increasingly share goals that bring them into conflict with multinational corporations whose *raison d'etre* rests on the principle of economic efficiency. The concentration of economic power has thus gone hand-in-hand with the fragmentation of political authority. The result is constant conflict between economically and politically-oriented institutions.

A comparison of the sales of the leading multinational corporations with the gross national products of various countries is equally impressive. In 1973, the sales of General Motors were bigger than the GNP of Switzerland, Pakistan, or South Africa, while the sales of Royal Dutch Shell surpassed the GNP's of Iran, Venezuela, or Turkey.

MNC Activities Located Mainly in Developed Countries

The key to the expansion of multinational corporations has been direct investment, not portfolio investment. The difference between the two types of investment is significant because direct investment involves a more lasting commitment and a degree of control over the means of production and distribution. Although initially American firms took the lead in investing overseas, European and Japanese enterprises have increasingly undertaken foreign direct investment. The more recent arrivals on the scene are the oil-rich countries, especially from the Middle East.

This rather spectacular growth of multinational corporations, however, is not evenly distributed across the world. Most of the activities of multinational corporations are located in the developed, not the developing world. This is so notwithstanding the proliferation of developing nations since World War II and notwithstanding the location of natural resources and population growth in the Third World. In fact, the imbalance seems to be increasing. In 1975, for example, more than 40 per cent of all developed-nation foreign direct investment was located in four host nations—United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and West Germany. The share of the global stock of foreign direct investment located in the developing nations fell from 31 per cent in 1967 to 26 per cent in 1975. Three per cent of the 26 per cent investment going to the developing nations in 1975 was, in fact, directed to tax-haven countries such as Bermuda and the Netherlands Antilles, and was often routed back to the developed nations. Six per cent went to the OPEC nations, leaving only 17 per cent of the global stock of foreign direct investment in all the other developing countries.

The trend of investments overseas by American corporations can also be

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examined over a period of time. After World War II, developing and developed countries shared American investments almost equally. But by the late 1960s, the ratio tilted decisively in favour of investments in industrialized nations. Whereas in 1950, 34.7 per cent of all US foreign subsidiaries were in developing nations, by 1977 they fell to 28.4 per cent. The same trend can be discerned in other industrial countries. For example, approximately 65 per cent of the subsidiaries of UK-based firms were in developing nations in 1952, compared to 25.4 per cent in 1977. Japan is the exception to this rule in that more than half (51.8 per cent) of its direct investment stock was in developing countries in 1975) although this proportion, like that of other developed nations, was lower than in 1967. As a caution however, it must be noted that the amount or stock of foreign direct investment in developing countries may not provide a truly accurate picture of the growth of activities of multinational corporations in these nations in recent decades because of new forms of investments, such as joint ventures, use of locally generated funds and the growing tendency to negotiate management contracts, licensing agreements and franchising in developing nations.

Factors Motivating Expansion

A number of circumstances have led to the rapid expansion of foreign investment and the growth of such investment in developed nations. With the establishment of the European Economic Community, european and US markets have become magnets for foreign investment. Many multinational corporations, fearing nationalization or expropriations by host nations in the developing world, have found it safer to invest in developed nations. This preference for developed nations reflects the market orientations of multinational corporations, which seek outlets for their products in countries with larger markets and higher per capita income and consumption.

However, it is the domestic factors (factors operating in a home-country), not external factors (factors operating in a host-country), which constitute the primary motivating influences for multinational corporations to invest overseas. Domestically, such considerations as corporate taxation, anti-trust measures, security and exchange regulations, recent and soon-to-become-law pollution abatement measures, labour costs, interest, transportation and demography make up the scenario in which decisions for overseas investment are determined. Moreover, it has been observed in several studies that the pressure to expand for its own sake builds especially when coupled with relative stagnancy of the home-market and the saturation of the domestic demand for a firm's existing products. Among some of the other reasons, firm's, especially in the extractive and manufacturing industries dependent on natural resources, invest overseas to secure sources of raw materials; and governmental encouragement to firms provides another domestic incentive

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to invest overseas. The United States Government, for example, offers corporations going abroad a panoply of benefits, including investment guarantees, tax incentives and foreign aid programme. But marketing reasons, more than anything else, account for the decision to expand by means of investment in foreign subsidiaries rather than by exporting goods. Although a firm could achieve growth in size by tapping export markets, it would face the effects of market discontinuities, including differences in consumer demand, income levels, cultural values, and technical conditions.

The strongest external factor encouraging corporations to invest overseas is the desire to overcome import barriers imposed by foreign governments. Although some host countries offer some positive incentives, such as tax incentives and subsidy programmes, low interest loans, government capital contributions, accelarated depreciation, tax holdings, and exemptions from capital transfer restrictions, especially on the repatriation of profits, these are generally of only marginal importance in the foreign investment decision process. A study of 29 British firms in 1971, for example, revealed that only a few of the corporations considered inducements offered by Kenya and Jamaica to be of major importance in their decision to invest in those countries.

It is widely believed that relatively lower labour costs motivate corporations in certain labour-intensive industries to set up plants in Third World countries. A further refinement of this point involves complementary world-wide sourcing, with plants located to take advantage of cost differentials. For example, parts are manufactured in one country, assembled in another, and the finished good is sold in still other countries. However, except in labour-intensive industries, such as consumer electronics, footwear, toys and apparel, labour costs in most industries comprise a smaller percentage of total costs and are less important. This is particularly true for American firms which generally tend to be capital-intensive. Donal M. Kendall, Chairman of the Emergency Committee for American Trade, declared: "There are always exceptions (e.g., the electronic field, radio and TV, textiles), but I know of no major multinational company that goes abroad to make investments because of low labour rates or because of tax advantages." Moreover, multinational corporations perceive developing countries as lacking skilled labour and political stability and as manifesting an "unfavourable" attitude toward the activities of global giants. Low-wage labour may not be low-cost labour because of productivity problems, such as training costs, high turnover and worker's inability to deal with the factory environment.

Overbearing Influence in Third World

There are, of course, several advantages that can accrue to Third World countries from multinational corporations. These include at the micro-economic level, improvements in the mobilization and adjustment of local

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resources and transfer of technology; at the macro-economic level, increases in production, GNP, aggregate employment, exports, imports of needed inputs and multiplier and linkage effects resulting from better use of technology and improved organization of the economy. It has been suggested that multinational corporations make a substantial contribution to developing countries through their capacity to mobilize money, workers, and methods needed for the production and sale of goods. In addition, it has been argued that multinational corporations are not only better able to raise funds in developing countries but also to make more productive use of such funds than would have otherwise been the case. Finally, multinational corporations are viewed more likely to increase the productivity of the factors of production in developing countries, either through improving economies of scale or conglomeration effects, capital accumulation, or the upgrading of labour.

On the other hand, critics of multinational corporations argue that these firms exploit local labour and resources by paying relatively lower prices and lower taxes than local firms; they claim that multinational corporations employ "artificial" transfer pricing between subsidiaries that minimize total taxes for them and that multinational corporations use scarce local capital to finance their subsidiaries rather than bring needed capital into the host-country, all having an adverse effect on local industry. It is also alleged that the involvement of multinational corporations in developing countries results in the transfer to the host-country of technology that it does not need, in the use of capital-intensive technology that destroys jobs and in the establishment of psychological dependence on multinational corporations. Besides producing non-essentials, critics further argue, multinational corporations provide little increase in employment, create further skewing of income distribution and have an adverse effect on inflation, terms of trade and balance of payments. Besides, the well-known instances of multinational corporations' intervention in the affairs of the local government (e.g., ITT in Chile), critics point to the overwhelming influence that multinational corporations can exert in Third World governments. In fact, one critic has termed the multinational corporation as "a medium by which laws, politics, foreign policy, and culture of one country intrude into another."

Notwithstanding the rhetoric surrounding the operations of multinational corporations in Third World countries, virtually all available research indicates that multinational corporations offer very little help in alleviating unemployment and boosting economic growth in developing countries. This is mainly because multinational corporations use extremely capital-intensive technology, which creates few jobs. In Mexico, for example, multinational corporations—which operate in only a few fields—are 2.5 times as capital-intensive as local firms of all kinds. An International Labour Office study has concluded that multinational corporations pay less wages compared to wage-rates in their home-country and engage in political repression, especially against labour unions. Another statistical study

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done last year of the effects of multinational corporations on economic growth in 104 developing countries concluded that, while foreign direct investment led to short-term increases in the relative rate of economic growth, multinational corporations had a detrimental long-term effect on the economic growth of those countries.

Appraisal

Small wonder, then, that developing countries view multinational corporations with suspicion and do not consider them as magical shortcuts to economic development. Consequently too, they believe that the MNCs and the world-wide capitalistic system perpetuates dependency of the Third World on industrialized nations, even after the passing away of formal colonial relationships. The rapid emergence of so many politically independent countries (over 100 since World War II), the growing concern in these nations with economic development and with the economic aspects of independence, and the expansion of multinational corporations in the world economy, have all focused attention on the role—positive or negative—of multinational corporations in national development and international economic relations.

Tensions between multinational corporations and the developing nations often reflect the deep feeling of ambivalence regarding industrialization in the developing countries. Almost all developing nations are committed to the goal of industrialization, even as they acknowledge the social and political cost of development. However, leaders in these countries are unsure about the means of economic development. Does external assistance—through foreign aid or the participation of multinational corporations—lessen or increase social costs?

Differences of opinion on such questions are a major source of tension within the developing countries. These tensions, in turn, frequently lead to ambivalent responses to the presence of foreign companies. On the one hand, uncompromising nationalism, economic populism and the aim to "terminate dependence on the United States" or the developed world seems to characterize the environment in which the multinational corporations have had to operate *vis-a-vis* developing countries. On the other hand, governments of the developing countries (especially in the corridors of their own ministries) urge greater multinational corporation participation and investment. Multinational corporation executives complain that leaders of developing countries take a different line of thinking on foreign investments for each audience, and policies toward the foreign investors become stakes in host-country politics. But should the pressures of massive public opinion and widespread public indignation against multinational corporations prove too strong and dangerous politically to ingore, the leaders of many developing countries are likely to resort to nationalization—first, to bolster their power in the face of public discontent and second, more importantly, as a

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way of implementing the social and economic policies they desire. After all, the continued stay of these leaders in office depends on the extent to which there has been a marked improvement in the living standards of their people.

While many Third World countries would like to tap the extra-ordinary resources of multinational corporations to improve the economic welfare of their people, leaders of these countries have a number of anxieties that make their relations with multinational corporations very tenuous. For example, the question of the responsiveness of multinational corporations to the need for expanded employment has been raised again and again. Other questions relate to the reluctance of multinational corporations to carry out research and development activities in developing countries so that these countries might raise technological levels within their own borders. In its broader sense, the issue involves the whole question of technology transfer.

The third major issue is the difference in objectives of developing countries and multinational corporations. The overwhelming economic power of multinational corporations has made it difficult for many Third World countries to come up with effective terms for either the establishment of a new subsidiary by a multinational corporation or the continuation of its operations. Consequently, negotiations between a developing country and a multinational corporation are frequently awkward and tend to overplay the anxieties on both sides, so that the multinational corporation either does not enter that country or curtails its operations. Therefore, whatever help a multinational enterprise could provide for the purposes of development is lost because of misunderstandings and tensions.

In this diverse environment, multinational corporations are torn in two directions. On the one hand, they must adapt to local circumstances in each country; this calls for decentralization in decision-making. On the other, they must coordinate their activities in various parts of the world and stimulate the flow of ideas from one part of their empire to another. This calls for centralized control. Perhaps because of their predilection for centralized control, multinational corporations prefer areas which appear to be at least approximately similar to their home-country environment. Naturally, this diminishes the attractiveness of the Third World. Moreover, because multinational corporations tend to develop in stable regions of the world where the threat of economic nationalism and expropriation is not significant, they tend to be less responsive to the needs of the Third World.

British scholar, Peter Drucker, in his study of 45 major multinational corporations found that "75 to 85 per cent of all growth, whether in sales or profit, in the last 25 years occurred in the developed countries." He naturally came to the conclusion that "for the typical twentieth century multinational, that is manufacturing, distributing, or financial company, developing countries are important neither as markets nor as producers of profit." In today's world, it is clear for developing countries that the generally naive optimism that characterized many discussions of multinational

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corporations twenty years ago is no longer prevalent. Such a realization on both sides guarantees to keep the question of the role of multinational corporations in world economy alive between future North-South relations.

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REWRITING HISTORY JAPANESE STYLE

ALL nations try to project their history in the light of what they regard are facts, but few ever bother to check the facts impartially. The recent textbook controvery during August-September '82 between China and Japan stemmed not only from an attempt by the Japanese to change the wordings in history textbooks but also because it wanted to gloss over certain crucial facts in Sino-Japanese history, especially of the 1930s and 1940s.

The two neighbours had been fighting continuously since 1931, but China's war of resistance against Japanese expansionism took a turn for the worse following the Lugouquiao (Marco Polo bridge) Incident of 7 July 1937. That incident ignited fresh hostilities which escalated into a full-scale, protracted war, soon spreading to Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. Japan continued to describe its encroachment on China as the "China Incident" or as the "China Affair." For the Chinese however, it was *Kang ri zhan zheng*—the war of resistance against Japan. By December 1937, Nanjing fell to the Japanese; the terror and brutality unleashed by the Japanese there came to be known as the "Rape of Nanking." Hundreds of thousands of innocent Chinese citizens were simply butchered in cold blood. By 1938 the Nationalists were forced to fall back to Chungqing. The resistance became stiffer when the Communist forces also joined the war against Japan. Further advances by Japan in the northwest were halted, but the Japanese did not put an end to their mopping up operations against guerrillas who harassed them considerably, cutting off their communication lines. Then it tried to consolidate its gains in the conquered areas, and, in 1940, set up the Wang Jingwei puppet regime at Nanjing. Japanese control over major industries, transport and communication, dockyards, shipping and banking was established through the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company. It was also in these occupied areas of the northeast that the Japanese established a notorious biological and bacteriological warfare unit. Known as the Kwangdong Army's 731st Unit, it used captured Russian, Korean and Chinese prisoners as guinea pigs for its experiments.[1]

The China War developed into the Pacific War after Japan attacked Pearl Harbour in December 1941. That war came to an end on 15 August 1945 when Japan surrendered unconditionally. But China and Japan continued to remain in a state of war till 29 September when the two neighbours agreed to bury the past and normalize relations. Japan expressed regret and remorse over its past deeds in China. Thereafter, relations between the two appeared to be smooth with trade and commerce prospering; the two even signed a peace treaty in August 1978 and it almost seemed as if the two had forgotten one of the most tragic chapters in their history. Even as the two nations were preparing to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the normalization of relations, rumblings of a quarrel began to be heard in the Far East. The occasion was the Japanese Education Ministry's attempt to change

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the wordings in the new series of Junior Middle School and High School history textbooks which were to go into use from 1983. Not only was the word "aggression" in the textbooks replaced by the milder word "advance," but whole descriptions about the "Rape of Nanking" and the Korean freedom movement were toned down. The number of Chinese killed at Nanjing was deleted on the ground that the figures had not been verified. Such liberty taken in describing Japan's aggressive activities in China was bound to cause resentment among the Chinese. On the eve of the normalization of relations in 1972, Japan had described its occupation of China and atrocities committed by its forces there as "a great deal of trouble." This certainly was an understatement but the Chinese accepted it in the hope that Japan would slowly realise the magnitude of its misdeeds. The Japanese attempt to rewrite history has undermined that hope.

All social studies textbooks in Japan are subject to inspection by the Ministry of Education; a Certification Committee consisting of 19 members, drawn from the universities, is constituted for this purpose by the Ministry. Corrections and revisions to be made are discussed between the committee and officials of the Ministry of Education; their decisions are then passed on to the authors and publishers. Since no textbook in the country can be published without the prior approval of the Ministry of Education, it almost becomes impossible for the publishers and authors to reject the directives of the ministry. According to Glenn D. Hook, such changes are introduced in the textbooks in order to tone down the meaning of passages. In many instances certain words and phrases are completely deleted or changed. For example, in one case the word "invasion of China" was rewritten as "extension of Japanese power."[2] Obviously the attempt has been to tone down the implications of Japanese aggressive activities in China by using different expressions at different intervals.

China's Reactions

Be that as it may, this time the Chinese Press took note of the manner in which attempts were made to tamper with history. On 15 August 1982, the *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), traced in its editorial the history of Japanese aggression on China and added that while China had no intention of settling old scores with Japan, it wanted old history to be remembered. "Since the beginning of Japanese aggression in China, despite the large-scale killings of the Chinese people by Japanese troops, we have all along considered Japan a close neighbour, a neighbour with whom we have had a long-standing friendship of more than two thousand years. The Japanese aggression on China constitutes but a brief interlude. Moreover, when we talk of Japanese aggression, we always distinguish between the broad masses of the Japanese people and a handful of militarists responsible for aggression in China. . . ." Then the editorial went on to say: "Old scores can be left unsettled but cannot be allowed to be forgotten nor can the facts be allowed

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to be distorted. The Japanese and Chinese people should unite together to work for the prevention of the revival of Japanese militarism . . . ."[3]

To prove that what indeed had taken place in China was in fact Japanese aggression and not merely an "advance," the editorial quoted the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 in which China, the United States and the United Kingdom had stated that their purpose in entering the war against Japan was to prevent its aggression and punish the aggressors. The editorial also referred to the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 which stated that the forces which mislead the Japanese people into venturing on world conquest should be forever eliminated. The final authority quoted was the International Military Tribunal for the Far East which declared on 4 November 1948 that Japan was guilty of "shattering peace."

China also lodged an official protest with the Japanese Government; the head of the External Affairs Division of the Chinese Ministry of Education, Li Tao, met Koji Watanabe, Minister in the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and conveyed to him that in view of the situation created by attempts to rewrite history, the planned visit to China of the Japanese Education Minister, Heiji Ogawa, would not be opportune.[4] Earlier, the Chinese Minister of Education, He Dong-Chang had conveyed his government's concern over the textbook problem to Watanabe. Li also added that it was regrettable that till 29 July, Kaoru Suzuki, head of the Primary and Secondary Education Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Education, had maintained silence regarding the ministry's responsibility for the distortion of facts relating to Japanese aggression on China. Further he stated, that since the Japanese Ministry was directly responsible for the revision the Chinese Ministry of Education considered it improper to receive Ogawa unless the distortions were corrected.

Watanabe meanwhile, expressed Japan's willingness to respect the spirit of the Preamble to the Sino-Japanese Communique of 1972. In that Preamble Japan had taken responsibility for "causing enormous damages to the Chinese people through war. . . ." Watanabe also promised to let the Chinese side see how the Japanese Ministry of Education administered its textbook screening system and satisfy itself that there was no government pressure on authors of textbooks to revise the texts.[5]

The Chinese Press also interviewed a number of people who had personally witnessed the horrors of the Sino-Japanese War. One of them, Shi Huyu, a well-known figure in the art and cultural world of China, said that the Japanese aggression against China began soon after the war of 1894-95. He and some of his friends in the world of art and culture continued to fight against Japanese aggression. In 1940 they went to Singapore to run the *Nanyang Daily*. When the Japanese militarists entered Malaya, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia in the wake of the Pacific War, Shi Huyu and his cohorts crossed the Malacca Strait into Sumatra. In Sumatra they saw the atrocities committed by Japanese soliders.[6]

On 4 September, the People's Daily carried a NCNA report about a

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meeting between Premier Zhao Ziyang and the Japanese film delegation visiting China to participate in the premiere of the film *Yi pan mei you xia wan de qi* (An Unfinished Game of Chess), which is a joint Sino-Japanese production. Zhao praised the film for having far-reaching educational significance. He said the film reflected the deep feelings of friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese as also the great hardships faced by the people of China and Japan during the war of aggression against China unleashed by the Japanese militarists.[7]

Most Chinese press reports have harped on the dangers of Japanese militarist revival. Within Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party's attempt to nationalize the Yasukuni Shrine, where the remains of the war dead are enshirned, is considered to be an attempt to honour the heroes of Japanese militarist adventures. On 15 August 1980 the Japanese Prime Minister, Zenko Suzuki and most of the Cabinet members paid their respects at the shrine not as representatives of the Japanese Government but as private citizens. The Yasukuni Shrine's history is intricately woven with the history of various wars waged by Japan. "Yasukuni Shrine has functioned as the fulcrum point for the maintenance of the spirit of militarism in Japanese society," writes Mitsuo Miyata.[8] The ruling LDP's proposed Yasukuni Shrine Bill aims at "passing on for eternity the great deeds of the war dead." It has been pointed out that nationalization of the shrine would amount to not only waiving the responsibility for the wars of aggression waged by Japan, but even justify them. On 15 August 1980, the *Shrine News* defended in its editorial Japanese aggression in Asia on the ground that Japanese action helped many Asian countries to shake off Western colonial rule.[9]

Protest Spreads to Hong Kong

Soon the wave of protests spread to Hong Kong. In a signed article Liu Hua wrote in the Hong Kong daily, *Zhong Bao*, on 1 August: "We must not overlook the distortion of historical facts in the Japanese history textbooks; Japanese militarist training starts from primary school onwards." The *Kuai Bao* (Express), another Hong Kong daily, drew the attention of its readers to a book which the Japanese writer, Yutaka Honda, had brought out after leading a fact-finding delegation to China. Entitled the *Japanese Army of China* the book exposed the crimes committed by the Japanese armed forces in China. The *Guangming Ribao* (Guangming Daily) which covered in detail the press reports in Hong Kong about the textbook book problem also referred to demonstrations in the British colony against the distortions.[10]

Under the circumstances, if the erstwhile victims of Japanese aggression take offence at Japanese attempts to describe it as mere "advance" or "extension of Japanese power," they have reason to do so. Yet, it would seem that the attempt to revise textbooks is a limited exercise. While some have tried to change descriptions, others have attempted to use less

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emotionally-laden words. These attempts are confined to history books meant for Junior Middle and Senior Schools. Yet, at least one edition of the history textbook meant for High Schools (*World Hitory for High Schools*) published in March 1982, used the word "aggression" (on page 312), to describe Japan's war against China. In fact the book uses both "aggression" and "advance."

Japanese Academicians Demand Rectification

However, it is not only the Chinese people who seem to be exercised over the revision of textbooks in Japan; *The People's Daily* of 6 September 1982 reported that 88 textbook writers in Tokyo held a meeting to impress upon the Japanese Government the need to rectify the mistake. The meeting was presided over by Prof. Junnosuke Sasaki of the Department of Sociology, Hitotsubashi University. He said the convernors of the meeting had already obtained signatures of 249 textbook writers in support of their demand. He then criticized the Ministry of Education for not taking any earnest action in solving the textbook problem. Prof. Keiichi Eguchi of the Department of Law and Economics, Aichi University, said that Japanese aggression in China and Korea formed an important part of the teaching of modern history. He also pointed out that the Education Ministry's statement that no accurate figures were available about the "Rape of Nanking" was not correct. The statement amounted to a violation of the standards of academic truth.[11]

The Japanese Education Ministry however has its own arguments as to why certain words are not desirable in text-books meant for the use of young boys and girls. The Ministry points out that it is not necessary to carry objectivity to a point where textbook descriptions of historical events tend to present a tarnished image of one's own country. The controversy arose because it dawned on the ministry that it was not possible to prevent Japanese children from thinking that their forefathers were aggressors and war-mongers without distorting facts.[12] Although this problem had been in existence ever since Professor Saburo Ienaga's textbooks were rejected for alleged bias, it was in 1981 that there was a revival of interest in it. Yashio Kojima, Professor of Modern Chinese History at Nihon University and 5 others submitted a textbook on world history for the ministry's screening and approval. The inspector insisted that the word "aggression" in regard to Japan's expansion into Korea be deleted and the word "advance" be written in its place. This is how the problem arose and eventually drew the attention of people.

Initially the Japanese Government chose not to take any concrete action to mollify the angry outbursts in different quarters. When pressures became heavy, Tokyo had to climb down to say that the revisions would be dropped and the original wordings restored as soon as possible. It was in this atmosphere of sourness that the Japanese Prime Minister visited China on

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26 September 1982 to participate in the celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. Knowing that everything was not all "sweetness" in Beijing, the Japanese Premier took a low posture on the delicate issue of textbook revisions. Both on this and the charge of revival of militarism in Japan, the Japanese leader remained on the defensive throughout his talks with the Chinese leaders.

The textbook episode was used by Beijing to revive the charge of militaristie recrudescence in Japan, a charge that had not been voiced since the early 1970s. In a somewhat delayed reaction, the Japanese Press tried to challenge China's accusation of militaristic revival in Japan and pointed out that China had greater potential for militarism than Japan. Masaru Ogawa, a columnist writing for the English language *Japan Times*, observed that China with its vast regular and paramilitary forces had a greater possibility of turning militaristic than others. Reminding China of its war with India, border skirmishes with the Soviet Union and despatch of troops to Vietnam, he added that China had demonstrated its war-like proclivities and had no right to accuse other nations of harbouring militarism. He concluded by saying that Japan's relations with China were going to be "rougher and rockier" but more realistic in the coming decade.[13]

Good Sense Prevails

Looking at the episode it is clear that the Japanese were caught on the wrong foot. The explanations given by official spokesmen about the motivations for changing words and descriptions in textbooks suggest that somehow or the other they wanted to extricate themselves from the tight spot in which they were caught. In one breath they stated that the revisions were made in order to ensure that the younger generation did not get an "unhealthy impression" of their country for its activities during the 1930s and 1940s. In another, they stated that textbook writers had been using the words "invasion" and "advance" interchangeably and therefore it was decided to drop the word "invasion" and use only the term "advance" in order to make the textbooks more objective and consistent. The Japanese national pride of course has been badly damaged by the wave of protests in East and Southeast Asia against the revisions. It was out of wounded pride that some people suggested that while it was reasonable and fair to listen to the complaints aired by the Chinese and Koreans, it would be humiliating to revise the textbooks again under pressure from outside; such a step would undermine the confidence of the Japanese youth in their nation. Some even suggested that the whole report about textbook revision should be repudiated before Prime Minister Suzuki visited China. Better sense prevailed and nothing more was done to further vitiate an already spoiled atmosphere.

September 1982 SHEELA MURTHY*

*Dr. (Ms.) Murthy, a specialist on China, recently visited the two countries.

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INDIA'S HOMAGE TO BP

THE death of hardly any foreign leader has ever been mourned in this country in the manner that it did B.P. Koirala's, popularly known as BP. The warmth of feelings expressed in various condolence meetings, organized in different parts of the country, on his death and the subsequent coverage and write-up in Indian newspapers and journals is extremely touching. It is quite different from the reciprocal formalities that people and governments observe. In BP's case they indeed are expressions of the real grief over the passing away of a near and dear one.

BP was, beyond doubt, near and dear to the people of India. It would not be undermining his robust Nepali nationalism if we are permitted to say that in a sense he did belong to this country also. Born and educated in Varanasi, he had worked, fought and suffered along with his Indian friends and colleagues in India's struggle for freedom. He was twice jailed for participating in the Indian nationalist movement. He received his political training in India through politics and revolution, and perhaps suffering too were in his blood. BP, it seems, had spent more of his life in this country than in his own; he himself confessed: "All my personal friends are Indian. I have colleagues here, but there is not a single Nepali with whom I can discuss my personal problems. My personal friends are the people with whom I studied in Calcutta or Banares. I do not have a single Nepali personal friend." It was, therefore, natural that his death came as a grievous shock to the people of this country and more so to a large number of intimate friends, valued colleagues and ardent admirers.

BP's death was prominently flashed on the front page along with his photographs, mostly of his youthful days, in almost all the leading Indian dailies, let alone the newspapers published from Varanasi, Patna, and Calcutta, the three Indian cities having close association with the life and deeds of the departed leader. Most of these newspapers published his life sketches recalling his extraordinary qualities, the story of his heroic fight against obscurantist forces, the twilight of his political success and the tragic *denouement* of his trials and tribulation that ended only when his mortal existence ended. Almost all newspapers carried editorials expressing their grief over his sad demise, which, in fact, had given prior notice of its arrival a few months ahead when it was discovered that the fatal disease had penetrated his lungs. They paid rich tributes to his "saga of sacrifice" and his exemplary life dedicated to democracy, freedom and service to humanity.

The wide media coverage given to BP's life and works reminded the people of his unique political career spanning more than four decades. The level of his thinking and the range of his vision, his undaunted spirit and indomitable will, as was evident even at the point of what the great British political philosopher Hobbes called the "terror of death," amply testify to the intrinsic goodness, greatness, and towering personality of the man.

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Indeed, BP was great in life by any reckoning; greater still is he after death!

Media's Glowing Tributes

Analyzing the nature and content of the coverage by Indian newspapers, leaders and peoples, one finds it indeed noteworthy. *The Times of India's* Nepali specialist—Tribhuvan Nath—paid glowing tributes to the man and his life-long struggle for democracy. Under the title—"BP's Saga for Sacrifice for Popular Rule," he observed of Koirala that he was:

> ....a man who did not know how to bend under the severest of stresses, he stalked like a giant on Kathmandu's political stage for almost four decades....He had in Nepal a populist appeal which few could match. He became in his lifetime a symbol of democracy to his people. Acknowledged as the Jayaprakash Narayan of Nepal, he was a socialist to his fingertips....The death of BP removes from the public life of this subcontinent a leader imbued with an international vision.

Equally interesting and warm-hearted was Bhola Chatterjee's "Pilgrimage's Last Mile," in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of 24 July 1982. Covering two-column space, the movingly written and detailed obituary notice was an enthralling account of the unique and inspiring political career of the departed patriot. Koirala was, Chatterjee wrote:

> ...a piece of the continent, a part of the main. He symbolized the hopes and aspirations of his people in search of liberty, equality and fraternity of a Nepal they could call their own. The people made myths, wrote poems and composed songs about this man who suffered persecution almost interminably because he would not compromise his principles, as he insisted on exercising the basic human rights.

The Statesman's fairly long "obituary" on Koirala on 23 July 1982 under the significantly appropriate title "The Story of a Rebel," was again an objective presentation of the significant events of Koirala's political life. In the same vein, *The Hindu* 31 July 1982, also devoted nearly a half page to the "Inveterate Believer in Democracy."

Most of the editorials in important newspapers focused appropriately and adequately different dimensions of Koirala's fiery but multi-faceted personality. *The Indian Express* 23 July 1982, called him the "Asian statesman" and highlighted that aspect of his personality which transcended the narrow bonds of nationalism. It also rightly depicted him as "a strong believer in South Asian co-operation" who felt that "the security and prosperity of the people of the region would be best ensured by their working together." The "BP" of the *Hindustan Times* 23 July 1982, was an

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excellent commentary on the calibre of the departed leader—in tune with the sentiments he evoked among the people in general in this country:

> Koirala had the charisma of leaders like Nehru and Jayaprakash Narayan; he embodied what was best in a bygone era and reminded many of what the present generation of leadership lacks—a defiant spirit, perseverance in purpose, courage of conviction and a willingness to place the country's interest before his own. He was baptised in the fires of India's freedom movement and returned to his native Nepal to launch a crusade to bring a modicum of popular democracy to that Himalayan Kingdom.... A democratic Nepal is the only befitting homage that the Himalayan kingdom can pay to its great son.

Equally appropriate was the *Times of India's* tribute—"Fighter to the End" on 23 July 1982. "In the death of Koirala," the paper asserted, "Nepal has lost its most determined and fearless advocate for the restoration of parliamentary democracy." It went on to add: 'By any reckoning, he was the greatest Nepali of the century. His commitment to his country was as intense as to democracy and socialism. The three ideologies merged in one harmonious whole in this remarkable human being."

The leading Hindi daily of Varanasi (the birthplace of Koirala and also the town where he spent most of his life), *Aaj* 24 July 1982, in its long editorial analyzed BP's personality and political philosophy—"Modern, courageous, farsighted, sensitive and active, the man who used to inspire both the countries (Nepal and India)...." Similarly, the leading English daily of Patna (where also Koirala had lived for many years in exile), the *Indian Nation* of 23 July 1982, under the deeply emotional caption "Unforgettable BP" offered the highest encomium to the departed soul, narrating in this process some of the outstanding qualities of his personality:

> One of the highest points of consciousness, courage and compassion in the contemporary world has merged into the unknown and infinite in the sad demise of Bisheshwar Prasad Koirala. The loss caused to humanity by his death is incalculable. It is no exaggeration to say that a man like BP is born in centuries. The story of his sacrifice and sufferings however will continue to inspire mankind for generations to come. BP had many rare qualities in him. He was a thinker, a writer, a crusader, an orator, an organizer and a successful diplomat. But what distinguished him from other people was his dedication to the cause of freedom and democracy.

The tributes of three leading Indian periodicals also deserve mention. The english fortnightly, *India Today* in its edition of 15 August 1982 presented a graphic and pulsatingly alive coverage of Koirala's death and funeral procession. Reviewing his political career, the Kathmandu correspondent Ashok Pandey stated that its end "signals a major watershed

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in Nepal's history." Calcutta's *Sunday* weekly (25-31 July 1982), flashed in two full pages a write-up by Bhola Chatterjee under the caption "Nepal Will Miss a Political Visionary." Finally, the Hindi weekly *Dinman* from Delhi (1-7 August 1982), which has, in fact, always shown keen interest in Nepalese affairs, paid tribute to the departed leader in a series of two articles captioned—"The Torchbearer of Nepal's Democracy BP is No More" and "The Last Journey." The paper also bemoaned the political future of the country after Koirala's exit from the scene.

Varanasi and Patna's Homage

Apart from the extensive media coverage, Koirala's death has been intensely mourned in the whole length and breadth of the country. A large number of institutions and organizations all over India held meetings to condole his death. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed her deep grief recalling his participation in India's freedom fight and his "important contribution to public life" in general. In a joint message, Madhu Dandavate, Ravindra Varma and R.K. Hegde, Janata Party leaders, said that his death marked the "end of an era of relentless struggle of the people against forces of authoritarianism in Nepal." The President of the Party, Chandra Shekher, deeply pained as he was, rushed to Kathmandu to attend the funeral, so did the Bihar Chief Minister, Karpoori Thakur, Madhu Dandavate and others.

Varanasi, Koirala's birth-place and also the town where his last remains were immersed in the Ganga, mourned almost for a full week by organizing scores of meetings to pay homage to one of its illustrious sons. The Law Faculty of the Banaras Hindu University, Koirala's *alma mater*, the Centre for the Study of Nepal, Department of Political Science, and the Students' Union of the University organised meetings to condole his death. Professor Iqbal Narain, the Vice-Chancellor, in his tribute to Koirala said, "his entire life was dedicated to freedom and justice...Koirala was a great fighter and he represented the glorious tradition of this great university." Manoranjan Jha, the Director of the Centre for the Study of Nepal praised Koirala's high qualities of head and heart and underlined his life-long dedication to democracy, socialism and nationalism. The former President of the BHU Teachers' Association, observed that in the death of Koirala "democracy has lost one of its great sentinels....His death marks the end of an era in the sub-continent, and in his absence, the fight for democracy in Nepal would perhaps become all the more protracted and complicated."

At other largely attended condolence meetings of intellectuals and writers, eminent Hindi scholars referred to the high quality of Koirala's literary works and termed them as monuments of Nepali literature. Krishna Nath stated the socialist thought in the entire sub-continent had received a grievous jolt.

Political and intellectual circles in Patna similarly condoled Koirala's death. The Chief Minister of Bihar, Dr Jagannath Mishra, said:

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"Death removes from the political secene of Nepal perhaps the most courageous politician the country had produced." Devendra Prasad Singh, former MP and one of Koirala's closest friends in Patna stated: "Nepal has lost a father figure as India had lost in Mahatma Gandhi." Other leaders lamented his death and asserted, "It is difficult to imagine another like him to be born in Nepal."

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THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE "NEW IMPERIAL SYSTEM"

A Review Article

PRESIDENT Castro of Cuba described multinational corporations (MNCs) as, "international monopolies (which) are the principal agents in the world capitalist process of accumulation and exploitation." He has drawn attention to the "alarming increase in the influence of these corporations on world economic relations," which "naturally had great social and political effects for third world countries."[1] According to figures furnished by him, in 1981 the ten biggest US MNCs had sales of almost $500 billion, which is higher than the GNP of most of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs). Their spectacular growth in the last decade has been substantiated by him. In the early seventies, 10 thousand such entities with 30 thousand subsidiaries operated around the globe. By the end of the decade, estimates of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations put the figure at 11 thousand corporations with 82 thousand subsidiaries. Yet, paradoxically, the Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the United Nations Secretary General to study the role of the MNCs in the developmental process of the LDCs, throughout its deliberations was struck by the "lack of useful, reliable and comparative information on many aspects of the subject." It is in this context that the two books surveyed in this article provide useful theoretical insights* and empirical data** on the MNCs. According to the Group of Eminent Persons, "the availability of pertinent information is central to many issues.... Making available the right kind of information could well be a most important first step in assisting developing countries in their dealings with Multinational Corporations."[2] The Stephen Hymer Papers (*The Papers*), with its elaborate general introduction containing a critical survey of literature on the subject, provides many new theoretical insights into the prevailing and emerging world economic order and on the subject of foreign investment in general and MNCs in particular. Feld's book, by contrast, is a useful documentation on the tortuous process of international negotiations towards building a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and control of the MNCs.

I

HYMER AND CONTEMPORARY MNC HISTORIOGRAPHY

The Papers is a tribute by friends and colleagues to a scholar "recognised

*Robert B. Cohen, *et. al.* (Ed.): *The Multinational Corporation. A Radical Approach. Papers by Stephen Herbert Hymer.* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979), pp. 32, price not mentioned.

**Werner J. Feld: *Multinational Corporations and UN Politics: The Quest for Codes of Conduct.* (Pergamon Press, New York, 1980), pp. 174, price not mentioned.

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internationally as a leading analyst of the Multinational Corporation and as one of its noted North American critics." He died on 2 February 1974, at the age of only 38. The result of this "collective effort" in a "labour of love" fully testifies the editors' hopes to make it "a partial memorial to Stephen Hymer's scholarship and inspiring intellect," and also "a tribute to Steve's belief in the importance of people working and sharing ideas collectively." This "memorial" is thoughtfully conceived by the editors, with a comprehensive general introduction locating Hymer in the context of the contemporary historiography on the MNCs. It traces Hymer's intellectual evolution, from a representative of the anti-trust school during his days as a doctoral student to his emergence as its critic, and finally as a Marxian theorist with incisive insight into the process of capital accumulation and the consequent international division of labour. The book includes eleven of Hymer's "best and most representative" papers thematically divided into sections, each preceded by an introduction from a colleague familiar with Hymer's work in the area; a biography tracing his intellectual, political and personal development; a complete bibliography of his published and unpublished papers; and to cap it all, an evocative "memorial poem" by a close friend from Ghana for this North American scholar. With such friends and colleagues any scholar could die peacefully, confident of immortality and abiding goodwill that only very few like Hymer so richly deserve.

The main issues discussed in the General Introduction by the editors consists of: 1 Capitalist model of development and growth as developed and applied by the North American theorists; 2 Efficiency and control of the MNC's in terms of resource allocation, technology transfer, product distribution and critical decision-making pertaining to investment and location of production facilities; 3 Conflicts between the MNCs and the State in which the sovereign powers of the State are being eroded and threatened by the MNCs; 4 Future of the world economy that is shaped and determined by the MNCs. In the second part, it discusses: 1 Capitalist accumulation both in its "primitive" and modern sense and Hymer's original contribution to the concept of "internationalisation of capital." 2 rise of the world market; 3 the new international capitalist division of labour; 4 the role of the State and its relation to the MNCs.

When Hymer began his dissertation on foreign investment, three main theories were prevalent on the subject: 1 International capital movement in and out of countries occurred in response to the different interest rates prevailing in those countries; 2 Risk premiums in the international equity market did not apply to foreign-owned subsidiaries from the hard currency countries that operated in the soft currency countries; consequently, the strong tendency of international equity markets to favour equities in the home countries of the MNCs against equities issued in the host country; 3 For MNCs, internally generated funds from profits were cheaper than externally raised funds; hence the former were used for expansion abroad which became necessary for firms to maximise their sales growth rate.

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Hymer argued that the three approaches were inadequate to explain international capital movement, especially direct foreign investment. His dissertation demonstrated for the first time that corporations' desire to control foreign operations was the central motive for direct investment. This desire for control was not motivated by any economic consideration of the most prudent use of assets, but as a strategic move to eliminate competition. In fact, according to him, unlike contemporary liberal assumptions, international firms did not operate under conditions of perfect competition. On the contrary some firms had advantages over others in factors like economies of scale, absolute costs, patent rights, ability to command large capital and technological resources and other advantages accruing from their multinational operations.

But Hymer's perspective had little initial impact on "establishment" economic theory on the MNCs till at least the late-sixties when the dollar-crisis accentuated by the transnational transfers of the vast liquidity of the giant MNCs posed a threat to the entire post-war international financial system created at Bretton Woods.

"Establishment" Economists for Global Expansion of Capitalism

Orthodox economic theory in the West, particularly in the United States, persisted in its advocacy for the global expansion of capitalism as being both inevitable and desirable. They pleaded for a capitalist model of development for the LDCs, despite occasional references to the hazards of possible conflicts with the Socialist countries, and the unsettling effects of Third World political alliances like the "Group of 77" or their economic cartels like the OPEC. Their arguments could be summarised: 1 Infusion of foreign capital, technology and managerial skill from the developed countries leads to growth in profitable sectors, thereby generating foreign exchange for the LDC; 2 Flow of capital and technology, through MNCs and direct investments, as well as licensing arrangements, are essential for the rapid industrialisation of the LDCs; 3 American path of development and growth is the most promising for the LDCs, and, capitalism as a system, the most efficient way of global resource allocation and equitable benefits for all.

Apart from the World Bank-IMF ideologues, the "establishment" economists in the United States, and their political spokesmen like Averall Harriman, Mcnamara, George Ball and Henry Kissinger have all peddled this view. The operative thrust of this ideology is now manifested in the American global diplomacy. US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger said in his Milwaukee speech on 14 July 1975: "As for the operation of our companies abroad, we consider it in our interest as well as in the common interest, to promote an environment of mutual benefit, in which our industrial business can continue to be both profitable and beneficial to the countries in which they operate." He repeated at the Seventh General Assembly Session of the United Nations: (The MNCs) "have been powerful instruments of

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modernisation both in the industrial nations—where they conduct most of their operations—and in the developing countries, where there is often no substitute for their ability to marshall capital, management skills, technology and initiative. Thus the controversy over their role and conduct is itself an obstacle to economic development." He also affirmed: "The United States is prepared to meet the proper concerns of governments in whose territories transnational enterprises operate and...we condemn restrictive practices in settling prices or restraining supplies, whether by private or state-owned transnational enterprises or by the collusion of national governments."[3] President Reagan's new directive to the State Department makes it obligatory for American embassies abroad to promote the interests of the American private investors in their respective countries; to that end, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has been streamlined. It is now the official policy of the United States to support, through American political, economic, cultural and military power, the global expansion of American capital, whose domestic social base has been so incisively analyzed by C. Wright Mills,[4] and the operative foreign policy dimensions by David Horowitz[5] among others. "What is good for General Motors," is now officially acknowledged to be, "good for America."

But at the academic plane, American economists have had cause to put their case in favour of the benefits accruing to the LDCs from MNCs, with some reservations, more so, after the revelations concerning the more sensational aspects of the economic malpractices of the MNCs, like the Lockheed Scandal, and their political interference as in the case of the ITT in Chile, leaving aside the widely known operations of the United Fruit Company in Latin American countries, the oil giants in West Asia and of the Dow Chemicals during the Vietnam War. These economists plead their case for the MNCs exclusively in economic terms, suggesting the need for governmental controls through the bureaucracy in the host countries, supplemented by an international code of conduct enforced by a supranational agency.

Reformist Liberal Prescriptions

Among such views, Charles Kindleberger[6] draws a parallel between the national firms, which increase the efficiency of markets for goods and other factors within the nations and the MNCs on an international scale. Consequently, according to him, MNCs could help in equalising incomes among the developed nations, and also between the rich and the poor countries through trade and higher employment. He is of the view that since the MNCs' ultimate concern is to increase the efficiency of the world economy as a whole, it might often act against the interest of the economy of its home base. He is opposed to any attempts to limit foreign investment as an interference with the world market which always tends to produce the most equitable equilibrium and promotes optimum advantage to all.

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Another view is that of Edith Penrose. In a study of the petroleum industry,[7] she concludes that MNCs are "defective, not so much because of the nature of the institution itself... nor even because of the monopolistic power it possesses, but because these characteristics, given the international environment in which the firms operate, may seriously distort the international distribution of the benefits obtainable from foreign investment." The danger of the MNCs, according to her, arises from the fact that they are forced to discriminate among countries to maximise their profits. Hence she advocates the incorporation of such firms under International Law, freeing them from the control of the home governments, and the setting up of an International Tax to eliminate differences in tax rates in various countries. Penrose's strongest argument is in favour of private enterprise because such firms are not "instruments for the implementation of the economic or political policies of any particular government." She concedes of a direct co-relationship between the level of development of the host country with the adverse impact of large foreign investment. Hence she recommends the need for considering acceptable costs of investment at an international level and for monetary penalties against the MNCs' violation of international standards.

On the question of conflicts between the MNC and the State, both in the home base and in the host country, Dunning[8] and Vernon[9] follow the foregoing liberal prescriptions. Dunning, though aware of this fundamental conflict, argues that the growth of the MNCs and its domination of the world economy offers the best prospect for the future. Similarly for Vernon, the MNCs, by efficiently transmitting knowledge, technology and resources across national boundaries, contributes to greater global welfare. He acknowledges the existing tensions between the MNC and the nation-state, but is optimistic ihat the global perspective of the MNCs, particularly the American MNCs, would enable them to transcend narrow nationalism. He also, like Penrose, suggests the need for the creation of supra-national authority to lessen conflicts.

On the question of the impact of MNCs on labour's right of collective bargaining, there appears to be a more variegated view among "mainstream" American academics. Duane Kujawa's comparative study[10] of industrial relations in the UK, West Germany and France led him to conclude that collective bargaining in a single country was more successful than transnational collective bargaining. Judd Polk, in his study[11] points out that, while earlier, US labour supported international free trade, it now found its standard of living threatened by US foreign investments. Though still in favour of free trade, it now demanded of the government imposition of quotas on a list of imports by US firms from low-wage areas. Polk advocates for co-operation between the United States MNCs and American labour to evolve a national consensus so as to meet the challenges of international competition and to maintain US technological superiority at the global level. But the benefits of US technological lead could be reaped globally

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through international production; as visualized by Polk, a minimum of $2,250 world-wide per capita income, a figure, howsoever unrealistic by present reckoning. A former Director of the International Institute of Labour Studies, Richard Cox, has analyzed[12] the emergence of a hierarchical structuring of the world labour force as a consequence of the emerging world economy. According to him, the privileged minority of workers directly employed by the MNCs represent the new labour aristocracy which is constantly faced with the dilemma: Whether or not to ally itself with the state for its own benefits by supporting corporate statism and political authoritarianism, or to ally itself with working class solidarity which includes the underprivileged.

The Papers, in the editorial introduction, critically sum up the entire gamut of the "mainstream" theory, and also some of its more important critics—both Marxists and the non-Marxists. Among the latter, are the findings of Streeten and Lal[13] who showed that 90 per cent of the 159 sample firms had a negative impact on the host countries' balance of payments; nearly 40 per cent firms had a negative effect on social incomes. Yet Streeten and Lal conclude that, foreign investments, properly chosen, effectively controlled, and synchronised into developmental plans, would help stimulate the developmental process of the LDC. But this, as the authors of the General Introduction comment, is yet to be proved, particularly when the socio-political forces—which are excluded in the study—are taken into consideration.

Barnett and Muller,[14] include these socio-political factors, along with the economic, and observe that underdevelopment is still the greatest management problem that the MNCs face. In their analysis of the LDCs, Barnett and Muller make the point that what "were once the richest and most culturally alive areas of the globe are now underdeveloped," sustaining three social classes: few very rich; relatively small, but growing, middle class whose tastes and preferences are similar to those of their counterparts in the United States; and the overwhelming majority of the poor living below the level of subsistence. Their criterion for determining the progressive character of any social force is the extent to which it benefits the bottom 60 per cent of the population. They indicate the critical role of finance capital in the history and the actual process of underdevelopment by pointing out the continued transfer of economic surplus from the underdeveloped countries in the form of profits, dividends, royalties, technical fees and interest on debts, while these countries remain poor. Finally they apply their own criterion to assess the role of the MNCs in the LDCs, and ask the question: Given its power and scope of operation, whether the MNC could "modify its behaviour in ways that will significantly aid the bottom 60 per cent of the world's population" in both the poor and the rich nations? Their answer to the question, judging from the present and projected strategies of the MNCs, is that the bottom 60 per cent are condemned to increasing poverty because the MNCs have failed to assist development. Further, according to Barnett and Muller,

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the bargaining power of the MNCs *vis-a vis* the government is related to their relatively greater adaptability; their goals are simpler, and bureaucracies more authoritarian; planning cycles shorter, conflicting interests fewer; plus their inability and control of information, have all contributed to a structural lag in governmental policy formulations pertaining to the MNCs. Governments continue to treat MNCs as national institutions, when in fact they are "global social institutions." Since, according to them, the main problem of the MNCs is their excessive power and the limitations of self-imposed restraints on that power, they advocate the need for regulation by national and international agencies and disclosure of their dealings to the public and the regulatory agencies.

"New Imperial System" Produces Hierarchies of Dependence

Stephen Hymer challenges these claims of economic efficiency of the MNCs, with the question: Efficient for what, and for whom? His own answer is that they are efficient at oligopolistic decision-making and ensuring their own expansion and survival.

As Levitt in his part of the introduction succinctly summarises: the interrelationship between the MNC—the microcosm—and the International Economic Order which is the macrocosm, is sought to be explained by Stephen Hymer by two laws of economic development—the law of increasing firm size and the law of uneven development. Hymer subsequently conceptualises the "New Imperial System" of transnational corporate capital. In this, the central image of Hymer is a pyramid of power whereby the microcosm of the MNC shapes the world to its image, creating a macrocosmic division of labour between countries that correspond to the various levels of the corporate hierarchy. "New Imperial System" tends to centralise high-level decision-making in a few key cities like New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo; rest of the world is confined to lower levels of activity and income; its settlements are the provincial capitals, towns and villages. Income, status, authority, consumption patterns, will radiate out from the centre in a declining fashion to the hinterland. Hence routine day-to-day management is left to the nationals of the subsidiaries rooted in the host countries. Above them is a layer of senior corporate management personnel, largely drawn from the home base, who move freely from one country to another, collecting and transmitting information. At the apex control point are individuals drawn from a culturally and socially homogeneous group. The line of command, control and communication is so sophisticated that on a clear day, as Hymer put it, the controllers at the apex can almost see the world sitting in their New York office rooms. The trend, according to Hymer, is towards international integration along the communication lines of large corporations, and the erosion of non-corporate linkages between the economies.

Inequality, according to Hymer, is built into this "New Imperial System,"

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reproducing hierarchies of dependence and dominance, wealth and poverty, at every level; and, as corporate capital becomes more internationalised, the international economic, social and political systems tend to become more hierarchical, unequal and authoritarian. By his "correspondence principle," Hymer superimposes an ethnic and spatial dimension to the unfolding mechanism of the "New Imperial System."

Since the hierarchical system requires the continued growth of the "modern" sector in the Third World countries to secure the class alliances necessary for minimum political stability, the new system must solve four critical problems with LDCs: foreign exchange shortage; labour skill and educational capacity; agri-business and the Green Revolution; population control and counter-insurgency. But Hymer doubts if the centre could have sufficient political stability, and coherence, to organise such a programme on a global scale. To him, "markets come out of the barrel of the gun, and to establish an integrated world economy on capitalist lines requires the international mobilisation of political power." Since the penultimate source of political power is military power, the process of internationalisation of capitalist production could proceed only under the umbrella of US military and political power which, Levitt rightly comments, is not different from the post-war system. But Hymer believes that the "New Imperial System" could survive the erosion of the United States' hegemony over it.

Apart from the non-Marxist critics of the establishment-theorists, the book also analyses the main Marxist views on private foreign investment, particularly the subtle nuances and varying emphases, in the viewpoints of Baran, Sweezy, Magdoff and Amin, before finally locating Stephen Hymer in this setting. The Marxist spectrum, to which anyhow Hymer was a late entrant, emphasizes the role of foreign investment in surplus appropriation and transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor nations, thereby enabling the developed nations to control the underdeveloped countries. In the present era the MNCs, beginning life as outlets for surplus capital, become the sources of additional surplus capital to provide the incentive for new areas of expansion and further geographical and industrial diversity. Amin locates the process of accumulation in a more general historical framework focusing on the inherent contradiction between the increasingly social nature of productive forces and the persistently narrow nature of production relations. This contradiction, according to Amin, is continuously being overcome by continual expansion of the capitalist system, renewal of the accumulation model, and revolutionising production relations to keep pace with the productive forces. The rise of the MNCs, and the growing state intervention in the economy of the capitalist countries, are "ways and means of prolonging the declining stage of the system." But Amin, like other Marxists, emphasizes upon the need for capitalism to constantly expand its market, and more or less ignores the role of labour exploitation as a motivating force for capitalist accumulation on a global scale.

It is in this sphere that Stephen Hymer is original in his interpretation

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of Marxist theory, in his analysis of the role of labour in the world economy. He disagreed with traditional Marxist theories of Imperialism, beginning with Lenin, in their emphasis on the intra-imperialist and inter-imperialist rivalries. According to Hymer, it was necessary to emphasize the basic contradiction between capital and labour and the fundamental basis of agreement among capitalists against the working class, a view that assumes some credibility from the continuing resilience of the economic, political and military alliances among the developed capitalist countries, inspite of their national rivalries. He further adds, capitalism expands by accumulating surplus value through the addition of a new proletariat at the point of production. Again according to him, MNCs serve as a substitute for the market; and that, capitalists would tend to unify their interests when they were threatened by world competition, either from non-capitalist groups or the working classes.

In his later works, Hymer discussed the MNCs, not simply as a quantitative expansion of the earlier capitalist class, but as a qualitative transformation into a new world economic order, dominated by the MNCs but not yet controlled by it. This would naturally create a new, and more complex, global economic and political situation in which, in their new incarnation, the MNCs would provide some cohesiveness but not immortality to the international capitalist class.

The Marxists, except to a certain extent Amin, have also not adequately emphasized on the important role of the MNCs in the developing world market in its historical context. Amin argues that accumulation takes place on a world scale, both in the centre and the periphery; his theory of accumulation is a theory of the relation between the centre and periphery which are being integrated into the world system through a transition of "peripheral capitalism;" the development of unequal international specialisation to the benefit of the centre. This domination of the centre causes the periphery to continually adjust to the centre's requirement for accumulation.

Hymer underscores both the centralisation of capital on a world scale, and its effects—the industrialisation of the Third World, changing pattern of international inter-dependence and the increasing linkage of new forces, like the Japanese economy, to the world market. Also like Amin, Hymer highlights the structural changes in the world market from the classical competitive model. Hymer emphasizes the new form of protectionism in Western Europe where governments assist MNCs in their penetration of the world market. Thus the expansion of a few dominant firms becomes the operative concept of "national interests."

On international division of labour, Hymer emphasized four main dimensions: 1 expansion of the firm itself; 2 creation of a world hierarchy of classes; 3 conflicts between the international capitalist class and the working class and 4 internationalisation of production. He saw MNCs as "elaborate corporate super structures to unite labour in production, but divide it in power." Through its international division of labour, capital could maintain

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control in many dimensions—horizontal, vertical, spatial and temporal. At the national level, echoing Marx, Hymer talked of a common front of the capitalists, "a veritable free-mason society *vis-a-vis* the whole working class." Extending his analysis to the international plane, he has indicated the emergence of an international hierarchy of classes which understandably has serious implications for the future of the international labour movement, particularly their struggle for the capture of state power in various countries. The process "which both brings labour together and separates it, has now taken on an international dimension," through the MNCs.

The support of nation-states to foreign investment by their national firms, leading to a weakening of the link between country performance and thereby eroding the power of the state to control MNCs was also studied with concern by Hymer in his later writings. But since the MNCs themselves could not deal with the problems of business cycles, social security and regional imbalances, multinational corporations required multinational nation-states. According to Hymer, the most important new development was not so much the emergence of MNCs *per se*, but the emergence of an international market and an international capitalist class with a material base for its international consciousness and not hamstrung by patriotic ties. This is the genesis of the new ideology of international inter-dependence.

Hymer's projections from the internal dynamics of the "New Imperial System" is futuristic. He predicted increasing international movement of capital and a growing class of international capitalists; greater concentration and control in fewer and larger international firms; increasingly sophisticated, but capital-intensive, technology. These would lead to a general erosion of the power of the nation-state to control international capital movement; increasing international consciousness among the capitalist class; increasing unemployment and an industrial reserve army on a global scale. Consequently, Hymer perceived of three levels of emerging contradictions in his "New Imperial System:" between the capitalist powers; between the capitalist and socialist powers and between the capitalist and third world countries. Hymer however, bypasses from his purview the contradiction among the socialist countries, which is somewhat intriguing in view of its contemporary significance, as also the possible contradiction between the socialist world and the Third World. If the entire socialist world were to remain outside Hymer's "New Imperial System," then it offers important policy-alternatives to the Third World countries to bypass its structure of dependence, a possibility that Hymer does not at all consider in his grim projections of the future.

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II

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL BASED ON INTERNATIONAL INTER-DEPENDENCE

The second book, by Feld—a documentation of the process of international negotiations for a NIEO and a code of conduct for the MNCs—is useful for its wealth of data on the economic and political problems that confront them. But the sharp contradiction between the position of the "Group of 77" and the advanced industrial countries of the West and the increasing political premium given in the West to the new concept of international interdependence, in fact, corresponds more to the theoretical postulates of the Marxist framework than the orthodox votaries of free enterprise or the liberal proponents of regulation.

Feld's own analytical framework conforms to the liberal viewpoint of control. He poses the problem: the LDCs need the economic, technological, financial and managerial resources of the MNCs, but fear its political costs. Hence, the search for conrols, without stultifying their economic activities, conforms to the logic of their interdependence. But the problem of control assumes new dimensions in the context of the specific features of most LDCs: 1 asymmetry in the economic power of the MNC and the host country raises fundamental questions pertaining to national sovereignty; 2 indigenous enterprises fear MNC competition; and 3 majority of the LDCs lack governmental expertise to negotiate with the MNCs, with their sophisticated technology and levels of information.

To circumvent these problems, the need for international control is envisaged, based on the principle of international interdependence, which, according to Feld, is the "in" word in the United States Administration popularised by Henry Kissinger. He, as Secretary of State, issued in July 1975, a special report from the State Department entitled—"Toward a Strategy of Interdependence." But inter-dependence in an asymmetrical hierarchy of power and sovereignty that constitutes the contemporary international economic and political order, conjures up visions of dependence, which are sharply reflected in the position of the LDCs in their global negotiations as documented by Feld. Equally striking is the position of the developed countries of the West, particularly the United States, in favour of an institutional framework of their version of interdependence. Kissinger asserted in his speech on 11 March 1976: "..., the interdependence of nations—the indivisibility of our security and prosperity—can accelerate our common progress or our common decline. Therefore just as we must seek to move beyond a balance of power in East-West relations, so must we transcend tests of strength in North-South relations and build a true world community. We do so in our self-interest..."

The sharp contradictions between the two positions, empirically documented by Feld, has been conceptualised by the Marxist theorists of "Centre-periphery," "Dependency" and in Hymer's version of the "New Imperial

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System." Among available alternatives for the LDCs, within the framework of the international capitalist division of labour, there is simply no model of development by which to circumvent the dependency that constitutes a structural imperative of the "New Imperial System." The diplomatic euphemism of this hierarchical structure of dependency is international inter-dependence.

ASWINI K. RAY*

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A CONSISTENT COMMITMENT: AMERICAN MILITARY IN EUROPE

A Review Article

INDIANS may be forgiven for seeing US foreign policy as inconsistent, zigzagging in response to the election of different Administrations and a succession of different Secretaries of State. In contrast there is the perceived stability of Soviet foreign policy, stewarded for almost forty years by the remarkable Gromyko. We tend to feel the Americans are unreliable, given over to fads, not to be taken seriously. "I still cannot figure out their objectives," is a common enough Indian comment on American foreign policy. But America is a land of advertising and show business. Each advertiser blares forth the virtues of his product ("Buy the NEW, IMPROVED, LATEST, MOST SCIENTIFIC gadget") in overblown rhetoric, though the product may be precisely the same, with a few cosmetic packaging alterations. The same is true of American foreign policy and its concomitant, American military policy. And like the naive consumer, fooled into mistaking the old for the new, we tend to overlook the remarkable consistency of American foreign and military policy.

Nothing illustrates this best than the 32-year old commitment to station six US Army divisions in Germany, itself part of a 70-year policy to prevent the domination of Europe by a hostile power.

Christopher Sam Raj's book* traces the origins of the commitment and its maintenance through eight American presidencies, from Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, to Reagan. Four were Democrats, four Republicans, evidence of the remarkable bi-partisan national consensus that has existed over the years on this issue.

The American build up in Germany to six divisions began in 1951, motivated by the increasing Soviet threat to West Europe and the Korean War. Then, as now, the rationale for stationing American troops in peace time in Europe, itself an unprecedented decision in the 175-year history of the American republic, was to buy time in the event of aggression to allow reinforcement of Europe.

The military-minded, on examining their history books, will find it impossible to identify six divisions. Just studying this question alone shows how American advertising works to obfuscate reality.

In purely operational terms, the commitment has never exceedcd five divisional equivalents plus three armoured cavalry regiments, which are actually corps troops (regiments in American parlance are synonymous with our brigades). But since six divisions sounds better than five, the figure has stuck.

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*Christopher S. Raj: *American Military in Europe: Controversy Over NATO Burden Sharing* (ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983), xiv, 380 p., Rs. 125.

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Till 1968 there was no change, except operational alterations in the divisions in response to the Army's needs. In that year the Administration withdrew two brigades from a mechanised division and an armoured cavalry regiment to forestall pressure from the Senate for bigger cuts. Despite the reduction, the Administration needed to emphasise that its traditional commitment was intact, so a fiction was created. The withdrawn units were termed to be "dual based" between the United States and Germany, and American deployment in Europe continued to be referred to as six divisions. But then, we may wonder, why was the American deployment not referred to as eight divisions? The United States had, since the Kennedy Administration, held complete stocks for two divisions in Europe, requiring only that the men be flown over to make two more divisions operational. These two could also be referred to as "dual based."

In the 1970s, growing alarm over the steady Soviet build-up led to a reassessment of the American ground commitment. Consequently, the two divisions with equipment in Europe (2 armoured and 4 mechanised) were provided a fourth brigade each, to be stationed in Germany; both formations rotate brigades through Germany every six months. Even more dual based, one would think, but still none talks of eight divisions.

This new deployment features a vital difference that has not been noted in India. One of the two brigades is located near Bremerhaven in North Germany, correcting a long-standing anomaly in NATO whereby the strongest forces, US 7th Army, are located in geographically the most difficult terrain; whereas the most vulnerable terrain, in North Germany, is held by four corps, three of which (British, Belgian, and Dutch) are small.

But the real American commitment to Europe is now eleven divisions. Equipment is stockpiled for six divisions, including one marine, so that eleven of the United States 19 ground divisions (16 Army and 3 Marine) are committed to Europe. The actual commitment in terms of division-equivalents is much larger, because a number of independent brigades will reinforce divisions, and because yet other divisions from the active Army and National Guard, will be sent to Europe in wartime.

So why does the United States not speak at least of an eleven division commitment? Because—and this is the most fascinating part of Raj's book—the Administration must maintain a national consensus on the issue of US troops in Europe.

Raj details how the national consensus on the stationing of American troops in Europe was created, and how it has been maintained over Europe. Indians are generally ignorant of how broad-based American foreign and military decision-making is. The Administration apart, with its own separate pressure groups from the Departments of Defence and State, to say nothing of the intelligence agencies—the Treasury and offices under the President such as the Office of the Mahagement of the Budget, there is Congress, divided into the House and the Senate, each with powerful sub-committees on defence and on foreign affairs, the media, the intellectuals, the thinking

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part of the general public, business, and sometimes (as now on the nuclear issue) even the Church.

The Administration is simultaneously the originator of policies and the prime instrument for reconciling divergent views and interests. The incredible complexity of the process, the skilfulness of the President in manipulating others to get his way, the limitations on his power, these are all major themes developed by Raj. We emerge with a new appreciation of the problems an American President faces. We are less prone to generalise about the lack of depth in American policy-making. because clearly it has a greater depth than that of any other country. And we have a new admiration for the quality of the democratic process in America.

A consensus inevitably implies a compromise position. The need to station troops in Europe arises from political and military imperatives. The relationship with the individual West European allies and with NATO requires a great degree of stability; this relationship cannot be exposed to the vagaries of domestic public opinion, which while crucial in a democracy, is often superficial. Military requirements generate their own problems, but must be met. If the President blandly announced that the United States commitment to Europe was eleven divisions, the consensus at home would probably be destroyed.

This is because traditionally an important part of America has opposed a peace time commitment to the defence of Europe. This dissent has been powerfully expressed in the Senate, by persons like Mike Mansfield. The dissenters are not neccessarily isolationists: rare indeed is the call for total disengagement from Europe. Nevertheless, they are very much concerned that a peace time commitment is contrary to American tradition, that it unbearably extends America, that it requires fiscal sacrifices which should not be demanded of the people, and that it permits the Europeans to get by with less effort on their own behalf.

Throughout Raj's exposition, we are aware of the efforts of the United States Senate to regain and maintain its traditional influence over US foreign policy and influence which has been eroded in the nuclear age. Behind every move concerning the American commitment to Europe is the Senate, arguing, debating, disagreeing, proposing, analysing, modifying, vetoing. It was the Senate that forced a cut-back of the commitment in 1968, because of concern that the United States could not maintain its efforts both in Indo-China and in Europe. Though Raj shows that the Europeans were doing as much as the United States in their own defence, given their limitations, and that the balance of payments issue was never as acute as was made out by Senate dissidents, the President had to bow to their wishes. He pulled out 35,000 troops, and thus prevented demands for even greater reductions.

Six divisions has become a mystic number. The consensus for the last three decades gives it sanctity. But operational requirements have changed in the face of the massive Soviet build-up. So the Administration has quietly and steadily enhanced that commitment, to the point of doubling it, while

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officially focusing on the magic figure of six divisions. The consensus is maintained.

Overall, I liked Raj's book because of its clarity and precision, so much lacking in most Indian works. I suspect these qualities arise because the book is an expansion of Raj's doctoral thesis under the guidance of the redoubtable Professor M.S. Venkataramani of Jawaharlal Nehru University.

In conclusion, those of us in India who have become overly impressed by the dissensions within NATO, especially on the euro-missiles issue, should read this book. The dissensions tend to obscure the reality, that America remains firmly committed to the defence of West Europe, and there is every reason to believe the commitment will extend into the next century as the longest-standing expression of American foreign policy.

RAVI RIKHYE*

INDIA

General

MAXINE P. FISHER : The Indians of New York City: A Study of Immigrants from India. Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, viii, 165 p.

MAXINE Fisher's most interesting study gives proof that former President Nixon is fortunately not typical of all Americans. The ease with which large numbers of Indians have been absorbed into New York—and indeed into other parts of the United States—would not have been possible had the Americans not been the friendly, helpful, straightforward, generous people that they are.

Coming entirely new to the field and therefore without any bias of any kind Ms. Fisher has, during the course of two years of practical research, understood amazingly well the Indian ethos and the problems, the attitudes, and the frustrations that are necessarily involved in the process of transplantation from one culture to another.

There are as yet no figures for Americans of Indian origin because till the last census they were not separately classified. One knows however, that prior to 1965, when President Johnson succeeded in eliminating all traces of racial discrimination from American immigration policy, the number of Indians settled in the United States, whether as citizens or permanent residents, was exceedingly small. Apart from the Sikh farmers who had established themselves in California in the second decade of this century there was no other appreciable body of Indians anywhere in America.

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The Act of 1965 changed the basis of the qualifications for admission to the United States from national and racial origin to the possession of skills which the United States required. The consequence was the opening of the flood-gates to Indian immigrants, for India was producing continuously more people skilled in the arts and sciences and every branch of technology than the slow growth of the Indian economy could absorb. Indian communities today abound in all the large cities of the United States; the Indian Consul General told the present reviewer that he would estimate Indians settled in the New York area alone at not less than 100,000.

The characteristics of these immigrants, their reaction to their new environment, the problems of adjustment which they face and the nature of the links they continue to have with the old country, must necessarily be the same in all these communities as have been so well and so sympathetically examined by Maxine Fisher for New York. There is the continuous question of how american in matters of dress, language, food, customs and general modes of life and thought one should become. The pull of ancient civilization seems to be so strong that immigrants from countries such as China and India resist much more strongly than others the pressures to conform to their new environment. Food and marriage customs are the last to change. The vast majority of Indian immigrants seek spouses from India—and certainly not from outside the Indian community. It is interesting also that the tradition of Indian hospitality continues. Relatives, friends, friends of friends and relatives of relatives are all welcome for unlimited lengths of time. "Analysis of their hosting behaviour showed that annually they provided lodging for an average of six individuals whose stay was at least a month," a finding which the author's occidental upbringing finds somewhat bewildering.

Unlike other immigrant communities in the United States, the Indians did not start at the bottom but, on the contrary, at the top of the social scale. It is only now, when preference under the Immigration Laws is given to dependents and relations, both near and far, of migrants already settled, irrespective of their technical skill or educational background, that the general level of the Indian community is being somewhat lowered.

Characteristically, though there are a couple of pan-Indian organisations in the New York area (also characteristically not on too friendly a basis with each other) the typical communal organisation is on the basis of natal language. This must necessarily be so for, in essence, each language area in India really represents a nationality in terms of political science while the all-embracing Indian nationality is no more than a product of political union. It is however interesting that though the essential social organisation is on a language basis there are considerable contacts and friendship across these language lines as well as across religious borders, this being more marked as the social level rises.

Another interesting fact brought out by Ms. Fisher is the question of racial classification of the Indian. When the immigration laws restricted entry

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into the United States on the basis of race the whole thrust of the Indian community was to insist that they were "white Caucasians." Now that the wheel has turned full circle and that "affirmative action programmes" give considerable advantages to non-white non-Caucasian ethnic groups the effort of a large part of Indian settlers in New York is to get themselves declared as non-white and non-Caucasian. This is not apparently a universal demand; nor is it yet clear what the final decision of the Census Bureau will be.

Chandigarh. B.K. NEHRU

Modern Indian Thought

RAM CHANDRA GUPTA : JP : From Marxism to Total Revolution. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, ix, 160p., Rs. 50.

AS the title of the book itself indicates, this is not so much a biography of Jayaprakash Narayan as a history of the evolution of his political ideas.

JP started as an ardent nationalist, but he soon became a Marxist. In this his case was not exceptional; there were many others who passed through a similar ideological transition. It is the further development of his ideas beyond Marxism which deserve special attention. Even there it would be wrong to treat his case simply as the exceptional intellectual history of an outstanding individual; but the inner tendencies of our times were mirrored in him in a particularly fascinating way. As a result we gain a deeper understanding of our age, its unfolding hopes and aspirations, through an understanding of JP.

Although JP was converted to Marxism in his twenties, and continued to profess some kind of Marxist faith for two decades after his first conversion, his commitment was never, fundamentally speaking, to an ideology or a theory of history and politics but to a set of values. This provided the deeper impulse or the guiding spirit of his life, and it is in obedience to this that he moved on from Marxism to Democratic Socialism to Sarvodaya and, again, from a more conventional conception of revolution to the idea of "total revolution." Critics would say that he moved on from one confusion to another. But this is to miss the historic significance of the evolution of his ideas.

To the Indian nationalist, opposition to capitalism came as a concomitant of his anti-imperialist struggle. Marxism, with its impressive critique of capitalism, had for him a natural appeal. In the same context, the rise of the Soviet State held out hopes of a new future. These were dominant influences on the consciousness of forward-looking people in the first half of this century. It is not surprising that both Nehru and Jayaprakash, in

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spite of their closeness to Gandhi, were influenced in that direction. But already the perspectives have started changing.

Today the historic struggle takes more and more the form of a struggle against the twentieth-century phenomenon of an incomparably powerful bureaucratic state. This is the enemy that youth power aims to fight and overcome. Capitalism remains an enemy; but socialism, in its present form, has also become synonymous with state bureaucracy. This has changed profoundly the historical perspectives for the revolutionary who has his gaze fixed on the emergent future rather than on any fixed ideology of the past. It is in this context that Gandhi has reappeared in our time with a new relevance, quite different from what the old nationalists were chiefly aware of. It is against this same background that JP emerges today as the symbol of new aspirations for the future. He is, at the same time, the exponent of a new technique of revolutionary practice. Revolution is no longer a neat act of seizure of power by a self-proclaimed party of the proletariat, for the party itself takes on the features of a bureaucratic apparatus careless of ethical norms. In many ways JP is closer to the spirit and objectives of the New Left that has been surfacing in recent years all over the world than any other leader of the first rank in contemporary India. The influence of Gandhi is revealed in a greater insistence on non-violence and the purity of means and a more distinct orientation towards a kind of rural communitarianism than is common among western radicals.

Dr. Gupta's is a straight-forward account of the development of JP's ideas. It does not go far in presenting the historical background. It is also untouched by any deep understanding of the way in which the spirit of the age manifests itself through the life it attempts to unfold. A few mistakes occur at places, which can be easily removed. In 1960, we are told, Jayaprakash established the Gandhi Educational Institute at Varanasi with a view to co-ordinating social science with Gandhian thought. (p. 87) That gives the name wrong, it should be Gandhian Institute of Studies.

Nevertheless, Gupta has written a useful book. It will come handy to anybody who wants a preliminary acquaintance with the political ideas of Jayaprakash Narayan.

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AMLAN DATTA

DEV RAJ BALI : Modern Indian Thought : Rammohan Roy to M.N. Roy. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, x, 200p., Rs. 60.

THE British conquest of India and the political domination that followed, threw up many a challenge to the sensitive Indian mind. Its reactions particularly to the cultural-domination were strong but diverse in character. Fascinated by the liberal traditions of the West, a section of

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the Indian intelligentsia was rather inclined to accept its cultural superiority. As against that, another section, inspired by the rich traditions of India's glorious past wanted to uphold the cultural values of that period. While the former believed that the traditional Indian culture was rather rooted in obscurantism and irrationalism, the latter vociferously advocated its revivalism. In the process, the cultural history of India began to be interpreted and reinterpreted in diverse forms which inevitably led to several socio-religious reformist movements.

It is in this background, that the relevance of the book under review is to be evaluated. The book though originally prepared as a doctoral dissertation, deals with nine outstanding thinkers of modern India. Rammohan Roy, Dayanand Saraswati, Vivekananda, Ram Tirtha, Annie Besant, Tagore, Gandhi, Aurobindo and M.N. Roy are the thinkers selected for the study. Not all these thinkers have been presented with the same emphasis nor all their ideas have been critically examined. The attempt is mainly to summarise the socio-religious thought of each one of them highlighting the common humanistic principles in all. In other words, the focus is essentially on their respective contributions to what is called the philosophy of humanism. But the author's claim, that these Indian thinkers "influenced vast masses throughout the world and gave an ideal solution of the problems facing the modern man" is rather untenable. Whatever be the merit of his arguments, the fact is that even in India—the land of the origin and propagation of these ideas—their impact has been very very marginal.

In the history of modern India, some of them have, no doubt, a place of their own and together they have contributed considerably to the cultural advancement of this society. But their significance in terms of ideas of a practical nature that could shape the destiny of a contemporary plural society is open to serious doubt and questioning. It is one thing to estimate the ideas of a thinker purely from the view point of a mere intellectual exercise, but it is another to evaluate their relevance from the actualities of a living community struggling for a bare existence. It is this gap that makes an average reader reluctant to accept any glorification.

In a broad classification, all these thinkers, except perhaps M.N. Roy, may be characterised as socio-religious reformers, socio-political thinkers, philosophers or spiritualists, and they belong to the community of more or less the same traditions in Indian thought.

Rammohan Roy was a rebel against many irrationalities in Hindu tradition. But his effort was mainly to harmonise the rationalism of the West with the cultural heritage of the East. Few in India are perhaps aware that it was Rammohan Roy who asked for English education in India. While on the one hand, he vigorously fought against the evils of religious bigotry and superstition, on the other, he passionately advocated unity, harmony and universal brotherhood. His was a mission to ensure the revival of humanistic cultural values so as to promote the common good.

Swami Dayanand, the founder of Arya Samaj, was a crusader for the

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revival of Vedic religion and culture which formed the basis of humanism. Though the Arya Samaj was established to keep the movement alive, it was largely confined to north India, and as time passed it lost much of its momentum as a religious movement. In fact, prior to Swami Vivekananda, there were three reformist movements represented by the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj and the Theosophical Society. But none of them could bring about any perceptible change in the orthodox Hindu community. Their leaders no doubt propagated many lofty ideals, but the metaphysical elements of their ideas coupled with the endless discussion of the eternal principles of truth and the other worldliness could hardly make any effective appeal to the masses. The leaders too had practically nothing much to offer to a social life of utter poverty, ignorance and superstition.

Deviating from this general philosophical approach, Swami Vivekananda developed a line of thought in sympathy with suffering humanity; he advocated the cause of human progress through concerted action. The twin evils —ceremonialism and ritualism—of the Hindu religion were condemned. In a sense, both Tagore and Gandhi tried to imbibe the spirit of those very sentiments. Accepting the Western concept of humanism Tagore held the view that since man was the measure of all things, God should be interpreted in human terms. The passion for human freedom made him so cosmopolitan in outlook that all his major writings have shown his deep concern for the well-being of man.

The weakest spot in the spectrum of thought presented in this work is the chapter on Gandhi. Although the focus is mainly on Gandhi's religious and humanistic ideas, the author does not seem to have realized the need for any fresh interpretation. What has been discussed is a mere repetition of things already known. One makes a vain search for anything new in it. The twenty-one pages of simple narrative description carry hardly anything refreshing. Gandhi's interpretation of religion, his revolt against the social evil of untouchability, his fight against communalism, and his ethicalisation of politics are all placed in the usual framework of familiar arguments.

However, at the end, the author laments that "India has paid only lip sympathy to the ideals of the Mahatma ... " and seems to have realised that Gandhian ideals are of little relevance in a society which is seriously afflicted by crisis of all kinds.

The discussion on Aurobindo is perhaps the best in this work. His philosophy with its stress on humanism in spiritual evolution has been put in a nutshell. With a high clarity of expression avoiding needless arguments, this part undoubtedly gives the flavour of pleasant reading.

Equally interesting is to read at the fag end about the radical humanism of M.N. Roy. Though Roy's critique of Marxism and Western democracy has found expression in the first few pages, the focus is mainly on his new humanism. One may, however, disagree with the author's statement on p. 171, that Roy, after his break with the Communist International returned to India in 1928 and "from that time onward he developed a new social phi-

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losophy known as Radical Humanism or New Humanism." But it is clear from his own writings that soon after his return Roy jumped into national politics and was soon arrested and remained a prisoner for about six years until 1936. Since then, until he left the Congress, he was quite active in the battle for freedom, specially on the trade union front and in the peasant organisations. His philosophy of Radical Humanism was a much later development. In fact Roy's unpopular stand during the war years brought him in complete political isolation. Coupled with it was the failure of his Radical Democratic Party; these two incidently prompted him for a complete withdrawal from active politics. It was in that background that Roy developed his new social philosophy.

Though it is not a detailed critical study, Dev Raj Bali's book is quite informative and students of modern Indian thought will find it extremely useful. He has maintained all through a lucid style and a balanced approach in presenting the diverse contributions to the philosophy of humanism. A critical appreciation of the ideas and interpretations would have been more beneficial to the reading public. Nevertheless, the work is a welcome addition to the existing literature on the subject.

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R.C. PILLAI

Regionalism

G. RAM REDDY and B.A.V. SHARMA: Regionalism in India : A Study of Telangana. Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, xvi, 347 p., Rs. 80.

SPONSORED by the Indian Council for Social Science Research and authored by a Vice-Chancellor and a Professor, the book under review is, strictly speaking, a study of the impact the 1969 separatist Telangana movement had on the mid-term Lok Sabha elections of 1971. It is divided into two parts. The first part contains what the authors have chosen to call "the background to the main study based on secondary source material" and the second, "survey research data and its interpretation." These two parts are followed by appendices including the "Questionnaire." The responses to the Questionnaire are incorporated in the 181 statistical tables in the second part. The responses are classified according to age, sex, religion, income, occupation including land-holding, etc. The result is behavioural quantification, currently making for academic impressiveness and excellence. That is a brief and admittedly formal and descriptive account of the work.

It would also not be out of place to state at the outset that the present reviewer hails from Andhra Pradesh and has been, since childhood, brought

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up on the concept of unity of the Telegu speaking people and unity of the country as a whole. The remarks that follow have this fundamental "bias" if bias it is.

The present state of Andhra Pradesh is more a product of history, of a people upholding a single set of cultural values. It consists of several regions and some of them, like the one the reviewer hails from, are as less developed as Telangana. The reasons are many and different. There is, however, enough historical proof that each region, developed as well as less developed, has contributed to the singleness of culture of the Telegu-speaking people. Andhra culture would be poor without Potana, a poet who hailed from the present Telangana and without Mallinatha, a critic and commentator of Sanskrit works of literature, respected across centuries all over India. And, these are not the only instances. The unity of Andhra Pradesh has been historically evolved through language, literature, art and culture.

It is also a matter of history that under the Nizam, Telangana lagged behind the "Northern Sircars," especially the delta areas. So did several other regions in the state. I am using region only in a territorial sense. But that is not the sense in which the word "region" and "regionalism" are used in the book under review.

The authors say : "Regionalism in Indian politics has generally been regarded (by whom?) as something that is anti-system, anti-federal and against the basic interests of a well-integrated and well-developed polity." (p. 3) Without defining what these "basic interests" of a "polity" are, the authors take it for granted that the definition they accept uncritically is good enough not only for their study buy also for general acceptance. Later, they even talk about "non-judical, non-statutory, primordial and parochial factors in the growth and development of regionalism in India." (p. 3) On the next page, they talk about "the emergence and alignment of linguistic middle classes." The phrases and/or concepts are nowhere defined or illustrated so as to enable the reader to judge the correctness of their study. They seem to want the reader to accept their vagueness and verbosity as they, perhaps, have tended to do. Even so, they had to admit that "regionalism in Andhra Pradesh shed much of its language and caste character and became mainly economic." This conclusion should have made them analyze the agrarian relations in Telangana and how the land ceiling laws in spite of their weightage in favour of the landed interests, were really at the root of the so-called Telangana agitation of 1968-69, ostensibly for jobs, promotions, economic development and so on. Instead, the authors seem to be satisfied with recounting the grievances of the agitators. In other words, for them opinion counted as facts and not the basic social realities which gave rise to such opinion.

When opinions were elicited in response to the "Questionnaire," the authors did not go beyond stating. "The response of the cross-section of the voting population . . . was important. . . ." (p. 112) But we are not told how many people were approached and how many responded, and whether the

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same people were involved in all the tables and on what basis or critieria people were selected to represent "the cross-section" for questioning.

Then, the statistical jugglery is rather amusing. For example, the authors say : "What emerges in a general way is that a little over half of the respondents (55.3 per cent) are either not sure of the treatment given or would not reply." So "a little over half the respondents" were silent on the question of "treatment" and one would presume they did not fare badly; the conclusion then should be that the majority, 55.3 per cent did not respond in favour of the author's unstated but omnipresent predilection for regional separatist formation. Now in their view, 55.3 per cent was only "a little over half of the respondents." But their next sentence reads—"The remaining half has a preponderant majority (75 per cent or 33.3 per cent of the total sample) of those feeling that the treatment to the region was less favourable." Please note the verbal and statistical trickery in the sentence. Earlier we had seen that 55.3 per cent were silent and that gave a remainder of 44.7 per cent which in the author's language becomes—"The remaining half!" And out of this 44.7 per cent minority, 75 per cent felt that the "treatment was less favourable." In other words, a majority in a minority held this view. Out of the total sample, this constituted only 33.3 per cent as we were told. But in the language of the authors this minority becomes "a preponderant majority!" Let us proceed. The authors continue "this leaves only about 2 ; per cent (10.8 per cent of the total sample) to report that the treatment was in no way different from the other two regions of Andhra Pradesh." Here the percentages do not add up to 100 ! And, if 55.3 per cent did not say or were not sure and if 10.8 per cent of the total sample did not see any difference in treatment, this majority of 61.1 per cent did not subscribe to the view that the "treatment" was "less favourable." Yet the authors (with dexterity, having shown that 75 per cent (of 44.7 per cent) felt the "treatment" was less favourable), advertly conclude: "Thus the majority ... are sour over the treatment given to the region by the State Government !" That rather deviates from standards of science. The deviation is not confined to just page 114 where the above-quoted sentences occur. It is present in all the tables and their interpretations.

However, the authors finally had to admit that "the separatists draw on the economically dissatisfied and discontented low and middle income groups and those connected with land." (p. 311) Moreover, these groups got support from the public sector employees. And as the tables reveal, the meaning of "those connected with land" means land holders and landed interests in general. So, a large majority of the urban working people, especially the working class and the entire gamut of agricultural wage-labour did not support separatism at all. Separatism, wherever it raised its head, could not command popular support because its essence was sectional or sectarian. Therefore, it is bound to fizzle out, through compromises, face-saving devices and through the bribery of political office such as governorships, ministerships, etc.

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Although, the authors truthfully mention that the communist movement and particularly the CPI were opposed to the separatist movement and campaigned against it (pp. 48-51), strangely, in their conclusion they aver that "each political party was divided over the Telangana issue." Such self-contradictions are a blemish in a work that could be scientific.

New Delhi G.J. RAMA RAO

Rural Development in India: Some Facets. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, x, 560 p., Rs. 100.

B.C. MUTHAYYA and S. VIJAYA KUMAR: Psycho-Social Dimensions of Agricultural Development : An analysis. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1980, 103p., Rs. 18.

RURAL development in India has taken a full swing. British India called it Rural Reconstruction, Independent India named it Community Development, the Janata Government Rural Development, and the present Indira Government Rural Reconstruction. Despite christening the programme differently the plight of the people has not changed for the better. The process of planning has in fact created more poverty. The benefits of development have been mostly manoeuvred by the elites; thus the rich have become richer and the poor poorer. This truism has been so much hammered that we do not need any fresh evidence to verify the fact. Research studies, books on the subject, papers and articles have all sung the sorry state of affairs of the villagers. But none of them have been able to clearly identify the problems and solutions to either eradicate poverty or raise the status of the rural poor. In other words, this rich knowledge has not enabled us to come out of the "darkness." This situation has compelled some thinking people to question the very basis of our research methodology which is highly biased and mostly perfected in an alien environment. The imitative and borrowed tools as well as instruments cannot enable us to get reliable and valuable data to know our society. The two volumes under review fall in this category. The compulsions of institutional ethos forces members of the staff either to "produce" or "perish." For mere survival the former has to give precedence to the latter. The production of books and studies become tangible and visible goods or assets of the institute which can be easily shown for financial audit as also social audit. This is needed to prove the worth and the utility of the institute of the nation.

The three criteria on which we should judge the performance of these institutions are dissemination, generation and utilisation of knowledge. On all these three counts the present works fall far below expectations.

The first volume is a collection of papers mostly based on written notes prepared by the members of the faculty to deliver lectures to a variety of

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courses organized by the Institute. The second volume is an empirical study conducted in the year 1973. The reading of the materials of both the volumes will not add to the already known facts. The class notes at best can serve as teaching material. It may perhaps to a busy administrator serve as a source book. He may, however, get frightened by the size of the book (560 pages). He may very rarely refer to it and allow it to rest on his desk or shelf. The findings of the second volume based on 1973 may have outlived its utility and purpose as the data and situation no longer holds true. The gap between collection and presentation is so great that it loses its relevance.

The twenty-six papers in the first volume are organized in four sections—Rural Socio-Economic Scene; Approaches to Rural Development; Programmes of Rural Development and Organisational Aspects of Rural Development. The overlapping, duplication and repetition of the material could have been avoided by rigorous editing and an exhaustive introductory chapter to link different themes with each other. The book does not seem to be an integral part of a whole. An introduction to each section would have added to the value of the book as all the different chapters with a varying degree of emphasis could have been inter-twined with each other. A concluding chapter to bring forth the wisdom of all the members of the faculty would have further helped to build a sound theory and guidelines for action.

The first section of this volume makes it clear that physical impact is not possible due to the dimensions of the task and the intensity of the problem of the social and economic situations in the rural areas. The various articles in this section point out that neither at the centre, nor in the states, are the respective ministries/departments dealing with all the aspects of rural development structurally integrated. Integrated rural development would be possible only when we have a vertical as also a horizontal integration of projects. The planning process has thus to be re-oriented to tackle the dual perplexity of production in general, along with adequate gains to weaker individuals, both in participation as also in yields. A participatory structure should be built up that would enable the people to make decisions about their own welfare. The minimum social consumption needs of the people have to be built up as a part of the infrastructure. This has to be done in a mixed picture of social structure wherein tradition and modernity coexist.

The section—Approaches to Rural Development conceives development as a dynamic process because it implies change from one level of existence to another level which is always considered to be better. It is unfortunate that this concept has remained unchallenged in the paper. Nobody would take issues with the authors that change would be dependent on people's awareness, perceptions, and attitudes. People need to be motivated so that their energies can be released in a desired direction. These energies can be canalized through people's institutions such as Panchayati Raj and other voluntary organizations.

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The third and fourth sections critically examine the various programmes and their organizations. Most of these papers are heavily drawn from the material already published in government reports and periodicals. However, some of the papers which are of an evaluative nature, such as Adult Education, Employment Generation in Rural India, Rural Credit in India and Rural Development in Rajasthan, throw a fresh light on the subject. Some of the remedies suggested are worth considering by policy-makers, administrators and grass-roots workers.

The fourth section rightly stresses that the main component of "development" has to be rural development and the main reference of development administration has to be rural administration. The objectives of rural development has to "encompass improved productivity, increased employment and thus higher incomes for target groups, as well as minimum acceptable levels of food, shelter, education and health to all." Translating all these objectives into reality and the achievement of these goals would be the task of development administration. It is, therefore, essential that the whole administrative machinery be changed or revamped to deliver the goods.

The references cited in the book have not followed a uniform style. In some chapters it is designated as "Helpful Consultancy," while in others "References" and "Books Consulted." Despite these limitations the present volume will be helpful to readers and researchers as they would find the scattered material in one place.

The main purpose of the second volume—an empirical study—is to locate the types of changes in the human and social dimensions of development that have resulted from the implementation of Intensive Agricultural District Programmes (IADP). The study has covered 497 respondents, including agricultural labourers. The findings indicate that the IADP has brought definite improvement in the agricultural situation in the IADP districts than the non-IADP ones. There is no change in caste structure either between IADP and non-IADP districts. The authors conclude that caste structure is immune to any kind of economic betterment as it sustains the social structure and, hence, change in this case becomes difficult. In regard to leadership, ascribed status is being replaced by achieved status. Economic betterment has brought increasing aspirations.

The study has not found much variation in the various socio-psychological dimensions studied between the respondents in IADP and non-IADP districts in two states—Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. This shows that most of our studies touch only the periphery of rural life. These types of studies should include non-participant observation as one of the tools to collect relevant and reliable data. The questionnaires and schedules may fail us to get correct responses from the respondents. Indepth case-studies of some of the IADP and non-IADP villages may help us to get more information to build our strategy of rural development.

Meanwhile, rural development still continues to remain a distant goal,

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and to reach the poorest of the poor a far-fetched ideal. It is hoped that these two volumes will inspire others to make concerted efforts to discover new paths, strategies, methods and processes to break the barriers.

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K.D. GANGRADE

T.K. CHAKRAVARTY : Development of Small and Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers : An Overview of Policies and Programmes. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1980, 180 p., Rs. 45.

DEVELOPMENT of small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers in India has been one of the primary concerns of our planners and policy-makers for quite a long time. Organisations like the Planning Commission, National Sample Survey, Reserve Bank of India and some academic institutions have often highlighted the various socio-economic problems of this vulnerable section of the rural population. More recently (since the early seventies), with the setting up of special agencies like SFDA and MFAL, the government hopes to achieve a real break-through in solving these problems in an organized manner and within a reasonable period of time. Also, quite a large number of social scientists and the Programme Evaluation Organisation (PEO) of the Planning Commission have evaluated the performance of some of these agencies in different parts of the country.

The chief merit of the book by Chakravarty lies in compiling the relevant information from available sources and presenting them in a very cohesive manner. This is not an original work of the author, nor does he claim it to be so. But it provides very useful information on the dynamics of change in the economic conditions of small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers in India. Besides, government policies adopted for the development of small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers during the five year plan period and performance of some of the special agencies as reported in various studies, have been very well summarised.

Nevertheless, the author has faltered in many places whenever he has tried to make his own comments on the available information. For example, the author's remark that the ever-swelling ranks of uneconomic and operationally inconvenient submarginal holdings, is likely to become the Achilles heel of our economic development efforts on the farm front, does not bear with his own statement that during the period from 1953-54 to 1971-72, both the number and proportion of households in the sub-marginal holding group have increased partly due to land distribution measures taken by the government. This could only be possible if the author believed that land

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distribution measures have a negative impact on land productivity, but again this has not so far been substantiated by any empirical studies. In fact George and Rao (of the NIRD in which the present author also works) in their study entitled *Land Reforms : Production-Productivity* reported the positive effects of land distribution measures. Whether any sub-marginal holding is economic or not, depends on a number of factors, and having not been considered in this book the author's remark appears to be wholly out of context. Similarly the comment made by the author that "the trends in the distribution of holdings showed a tendency towards narrowing down of inequality over the period," does not seem to be conclusive in view of the fact that the NSS data (as presented in Tables 3 and 4) indicates that while ten per cent households at the top bracket owned 53 per cent of the area in 1953-54, the top eleven per cent households owned 54 per cent of the area in 1971-72. This difference is not very suggestive. Furthermore, while discussing any data relating to income, expenditure, assets and indebtedness of different groups of household overtime, the author has not considered the real value (measured at constant prices), and therefore, when he says that the average debt per agricultural labour household increased by 161 per cent between 1964-65 and 1974-75, it has an element of inflation and the real value would be much lower than what has been mentioned.

However, the author has rightly concluded that the evaluation studies reviewed by him point out the strength and weaknesses of various programmes undertaken for the development of small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers in the past and "these are important learning experiences for planners and policy-makers which should pave the way for more realistic programme planning and administration in future.

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Labour Politics

RAKHAHARI CHATTERJI : Union Politics and the State : A Study of Indian Labour Politics. South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, ix, 268p., Rs. 60.

THE blurb of this book claims that "... it has undertaken a thorough organisational analysis of the unions ..." and that it "not only throws new light on the Union situation in India but also marks a definite departure in its analysis of the Indian State ...." Actually, the research base of the book is just six trade unions, two from each of the states of West Bengal, Karnataka and Rajasthan. The sample is not a random one and although Chatterji tries to explain at some length the significance of his choice of the states and the unions, the selection is also admitted to be guided

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by considerations of convenience of study. It can hardly be viewed as representative or even indicative of trade unions in India as a whole numbering over 20,000, especially since only one of the three states chosen can really be seen to be among the leading industrialised ones in the country. Any study based on such a meagre sample can hardly qualify for recognition as an organisational analysis of Indian trade unions, "thorough" or otherwise, and can hardly be adequate for any reliable and worthwhile conclusions.

What is worse, Chatterji does not systematically present at any place the data actually gathered by him even from this minute sample, so that the reader could interpret it for himself and check the validity of the conclusions drawn by the author against the facts discovered by him. Various facts relating to the unions are, no doubt, mentioned from place to place in the course of discussion. But these references are scattered and seem to be intended to substantiate views already held rather than being presented as material from which the view or conclusion is derived.

With his own data base so meagre and not clearly stated, Chatterji has had naturally to fall back upon other published material on his subject. Fortunately for him, there is no dearth of such material, for, the subject chosen by him is perhaps the most popular aspect of Indian trade unions for study among academics. But the inevitable result of leaning so heavily on the work of others is that both the ground covered and the conclusions drawn sound very familiar.

As happens so often in works of this kind, facts and information used in the course of discussion are not always accurate and sometimes the insight into their real significance is missing. For instance, Chatterji treats the Code of Discipline, the Inter-Union Code of Conduct and the Code of Efficiency and Welfare on a par. Actually, the second of these is not a decision of the Tripartite Indian Labour Conference while the last was discussed by the tripartites but not adopted due to the opposition of the unions. Similarly, Chatterji states that government "has created institutions like the Central Industrial Advisory Council to facilitate labour participation at the national, industrial and plant levels," not appreciating the distinction between unions being granted a few seats in a large council consisting predominantly of government, business and industry representatives, and a council being "created to facilitate labour participation." The purpose of creating the council was certainly not that. Chatterji also cites a lot of scattered, disconnected and not always relevant data to assert that unions have not been able to improve the conditions of wage earners and goes on to argue that because of this failure, "they become interested in ideological and social restructuring type of goals." He misses both the points that but for the unions, workers would not have achieved even such protection of their standards as they have actually done, and that both improving the workers' material conditions and striving for social transformation always had a place in union goals. Unions do not need to fail in one to turn to the other.

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Again, Chatterji asserts elsewhere that "the organisational goals of the unions in the states are set by the constitution of their all-India organisations ...," which really puts the cart before the horse.

Chatterji has discussed at considerable length the theoretical aspects of the emergence of trade unions and their relation to political parties. Much of this discussion is useful and helps in clarifying some aspects of the theme. But even here, Chatterji poses some non-questions such as, "What explains the difference in the degree of union growth in these three states? " viz. West Bengal, Karnataka and Rajasthan and proceeds to ponderously answer them. Besides, much of the theorising seems to have only a tenuous nexus with the trade union and political realities discussed in the rest of the book.

Bombay. BAGARAM TULPULE

JASPAL SINGH : India's Trade Union Leaders. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xiv, 260p., Rs. 70.

A comprehensive and analytical study of the sociology of trade union leadership is a difficult task. Jaspal Singh's study of *India's Trade Union Leaders* is an attempt in this direction. Unfortunately, the author's excessive reliance on statistical quantification to provide him the insights into the nature and content of trade union leadership, deduct from the quality of the final picture. Nor is he able to place his analysis within a conceptual framework. In fact, there are serious gaps in the logic of his theoretical arguments.

The title of the book is misleading, as the study is based on a sample of union leaders drawn from certain industrial centres of the Punjab. The author is mistaken in his assumption that patterns of union leadership in Punjab will hold valid for the country in general. Another serious drawback with the book is that it becomes a survey covering a vast spread of facts concerning the trade union movement and its leadership. This of itself is no inadequacy, but the inability of the author to relate the data gathered to the issues of leadership, leave much to be desired. Though considerable effort has gone into the collection and grouping of data, the study fails to go beyond this into the realm of sociological explanation. A study such as this would be expected to throw light on the legitimising sources of leadership, the direction provided by the leadership to the union movement, the complementary or conflicting objectives of the leadership and the rank and file, the practice of internal democracy, the process of decision-making, the relationship of the leadership with rank and file and the methods or modes of influence and pressure exercise, amongst other issues. The research has little or nothing to say on most of these issues.

The study touches on the manner of recruitment of leaders and peeps at qualities of leadership by reference to the qualities of national trade union

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leaders and the reactions of the interviewees to those leaders. It looks at training imparted to leaders without appraising the influence of such training on them. Goals and objectives of union leaders are categorised into long-term and short-term without any explanation for such distinctions, or as to how their performance in achieving these objectives determine their relationship with the rank and file membership, the union hierarchy, the employers and other agencies of state that are involved or intervene in the process. And it need be underlined that most of the data is based on perceptions of the trade union leaders.

On occasions, Singh's research reads more like an industrial relations primer. Analyzing the relationship between employers and unions, the author has mainly statistics of strikes, lockouts, results of strikes and settlement of disputes to offer as a basis for commenting on employer-union relations. He has no thoughts to share in the context of Punjabi entrepreneurial talent and the styles of management that may follow from this, nor has he any case studies to offer which would have enlightened the reader. The chapter on "Unions and Government" apart from a brief historical sketch, focuses on whether the respondents were satisfied or dissatisfied with the attitude of the Central Government and the State Government to the union movement. There is no analysis of what these attitudes are, or the political context of these attitudes. The chapter on "Unions and Politics," is one of the better chapters, and particularly so as Singh is able to relate some of his social and activity data about the respondents to the political affiliation of the union they belonged to.

To return to the theoretical content, even in the review of literature, the author does not locate his study within the conceptual parameters of the literature surveyed. He brushes the issue aside with the alarming statement that "in the absence of any study on trade union leadership in the area under investigation...it was not feasible to select arbitrarily any one of the theoretical orientations and subject the same to a test in the absence of reliable basic information."

This lack of a theoretical understanding leads the author to attempt statistical explanations without a sociological awareness. An example is the exercise to define the class of origin of the respondent trade union leaders. To do this, a list of occupations is prepared, and a group of twenty-four individuals, all employed in an engineering college, are asked to rank the occupations on a five-point scale. A four-fold class categorisation is designed from the ranking—upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class and lower class. And as would be expected, DMs and MPs top the upper class, while sweepers and domestic servants belong to the lowest of the lower class. This classification aids him to locate that most respondents belong to the middle class. He then proceeds to identify inter-generational and intra-generational occupational movements of the respondents. But, Singh has no light to shed on how these facts of occupational mobility affect the trade union leaders—their perceptions, their relationships with rank and

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file, their ability to lead, their future in the trade union movement. The ability to translate statistical findings into sociological explanation, is the major inadequacy.

Another example of the inadequacy of explanation is illustrated in the analysis of why individuals become union leaders. On the one hand, drawing from the respondents' perceptions, the author presents that altruistic reasons stemming from a deep social concern, encourage them to become union activists. He also refers to their perception of themselves as agents of social change—as intellectuals who are a potential alternative to the ruling elite. And then at a later point, data and logic are scuttled. He argues that they become leaders to "revenge on those responsible for their failure to move up." Singh further confuses the issue by adding that trade union leaders stagnate in their careers and that "this stagnation supplies an explanation for their motivation to participate continuously in trade union activity viz., an avenue for moving upwards." Apart from an astonishing gap in the logic of argument, what is the relevance of the respondents' perceptions to the author's conclusions? And if the author has reason to set aside data, surely he needs to explain why. Sociological explanation is lost in such unrelated moves from data to comment.

Finally, it may be concluded that the data available to the author could have been definitely used more systematically and coherently. The ill-fit between finding and explanation, could have well been avoided. A conceptual frame of reference would have helped the author go a long way in this direction. One cannot also but comment that the author was poorly guided in his research.

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CHERIAN JOSEPH

Urban Problems and Policy Perspectives

GOPAL BHARGAVA (Ed.): Urban Problems and Policy Perspectives. Abhinav Prakashan, New Delhi, 1981, xiii, 501 p., Rs. 150.

DURING 1901-1971, whereas the total population of India registered an increase of about 130 per cent, the urban population increased by 320 per cent. The level of urbanization which stood at 10.8 per cent in 1901 increased to 19.9 per cent in 1971. This is by no means a high level, but the increment in absolute terms is quite large. The growth has been highly disparate in different categories of towns: the giant cities have all along been gaining at the cost of the small and medium-sized ones. Whereas class I towns had accounted for 22.1 per cent of the urban population in 1901, their share rose to 48.9 per cent by 1971. In contrast, whereas in 1901 about 39.6 per cent of the urban population lived in small (class IV to VI)

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towns, the share of these towns had come down to 19.3 per cent in 1971. Still more glaring is the growth tempo of the metropolitan cities, which in 1971 supported roughly a quarter of our total urban population.

Despite increasing concentration of population in large-sized cities, the level of work-force engaged in agriculture has remained static at around 72 per cent. Diversification of economic activities has not kept pace with increasing urbanization. While the sector-wise break up of work-force has remained almost static, the contribution of the different sectors in national income has drastically changed over time, so that the share of the primary sector (which still employs over 72 per cent of our work-force) came down from 66.3 per cent in 1901 to 44.1 per cent in 1971. This decrease in the share of the primary sector was taken over by an increase of 10.5 per cent (from 11.7 to 23.2) in the share of the secondary sector and 10.7 per cent (from 22.0 to 32.7) in that of the tertiary sector. This means that prosperity has gradually been syphoned off from the rural to urban areas. The increasing concentration of non-primary economic activities in large cities has created a strong gravitational force towards them and simultaneously weakened the influence of smaller towns as central places. This is enigmatic, since well over 75 per cent of the industrial establishments in our large cities employ fewer than five workers and use no power.

The progressively increasing concentration of population in our larger cities has given rise to a series of serious problems calling for urgent solution. A joint venture by practising experts on *Urban Problems and Policy Perspectives* is therefore, both timely and welcome. The book is "an academic venture" of the Social Scientists' Association of the Town and Country Planning Organization (New Delhi), brought out with a view to meet the long-felt need for "consolidated and up-to-date literature" on our urban problems and their policy implications. It consists of 30 papers written by 25 different scholars, singly or jointly. The papers are grouped into 10 sections of very disparate length and weight. An examination of the title, content and scope of different papers in each section would show that the book has been brought out without a definite plan. Rather than being assigned a definite task, each author seems to have been asked to contribute a paper on any subject of his choice so that on each major theme we have more then one paper with nearly the same title, perspective and scope, but differing in quality according to the writer's skill. This volume is thus a collection of papers rather than a compact book on urban problems and perspectives; Gopal Bhargava has been more of a compiler than an editor. This naturally renders the book a most difficult one to review. The individual papers are not without merit however; names of present as well as the past Chief Town Planner to the Government of India, a former Registrar General and several distinguished senior administrator-scholars in the list of contributors insures this.

In the opening essay, U.C. Mallick has drawn a well-rounded profile of India's urbanization, a fact that makes the following essay by C.S. Gupte

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appear as largely repetitious. On policy perspectives however, Gupte (a former Chief Planner at TCPO) is more insightful. The third essay by Ashok Mitra on "Urban Poor and Social Ferment," though good, is hardly relevant in a book on urban problems and policy perspectives. With reference to a case study of Calcutta, Mitra has examined the truth of the commonly held belief that the roots of social ferment lie among the urban poor, who have oftentimes been pictured as a keg of gun powder all too ready to ignite. Mitra concludes that in spite of their precarious existence the urban poor "have too much at stake in what they enjoy or hold or perhaps to strain all their energies to keep going to have much surplus left to stir up major social ferments...on their own."

In a perceptive essay on metropolitan planning, S.S. Shafi has drawn attention to the fact that the exercise in economic planning in India has remained "basically spaceless." Our master plans have been mainly concerned with the development of new suburbs rather than improving living conditions in existing localities. This has led to increasing blight in the older precincts, and thereby has further accentuated spatial inequality in living conditions within the same municipal limits. In his essay on the urban transportation system, Patankar has drawn attention to the problems of movement in our cities where to-and-fro journey to work may take as much as 2-4 hours in the metropolises like Bombay and Calcutta; and though we have a 30-h.p. auto at our command, the traffic moves at the slow speed of a bullock cart. Attention has been drawn to the multi-dimensional character of the problem but there is little by way of an action programme. Two essays in Section II are devoted to population projection in the year 2000 A.D.

Section III opens with a comprehensive paper on urban housing by J.B. Mehta. Abother paper on the same topic by Jagmohan asserts that our problem in India is essentially of a "roof over head." As such, "We must ban by legislation any further construction of houses costing, say, a lakh of rupees or more, and concentrate on building simple and inexpensive units of shelter. A ceiling of, say, 300 sq. yards should be fixed on the size of plots, and it should be stipulated that no new residential colony would be sanctioned, unless five to ten per cent of land is allocated, free of cost, for service personnel, i.e., the class to which most of the squatters belong." Ardhendu Bhattacharya has presented a case study of Bombay. The fourth general essay by Jain and Bhargava is similar to Mehta's contribution in content and scope.

Section IV on "Slums and Squatter Settlements" contains two papers respectively by Alfred de Souza and Gopal Bhargava. Both are in the nature of background papers covering the same ground. As De Souza notes, slums should be viewed not "as a problem of the people but of structures maintained through a technocratic value system and ideological beliefs that keep large numbers of men and women poor and powerless." Both the papers offer useful suggestions for action. Section V has five different contributions

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on urban land issues. The most pertinent are those by Krishna Rao on "Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976," and by Nilima Verma on "Urban Land Acquisition." As Rao tells us, the Urban Ceiling Act appears to have been inspired more by political ideology than a will to achieve orderly urban development: "The government appears to be neither inclined to displease the proprietary interests by enforcing the Act nor be bold enough to revoke the same. In this state of hesitancy, the possibility of Urban Ceiling Act having a natural death in course of time cannot be ruled out." Nilima Verma has highlighted the issues in urban land acquisition and notes that land acquisition, development, and disposal policy has squarely failed to do justice to the economically poor strata of the society; while disposing the developed land the developmental agencies have mostly catered to the lust for land of the rich. Thus, in Delhi during 1960-61 to 1970-71, 63.5 per cent of the total developed land was sold to those in the high income group, whereas the middle income group got 16.5, and the low income group a mere 6.5 per cent—the remaining 14.5 per cent going to the "alternative allottees."

In Section VI, devoted to the problems of the deteriorating urban environment, Nag Chaudhari has drawn attention to the urgency for a close examination of the energy budget of our cities which, he warns us, "may well become a runaway juggernaut which can destroy this civilization of ours because of irrational use or misuse of energy." In another paper Gopal Bhargava has described the nature of environmental pollution.

Of the three papers on the "Urban Settlement System" in Section VII, the most insightful is on "Urban Dispersal" by Sawhney and Chandra Prakash. Attention is drawn to the continuation of the colonial legacy of the concentration of crucial economic activities in the large metropolises, even though it is well known that as city size increases the population has to be served at a higher per unit cost. The trend has continued because, "fortunately for the private sector and unfortunately for the society as a whole, most of these costs are borne by the public agencies. . . while the private sector continues to reap the benefits of concentration." The higher productivity in larger cities is inevitably at the cost of low productivity elsewhere. One remedy—and a most important one—lies in a dispersed pattern of urbanization through an industrial location policy geared to locating traditional and small scale industries in rural areas and small towns and by directing all new industrial ventures away from large cities and their satellite towns.

The next section—"Economics of Urban Development"—contains two comprehensive papers on urban finance by V.V. Subrahmanyam and Gangadhar Jha respectively, and an essay on interrelationships between urban and rural local bodies by J.S. Sawhney. The latter contribution by Sawhney (like his earlier joint paper in the same Volume) is notable for its essentially integrative spatial perspective. It is rightly noted that mere delimitation of municipal boundaries does not limit an urban process. Urban centres are continuously expanding since people intending to take

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advantage of non-application of municipal laws in areas beyond the municipal limits move to those areas to avoid municipal taxes. The rural local bodies do not possess administrative equipment to regulate such developmental activities. The need for an integrated regulatory and promotional statutory system for rural and urban areas is therefore imperative. Despite the dualistic perspective of our planners and politicians, the city and the countryside are parts of a spatially operational system.

Section IX has a general paper on management of urban local bodies by H.U. Bijlani. The book closes with three case studies in Section X, on Shahajahanabad, Calcutta and Ludhiana. These are hardly relevant to the theme of the book, though Jagmohan's contribution on Shahajahanabad is quite informative.

To sum up, although the information and findings of individual contributions adds up to an impressive and useful total, the Volume does not present a "consolidated" picture of urban problems and perspectives. Faulty planning and execution have made the book (despite some very good individual contributions), repetitious and unnecessarily bulky, and for that matter alone a somewhat difficult reading. The book should, nevertheless, prove a useful reference for university students in the social sciences. Each university level library should have a copy (but no more, at Rs. 150/-). The book is well-produced on good quality paper, printing mistakes are few, though copy-editing could have been a little more careful. The book's cartography is, however, apalling. The artist appears to have lifted the outline map of India straight from her school-going child's scrap book of freehand drawings. Maps of India on pages 32 and 103 provide the best examples in print of how not to do it. It would appear that clearance of maps from the Survey of India is a formality that the Town and Country Planning Organization has been allowed to dispense with completely!

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RAMESH DUTTA DIKSHIT

JUGENDRA SAHAI: Urban Complex of an Industrial City. Chugh Publications Allahabad, 1980, vi, 255p., Rs. 65.

THE last three decades have seen many a pet theory regarding economic growth and social development falling apart as the results expected of situations forecast by these theories did not come true. One such theory of "spread effect" or the "trickling down" phenomenon of large-scale industrial activities projected, that the region surrounding a large industrial complex would respond to the growth impulses emanating from the industrial centre and there would be a continuous spread of medium and smaller size industries in the region. Further, the benefits of the large

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industrial location would trickle down to the secondary and tertiary urban centres around and this would lead the entire region towards rapid economic development. Based on this theory several industrial complexes were established in the first two plan periods in underdeveloped areas; Rourkela, Bhilai and Durgapur are examples of the effort.

After two decades of development, it has come to be seen that these centres are like oases in a desert and that they have had no discernible effect upon the surrounding region. 10 miles out of these industrial centres, the conditions have remained as they were, e.g., primitive and tribal and the impact of these centres on far-away metropolitan centres has been more than on the surrounding region. Jugendra Sahai has done an excellent job of verifying this in the case of Durgapur—confirming that Durgapur has had no impact on its surrounding region.

The book begins with an account of urban growth in India based mainly on the census data for 1961, with emphasis on the economic and social factors and the changes they have undergone in the last three decades. The census data of 1961, nearly 20 years ago, is rather outdated for a socio-economic analysis in 1980. The chapter also shows large dependency on the conclusions reached by Hoselitz, Kuznets and others, many of which today have been seriously questioned both in regard to facts and the arguments Sahai has then taken up a discussion of the ecology of Durgapur—this is mainly a description of land use given in the Durgapur Master Plan—followed by a study of the occupational structure in the steel city. He has then gone on to the social and economic background of immigrants, income, expenditure, savings and investment pattern of the immigrants and more important their adjustment, participation and social deviance. He has ended the book with a chapter on the relationship of the city of Durgapur with its surrounding region. The last chapter on urbo-industrial complex is a summary of the author's findings on Durgapur and an evaluation of the conclusions.

The basic objective of the study, according to the author, was to analyze and find out the relationship between urban growth and social and economic development in India. For this purpose he has depended on primary and secondary sources. While the secondary data has been drawn freely from census and other publications, for the primary data the author organized a 5 per cent sample survey amongst the heads of households who were occupying houses in the two townships built for the coke oven plant and the steel plant. This covered 500 households in a restricted, no doubt but homogenous universe. This size and type of sample has imposed several limitations on the study which the author has recognised. Only heads of households were covered and these were male and adult. The sample was restricted to those who occupied township houses. In an industrial city, there is always a large population living in makeshift housing, in the towns and villages in the vicinity and in the temporary hutments put up by contractors and others. This population is substantial, and if not taken into account can throw the

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conclusions wholly out of focus. The 5 per cent sample consisting of 500 households would not therefore really be representative of the population, and the conclusions drawn on the basis of such a sample cannot be relied upon. It is no wonder therefore that the author stated in the concluding chapter that, "India's experience of socio-economic surveys shows that these surveys tend to be data-oriented rather than problem-oriented. They have limited value for the point of policy formulation." This is a wholly subjective judgement just like the author's conclusion that "inhabitants are found to be deviating from the norms of behaviour, viz., indulging in alcholism and illicit sex relations," and cannot really have any validity.

Then again, Durgapur was not a suitable choice for such a study. The town is inhabited mostly by immigrants (96.8 per cent) as can be expected of any new industrial city, but 69.2 per cent of these are Bengalis. Further nearly 60 per cent of the immigrants have come from smaller towns and urban areas—"turn-over immigrants" as they have been called—a large percentage is of single individuals, mainly skilled people in search of betterment in their jobs. They are also literate. Thus we have already a strongly urban oriented population and the socio-economic characteristics that have come out of the survey do not show any significant departure from what could be expected of such a population group. There have been similar studies of other industrial towns, notably of Bhilai which the author has not referred to in his book or in the bibliography and does not seem to be aware of. A study of the methodology and the conclusions would have helped the author to broaden the base of his sample and his analysis.

One cannot but agree wholly with the author's conclusions that the growth of Durgapur has miserably failed to accelerate the growth changes in the surrounding region of which it is a part. This is equally true of other industrial cities as well. However, in the case of Durgapur, the opportunities were there and the growth impulses definite, but it did not grow the way it ought to have, mainly because of the apathy, inaction and outright neglect of both the state and central agencies involved in its development.

Durgapur cannot have much expansion in the future because of the constraints of water resources; the author appears to have overlooked this aspect in his assessment. The social conditions and attitude that exist in Durgapur can hardly make it an achievement-oriented city, if anything, it is the opposite. An interesting comparison would be with the TISCO steel township at Burnpur which has a much longer history and has somewhat greater stabilized conditions in regard to both economic and social structure and might have thrown light on the growth conditions in Durgapur.

New Delhi. C.S. CHANDRASEKHARA

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KAMAL NAYAN KABRA : Developing an Urban Fringe: Blueprint for Voluntary Action. Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1980, xii, 98p., Rs. 30.

KABRA presents in this study a blue-print for voluntary action to develop an urban fringe Tajganj, which is situated behind the famed memorial, the Taj Mahal in Agra. Tajganj consists of wards 26 and 27 of Agra Nagar Mahapalika and has an area of 200 acres inhabiting some 36,000 persons. From the account given by Kabra, the question arises whether Tajganj is an urban fringe, a slum or an urban village? To the reviewer it appears to be an abode of "urban informal sector."

The population of Tajganj is distributed in its four community courtyards each focusing on to a mosque. Half of its population is Hindu and 30 per cent Muslim. It has a high percentage of young people (43.23), below 14 years, indicative of their heavy economic dependency. The low percentage (5.57) of persons in the age group 60 years and above reflects the low expectancy of life. The everage family size is 6. Literacy is low at 29 per cent. Population density, which is rather low, ranges from 750 and 125 per hectare in each unit. The land use data indicates that over 67 per cent of the total developed area is devoted to residential use. Commercial and industrial use comprises 2.24 and 0.85 per cent only and institutional use 3.07 per cent. The area devoted to roads is 7.48 per cent.

The procedure and method adopted for the study is inadequately explained except for the fact that the study is based on 10 per cent sample survey of Tajganj carried out by the Department of Town and Country Planning, Government of Uttar Pradesh in 1971 suppelmented by a "fresh survey" based on the same sample carried out by IIPA in May-July 1976 to collect "additional information." The author has carried out a household sample survey; the survey of commercial and industrial units was done by the Town and Country Planning Organisation, Agra Division. In absence of this, it is difficult to "weigh" data for its representativeness.

There is a total absence of immigrants in Tajganj. Migrants constitute only 0.48 per cent of the population. Also, social mobility on the occupational ladder is not much in evidence. About 55 per cent of the respondents reported "no change" in occupations even in the third generation—a picture of virtual stagnation. Only 17 per cent reported change to higher level occupations. Ten per cent slipped back to lower occupations.

A large majority of the workers are engaged in tertiary sector activities—trade and commerce (45.52 per cent) and service (46.91 per cent). Most of the shops (73.17 per cent) purchase merchandise from the local market. Workers employed are mostly (98.67 per cent) local, commercial firms are either self-employed (56 per cent) or shared by family members (29.33 per cent). Galicha (carpet) making is the main industry—12 out of 35 units were engaged in this activity. Twenty-seven of these 35 industrial units came up during the seventies; similarly, 59 per cent of the shops sprang up during

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this period. However, only one-third of these shops are registered. Out of 42 such shops, 12 were general shops and groceries and 8 eating places. Tourist interest shops numbered only six. Fifty per cent of the employed work 8 hours a day and more than 33 per cent beyond 8 hours. Earnings are low reflecting low skill profile and unorganised nature of these activities.

The average monthly household income is Rs. 295 which works out at Rs. 55 per head in a household of six. Taking Rs. 30 per month (at 1962 prices) per capita expenditure as the poverty line, over 85 per cent of Tajganj families are below the poverty line. Only 7.42 per cent families have a savings bank account; and 13 per cent contribute to the provident fund account. Less than 8 per cent have LIC policies. People have very little of physical and material assets. The commonest type of "furniture" is a cot possessed by over 93 per cent of the households; sewing machine, electric fan, radio/transistor are owned by only about 16 per cent each. Fifty-two per cent owned bicycles; and wrist watches were worn by 26 per cent of the households.

The average value of a house, normally 60 years old, is Rs. 8,362. Most of these old houses need major repairs. Sixty-two per cent of the houses are *pucca* constructions. Eighty-seven per cent of families own one house. The low incidence of non-owners reflects again very little immigration. Rents are low at below Rs. 20 per month.

In terms of facilities, 215 of the 454 houses surveyed have private manual latrines, and 2 houses, private (sanitary) latrines. Forty-eight per cent families use the open fields. About 73 per cent of houses do not have independent kitchens; more than 78 per cent are without bathrooms and 56.39 per cent without latrines. Only one-third of the houses have electricity connection (though available), with the result that just behind the Taj Mahal, the monument visited by tourists all over the world, 60 per cent houses see light through darkness with the help of the traditional kerosene oil lamps.

Even in respect of industrial units, only 37 per cent use electricity which brings out the pre-industrial character of these activities. Monthly average output is valued at Rs. 6,100. Over 70 per cent of the units are located in their own premises. Employment of women is negligible. Among the 1,365 workers in 35 industrial units, female workers number 15 only.

People's perception of different public services indicates a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. More than 80 per cent of Tajganj residents considered health, municipal and educational services "poor" in their locality.

The story of Tajganj is a story of a slum which is inadequately integrated with the main city and is having a small and stagnant economic base, relatively low land values and poor civic infrastructure. It has not felt the demand pressure of the growing city of Agra and is rather passive in response to the city's growth. This is quite in contrast to K.N. Gopi's study (1977) of Uppal near Secunderabad, an invading city fringe, which has received impulses of growth and expanded in its economic base through

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spurt in dairying, fodder cultivation and milk supply. What is insulating Tajganj from such developmental impulses?

The purpose of Kabra's study is to develop an action plan for the development of Tajganj which is in the vicinity of a luxury hotel. Kabra has succeeded a great deal in bringing out the predicament of a small urban fringe in a multi-structured, under-developing market economy. Part II attempts such an action plan. He presents the strategy, priorities and programmes. However, the 15-point line of action suggested by him is couched in the language of general propositions; his scheme of four priorities provides only a framework. The programmes presented by him for civic amenities and expanding economic activities later are more specific. To give Tajganj a "take off", it is important that economic activities (and skill formation) are generated, rather injected in the area. The next step is to increase both forward and backward linkages between the core city and the urban fringe. On both these fronts, individual economic activities or enterprises need to be indicated along with the amount of investment required in each sector. Also, how much and what type of labour is required over different phases of its development. For development of housing, the estimated cost of repair and reconstruction as also the amount of different materials required need to be specified. Without such a budget, how does a voluntary agency come forward to translate need into action programme? Kalra makes a good suggestion for a "sub-plan" of the Agra Master Plan. But city master plans have the very weaknesses that we have pointed out above. Kalra's study is quite a concise presentation and he has touched the key issues admirably. Maybe he can develop this into a larger study. The book is useful and would be of interest to all those interested in understanding urban problems.

New Delhi

S.M. SHAH

K. PRABHA : Towns, A Structural Analysis : A Case Study of Punjab. Inter-India Publications, New Delhi, 1979, 214p., Rs. 60.

KRISHNA Prabha's book, under review, is a socio-geographic analysis of urban Punjab. Let me begin with the first para of Dr. Prabha's "Conclusion" which indicates how the author views her own work:

> The study on structural analysis of urban Punjab has dealt with two important problems in the geography of Punjab—firstly the structure of Punjab towns, and, secondly, the identification of urban hierarchy in the state. Though town plays a dual role, both as a distributed feature of the earth and as a feature with internal structure, here the role of the town in area, i.e. location has been analyzed through functions, what a town does or did in the past, determines its location and controls its growth. It is primarily because the present study is a macro-level

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attempt of a meso-region. Thus with town as an unit of analysis, multi-dimensional character of town's structure has been examined. . . .

That will do. Those who have read G.V. Desani's—*All about H. Hatterr* will recall the man who learnt his english from a dictionary and whose utterances were humorous because of their bold defiance of the wider conventions of the language. What, pray, should one make of the penultimate sentence in this quote? Or of the extraordinary uses of the word "role"? Or of the inability to bring the clauses in that sentence into alignment? Both Dr. Prabha and I have to publish the results of our work, but we also have the responsibility to make our writing intelligible.

To be intelligible is to have meanings understood. Dr. Prabha's work concerns human aggregations; therefore when she writes, she necessarily has to seek to convey human meanings. A geographer's map (or an economist's equation, a sociologist's table) is the result of putting some evidence concerning the human situation through the discipline's more or less technical operations. What emerges from these operations is as meaningless as logarithmic tables—until the scholar interprets this output in relation to the wider human situation. One strategy for restoring something of that wider meaning is to see one's own findings in relation to those of other social sciences (and others who deal with the same situation too), where evidence from that same situation is put through other distinctive operations; thus one approaches that meaning again. There can be no social science with human content unless it is "interdisciplinary," that is what the word means—except on the banner of a cult. One difficulty with the present work (and with much of what passes for scholarship among us) is its exclusive preoccupation with certain limited technical operations. There is little interest in the *meaning* of what one is working with—and none in that of one's own work.

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SATISH SABERWAL

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By **Ashok Jambhekar**

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian Publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the Review Section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—Managing Editor.)

ATTAR CHAND. *Non-aligned States—A Great Leap Forward: A Study in New International Economic Order.* UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1983, xxxi, 308p., Rs. 150.

The non-aligned nations, at their various meetings, voiced their anxiety about the widening gap between the levels of economic advancement of the industrialized nations and the developing countries and demanded radical restructuring of international relations including economic relations. This study written with scholarly insight and precision highlights the troubles of global economics, role of MNCs in the Third World and concept of NIEO *vis-a-vis* the non-aligned nations. The author argues that no viable world economic system is conceivable today without consideration of the interests of the non-aligned countries and believes that normalisation of East-West relations, the liquidation of discrimination in economic relations on political and ideological grounds and the abolition of the deformation of international division of labour should also be included in the concept of NIEO. The study proves that the NIEO can help forge closer and more abiding relations among the non-aligned nations than ideology or military imperatives do. The book also contains selected documents speeches/ messages covering a period from 1961 to 1983.

ATTAR CHAND. *Non-aligned World Order : Ideology, Strategy and Prospects.* UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1983. lxiii, 262p., Rs. 150.

The bibliographic survey with selected abstracts, covering the period 1961-1982, is exhaustive in respect of coverage reflecting development of the Non-aligned Movement in all its dimensions and the contributions made by the leaders of the non-aligned nations for co-operation and unity among them.

BAIN, S.K. *Afghanistan Will Not Die : An Authentic Account of How the Afghanistan Crisis Has Developed and of the Implications of this Crisis for the World.* Satyam Shivam, Calcutta, xvi, 166p., Illus., Rs. 37.50. (Paper)

Chronology of the crisis; it discusses the events after the Soviet troops entered the country. It also studies outside reactions to the crisis.

CORREIA-AFONSO, John. (*Ed.*) *Indo-Portuguese History : Sources and Problems.* Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1981, xii, 201 p., Rs. 80.

Collection of selected papers presented by eminent scholars at the International Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History held in Goa in November 1978. The papers discuss secondary and primary sources of Indo-Portuguese history. The secondary sources studied include major historical works and classical works of Sebastiao Goncalves, Fancisco de Souza and Paulo da Trindade grouped under Church and Missionary Works. Among the primary sources, rich documents of the Archives of Goa and Rome and the Monsoon Codices at the National Archives of the Torre do Tombo are studied. An account of Cartorio dos Jesuitas gives an annotated list of historical materials of Jesuit origin about Portuguese India to prove the value of Portuguese records on Indian history. Lastly, the papers discuss the value of Portuguese sources on India from a variety of angles. The Seminar discussions underlined the utility and need of a multi-disciplinary study of the problems of Indian history, mutual understanding of Indian and Portuguese civilizations and of Eastern and Western

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historical sources, and emphasized on fostering study of Portuguese language and civilization to enable scholars to make use of available language materials.

DEV DUTT. *Report to Gandhi by Gandhian Institutions on the Basis of a Survey of Selected Programmes in 1978-79.* Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, New Delhi, 1982, 168p.,

Report of the work being done by constructive and voluntary agencies affiliated directly or indirectly with the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, with the purpose of contributing to the realization of the objectives for which the Committee of Constructive Work was set up. The information is provided programme-wise in this booklet.

GANDHI, P. Jegadish. *Indian Economy—Some Issues.* Vellore, Institute for Social Sciences and Research, Vellore, 1982, xvii, 321p., Rs. 45.

The book, a collection of the author's articles, is divided in five parts, viz., Development Trends, Monetary Trends, Fiscal Trends, Banking Trends and International Trends. In the first part the author discusses the problem of population control, pathology of poverty, model for rural development, mixed economy, 20-Point Programme, economics of buffer-stock in foodgrains and the philosophy of public distribution system. The inflation phenomenon is discussed in the second part. Third part is devoted to the Central Budget and deficit financing. Banking trends in the post-nationalisation period, State Bank of India's role in branch expansion, Lead Bank Scheme, Regional Rural Banks, etc., are discussed in part four. Part five outlines the international trends of the energy crisis, foreign exchange reserves and NIEO. The work provides a thorough analysis of the issues and problems facing our economy.

MATHEW, K.K. *The Right to Equality and Property under the Indian Constitution.* National, New Delhi, 1980, 108p., Rs. 40.

The distinguished author examines the two allied concepts of equality and property in these Second Dr. Rajendra Prasad Memorial Lectures. He deals with every aspect of equality and interprets and explores the moral, religious, legal and economic facets of equality. He propounds a functional approach to the concept of property and examines implications of the relationship of property to democratic social order. In the course of analysis the author builds bridges between constitutional law and jurisprudence, between equality and property, between property and dignity, and between liberal liberty and distributive justice. Persidential remarks of Justice Beg are also reproduced.

MITHANI, D.M. *Review of Planning in India and the Sixth Plan.* Vora, Bombay, 1982, vi, 112p., Rs. 20. (Paper)

After independence, planning in India was adopted as a grand panacea for the problems of poverty, unemployment, inequality and socio-economic backwardness. During the period 1951 to 1980, five Five Year Plans, three Annual Plans and the Rolling Plan were adopted. Analytical review of the three decades of the planning process in the country with theoretical issues of economic planning and historical background is presented in this book. The last chapter is devoted to an analysis and evaluation of the Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85, with a view to keeping the reader abreast of the current planning phenomenon.

PANDIT, Vijaya Lakshmi. *The Scope of Happiness : A Personal Memoir* (2nd ed.), Orient Paperbacks, Delhi, 1981, 310p., Rs. 20. (Paper)

Autobiography of a politician and diplomat; she narrates her childhood and marriage, first prison experience, assignments in various capitals, role at the United Nations and gives fine portraits of her father Motilal Nehru, brother Jawaharlal Nehru, and Krishna Menon, Winston Churchill and others. The book throws light on aspects of the freedom movement in India and countries where she stayed as Ambassador or visited on missions. The fascinating first person account is presented with frankness and grace in a lively and lucid style.

PATEL, Raojibhai. *Some Reflections on Gandhism.* Centre for Social Studies, Surat, 1982, 71p., Rs. 10. (Paper)

Paper submitted at the seminar organised by the Centre for Social Studies.

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It analyses Mahatma Gandhi's concept of truth, inner voice, and socio-political ideals. Also included are the comments from invited scholars; these have been incorporated in the book along with author's rejoinder.

SHAH, S.A. (*Ed.*) *India : Degradation and Development—Part I.* M. Venkatarangaiya Foundation, Secunderabad, 1982, 192p., xvi, Rs. 15. (Paper)

Collection of essays focusing on the social (class) basis of contemporary India. It explores the importance of the question of tribals and nationalities as well as the significance of peasant organisations for the rights of the rural poor. The essay written by D.D. Kosambi provides a challenging thesis that the ruling class in India is the bourgeoisie. The essays written by Ranjit Sau and N.K. Chandra take a critical look at the patterns and consequences of economic growth in India and contend that the pattern of growth serves the upper affluent segments of the "new" landowners and the industrial bourgeoisie. They point out that the principal obstacles to relevant economic development are the character of land relations and the subordination of the Indian economy to imperialist hegemony. Other essays contained in the volume present their findings on the explosive issues of how and why caste, class and tribe along with nationalities are reproduced in the Indian social formation, based on the analytical study of peasantry in North India, class and tribe in Jharkhand, nationality question in Assam and peasant organisations in South India.

SHARMA, Man Mohan. *Folklore of Nepal* (2nd, ed.), Vision Books, New Delhi, 1982. 216p., Rs. 80.

Presents english translations of some 70 selected folk tales and legends and 25 folk songs from the oral tradition in various Nepalese dialects—covering a large range of subjects from the supernatural to common household customs, including legendary princes and princesses, fate and portents, nature beings, magic, family relationships, old customs etc. In addition the book contains information on Nepal and acquaints the reader with the traditional thought patterns and expressions by including a chapter on common Nepalese proverbs and idioms.

SHARMA, Satinder. *Contemporary Approach to School Library.* Sawan Publication, Delhi, 1982, viii, 96p., Rs. 30.

The articles contributed to this volume by librarians and others, discuss the problems, organisation and management of school libraries and highlights their importance for the overall growth and development of children.

SHARMA, Satinder and SHARMA, Indra, *Rajiv Gandhi : An Annotated Bibliography : 1944-1982,* Sawan Publication, Delhi, 1983, 164p., Rs. 50.

Information culled mostly from newspapers and weeklies; is grouped under four broad categories viz., (a) Personal, (b) Social, (c) Political and (d) Professional. Seven hundred and seventy entries are annotated enhancing the utility of the publication. This is the first bibliography of a political leader who has recently entered into the socio-political life of the nation, making a tremendous mark of his presence.

SUBBARAO, T.V. *Non-alignment in International Law and Politics.* Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1981, 176p., Rs. 75.

The author examines the underlying principles and objectives and the origin and development of NAM from Bandung to the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Nations held in New Delhi in February 1981 with an exhaustive reference to all relevant international conventions and conferences. He also discusses the evolution of non-alignment in India, perspectives of super powers and policy of non-alignment as pursued by Sri Lanka, U.A.R. and Yugoslavia. Non-alignment's status in international law and its impact on it, and contribution made to the development of international law by tho non-aligned countries are discussed elaborately. The scholarly analysis based on authentic sources makes this a commendable work.

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VENKATA RAO, V. and PATTABHIRAM, M. (*Eds.*) *Changing Contours: A Political Study*. M. Venkatarangaiya Foundation, Secunderabad, 1982, xi, 204p., Rs. 90.

Commemorative volume in the memory of Prof. M. Venkatarangaiya, a well-known scholar, political scientist and educationalist. The authors who have contributed to this volume include political scientists, administrators and parliamentarians; to name a few—B.K. Nehru, M.S. Gore, Hiren Mukherjee, Dr. Appadorai, C.A. Perumal and Prof. V.P. Varma. The articles deal with the changes that have taken place in the political, social and administrative set up in India during the last three decades.



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